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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS (ACRS)
5	520th MEETING
6	+ + + +
7	THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2005
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9	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
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11	The committee met at the Nuclear
12	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T-
13	2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Graham B.
14	Wallis, Chairman, presiding.
15	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
16	GRAHAM B. WALLIS, Chairman
17	WILLIAM J. SHACK, Vice Chairman
18	GEORGE E. APOSTOLAKIS, Member
19	MARIO V. BONACA, Member
20	RICHARD S. DENNING, Member
21	F. PETER FORD, Member
22	THOMAS S. KRESS, Member
23	DANA A. POWERS, Member
24	VICTOR H. RANSOM, Member
25	JOHN D. SIEBER, Member-At-Large

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3	SAM DURAISWAMY, Technical Assistant
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7	GREG GRECHECK, Dominion Resources
8	WAYNE HARRISON, Chairman, Westinghouse Owners
9	Group LBLOCA Redefinition Working Group
10	TONY PIETRANGELO, NEI
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1	A-G-E-N-D-A
2	Opening Remarks by the ACRS Chairman 5
3	Revised Draft NUREG on Expert Elicitation on Large-
4	Break LOCA Frequencies 7
5	Proposed Rulemaking Package for Risk-Informing
6	10 CFR 50.46
7	Draft Safety Evaluation Report Related to North
8	Anna Early Site Permit Application 176
9	Technical Basis for Potential Revision of the
10	Pressurized Thermal Shock Screening
11	Criteria in the PTS Rule 239
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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 8:27 a.m. 3 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Good morning. The 4 meeting will now come to order. This is the first day of the 520th meeting of the Advisory Committee on 5 Reactor Safeguards. 6 7 During today's meeting the Committee will consider following, 8 the draft NUREG on Expert 9 Elicitation on Large-Break LOCA Frequencies, proposed rule-making package for risk informing 10 CFR 50.46, 10 11 draft safety evaluation report related to North Anna 12 early site permit application, technical basis for potential revision of the pressurized thermal shock 13 14 screening criteria in the PTS rule, and the 15 preparation of ACRS reports. particularly 16 Several of these are 17 significant items. And I think we're going to be quite busy. This meeting is being conducted in 18 accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory 19 Committee Act. 20 21 Dr. John Larkins is the designated Federal 22 Official for the initial portion of the meeting. have received no written comments from members of the 23

public regarding today's sessions.

have received requests from Wе Mr.

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Pietrangelo, NEI, and Mr. Harrison, Westinghouse Owners Group for time to make oral statements regarding risk informing 10 CFR 50.46.

A transcript of portions of the meeting is being kept. And it is requested that the speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves, and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard.

Before we get started there are some items of current interest. In the handout of items of interest you'll note that there's an SRM that states that the ACRS or ACNW should continue to review major research projects addressing nuclear safety issues.

So we continue to do that with an SRM.

And there's also, you'll note, a couple of presentations by Commissioner Merrifield in here.

Now, you probably know that Mag Weston, who has been with the ACRS staff for five years, is retiring on April the 1st.

And, on behalf of the Committee, I'd like to thank her for her outstanding technical support of the Committee in reviewing several technical issues, including reactor vessel penetration cracking, reactor vessel head degradation, reactor oversight process, the mitigating systems performance index program, and

1 construction authorization requests for the MOX fuel 2 fabrication facility. She was also responsible for coordinating 3 4 the preparation of the ACR's action plan and the 5 subsequent revision. I note that she also did several other things not listed here. 6 7 Thank you Mag, and good luck in your future endeavors. Also, I believe you all know that 8 9 this is the last meeting of the ACRS that Peter Ford will attend as a member. 10 I'd like to express our appreciation of 11 his contributions to the Committee and our pleasure 12 having him as colleague. Thank you Peter. 13 14 will proceed with the meeting. 15 And the firs item, Draft NUREG on Expert 16 Elicitation on Large-Break LOCA Frequencies, I'll ask 17 Professor Apoltolakis to take us through that, please. 18 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Thank you Mr. 19 The purpose of our meeting today is to 20 review the revised draft NUREG report on estimating 21 frequencies through opinion LOCA the expert 22 elicitation process. 23 And, of course, this report was developed 24 in support of the risk-informed revision to emergency

core coolant system requirements 50.46.

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We issued --

we reviewed the version dated November $4^{\rm th}$, 2004 of the report.

And we issued a letter in December, December 10th of last year. We received an EDO response on February 4th. There were four, I would say, major -- although they're not all of the same significance -- issues that we raised in our report of December 10th.

The first one had to do with our explanation of what the objective of the expert opinion elicitation was, what -- we saw the word genetic frequency a lot, and, in particular, whether plant-to-plant variability was considered in the estimates.

The second comment in our report had to do with whether all the experts understood the questions that were posed to them. And there appear to be some confusion from some of the experts that were present in our deliberations here regarding the flow rate.

The third one appears to still be a point of disagreement between the authors of the report and at least some members of the Committee. And it has to do with the averaging method -- the method that is used to average the individual member opinions and estimates.

And the final comment, the fourth comment, had to do with our request that the authors of the report state clearly, if they could, that the distribution they developed, based on all the sensitivity studies they did, that that distribution of the frequency of LOCAs represented the expert community's views and not just that annex.

Because, this Agency makes decisions based on the state of the art, not on what six people think, even though these six people might think very prominent.

I was looking again at the revised draft rule -- this morning in fact. And it seems to me that even though we may disagree on several things that the report does, the overall contribution to the revision of 50.46 is good in the sense that the proposed transition break size in the revised rule is greater than the sizes that correspond to 10 to the minus five frequency that you get in the report independently of what method you use.

In other words, what the Staff is going with is the conservative estimate of TBS. So, on the one had, we might say there is a positive contribution of the report in the sense that now we know that, no matter how one process the information from the

1 experts, the regulatory staff is proposing a break 2 size that is higher. So that's good to know. On the other 3 4 hand, given that this report might be used in the 5 future by other people and so on, one would have to be more careful about the methods that are used and what 6 7 is proposed. 8 So, the disagreements then have to be 9 So, with these happy notes and resolved. observations, I'd like to turn the meeting over the 10 Staff. 11 And I understand Dr. Alan Hiser wants to 12 make a few comments first, please. 13 14 DR. HISER: Good morning, Dr. Apostolakis 15 and Committee members. My name is Alan Hiser. I'm 16 the Chief of the Component Integrity Section of the Office of Research. 17 As you described, we are here to discuss 18 19 our revised draft NUREG. I guess what I would note is 20 that this would be, over the last twelve months, our 21 sixth briefing of either sub-committee or the full 22 committee. 23 This report has been reviewed by ACRS. 24 We've had two external peer reviewers, NRC internal 25 We are here today to discuss two parts peer review.

of the NUREG.

One are the changes that we've made since the Committee last reviewed the report and also to discuss our responses to the ACRS letter. At the end of our presentation we'll be seeking to release the NUREG for public comment.

And we'll request a letter from ACRS to that effect. With that, we look forward to a constructive dialogue this morning. And I'll turn it over to Rob.

MR. TREGONING: Thanks Alan. Good morning audience and Dr. Apostolakis and the rest of the ACRS.

I wanted to thank you for providing us the opportunity to come in front of you today and, further, additionally discuss some of the, I'll say, remaining issues that we may have to try to resolve prior to, hopefully, our release of this document for public comment.

I'm just repeating the objectives I think George and Alan really summarized pretty well. But the objectives of this presentation, one, as Dr. Apostolakis mentioned, you have reviewed a preliminary version of the draft that was dated November of '04.

We want to walk you through what the major changes in this latest version is so that when you do

your subsequent review this hopefully will allow you just to focus on pertinent areas.

So, the first thing we want to do is just very systematically walk you through what's different, the major things that are different. And then probably the more meteor portion of the talk is going to be the discussion of the ACRS comments that we received in your letter dated December 10th, and then our subsequent response to those comments in the letter as Dr. Apostolakis mentioned, dated February 4th

And, as Dr. Hiser mentioned, we are here. And the ultimate objective is to hopefully we can come to a successful resolution of these differences or at least an agreement on the best path forward so that we can move forward with releasing this document for public comment.

I think Dr. Hiser mentioned this, that we've been in front of ACRS numerous times throughout the elicitation process. It has been our goal to keep ACRS fully informed as we -- not only as we develop the process, but as we started to work through it.

So, this is just a continuing dialogue that we've tried to maintain with ACRS throughout the whole process. And, because of that, we're really

1 just, you know, don't want to revisit old ground here. 2 I think we've discussed a lot of these issues fairly extensively. And we just want to focus 3 4 on -- I'll say there's really only a few areas of 5 disagreement that we have right now. Now, since we were last in here, you see 6 7 about the bottom of the slide, I just wanted to 8 indicate what we've done with respect to the program 9 and what milestones we've completed since we were last in here in December. 10 We have completed the draft NUREG that we 11 supplied to you for review prior to this meeting. 12 And, in this draft NUREG, we incorporated revisions in 13 14 an attempt to address comments that we received in the December 10th letter from ACRS. 15 And we submitted that revised draft NUREG 16 17 for both NRR and ACRS. I just want to -- I'm going to 18 mention the comments that we got in the letter up 19 front. 20 And then I'm going to walk you through the 21 major changes. And the reason for mentioning these up 22 front is, when we look at the changes, we'll say this 23 change was to address ACR comment whatever. 24 So I just wanted to enumerate what those 25 comments were. Again, Dr. Apostolakis stated these

1 comments already. But I just want to make sure that 2 we're clear what we're talking about today. 3 The first comment was that the report 4 should include a better explanation of what a generic 5 frequency value for the plants means, and to what variability 6 extent plant-to-plant affected the 7 results. The second comment in the letter was that 8 9 the report should state clearly what the understanding 10 of the experts was when they answered questions about LOCA size categories. 11 The third comment was this practice and 12 the practice that was being discussed is geometric 13 14 averaging as it varies with the methods employed in 15 references five through seven. And those references are NUREG 11.50, the 16 17 EPRI document on the seismic PRA, the hazard determination, and then also a companion report that 18 19 talks about expert elicitation procedures with respect 20 to the seismic hazard curve analysis. So, the practice is at odds with those 21 22 And all of those references used an references. 23 averaging arithmetic type method to construct 24 probability distributions of expert opinion.

And then the fourth comment was that the

1 final distribution reported in the executive summary 2 should be the composite distribution that the analyst 3 -- and by analysts they mean authors of the report --4 based on the sensitivity analyses, believe represents 5 the expert community's current state of knowledge regarding LOCA frequencies. 6 7 So, these were the four comments. 8 again, Dr. Apostolakis has already indicated what they 9 are, has already summarized these. So, the next few 10 slides will just walk you through what changes we've had. 11 And this first slide really deals with the 12 areas that we have really minimal changes. The first 13 14 bullets up there just is -- you know, this is probably 15 a nuisance point. But we've re-lettered all the sections. 16 17 So we had executive summary previously lettered as section A. Well, that's up front now. 18 So then all 19 the sections go up one. 20 Τf you comparing section Η were 21 previously, which was quantitative results, that's 22 So we apologize for that nuisance. section G now. 23 And hopefully it hasn't caused too much consternation. 24 I just wanted to make that clear. Most of

the sections in the report we -- you know, between the

the draft that you've recently 1 11/04 draft and 2 received, there's really no changes. 3 Or I would categorize them as 4 editorial type changes. And that includes the 5 background section, the objective and scope section, the base stage results section, the qualitative 6 7 results and discussion section, and then the section where we talk about ongoing work. 8 So those chapters of the draft NUREG are 9 Now, section C, which is the 10 essentially unchanged. 11 section on elicitation approach, we did go back in and 12 add some clarification specifically to address the second comment which was, you know, understanding that 13 14 the experts were -- what were they providing answers 15 to with respect to break sizes. 16 So, added some discussion. 17 specifically in section C7, which deals with the development of the flow rate correlations and how they 18 19 were used within the elicitation. 20 So, when you review that section, you 21 should -- I mean, this should be clear. And that new 22 language is in there to make sure it's very clear how 23 the elicitation was structured. 24 Now, later one, we're going to 25 specifically address the ACRS comments. And I'll go

1 into what exact language we use. Right now I'm just 2 trying to provide an overview. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This flow rate thing 3 4 always seemed to me backwards. These are experts in 5 pipe rupture, aren't they? And the question they're going to ask is will this pipe break? 6 7 They're not going to ask, will I get 8 10,000 gallons per minute. That means nothing to 9 them. 10 MR. TREGONING: Of course. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So it seems very strange 11 12 to define the problem in terms of flow rate. problem is in terms of -- should be defined in terms 13 14 of will a pipe break, how will it break, and what kind of a hole are you going to get when it does break? 15 Right. 16 MR. TREGONING: And when we define 17 the LOCA categories, realizing there's a lot of historical context involved in how LOCA categories 18 19 have been defined. 20 They've been historically defined on a 21 flow rate basis because the flow rate distinction is 22 more important because it has implications in terms of 23 what system performance is required. 24 You know, are you going to need HPIS, LPIS 25 You know, what the system response is going to pumps?

1	be. So, when we define the elicitation category, we
2	stuck with those historical definitions, expanded them
3	somewhat so that we could more definitively evaluate
4	large break LOCAs, I'll say, with a finer a larger
5	amount of categories.
6	But we certainly realize that the experts
7	that we had, they are experts in degradation
8	mechanisms. There were no plant systems expertise
9	with respect to thermal hydraulic response for
10	mitigating breaks.
11	So that's why we needed to develop the
12	correlations and relate those categories to effective
13	break sizes that the experts then took and used in
14	their elicitation.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And then the peculiar
16	thing
17	MR. TREGONING: But we did want to tie
18	them back to those historical definitions.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You converted them to
20	single-ended breaks, as if the pipe is going to break
21	and only have one end. It seems, again, a very odd
22	thing to do.
23	MR. TREGONING: No, it's not.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Most
25	MR. TREGONING: It's not a single-ended
	I

1	break. It's, again, the way the correlations were
2	developed is the initial definitions were based on
3	flow rate.
4	We related the flow rate to pipe to break
5	areas. And then all we did is we took those areas and
6	calculated and effective break diameter.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: For a single
8	MR. TREGONING: Assuming that those areas
9	are
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: For a single
11	MR. TREGONING: It's an effective break
12	hole.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: One hole?
14	MR. TREGONING: One hole.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, in fact are
16	you coming back to it?
17	MR. TREGONING: Yes.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: To this issue later?
19	MR. TREGONING: Yes, I'll talk exactly
20	about the language we use.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Because I, in the EDO
22	response of February 4 th , we I suspect you guys have
23	something to do with, there is a sentence that is not
24	clear to me.
25	Thus the LOCA frequency associated with

1	each LOCA size category relates to the cumulative
2	frequency of a single-ended break of the site's size,
3	and all larger breaks, including double-ended breaks
4	of that size and larger pipe.
5	I'm having a problem understanding this.
6	What does that mean?
7	MR. TREGONING: Well, again, realizing how
8	the categories were defined in the elicitation, we
9	were asking for frequency contributions for that size
LO	and height. So, the frequency
L1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Independently of
L2	whether it's double break or it's just a size.
L3	MR. TREGONING: It's a size.
L4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's a size, okay.
L5	MR. TREGONING: It's a size. So, if you
L6	look, let's say, you know, category 3, which was a
L7	flow rate of 5,000 GPMs
L8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Right.
L9	MR. TREGONING: We're looking for and
20	it's greater than 5,000 GPM flows. So we're I
21	think we, for PWRs, that ended up being a three to
22	four inch break size.
23	So, we're looking for frequency
24	contributions for breaks of that effective diameter
25	and higher. So that's what's meant by that statement,

1 that it incorporates not only -- so, if you had a 2 reactor. Let's go to the biggest category, category 3 4 6, which is essentially -- to get to the biggest 5 category you need to have some failure in the main recirculation piping. 6 7 Okay, so when you go to category 6, that 8 would incorporate not only, I'll say, a single hole --9 let me put it that way -- a single hole in the reactor piping, but it would also incorporate a double ended 10 quillotine break as well. So that's what was meant. 11 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Of smaller size? 12 MR. TREGONING: Of a larger size. 13 14 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, a larger size? 15 MR. TREGONING: Yes. 16 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: That's a cumulative distribution rather than a density distribution. 17 18 MR. TREGONING: Right. 19 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But, if all pipes 20 broke with two ends, and you said -- used your method, 21 it seems to me you'd always be displacing the 22 coordinates by a factor of two in terms of size 23 because you wouldn't have a single-ended break. 24 So your single-ended break area would have 25 nothing there. It would have bigger things, which the

1	first point would be twice as big. But that would be
2	plotted as if it were the single-ended break.
3	So all the points would be displaced by
4	this factor of two when your
5	MR. TREGONING: I'm having trouble seeing
6	that. Because, if you had look, the type of break
7	if you truly had a double-ended guillotine break,
8	you know, depending on the system, that would you
9	could get dramatically different
LO	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Suppose that you have
L1	5,000 gallons and that corresponds to a five inch
L2	pipe, one end broke. And they asked the question,
L3	what's the frequency of pipe breaks of that size or
L4	bigger?
L5	That's your question. Well, suppose that
L6	when five inch pipes break they only break with double
L7	ends. Then there's no point of five inch. The first
L8	point is at twice that. Well, you could plot it as if
L9	
20	MR. TREGONING: You could have
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: it were the single
22	end. You see what I mean?
23	MR. TREGONING: Right. You could have
24	you could potential and this is a George question.
25	You could potentially have smaller pipes that
J	I control of the second of the

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Had two ends.
2	MR. TREGONING: That had double ended
3	breaks that would be
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you might have
5	some real points as well.
6	MR. TREGONING: As well.
7	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Or you could have a
8	large crack in a larger diameter pipe.
9	MR. TREGONING: That's right. So it
10	includes partial breaks as well.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I understand that.
12	It's just that, this isn't how you do this. This
13	isn't independent of the way in which pipes actual
14	break.
15	And the way in which pipes actually break
16	has a potentiality to move things around a bit.
17	MR. TREGONING: Yes. No, that's exactly
18	right.
19	MEMBER BONACA: I think it's the way that
20	the break is selected in the rule that gives that
21	sense, that you're bounding you're really you're
22	taking, for example, the largest pipe attached, so,
23	for example the and so, it gives you the sense that
24	you have a double ended, but in reality, that's not
25	the case.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: They do say in the
2	revised rule that they consider the largest pipe
3	attached, which is from the pressurizer, right? They
4	say they consider only one side.
5	MEMBER BONACA: They consider only one
6	side?
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: One side. Because
8	that's what matters from the hot
9	MR. BISHOP: Excuse me, this is Bruce
LO	Bishop from Westinghouse. I was a member of expert
L1	panel. And I just want to reinforce something that
L2	Dr. Shack just said to contradict an impression that
L3	was stated earlier.
L4	And that was the probabilities of having
L5	double ended break are very, very small for all pipe
L6	sizes, except the very small pipe sizes due to,
L7	typically, vibration of socket welds.
L8	The probability primarily come from small
L9	slits in bigger pipes. And those are much more
20	probable. Again, they are very small. But they are
21	still much more probable than a double ended break.
22	And, at least for the PFM team members,
23	and we shared our results, okay, with the other teams
24	also. And there is no database in the database
25	there are no double ended breaks.

1 Okay, there are lots of leaks. So, even 2 the people that were, you know, the experts on the 3 database, had to make some transition from leaks, the 4 probabilities of having leaks, or big leaks, to 5 breaks. think that point 6 Again, Ι is 7 important. A primary contributor is the small slits much less than -- again, to get -- maybe like you were 8

> talking about a 5,000 GPM leak rate. In a reactor coolant system piping you may only need flaw that's percent а ten of the circumference to give you that flow rate. And the

> probability of having that flaw is much larger than

having a double ended break, even of a six inch pipe

or something like that.

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The other point is that one of the things that the expert panel was asked to take out to consider is how many pipes of a given size contribute to that overall leak rate because that also factors into that cumulative that Rob was talking about.

It's not just one pipe. You may have multiple pipes that could break. And so, the probabilities have to add up. And so, you have to start excluding certain pipe sizes as you go up in size.

1 And I think a number of us, that's where 2 the double break sort of got -- that's the way you 3 could exclude a pipe size. If physically the leak 4 rate was greater than that of a double ended break 5 then you didn't have to consider that pipe size as being a contributor. 6 7 You could exclude that from the cumulative numbers you had to add up. Now, that's a lot of 8 9 things to keep in your mind. But those were just some of the considerations that I know were discussed with 10 all the panel members. 11 12 Now, I can't say that everybody agreed with that. But at least we all discussed that 13 14 together and talked about that. So I think we were all sort of aware of that. 15 16 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That was very helpful to 17 me, thank you. MR. TREGONING: Thank you Bruce. 18 So, this 19 next slide deals with -- we're starting to deal with 20 the sections that we have more substantive changes 21 since the November '04 draft report. 22 This slide deals with section E. And that 23 section deals with the analysis of the elicitation 24 responses. We really had two types of changes that we 25 have here.

1 The 11/04 draft, we had some 2 inconsistencies between the description in section E and the 11/04 document and what was actually done and 3 4 presented in the quantitative results section. 5 So, it just we had some inconsistencies that we have to fix. And that's 6 7 represented by these first changes made in these first three sections, sections E34, E341, E341, on summing 8 9 distributions, calculating means, and the calculation of the variance and percentiles that we subsequently 10 present in the quantitative results section, section 11 12 G. We also added some new sections which 13 14 describe either additional or modified sensitivity 15 analyses that we also have the result of in section G. And those sections which were either 16 modified or added include sections on the mean 17 determination, correlation structure, the aggregation 18 19 parameters, and the mixture distribution aggregation. 20 Again, we're not -- we hadn't planned to 21 over the changes today. Some of them are 22 relatively minor. Some of them are more substantive. 23 But, I just wanted to alert you as you do 24 your review what sections possibly to focus on. 25 Section G, the quantitative results section, as I

mentioned previously, the results that we provided you in 11/04 did previously reflect the current analysis methodology.

So, there's no change in the results that

we presented between 11/04 and the draft NUREG that you've got in front of you now. We did, in keeping with sections that were added or modified in section E to reflect either additional or modified sensitivity analysis, we have corollary sections in section G that we've either added or modified on mean determination correlation structure, mixture distribution aggregation, and a new section on summary results.

We also added a new section, the summary results section. And this was in response to ACRS comment 4 to provide a recommendation as to what we thought, I'll say, the best encapsulation of the elicitation results were.

We've added a section called summary results, which are based on the overconfidence adjustment using the error factor scheme, however, aggregated currently with the geometric mean approach.

So, I know we're at odds with you on that.

And, again, our opinion is those are the best or the improved group LOCA frequency estimates. We also highlighted these summary results in the executive

1	summary.
2	Those are the results that we use in the
3	new report. And all the comparisons with historical
4	results that we make in section G are with respect to
5	those summary results.
6	So, there's consistency at least there
7	between what's in the executive summary, comparisons
8	with historical results, and then this summary results
9	section that's in section G.
LO	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So the baseline
L1	results do not have any adjustment for overconfidence
L2	or anything? And you are not reporting them in the
L3	executive summary?
L4	(No verbal response.)
L5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. What you
L6	report there is what you believe after the whole thing
L7	is the current distribution of the frequency.
L8	MR. TREGONING: That's exactly correct.
L9	And I should have made that point. So I'm glad that
20	you made if for me.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And the
22	overconfidence adjustment has to do only with the
23	lower part of the distributions, right?
24	MR. TREGONING: Well, again, just to

refresh your memory on how we did those -- how we did

1 that adjustment, we looked at all the error factors 2 associated with each category that we were trying to get quantitative results for. 3 4 And we calculated -- so we had, let's say, eight or nine experts that weighed in on a given 5 question. We determined the mean error factor from 6 7 those eight or nine experts. 8 And then experts which were below the 9 mean, we adjusted their error factor only, not their 10 middle response, but their error factor. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And you brought them 11 12 up to the mean. TREGONING: We increased their 13 MR. 14 uncertainty. We brought it up to the mean. 15 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. 16 MR. TREGONING: But those that were above 17 the mean, we just left them there. We didn't correct them down. 18 19 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Right. And the 20 reason was that you felt that the guys with the lower 21 error factor were overconfident? 22 MR. TREGONING: Yes. Based on -- and Lee 23 may want to weigh in here. But, based on a lot of 24 elicitation work, overconfidence adjustment is a well-25 known phenomenon.

1	And, as I mentioned earlier, we have
2	initially planned on doing some sort of correction for
3	everybody on overconfidence. When we started to look
4	at some of the uncertainty regions that we had for
5	some experts, it became clear to us that they may not
6	have actually been overconfident.
7	In some ways, many of them could have
8	actually been under-confident. But, we didn't decide
9	to correct back that way.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Do you remember how
11	many experts were overconfident? I mean, according to
12	this.
13	MR. TREGONING: Well, by definition, I
14	mean, if you had eight experts and you calculated mean
15	
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Because you went with
17	the
18	MR. TREGONING: You'd have four that you'd
19	correct with, approximately four.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Do you remember what
21	their affiliation was?
22	MR. TREGONING: There was no
23	(Laughter.)
24	MR. TREGONING: You know, I don't think it
25	asks this question. I did ask this question quite

1	often. Did we notice any, I'll say, organizational
2	effect on either the mean results or the uncertainty
3	results?
4	And I will say usually no. If I looked at
5	all the experts, there was no systematic differences
6	between organizations. The only thing I will say is
7	with respect to the uncertainty analysis.
8	There was probably a weak correlation that
9	the industry participants probably tended to be a
10	little more confident than some of the rest. But,
11	it's a very weak correlation.
12	I wouldn't read too much into that
13	comment.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Confident in the
15	sense that they are giving you
16	MR. TREGONING: That they
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: tighter
18	distributions.
19	MR. TREGONING: Yes. So it's not so,
20	again, just realizing for each question we ask for
21	their mid-value responses and then their uncertainty
22	about the response.
23	So, it wasn't that there was any clear
24	difference in mid-value responses as a function of
25	organization on the expert panel. There was a
ı	I and the second

1	stronger correlation, again, albeit, it was still
2	relatively weak between their uncertainty associated
3	with that value.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But, again, if you
5	look only at the error factor, you really don't care
6	where the distribution is, right? The error factor is
7	a ratio for the square root of the 95^{th} to the 5^{th} .
8	And I wonder I mean, this is another
9	example of, you know, the hundreds of ways that one
LO	can process this information. Because, you might say,
L1	yes, a guy was over-confident.
L2	He gave a narrow error factor in that
L3	sense. But he placed the distribution way up there,
L4	you know. He was very conservative of where he put
L5	it.
L6	So, by adjusting his error factor, I do
L7	not know, maybe you're doing some injustice to his
L8	estimates. In other words, overconfidence has to
L9	include some measure of location too, where the
20	distribution
21	MR. TREGONING: That's
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Not just the spread
23	of the
24	MR. TREGONING: That's a valid point. And
25	that's one of the reasons why we settled on the
I	I and the second

1	approach that we did. We looked at some of the more,
2	I'll say, classical ways to do overconfidence
3	correction. This is not a classical way.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
5	MR. TREGONING: That was a that's a
6	point that, you know, we had some because what
7	happens, your median doesn't shift, but your mean can
8	shift dramatically.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Exactly.
10	MR. TREGONING: Based on overconfidence.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The abstract.
12	MR. TREGONING: And, when we did some of
13	these corrections, the mean shifted, because they had
14	been conservatively placed, to frequencies which just
15	weren't physically supportable.
16	And I think, you know, we've had past ACRS
17	meetings where we talked about some of the reasons for
18	that and what some of the ramifications were.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
20	MR. TREGONING: And that's another reason
21	that we ended up doing this particular error factor
22	correction.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: As long as we
24	recognize that, you know, overconfidence must be
25	related to the location of the distribution, the

1 estimate too, not just the spread. 2 MR. TREGONING: Right. 3 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 4 MR. ABRAMSON: Dr. Apostolakis -- Lee 5 One thing that we could do, as suggested by 6 your remarks, is we could investigate 7 sensitivity studies, sensitivity analyses, considering other modifications. 8 We investigate, as you know, a number of 9 possible ways to do the overconfidence adjustment. 10 However, as far as the error factor correction is 11 12 didn't concerned, investigate we try to any modifications to this. 13 14 But this is certainly possible to do. And 15 I do not know how this would turn out. We could, for example, say one way of suggestion is consider 16 17 modifying this when it's going to drastically change the location of the distribution. 18 So, these are things that could be done to 19 see what affect this particular, say, form the 20 21 overconfidence adjustment was. The reason that we 22 used the error factor adjustment was it was a more or 23 less objective way to do it. 24 We didn't have to make any particular 25 judgments about the level of the overconfidence

1 adjustment that we did. That was some of the things 2 that we did investigate from the targeted and the adjusted ones. 3 4 This was an overconfidence adjustment in 5 which the experts themselves determined how much they had to be adjusted by virtue of their relation to the 6 7 error factors of the other experts. 8 So, certainly, we could do some 9 sensitivity analyses, which we haven't done yet. 10 MR. TREGONING: I'm going to maybe 11 slightly disagree with one of my co-authors on that. 12 I think one of the things we have to keep in mind with this error factor overconfidence correction is, you 13 14 know, when we did that we did look at the location. We sort of plot it out. And we have some 15 16 box and -- plots that we show in the report that shows 17 how specific points move. And the thing we have to keep in mind here is it's a relatively modest 18 19 correction in the grand scheme of things. 20 Usually factor of two in the mean 21 frequencies or less. So, you know, I think there's a 22 lot of interesting ways, like you had said, that we 23 could look at evaluating and processing these results. 24 But, you know, to me -- and I think we

tried to do that by looking at -- we looked at three

or four different overconfidence adjustment schemes. And I think, by that sensitivity analysis, we've really bounded pretty well the amount of, I'll say, results perturbation that you could do to account for overconfidence. I don't really know that we, you know, given that we're talking about factors of two or less, that any further perturbation in the error factor scheme is really going to be justified at this point. MR. BISHOP: Dr. Apostolakis, in the NRC SER for the risk informed ISI method, Dr. Fred Simonen at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory did some studies on the variability in the PFM results, some expected variabilities. And I know several of the PFM members used that because it seemed to make sense. And what it showed was is that for the very high frequencies where you typically have failure data or something like that driving your failure probability predictions, the

But, when you start getting down to very low numbers like 10 to the minus six, 10 to the minus eight where you have very little or no data, the relative uncertainties can be very large, several orders of magnitude.

variability is fairly small.

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1	However, you're talking about whether it's
2	10 to the minus six, 10 to the minus eight, or 10 to
3	the minus 10 th . And so, in an absolute sense, if you
4	were using arithmetic mean, that probably wouldn't
5	have much effect.
6	But, if you were using a geometric mean,
7	it could have more of an effect because the relative
8	uncertainties are higher.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Coming back to the
10	composite, one of the major conclusions of this other
11	study that you guys refuse to consult
12	MR. TREGONING: No, no.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That was EPRI, DOE,
14	and NRC, reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences.
15	One of the major conclusions there was that precisely
16	because one can do a lot of implement a lot of
17	mathematical schemes to process individual estimates,
18	group estimates, and so on, as we just discussed, the
19	ultimate distribution has to come from the experts, a
20	consensus process, from a consensus process.
21	Did you ask the experts to bless your
22	final distribution, or is it yours, the authors of the
23	report?
24	(No verbal response.)
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Whose distribution is

1	it, the one that you report in the executive summary?
2	(No verbal response.)
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You had eight
4	experts, right?
5	(No verbal response.)
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Did these eight
7	experts look at what you said, finally this is the
8	distribution? And they said, yes, we agree or I don't
9	violently disagree?
10	(No verbal response.)
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Or, is it Abramson's
12	and Rob's?
13	MR. TREGONING: Okay. Yes, we
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That doesn't mean it
15	is bad if it's yours. But I want to understand whose
16	it is.
17	MR. TREGONING: Yes, you want to
18	understand the process, right. And the way the
19	process works, or the way the process worked, is we
20	got results from the experts, which we went around
21	with the experts individually to make sure they were
22	satisfied with their individual results. There was a
23	lot of back and forth.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The individuals?
25	MR. TREGONING: Individually.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
2	MR. TREGONING: Individually. Then we met
3	last about a year ago last February or so where we
4	presented all the results, all the individual results
5	and outlined our aggregation schemes to the experts.
6	We had a lot of discussion then about what
7	was appropriate and was not appropriate. And then we
8	went off, we finalized the aggregation schemes, and we
9	reported those aggregation schemes.
LO	And, in last July we had another two, two
L1	and a half day meeting with all of the experts where
L2	we presented the results of the various aggregation
L3	schemes.
L4	Now, we hadn't done the mixture
L5	distribution aggregation yet, which is I'll take
L6	issue with the fact when you say we didn't consult the
L7	work.
L8	I think we consulted that work quite
L9	extensively. And the mixture distribution is in line
20	with what some of the prior work would recommend.
21	We didn't have that distribution.
22	However, we had the arithmetic mean type of
23	aggregation, which is pretty similar. You get pretty
24	similar results to what you do with the mixture

distribution creation.

1	And we had some discussions among the
2	expert panel. And I will say that probably some of
3	the violent discussions among the expert panel. And,
4	as far as the expert panel, they were those that
5	were I don't want to speak for everyone, but we
6	heard several people in violent opposition to using
7	the arithmetic mean type of averaging schemes because
8	of the reason they didn't think it represented a
9	consensus type distribution for this elicitation.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, but two
11	questions. First, did they agree that your
12	distribution is representative?
13	(No verbal response.)
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Because, you keep
15	talking about the scheme. Well, it's one thing to
16	talk about the method, and quite another to say, guys,
17	this is it.
18	This is what we're going with. Did they
19	have a chance to say, yes, this is fine?
20	MR. TREGONING: Sure. During that meeting
21	they had a chance to weigh in on which aggregation
22	scheme they proposed. Although, you know, we took
23	their recommendation with somewhat of a grain of salt
24	because, again, these are experts in these aren't
25	experts in elicitation or aggregation of expert

1	results.
2	So, we certainly wanted their input. But,
3	I think Lee and I, you know, we wanted to withhold
4	final judgment to do what we thought was right as
5	well.
6	But, in all honesty, the experts largely
7	agreed with the scheme that we were recommending at
8	the time, the geometric mean aggregation was the most
9	acceptable one that we presented.
10	The other thing they were violently
11	opposed to was overconfidence correction. And that's
12	a good thing. They should have been violently opposed
13	to that.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But you did it
15	anyway?
16	MR. TREGONING: We did some anyway, sure.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So, you could have
18	done the same thing with the aggregation scheme?
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We could have done
20	the same, of course. Look, that's the role of the
21	integrative facilitator, of course. But, I'm going to
22	mention this later.
23	We were sort of clear throughout all the
24	elicitation that we were looking to develop consensus
25	type estimates. And that's something

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: When the experts
2	agreed with the distribution that you presented, what
3	was their view? What kind of distribution whose
4	opinion did this represent?
5	Just the group's? Or did they feel that it
6	represented that of the community at large?
7	MR. TREGONING: Just the group's.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Does this Agency make
9	decisions based on a group of eight people?
10	MR. TREGONING: It was a group of 12
11	experts.
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Twelve people, 20
13	people. We never do that. We are based on the state
14	of the art. So, the experts should have told us, this
15	is if you go out, you know, this is what the
16	community thinks.
17	MR. TREGONING: We're going to get to this
18	point later.
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
20	MR. TREGONING: And, I understand where
21	you're coming from. I think this is state of the art,
22	to be honest. And we'll get to
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's not what your
24	response says. And that's not what the report says.
25	The report says that its' impossible to say what the

1	state of the art is.
2	Which I if I were a Commissioner I
3	would be really very upset.
4	MR. TREGONING: No. I don't think the
5	report says that. The report says it's impossible to
6	say what the expert community what the community at
7	large thinks.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. Because, if I
9	select the experts carefully which I think you did,
10	you did do it carefully I should be able to figure
11	out from those experts, if I ask the right questions,
12	what the community at large thinks.
13	MR. TREGONING: Well, let's
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, we'll come to
15	that. Okay.
16	MR. TREGONING: We'll come to that. And
17	I think my this may be you know, I'm going to be
18	optimistic here. This may be a semantic thing as much
19	as what you're calling the expert community and
20	what we're saying, you know, we think our panel
21	represents.
22	So, we're going to discuss that more fully
23	later.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: All right. Keep
25	going.
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1	MR. TREGONING: Okay. So, changes to the
2	draft NUREG abstract conclusion, executive summary
3	statement. I think I mentioned a lot of these
4	already.
5	The table and figures now reflect the
6	revised summary results. And this was in
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, I have another
8	there were two issues. One is with what we just
9	discussed, the community at large.
LO	MR. TREGONING: Yes.
L1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But there is the
L2	other statement that you keep making the report. And
L3	maybe we need to clarify that as well. The key
L4	requirement for aggregation is that the group opinion
L5	must be somewhere in the middle of the group.
L6	I don't understand that. I really don't.
L7	Are you going to maybe when we talk about the
L8	expert community
L9	MR. TREGONING: Yes, we'll talk about
20	that.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: All right. Fine,
22	let's go.
23	MR. TREGONING: Okay, so the executive
24	summary again. The table and the figures in the
25	summary now reflect these revised summary results.

1 And this is our recommendation that you requested that 2 we do an ACRS comment number for. 3 We tried to clarify in the executive 4 summary what we meant by generic frequencies. 5 I'm going to specifically tell you what we did here in the next slide. 6 7 That was ACRS comment number one. Wе tired to summarize a rationale for using the geometric 8 9 mean again and why, at least in the author's opinion, distribution 10 the mixture aggregation is appropriate, at least for the revised summary results. 11 12 And that's your ACRS comment number three. And, again, tried to clarify our opinion that the 13 14 study results are designed to best represent the 15 expert panel state of knowledge regarding 16 frequencies. Now, we still have this issue of, does the 17 expert panel represent the community at large. 18 then the abstract and conclusions have been revised to 19 20 make everything consistent with the executive summary. 21 So, let's get into specifically what we 22 did. And then I think we'll be -- this will lead 23 obviously to the conclusions discussion about the 24 expert community and some of the other issues that Dr.

Apostolakis has raised.

1 But, let's get -- we wanted to get through 2 the first couple of comments first because I thought 3 hopefully we had pretty good agreement that we've 4 handled those correctly now here. 5 Comment number one, you'd asked -- again, just to refresh your memory -- better explanation of 6 7 what the generic frequency means. And this was the staff response to the letter as well as we've tried to 8 9 clarify the executive summary to make this clear. 10 We had instructed the expert panel to develop generic or average type values. However, they 11 12 did consider the service history. The service history comes from all plants. 13 14 So, by definition, the service history has 15 information about plant specific variability. because we asked them to give us the average, really, 16 the only factors that influence a large number of 17 plants, you would expect to significantly influence 18 19 the average. 20 And that's why we had given the panels 21 clear instructions to only account for very broad 22 plant specific factors and not specific individual 23 plant to plant variability. 24 So, by broad plant specific factors,

you're looking at factors which may affect a handful

1	of plants, five to ten plants. You get into things
2	like design differences, vendor differences, some of
3	the bigger grosser distinguishing characteristics of
4	plants.
5	But, you didn't get down to the level of
6	a specific environment or operating history of one
7	specific plant. And, again, we clarified the
8	executive summary to reflect this understanding.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is that how we
10	regulate?
11	(No verbal response.)
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Are the regulations
13	intended to address the average plant? It's unclear
14	to me.
15	MR. TREGONING: LOCA frequencies have
16	always been developed historically with that in mind,
17	yes. And that was another reason that we tried to be
18	very clear there.
19	We wanted to be consistent with how LOCA
20	frequencies have been developed and utilized in the
21	past.
22	MEMBER FORD: Could I follow upon that
23	Rob?
24	MR. TREGONING: Sure.
25	MEMBER FORD: So far we have been having
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1 a very useful discussion on the process of how we 2 ascribe to various uncertainties in how the decisions 3 were made. 4 Much bigger uncertainty, however, is the 5 specifics over the degradation mechanisms. know, there's been a whole range of these. 6 7 there's going to be a big distribution of what's the likelihood of a crack, for instance, what's the 8 9 likelihood of various cracking mechanisms? 10 And these are not taken into account, because you are looking at the generic plant, generic 11 12 BWR, generic PWR. These are not taken into account. Those specific degradation uncertainties 13 14 are not taken into account. Brian Sheron at the last 15 meeting -- I forget -- the last full meeting, resolved that problem for me by saying that, yes, the TBS that 16 17 you come up with is the average. But, plant specific issues, such as a BWR 18 19 different water chemistry, PWR at different 20 temperatures and things of this nature, if they have 21 a pipe or component lodged in the TBS, then they have 22 to, still in a plant specific basis, apply a 1174 to 23 show that the risk is not going to be -- for that 24 specific plant.

Is that -- did I hear Brian Sheron

1	correctly?
2	(No verbal response.)
3	MEMBER FORD: Because that resolves my
4	problem with all these discussions of uncertainty.
5	MR. TREGONING: Yes, I don't want to
6	interpret what Brian said. But, he's here, so maybe
7	he would feel so compelled to
8	MEMBER FORD: Do I understand this
9	correctly? There's a back to this, a plant
10	specific basis, if you have a BWR operating under
11	something like this, then they can make the
12	appropriate case for the larger pipe sizes and TBS to
13	locate? Is that what you said?
14	MR. SHERON: In other words I'm trying
15	to understand what
16	MEMBER FORD: The problem I have is that
17	you're defining a TBS for a generic plant.
18	MR. SHERON: Right.
19	MEMBER FORD: And anything above that you
20	get exemptions. But, the problem is that if you have
21	a plant which is operating under different water
22	chemistry conditions, for that specific plant they
23	have to make the safety case for those larger pipes or
24	components. I think that's what you said.
25	MR. SHERON: For plants let's put it

1 this way, we selected a transition break size, which 2 is a generic number, okay, or a generic one. based on the largest attached pipe to the primary 3 4 system. 5 MEMBER FORD: Right. MR. SHERON: So, that is a bit of a plant 6 7 specific factor. We have said that if a plant, for 8 example, proposes to run at conditions -- I think we 9 used, like for an example, at an up-rated power level, where you might have higher vibration levels, higher 10 temperatures and so forth. 11 12 They would have provide to а rationalization for continuing to use that -- in other 13 14 words, to show that the transition break size hasn't 15 been adversely affected from probabilistic а standpoint by running at these higher conditions. 16 17 MEMBER FORD: Right. MR. SHERON: Does that make sense? 18 That's 19 what I was, I think, trying to get across at the 20 meeting, that we were not just given a blanket okay, 21 you know. 22 The parameters that were used in the study 23 had to be consistent with the parameters licensees 24 running their plant at. 25 Thank you. MEMBER FORD: That's the --

1 MEMBER BONACA: So that you then would 2 address plant to plant variability? Well, it is plant 3 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 4 specific the way they specify. But that question 5 should come up again. I think your question 6 MEMBER BONACA: 7 before about regulation was very valiant. 8 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I don't mean you, I 9 mean the revised group. 10 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: The plant specificity seems to have very little to do with 11 12 degradation, you know, the size of your largest attached pipe has virtually no connection whatsoever 13 14 with any degradation mechanism that you do have. 15 On the other hand, it seems to me that I 16 wouldn't blow this up too much. I mean, the way we 17 run plants today, the variations in water chemistry from one BWR to another, you know, is almost at the 18 19 limits of measurement of the water chemistry purity. 20 specifications are fairly tight. The 21 We're dealing with such a limited database. I mean, 22 you know, we are extrapolating -- we're looking for 23 probabilities of six inch holes when, you know, your 24 database, you know, is largely on leaks of a few 25 gallons once you get beyond steam generator tube

1	ruptures.
2	As you consider the data and you consider
3	the restrictions that these plants are operating in,
4	I'm not sure how I would distinguish between my fleet
5	variability and uncertainty and my plant to plant
6	variability and uncertainty.
7	I think you're just slicing the bologna
8	finer than you can make it, if you really think that
9	you can get it any finer than that.
10	MR. TREGONING: But, just to follow-up, I
11	mean.
12	MEMBER FORD: But all you need is one.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But remember also
14	that the report claims that safety cultural is not
15	important.
16	MR. TREGONING: No, the report does not
17	claim that at all. That is not claimed
18	MEMBER POWERS: An entirely accurate
19	perception.
20	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: That's not what it
21	says George. It says that the safety culture is not
22	likely to change dramatically. They've built in an
23	assumption about safety culture.
24	But they don't think it's going to be
25	allowed to get worse. And that's very different.

1 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But they also say, I think, that variability in safety culture could affect 2 the results significantly. 3 4 MR. TREGONING: For a given plant. 5 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Right. MR. TREGONING: By all means. 6 7 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Which makes it now 8 plant specific. But that effect we are ignoring in 9 this analysis. 10 MR. TREGONING: Just to follow-up a little bit on what you had said. You know, when we had 11 talked about degradation mechanisms, Dr. Ford, we did 12 talk about the variability. 13 14 For instance, PWSEC, we talked about the effect of temperature. And, I know when the -- so, 15 16 even though we did generic considerations, a lot of 17 testimony that we go tended to make rather conservative assumptions for how they were estimating 18 19 the rates of degradation and things like that based 20 on, again, sort of a maybe a more conservative set of 21 operating conditions. 22 So, I know for PWSEC that was the way it 23 turned out. For IGSEC, like you had mentioned, where 24 we have a lot more knowledge, the more generic

considerations probably held, a lot more knowledge and

1 a lot more uniformity, as Dr. Shack had said. 2 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I think we're falling 3 This issue will come up again in the next session. And I'd rather have the next session go 4 5 overtime than --MR. BISHOP: But let me just make a point. 6 7 The point that was said, okay, is that plant to plant variability and so forth was not considered. That is 8 9 not a true statement because we were asked to provide a best estimate value which was a medium value which 10 -- to represent sort of like the fleet average if you 11 12 want to call it that. But we also asked to provide five and 95 13 14 percent values. And those tend to catch both the high 15 low outliers. That was specifically and the discussed. 16 17 Okay, that's why we were asked to do that, was to catch -- yes, not all plants are going to have, 18 19 you know, welding fabrication problem or high residual 20 stresses or, you know, forgot to stress relieve their 21 welds, or whatever that problem may be. 22 But there is still is a chance that maybe 23 And that's why we were asked to estimate five 24 95 percentiles also on all our estimates. 25 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. I think we're

1	done with them.
2	MR. TREGONING: We discussed this comment.
3	I don't think we need it. So, let's get into the
4	MR. SNODDERLY: Yes, Rob, it's Mike
5	Snodderly. So, we've got a half hour left. Because
6	we really need to end this presentation at 10:00, and
7	three comments to go. So, let's try to
8	MR. TREGONING: Two comments to go.
9	MR. SNODDERLY: Two, great.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What do we have at
11	10:00?
12	MR. SNODDERLY: A break at 10:15. Then we
13	start the discussion which is going to be
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I thought you said
15	industry presentation.
16	MR. SNODDERLY: That's why we need the
17	extra time, for the next presentation.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Do we have an industry
19	presentation on this topic.
20	MR. SNODDERLY: No, for the next topic,
21	the Rule Making Package.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This topic will end
23	at 10:00. So where are we now? Slide 11?
24	MR. TREGONING: Yes. So now we're at sort
25	of the mead of the disagreement or the mead of the

comments here.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.

MR. ABRAMSON: Addressing your third comment on this, and just to -- as we stated again, this practiced geometric averaging is at variance with the methods employed previously in which the arithmetic averaging method is applied to the probability distribution of the experts.

And our response went along the following lines, first of all, fundamental consideration in the elicitation was to aggregate such that the final results represent the opinions of the panel as a whole.

And, let me just digress from this or just amplify this a little in response to your comment there about our statement that it's important in the report that the results represent the center of the group.

What we kept in mind at all times, of course, is this is an expert elicitation. And what's the rationale for doing this? Well, there's been a lot of experience with this, as you all know.

And the indication is -- or there's a lot of evidence that there's some wisdom in the group and that the experts each bring different perspectives,

1 experience, intuition and so on and so forth, and that 2 the group is better than any individual expert could 3 be. 4 I should emphasize that the purpose the 5 elicitation is not to try to identify one or two good experts. If we could do that we wouldn't have to have 6 7 the elicitation in the first place. Now, what do we mean by a group opinion? 8 9 Well, it seems too axiomatic that a group opinion has 10 got to be somewhere in the center of the group because, if it's near the high end for whatever 11 12 reason, or the low end, then it's not a group opinion. Most members of the group would not agree 13 14 that this is a consensus opinion. 15 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Are you talking about the point value now? 16 I'm talking about if you're 17 MR. ABRAMSON: taking what he had -- we had, what, for BWRs we had 18 19 eight, for PWRs we had nine experts who weighed in on 20 this. 21 Say, for the eight, what we did for the 22 purpose of the report for summary, we had them 23 summarize these eight values or nine values so they --24 so, to replace them, to summarize them by a single

point, a single value for whatever it was, for the

1	mean, the median, the 5 th percentile, whatever it was,
2	and that this necessarily was, as a group opinion, had
3	to be somewhere in the center of the group.
4	Because, if it was near the high end, it
5	was like the 8 th highest value or the 7 th highest
6	value, most members of the group would say, that's not
7	a group opinion.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But that assumes that
9	you have to work with the estimate, say, of the 95 th
10	percentile. Another way of looking at this is the
11	consensus is sought at the distribution level.
12	MR. ABRAMSON: Well, we didn't choose to
13	do this.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You did not?
15	MR. ABRAMSON: No. What we did is our
16	emphasis in the report the parameters of interested
17	
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Right.
19	MR. ABRAMSON: directly, specifically
20	the mean, the median, the 5^{th} , and the 95^{th} percentile.
21	And we did not try to estimate the distribution as a
22	whole, just these particular parameters, which, you
23	know, if you say in the report, are the ones that are
24	used for regulatory decision making purposes.
25	MEMBER RANSOM: Part of the problem seems

1	to be with what do you mean by center?
2	MR. ABRAMSON: Well, when I say center
3	MEMBER RANSOM: I mean, the center of a
4	log basis or what is
5	MR. ABRAMSON: When I say center I mean
6	center so that well, a center could be the median,
7	for example.
8	MEMBER RANSOM: Right.
9	MR. ABRAMSON: It would be the halfway
10	point.
11	MEMBER RANSOM: Or it could be the
12	arithmetic average.
13	MR. ABRAMSON: Well, it depends. If you
14	have in some cases we had where the difference
15	between the low and the high value was several orders
16	of magnitude.
17	The arithmetic mean would be between the
18	highest and the next highest value. It would not be
19	at the center of the group. And then, when I say the
20	center of the group, it should represent in both from
21	the point of view of the panel and also, of course,
22	from the analyst, a group opinion, and not something
23	that's skewed either high or low.
24	And what this should be would depend on
25	the particular circumstances, I would say, of the

1	situation.
2	MEMBER RANSOM: Well certainly, it would
3	make a difference whether you considered the actual
4	values or the log of the values, for example, to
5	define the center.
6	MR. ABRAMSON: Well, what we did no, it
7	wouldn't. It wouldn't because you're just making a
8	monotonic transformation of the if you take the
9	median and you take the logs, you're going to get the
LO	same value.
L1	It doesn't make any difference. The
L2	median is the center whether it's spread out or it's
L3	compressed with the log scale. It makes absolutely no
L4	difference.
L5	MEMBER RANSOM: You mean the mean or the
L6	median?
L7	MR. ABRAMSON: Well
L8	MEMBER RANSOM: The median just divides
L9	half higher and half lower.
20	MR. ABRAMSON: Exactly. That's right.
21	And by the center if you took the it depends on
22	the value whether the arithmetic mean or the geometric
23	mean, or some other kind of mean is going to be close
24	to the median or not.
25	By the center of the group I mean

1	something around the median.
2	MEMBER RANSOM: The median.
3	MR. ABRAMSON: Right.
4	MEMBER RANSOM: Okay.
5	MR. ABRAMSON: In the sense that you have
6	well from a I guess from a mathematical point of
7	view, it's one that I would say it's around the $50^{ m th}$,
8	maybe the $60^{ ext{th}}$ percentile or the $40^{ ext{th}}$ percentile.
9	But it's not the 90 th or the 95 th
10	percentile or the $5^{ ext{th}}$ percentile. That's point one.
11	And point two is, of course, as Rob emphasizes, you
12	all know we had extensive feedback and iteration with
13	the experts.
14	It's one of the experts as a group should
15	feel is a consensus opinion. And Rob already
16	described how they weighed into this. I don't want to
17	say that it's for example, we didn't use the median
18	in our report, although we did in some of our
19	preliminary evaluation, we did use the median because
20	it was easy to calculate.
21	And we presented that to the experts. But
22	we did not choose to use this as the final result.
23	The median by definition is the center of the group.
24	But we didn't use that.
25	But it should be something close to this

1 for the purpose, again, of having this be accepted by the panel and also, obviously, by the analysts as a 2 3 group opinion. 4 And that's the key in this. That's their 5 assumption, that we want to get a group opinion. this necessarily --6 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The fundamental 7 difference. 8 MEMBER RANSOM: Wouldn't that affect what 9 you consider to be the 95^{th} percentile, for example? 10 MR. ABRAMSON: No. Because what we're 11 12 doing -- remember what we're doing is we're estimating the 95th percentile. So we have 95th percentile from 13 14 all eight or nine experts. 15 So, we want to know what is the group opinion about the 95th percentile. Well, we have 16 these numbers here and we just take, you know, what we 17 did, the geometric mean, whatever we did. 18 19 MEMBER RANSOM: Okay. 20 MR. ABRAMSON: Okay. So that's the 21 fundamental philosophy behind. Now, the -- we 22 outline, as I said, as Rob emphasized in the report, 23 we took, you know, a lot of -- paid a lot of attention 24 to explaining this to the experts, this philosophy. 25 We got what we call a consensus type

1 estimate, which means the other center individual --2 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let me -- it seems to 3 me that, you know, as we have already said several 4 given eight experts who are providing 5 distributions, point values, or whatever, there are many, many ways that one can process that information. 6 7 So, what really should matter at the end is not whether one use a geometric or arithmetic and 8 9 In fact, as you guys did, doing a lot of 10 sensitivity analysis informs the process. So, what really matters at the end is, is 11 12 the distribution that you guys are proposing in the executive summary a distribution that represents what 13 14 we know now about the frequency of various size breaks so that the decision maker like the Staff or the 15 Commission can base its decision on what you have 16 17 produced? That really should be the final thing 18 19 because to argue whether we are in the middle -- I 20 mean, you know, Lee has a point, maybe I have a point, 21 somebody else has another point. 22 All these analyses, it seems to me, inform 23 the process, and ultimately we form a judgment in our 24 mind, and we say this is it. So, the final question

really should be, the distribution that you are

1	proposing in your exhibit, what does that represent?
2	And I think our disagreement is now
3	whether it represents a community or just the eight
4	experts.
5	MR. ABRAMSON: I'm going to come to this
6	in a minute.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Why don't we
8	focus on that, because we can discuss this forever.
9	MR. ABRAMSON: Okay.
LO	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I mean, this is just
L1	one way of doing it. You also did the mixture of
L2	distribution. I mean, I look at all these things. In
L3	my mind I form a distribution, right?
L4	So the question is, at the end, can the
L5	Commission feel that, yes, if I look at this
L6	distribution, and we go with that the Staff proposes
L7	regarding the TBS we are concerned?
L8	MR. ABRAMSON: Okay, let me skip then.
L9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This much, because we
20	are running out of time.
21	MR. ABRAMSON: Let's skip the next slide.
22	The ACRS comment number 4, which is what you're
23	saying, the final distribution should be the composite
24	distribution of the analysts based on the sensitivity
25	analysis, represents the expert community's current

1 state of knowledge regarding local frequencies. 2 Our response is this, the main 3 point, the first point is, the elicitation did not 4 attempt to determine the state of knowledge of the 5 expert community. By that I mean we did not explicitly tell 6 7 the -- I don't think so -- the experts that they were to -- obviously they all recognized they were a part 8 9 of the expert community. They wouldn't be there otherwise. 10 didn't specifically ask them to try to tell us what 11 12 the expert community to be a stand in or to their opinion what the expert community felt. 13 14 So, they were not there as representatives 15 of the -- or as assessors of the expert community opinion. They were there for their own opinion. 16 again, saying the study represents the expert panel's 17 current state of knowledge regarding LOCA frequencies. 18 19 So I would say, certainly everything we 20 did was we tried to make sure that we fairly in an 21 unbiased way as we possibly could, in as accurate a 22 way as we possibly could, have the experts make sure 23 that the results we got from the experts represented 24 their opinion.

And then, of course, from the point of

1 view of the aggregation, we tried to make sure that 2 the -- tried to aggregate in such a way that the -what the results we finally came up with represented 3 4 the panel as a whole. 5 So that's what we did. But we're talking about the expert panel. Now, because these -- the 6 7 panel was not asked -- to ask as a stand in for the expert community, we certainly cannot claim the study 8 9 represents the state of knowledge of the expert 10 community. We can't claim that. We have their 11 12 personal opinions, but not their perception, expert community's opinion. 13 14 MEMBER DENNING: Can we ask them --15 MR. ABRAMSON: However -- okay, I'm sorry. 16 MEMBER DENNING: Maybe you're going to get 17 there. Make your point. MR. ABRAMSON: Okay. However, the panel 18 19 -- this is of course very, very important. The panel 20 selection designed was to represent broad 21 organizational, experiential, international and 22 differences within the community. 23 We very deliberately made that. This is 24 not necessarily a -- we did not try to get a random 25 sampling in any sense from the community. So we very

1 carefully chose and obtained relevant diversity. 2 And, therefore, the diversity of 3 experts would tend to accomplish the full breath of 4 views in the expert community. So we felt that we had 5 the full breath from whatever in this industry, academia or the regulatory point of view of the expert 6 7 community. 8 It's just that we did not explicitly 9 identify them as representation or representative of the expert community. So, from that perspective, we 10 can say that the results may very well represent the 11 12 results of the expert community. But, we didn't make that assessment. 13 14 up, I think, to you and the Commission and so on in 15 deciding to what extend these results are going to be relevant and valid. 16 17 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But your words now are much more softer than what you have in the report. 18 19 The report is absolute. No, we didn't do that. 20 Come on, you selected these guys, as you 21 say, to represent the broad spectrum of use. 22 know, if I --MR. ABRAMSON: I think these words are in 23 24 the report. These particular words are in the report. 25 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, but, the report

1	is big, right? They can be down here in
2	MR. ABRAMSON: Certainly in the executive
3	summary. I believe these words are taken from the
4	executive summary or they are in the executive
5	summary.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, let's see with
7	Dr. Denning.
8	MEMBER DENNING: Well, I just think this
9	is semantic. I think really that what you've done has
10	really looked at the community that's out there and
11	sampled.
12	You didn't go out intentionally to sample
13	like that. But I think that the saying that it's not
14	really representative is an over I mean, these
15	words are okay here.
16	MR. ABRAMSON: I'd like to make another
17	point. Maybe Rob was going to make this. I'll jump
18	in. The community the expert community is a rather
19	small community.
20	And, therefore, our petition is that this
21	panel of 12 is a pretty good chunk. I do not know how
22	big of a chunk, but a pretty good chunk of the expert
23	community.
24	So, from that point of view, it's already
25	fairly representative, although it's not necessarily

1	a random sample.
2	WITNESS RICE: It doesn't have to be
3	random. In fact, I wouldn't want it to be random. I
4	want the best guys on the
5	MR. ABRAMSON: Of course. And I would
6	certainly oppose, you know
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But that's not
8	MR. ABRAMSON: A random choice is not the
9	one you want to make anyway.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let me ask again. If
11	the Commission bases its decision on what you guys
12	propose in the executive summary, would they be basing
13	their decision on the best state of the art right now
14	regarding these frequencies?
15	MR. TREGONING: My opinion is yes.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So, why don't you say
17	that in the executive summary? Why do you keep
18	talking about random samples and this and that? I
19	mean, just say it.
20	Okay, you made a mistake if you can
21	call it a mistake in the sense that you didn't ask
22	the experts to actually try to figure out the state of
23	the art.
24	But, the care that went into selecting
25	them, all this stuff, all these analyses, all this

1 stuff, you're damn close, it seems to me. I mean, 2 what else can we do right now? You know, maybe form -- is it possible to 3 4 have a review group of equally qualified experts that 5 would look at your work and the expert opinions that you collected and come up with the expert community's 6 7 distribution? And would that be significantly different 8 9 from what you already have? Especially on the high side, that's really what worries, I think, the 10 regulator. 11 12 Yes, if you formed another MR. TREGONING: group, you would essentially be replicating 13 14 elicitation at that point. 15 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, I don't want to elicit again, I would have them review what you guys 16 have done. But, do you think that is possible and 17 would that give any results that would justify the 18 19 expense drastically different? 20 MR. TREGONING: My opinion is no. And I 21 think that's one of the reasons. The other way we're 22 trying to tap into the expert community here as well 23 is by going out for public comment, by doing the 24 reviews of the NUREG that we've done with ACRS

internally and otherwise.

1	We're hoping to get some of that review
2	and some of the comments and feedbacks that we've
3	received. And, you know, when we went out for the
4	external review panel, that was one of the objectives
5	of that as well.
6	And I think, throughout this review
7	process, we've received very valuable comments,
8	including comments that we've received from ACRS that
9	we're trying to use to inform us on how this report
10	needs to be structured and presented.
11	And I think, just following up on your
12	remarks, I think what reaction we'll take out of this
13	is we're going to look at the executive summary yet
14	again and make sure that we do, I'll say, in keeping
15	with words that are on the slides here, to make sure
16	that we, maybe more accurately and fairly represent
17	what's been done here in a very concise manner.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, and
19	MR. TREGONING: To be consistent with some
20	of the concerns that you've raised.
21	MEMBER BONACA: And I think, particularly
22	the second last paragraph, the way it's written, you
23	know, it says, you know, arguing about why the
24	geometric mean was chosen.

It says mixed distribution aggregation can

lead to significantly higher mean in 95 th percentile 1 2 estimates. And then you go into a long discussion to 3 explain why you want to have that. 4 It almost seems as if you want to have a 5 But that's not really what they intend to And I think if there is some rewording here to 6 reflect better this discussion, I think that should be 7 8 appropriate. 9 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, exactly. The 10 point is not which distribution gives me something or which method gives me something that I like. 11 12 all the methods. In fact, you did. What matters at the end 13 14 is the group that I had, plus you, of course, because 15 you are acting as the integrator. Having seen all these results, you know, if I do the arithmetic thing, 16 17 I get this. If I do the other thing, I get that. 18 Ιf 19 I have error factor adjustment, I get something else. 20 Having done all these, having looked at all this 21 stuff, now, what do we think as a group? 22 And that's really what matters at the end. 23 And it should be emphasized, not one method against 24 the other. Maybe they decided at the end, you know,

I looked at the arithmetic average, I think it's a

1	little stretching it too much.
2	You know, so their consensus distribution
3	did not really go close to that. But that's fine.
4	That's up the experts.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: George, it occurs to me
6	there's something else here too. I mean, you can ask
7	the experts for all these opinions and stuff and
8	what's their best conclusion.
9	That's rather different than asking them
10	what should the authority use as a distribution in
11	order to make decisions. That might be a different
12	question.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: it's a very different
14	question.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's not the question
16	being asked.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: They should
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But I think that's the
19	question you're trying to ask.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No. What I'm trying
21	to answer is, is this the distribution of what the
22	expert community that means what the state of the
23	art is?
24	I don't want to have an expert who's
25	working in some obscure laboratory somewhere in

1 Germany come back and give us evidence that this 2 distribution, for example, is optimistic. 3 I want to have this warm feeling that, 4 yes, this distribution -- look, experts may disagree, 5 you know, by a factor of two here and there. But, by and large, we have captured what 6 7 we know now as a community. And this is really what we should be using in regulatory decisions. Now, one 8 9 way of doing that is to ask the experts at some point 10 explicitly to consider the community. Now, these guys admit they didn't do that. 11 12 But now the next question is, are we really far off? And, you know, the selection of the experts and so on, 13 14 I tend to agree with you that we really aren't because 15 we were careful how we selected the experts. were careful, you know, with the 16 process and so on. We did a lot of -- we, I mean you 17 did a lot of sensitivity analysis and so on. 18 19 not getting it at this stage into the question of how 20 these results should be used. 21 No, this is up to different people who 22 will come before us at 10:15. 23 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: No, but George, the 24 thing is, for certain purposes you might want to use

different distributions because there's a good reason

1	for using that particular distribution for that
2	purpose.
3	MR. TREGONING: And that's why we tried to
4	be very clear. And that was one of the reasons we
5	were hedging about having a set of summary results in
6	the executive summary.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, yes. And, as
8	you recall, in the draft of November they said, you
9	know, you go and read the report and decide what you
10	want to use. And we objected.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, George, can I ask
12	you, you've asked all these questions, are you not
13	satisfied that they have a reasonable cross section of
14	the expert community?
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I am.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That the expert
17	community is rather small and they have a fairly good,
18	you know, fraction of that community is being captured
19	here, that it is sufficiently diverse and all that.
20	Are you satisfied with all that?
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: All those answers to
23	those questions?
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
25	MEMBER KRESS: Yes. I think he just says

1	that it ought to say that in the report.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's the words.
3	MEMBER KRESS: The words, yes.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, let me tell you
5	what I think. First of all, if I combine this with
6	what we're going to hear in the next session, the way
7	the Staff is proposing to select TBS, I think what
8	they have done is fine.
9	The stuff is going a little higher.
10	That's fine. Now, if there is any discussion at some
11	point of going to lower transition break size, lower
12	than eight inches for PWRs, then you are entering now
13	the range of sizes of the experts are giving me.
14	Then I would probably have to rethink
15	about it. The thing that really bothers me is that we
16	do not seem to be building on the work that this
17	Agency has sponsored in the past.
18	In fact, if I look at the citations on the
19	revised report, chapter E, section E, this joint
20	effort by EPRI, NRC and DOE is not even close. And
21	that bothers me.
22	Because, in the future I'm sure people
23	will go to this report and say this is the latest on
24	expert opinion and LOCAs and so on and they will use
25	this.

1	And the question of expert community, for
2	example, I don't want it to disappear. I want in the
3	future to be more aware of the fact that we're really
4	after the expert community's distribution, not just
5	the expert panels.
6	Okay? And that's what bothers me with it.
7	But in terms of revising 50.46, I don't think there is
8	a problem.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I do not know quite what
LO	you mean by expert community. Each of these
L1	communities is sort of a pyramid. And if you take
L2	your expert community and make it too big, they're no
L3	longer experts.
L4	Your experts are usually fairly select
L5	group.
L6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You know what I mean.
L7	I mean the state of the art.
L8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, it's often behind
L9	the experts. The standards
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: This
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: used by engineers in
22	the field is often way behind the expert knowledge in
23	the field.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And it's interesting
25	to me that yesterday, in fact, the whole methodology

1	that these guys used was on the early was in fact
2	based on this joint effort on expert opinion
3	elicitation. Anyway, you have a slide 15?
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: George, you may a
5	predictive statement, which was deterministic, which
6	was that we will finish by ten o'clock.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We will.
8	MR. TREGONING: I certainly hear what you
9	say. We're going to go back and look a the executive
10	summary as well as some other areas to make sure.
11	It sounds like it is semantics that we're
12	talking about in making sure that the semantics and
13	the way we characterize the elicitation is clear with
14	respect to the state of the art and what was done.
15	I mean, we're taking that as an action to
16	go and do further revision at this point on the
17	executive summary.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Are we going to see
19	this report after the public comment period.
20	MR. TREGONING: Yes.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We will again?
22	MR. TREGONING: Certainly, yes.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Do you have
24	any closing comments?
25	MR. TREGONING: Closing comments, again,

1	the reason that we're here is we're requesting a
2	letter from ACRS essentially allowing us or
3	recommending that we proceed for public comment with
4	the draft NUREG report.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Any comments,
6	questions from the members?
7	(No verbal response.)
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Anybody else?
9	(No verbal response.)
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, Mr. Chairman,
11	we finished six minutes earlier.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Very good. We'll expect
13	this to be maintained, this performance George. Let
14	us take a break until ten after ten.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, 10:15.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I guess we can't stop
17	it's just I'm trying to leave enough space for the
18	examination subject, which I think is going to take
19	some time. Okay. We'll take a break until 10:15.
20	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
21	went off the record at 9:50 a.m. and went
22	back on the record at 10:10 a.m.)
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Come back into session,
24	please. The next topic is 50.46, and I'll hand it
25	over to my colleague, Dr. Shack to get things going.

VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Okay. We're here today to review a proposed draft or a draft of the proposed revision to 50.46 to risk inform the rule. In December, we reviewed a previous draft of a proposed rule change.

There have been a number of changes in this new rule that we're going to be seeing today. The three most important ones that I could identify is the transition break size now is a single-ended rupture of the largest attached pipe in the recirculation piping system.

The previous rule prohibited bundling of unrelated changes when we were assessing essentially changes in risk when we were making changes here. Now the new rule will permit bundling of unrelated changes, so that's a substantial change in the rule.

And they've also removed some of the detail from the acceptance criteria for changes under 50.46. That is the sort of Reg Guide 1.174 stuff that was built into the rule has been now -- some of that has been removed and there's basically a number of high-level requirements left but some of the details have been gone. And I guess there's a suggestion there will be a regulatory guide that will provide more detail to that.

The rule still requires that you be able to mitigate all breaks up to the DEGB. However, when you do that, you do not need to assume loss of off-site power for an independent single failure, and you can credit non-safety grade equipment. And, again, the requirement is that you maintain coolable geometry and provide long-term cooling. The notion will be that there will be somewhat relaxed limits on the amount of damage that it can tolerate. But, again, the requirement that you can only operate in configurations in which this capability has been analyzed and credited is still maintained in the rule.

And Richard Dudley will lead us through a more detailed discussion of some of these changes and the staff's reasoning behind the changes.

MR. DUDLEY: Good morning. I'm Richard Dudley. I'm the rulemaking project manager for the risk-informed 50.46 rule. Today, I'd like to accomplish two things. We'd like to accomplish two things in our talk. First, as Dr. Shack said, we'd like to update the ACRS on what we've done to change the rule since we were last here on the 2nd of December. And, secondly, we would like to ask the ACRS for a letter so that we can go forward with putting the proposed rule forward to the Commission.

And we'd like the letter hopefully by March 11. And I'll show you later in our schedule why that's important to us.

When we were here last on December 2, we received a letter from the ACRS on the 17th with three major comments. The first comment was that we should maintain mitigation of accidents up to and including the largest double-ended break of a reactor coolant system pipe. The proposed rule had that mitigation, and the current rule has that mitigation, so we have made no changes in that area.

The second comment was that for the transition break size we should consider the single-ended break versus a double-ended break. As you have heard, we have looked into that and decided we should change the TBS to a single-ended break.

And the final comment from the ACRS was that we really hadn't done what's necessary to quantify the risk benefits of a smaller TBS and that additional studies and work would be necessary before that relationship was properly known. And so we're doing some studies on that that we'll talk to you about in a moment.

Again, the TBS now is a single-sided break. Gary Hammer, of our Mechanical Engineering

1 Group, is going to talk to you in some detail about 2 the changes that we've made to the TBS and why we've 3 made those. 4 We've initiated thermal-hydraulic studies, 5 both the NRC and the industry, to investigate the risk benefits of smaller technical break size. Ralph 6 7 Landry, of our Reactor Systems Group, will talk to you 8 in some detail about those studies and the parameters 9 and the other things that we're looking at. 10 And also we've made a number of changes. In addition to changes to bundling, we've made some 11 12 other changes in the risk assessment requirements that we had in the proposed rule. These would be the 13 14 requirements that would be used to determine the 15 acceptability of facility changes that are enabled by the revised 50.46 ECCS requirements. 16 17 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I thought, Ralph, doing risk benefits a smaller break size, but, presumably, 18 19 if you back off on the requirements for the large 20 breaks, then the risk associated with large breaks 21 goes up? 22 I quess that would be the MR. DUDLEY: 23 case. 24 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are you looking at that 25 risk at all?

1 MR. DUDLEY: If you optimize your ECCS 2 design for smaller breaks, which are more likely, you 3 could have the net effect be the overall risk to go 4 down. 5 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You could, but you don't But you can't ignore the other effects on the 6 7 larger breaks while you're doing that. 8 MR. DUDLEY: Yes, that's correct. You 9 would have to factor that in and weigh that off 10 against any increases. That's correct. Again, we're going to talk about that in a moment. 11 12 Again, on this 1.174 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: type requirements, we make all sorts of decisions on 13 14 changes to licensing basis using 1.174 now. Why do we 15 have to have new requirements in the rule for these particular licensing basis changes? 16 MR. DUDLEY: I think Mike Tschiltz will go 17 into that perhaps later on. My understanding is that 18 19 had Req Guide 1.174. It had a number of 20 recommended items of quidance in there. And in 21 addition to that, as the staff went through the Reg 22 Guide 1.174 review for risk-informed changes, there 23 were additional things that the staff, I quess, 24 performed or considered or looked at or there was a

level of detail that perhaps wasn't in the reg guide

1 that we used when we reviewed risk-informed changes. 2 Again, I'm going to have to let --VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: 3 Why these changes to 4 the licensing basis deserve that consideration and 5 other changes to the licensing basis are okay to get by with an inferior version of 1.174. 6 7 MR. DUDLEY: Well, the inferior version of 8 Reg Guide 1.174 is not a requirement at all; it's just 9 guidance. 10 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: But it's an acceptable way to make licensing changes. 11 12 Well, if I could point out --MR. RUBIN: this is Mark Rubin from the staff -- the base of 1.174 13 14 was licensing changes that met all current regulatory 15 Here we're making substantial changes requirements. to some of the fundamental safety requirements that 16 were promulgated 20, 30 years ago. And so as a 17 consequence, 1.174, the general approach to 1.174, 18 19 while it's being significantly retained, it's being 20 expanded to fill into the context of supporting a 21 major regulatory change. As a consequence, some areas 22 a little more detail is being provided to provide 23 clarity and ensure that adequate safety to 24 maintained.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS:

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I thought part of the

reason was that as long as it's a regulatory guide you really don't have to follow it. But if you put it in the rule --

VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Yes, but you have that problem with every licensing basis change. They don't have to use Reg Guide 1.174; they just do.

MR. RUBIN: But they have to either follow the regulatory guide or provide an alternate acceptable method. Here there are requirements in the rule that have to be satisfied, and there will be a regulatory guide that will provide one way of meeting those requirements.

VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Yes, because you've chosen to do that for these changes to the licensing basis.

is that when you change this rule there are enumerable changes that can be made to the plant that changes the licensing basis as a result of the rule change. It's relatively impossible to a priori know how many plants will make how many of those changes. Therefore, to go up front and say, "Apply 1.174," it's not going to be very easy because you have to somehow make judgments about all of those changes that are going to be made and how each of them affects each plant. So I don't

1	see how they can
2	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: They can't make any
3	change without coming in and presenting it.
4	MEMBER KRESS: Well, after the fact they
5	will come in and use 1.174 to track the result of
6	those changes. I think they're using it I don't
7	think you can use it as a basis for judging the pipe
8	size or the rule. You can use it as a control of the
9	effect of the rule once it's in place.
10	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: The rule, as I
11	understand it, will not change anything that's in
12	place. If a plant wants to change anything in
13	response to the new rule, they're going to have to
14	come in and apply for a change to their licensing
15	basis.
16	MEMBER KRESS: And I think they will use
17	1.174 like criteria for that.
18	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: But why can't they
19	just use 1.174?
20	MEMBER KRESS: They probably could have.
21	Every plant would have had to come in and do it.
22	MR. DINSMORE: This is Steve Dinsmore from
23	the staff. I think we couldn't just reference 1.174
24	in the rule. We wanted to put enough in the rule to
25	provide the framework with which we had to work with.

1 And so that's why we actually put some of the 1.174 2 criteria into the rule. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: In other words, you 3 4 don't people to propose an alternative approach. 5 (Laughter.) If it's a regulatory guide, they can. 6 Now 7 you're putting it in the rule. 8 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Now they will have 9 no alternative. Dr. Shack, if I could also 10 MR. SHERON: add, if you remember that what the rule allows is 11 12 beyond the transition break size, okay? There are a things are currently regulatory 13 of that 14 requirements, for example, consideration of a single -- or assumption of a single act of failure occurring, 15 16 picking parameters at their worst case conditions. 17 For example, as I said, we assume infinite operation for decay heat along with the assumption of a maximum 18 19 peaking factor which those two can't occur, basically, 20 at the same time, yet those are requirements that 21 currently exist. 22 If a licensee were to come in, you know, 23 and as Mark said, the 1.174 is a risk-informed req 24 guide but licensees still have to meet the regulatory

requirements that exist. What we're doing is we're

changing the regulatory requirements in this case, okay? When we apply 1.174 to other situations, licensees still have to meet the regulations regardless.

In this case, if a licensee, for example, were to come in and say, "I want to change my ECCS analysis, and I want to use Reg Guide 1.174," unless they used, for example, infinite decay heat, 1.2 times ANS, et cetera, and the like, they would have to request an exemption from the regulation. They would still have to meet 50.46 requirements. That's the difference. And this is allowing that we are changing 50.46 requirements. We're backing off from them, and what the 1.174 does --

VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: But with the new rule in place, with 50.46(a) in place, why can't he now come in under 1.174 and say, "I want to change my diesel start time" and present an analysis with a 1.174 analysis? He'll do exactly the same thing except the requirements are in the rule versus the reg guide. If we decide in our infinite wisdom sometime that we need to change 1.174, we now are faced with the fact that we'll have things built into the rule rather than the 1.174. So we're --

MR. SHERON: Well, again, the difference,

I think, as Mark said, and that is that 50.46 is an enabling rule. We want to have that control, basically, over changes in risk, because we believe that if a license were to come in and propose changes under 50.46(a), they could result in substantial changes to public health and safety from reduction in risk.

As you said, 1.174 is merely -- it's a guide, it's an acceptable way to meet the Commission's rules and regulations. It's not the only way. That puts more of a burden on the staff from the standpoint is a licensee wants to deviate from 1.174 we have to consider it, we have to -- it basically becomes the burden is on us to say why something's not acceptable. I think the approach we're trying to promulgate here is to put some consistency in the regulatory process in how licensees come in and justify changes to their plants. We've probably beat this enough to death.

MR. DUDLEY: Well, you'll get another chance toward the end, and Mike Tschiltz, the Branch Chief of the Probablistic Assessment Branch, will be talking to you about the changes in the risk assessment that follows.

Now, I'd just like to talk about the schedule for issuing a proposed rule. We're at the

point where we've just completed office concurrence and we've received concurrence or comments from a number of different offices. On March 10, our current internal schedule is to resolve any open issues associated with the concurrence or concurrence And now I'd like to kind of go to the end comments. of the schedule. On the March 31 date when we're supposed to have this proposed rule to the Commission, in order to do that, working backwards, we have to provide it to the EDO on March 23. And to get it to the EDO on that date, we have to start the concurrence process around the 17th or the 18th of March.

So it's important for us to get your letter somewhere very near March 11 because if it contains any items that we need to address, either in rule language or in the Federal Register notice, we will need to make those changes before we start the concurrence process. This is why we're asking for the letter by a particular date.

And the last two slides are on what we call a planning schedule. This gives you just an overall idea of how the schedule for the proposed rule and the final rule would go. The purpose of these slides is not to specify the schedule we'll actually use because it's all contingent on many things we have

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1 no control over, but the purpose of these slides is to 2 show you that we'll be coming back to the ACRS on numerous occasions as we continue to go through this 3 4 rulemaking process. 5 If we assume that the Commission is able to issue an SRM in two months, and that's just an 6 7 assumption, that's a pretty optimistic assumption, 8 quite honestly, but if that were the case, then we 9 would issue the proposed rule somewhere around the 10 middle of June. We're already working on the reg guide. 11 What SRM would that 12 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 13 be? 14 MR. DUDLEY: We'll put forward the 15 proposed rule to the Commission and if the Commission 16 gives us an SRM that tells us to issue the proposed 17 rule --18 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh. 19 MR. DUDLEY: -- towards the end of May, 20 then we would publish the proposed rule in mid-June. 21 We're already working on the reg guide, 22 and we have an internal date of the 30th of June to 23 complete the first internal draft of that reg guide. 24 So in the summer of 2005 we'll probably initiate 25 discussions with the ACRS on the reg guide, most

1	likely with the subcommittee. In late summer or early
2	fall of 2005, we'll publish the reg guide for comment
3	and it will be a 75-day comment period, the same
4	comment period we believe that we'll use for that
5	we know we'll use for the proposed rule, and we think
6	we'll use the same period for the reg guide.
7	In September of 2005, the proposed rule
8	comment period would end. Shortly after that, in the
9	fall of 2005, the comment period on the reg guide
10	would also end. In winter 2005-2006, we're looking to
11	complete the final rule package in the reg guide, the
12	final reg guide. So we'll probably meet with the ACRS
13	at least one more time in the winter of 2006 to
14	discuss the reg guide and the final rule, maybe in one
15	meeting, maybe in separate meetings.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's interesting that
17	you're putting the reg guide and the rules together
18	here; they go out as a package.
19	MR. DUDLEY: That's correct. That's our
20	goal.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Whereas what we've got
22	today to look at is a rule
23	MR. DUDLEY: Right.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: with great vagueness
25	about what might be in the reg guide, I think

1 deliberately because you haven't done it yet. 2 MR. DUDLEY: Yes. It gives you freedom to 3 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 4 put in what's appropriate. But we've only got one of 5 those things today. 6 MR. DUDLEY: That's correct, yes. But you 7 will be seeing the reg guide at least two more times. And in the spring of 2006, we would be in 8 9 a position to put the rule forward to the Commission. Again, I want to emphasize, and there's an asterisk on 10 all the planning schedules, that these dates are not 11 12 official dates. They're contingent on many things we have no control over. And they're just kind of for 13 14 ballpark planning purposes only, and the elapsed times 15 on the rulemaking items are based on typical rulemaking schedules for other goals, rules that we've 16 worked with. 17 MR. SHERON: Dick, could I add one thing 18 19 that I think Dick didn't cover? The industry has 20 indicated their desire to develop let me call it an 21 evaluation or implementation guide document, an 22 perhaps similar to what they did for Generic Issue 23 191. We have agreed that we think that's something we 24 encourage them to do. I don't know their schedule 25 Maybe that's a question you might want to right now.

pose to them when they come up and speak, but the thought is is that somewhere down the road they will have their own guidance document which the staff will review, and presuming we find it acceptable we would then probably endorse it as another alternative method for implementing the 50.46(a) rule. We would endorse it through our reg guide. So that's another piece which you'll probably become involved in.

MR. DUDLEY: Now I'd like to introduce Gary Hammer from the Mechanical Engineering Branch, and he'll talk about the revised selection of the transition break size.

Yes, good morning. MR. HAMMER: a little brief background on the selection of the TBS, as you remember, we were here in late 2004 on a couple of occasions to discuss this with you before where we outlined the basis for the TBS selection at that time, and we discussed that we had based that on several considerations, foremost the expert elicitation frequency estimates. Together, with that, we wanted to incorporate consideration of uncertainties and sensitivities that might need to be considered, and we also wanted to try to account for adjustments that might further need to be incorporated, such as any considerations due to heavy loads other than during

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normal operation or the sizes of actual attached pipes that are configured in the plants.

And as we discussed, ultimately, we based the size of the TBS on the size of the largest attached pipe in the RCS loop, and those size pipes roughly have the frequency of the 95 percentile of ten to the minus 5th per reactor year. Piping larger than that, larger than those attached pipes, tends to be quite a bit larger and has quite a bit of smaller frequency, such that you have this jump, if you will, which forms sort of a natural decision point, if you will.

At that time, we were postulating that the TBS be considered as double-ended since it was an actual broken pipe, and that it would be applied as a double-ended break at the limiting location; that is, it would have to be moved around in the main loop just to see where the limiting location was.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, wait. Go back.

Let's go back. I think the first sub-bullet under the first bullet is a little misleading. The frequency, actually -- eight inches I think is the smallest diameter, right?

MR. HAMMER: It would depend on how you aggregate the data. The aggregation had a big change

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2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, no, no. The
3	pipes attached to the RCS main loop, I think the
4	smallest size is eight inches?
5	MR. HAMMER: Oh, yes.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Forget about the
7	expert opinion. I'm talking about the plants now.
8	MR. HAMMER: Okay.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's about eight. I
10	think the frequency of the whole equivalent diameter
11	of eight inches is much lower it's lower than ten
12	to the minus five. It's not ten to the minus five, as
13	this sub-bullet implies. And that was your choice is
14	a little more conservative than this.
15	MR. HAMMER: I'm not sure
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Attached piping has
17	95th percentile break frequency of about ten to the
18	minus five?
19	MR. HAMMER: That's roughly
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's not an accurate
21	statement.
22	MR. HAMMER: It's not exact.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It's lower. The
2.4	frequency is actually lower.

MR. HAMMER: Well, if you look at the 95th

1 percentile, those numbers were of course a little 2 bigger breaks. And if you look at the LOCA categories covered some range between LOCA Category 3 and LOCA 3 4 Category 4 or 4 to 5. And so all of these pipes fell 5 roughly in that range. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I think it's lower. 6 7 MR. HAMMER: Coupled with that, the next 8 bullet, which is that the next larger pipe has a much 9 lower frequency, so --10 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So what you're doing 11 here, for my own benefit, if I go to the 95th 12 frequency failure, percentile of the of the distribution of the frequency failure, then I have a 13 14 bunch of expert opinions, right? Then I will also go 15 to the 95th percentile of the expert opinion 16 variability, and that's the ten to the minus five 17 you're using? MR. HAMMER: I'm not sure I understand 18 19 what you're saying. We were only working with one 20 curve, but the curves were aggregated in different 21 ways. 22 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But this one curve 23 you are using is from the executive summary from the 24 Is that what you're using? You say you're

working with one curve. Where did that curve come

1	from?
2	MR. HAMMER: Well, you mentioned 12
3	experts, but the experts were aggregated into one
4	curve. That's what I meant.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Right, from the
6	executive summary.
7	MR. HAMMER: But there were several of
8	those curves.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I know. And which
10	one did you pick?
11	MR. HAMMER: We tried to consider that
12	there was some sensitivity involved in which curve you
13	picked, so we took that into consideration.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Did you pick the one
15	that the previous speakers in the previous session
16	feel is the best consensus curve or you picked another
17	one?
18	MR. HAMMER: Actually, the base case was
19	the geometric mean curve
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
21	MR. HAMMER: that you heard about
22	earlier. There were also the aggregations of the
23	mixture distribution or the arithmetic mean, and we
24	looked at all of those and tended to pick whatever
25	number came up as the larger of the group.

1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, okay.
2	MR. HAMMER: So this is realizing that
3	there's not uniform agreement on the exact aggregation
4	anyway and
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
6	MR. HAMMER: and we wanted to consider
7	that.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you went with the
9	most conservative estimate that you could find.
10	MR. HAMMER: Well, yes. I mean of course
11	95th percentile is arbitrary, so in some person's mind
12	that might not be the most conservative.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But the point is that
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15	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: We're supposed to
16	finish at 10:55.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But this is an
18	important point. I don't know why the other guy
19	hasn't bothered to come up with their best
20	distribution.
21	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Well, he's going to
22	pick a different break size anyway. He's
23	conservative, George.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I know he is. All
25	right.

1 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Let's move on. 2 Is there a slight MEMBER RANSOM: 3 disconnect here? They're focusing on attached piping, 4 and I thought the elicitation was for cracks in piping 5 and more or less of a continuous distribution. VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: This is the size. 6 7 MEMBER RANSOM: Right. 8 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: They're picking the 9 size based on the sciences. 10 MEMBER RANSOM: But why pick it based on attached piping? Why not pick it based on just on the 11 12 probability of occurrence regardless? MR. HAMMER: Well, we looked at that. 13 14 mean you could have holes in the system of various 15 configurations. We felt like one of the ways that -since the bigger pipes tend to be thicker and more 16 17 robust, then there was a greater likelihood that if you had a break of a given size, it might be in the 18 19 attached pipe. Because the wells are oriented in a 20 circumferential fashion, so if you have a crack of a 21 given length, it tends to affect you more that way 22 than in some other way. MEMBER RANSOM: But we heard from the 23 24 elicitation that the double-ended or quillotine break

was more unlikely than, say, cracks in piping and

1	things like that, which might open up, which then
2	leads you to a continuous distribution of sizes of the
3	break, even though it's single-ended type of thing.
4	And I would think that your choice of TBS would be
5	based on the same type of consideration.
6	MR. HAMMER: Well, I heard the discussion
7	earlier. I'm not sure I exactly agree with it, but we
8	wanted to capture what we though were the important
9	things in terms of the actual configurations. And so
10	we felt like the attached pipes were a major
11	consideration.
12	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: But, again, this
13	size does bound all those other holes that could
14	appear in the system
15	MR. HAMMER: Right.
16	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: which is
17	consistent.
18	MR. HAMMER: Right. Right. And I'll get
19	into that a little bit. We looked at how we might do
20	something regarding varying the size of the break with
21	regard to location, and I'll touch on that a little
22	bit. We did investigate that.
23	After the last RCS meeting in December, we
24	set about investigating ways that we might able to
25	better estimate the TBS, make it smaller or more

accurately estimate it. We looked at primarily two issues. The first was could we vary the size of the TBS with respect to the location, and I think this gets into your question a little bit.

One of the things that we specifically wondered, and this is kind of maybe just one example, but we felt like it was an important one, on PWRs you have hot legs and cold legs that operate at slightly different temperatures. Might be 40 degrees F or 50, degrees F, whatever it is. Anyway, it's substantial, perhaps, in terms of the degradation mechanisms being somewhat different, at least theoretically.

So we thought -- and cold leg breaks tend to be limiting thermal-hydraulically in the analysis. So we thought, well, okay, we're basing this TBS on the largest attached pipe, which is actually the surge line, and the surge line is attached to the hot leg. Do we need to make that same size break in a cold leg? Maybe it doesn't logically follow.

So we went through that though process, and we said, well, can we further parse or subdivide some of the information that was in the elicitation data, in some of those estimates, and see if we could come up with some difference like that or some better

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1 estimate, which might be beneficial in terms of making 2 the break somewhat smaller in the cold leg? But when we started to do that we found 3 4 that we really couldn't adequately quantify such 5 difference, because the elicitation responses were in terms of overall frequencies of a certain size 6 7 aggregated over a significant population. So if you 8 start to break that data out in that way, it really --9 you're doing something and it really wasn't generated for, we didn't feel like. So we felt like we're 10 introducing a lot of additional uncertainty in trying 11 to make that type of formulation. 12 And so we felt like that what we would do 13 14 is just stay with the size of the largest attached 15 pipe and apply that from all locations. 16 MEMBER RANSOM: That's what you're 17 intending to do, apply it in all locations. 18 Right. MR. HAMMER: 19 MEMBER RANSOM: Okay. 20 MR. HAMMER: Well, in all locations, but 21 22 In cold legs? MEMBER RANSOM: 23 MR. HAMMER: Right. Right. Right. 24 other question we had was something that the -- yes? 25 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Two minutes we'll

106 1 finish up? 2 MR. HAMMER: Two? 3 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Two. 4 MR. HAMMER: Okay. I'll run quick. All 5 right. The other question was something that the ACRS had specifically asked about that we though was a good 6 7 question, whether it needed to be modeled as double-end. There's several considerations about 8 9 that, and I've listed them there. Ultimately, we felt like -- I quess the most important bullet there is 10 11 that heard this morning, the, as you expert 12 elicitation really estimated frequencies of certain holes in the system, and our further 13 14 consideration of doubling that size hole was 15 essentially double counting that would be inappropriate, in large part. 16

And even if you look at the full break of pressurizer surge line, which does simultaneously empty the pressurizer contents in addition to flow out of the hot leg, the primary effect is what's coming out of the hot leg, not what's coming out of the pressurizer. And so -- let me see if there's anything else there.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You had something about manways.

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1 MR. HAMMER: It's essentially bounded --2 We were happy that the CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 3 double-ended break sizes seem to bound the manway 4 break, but the single-ended break probably does not 5 bound the manway break anymore. I'm sorry, Dr. Wallis. 6 MR. HAMMER: 7 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The manway and the steam generators and so on, if they come off, that area is 8 9 I think equivalent to the double-ended break you had I think going with a single-ended break you 10 no longer cover the manways. 11 Because the manway itself 12 HAMMER: would be bigger than this size, you mean --13 14 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yes, right. 15 MR. HAMMER: Yes. But in looking at the 16 manway failure, I think we felt like that was a lower 17 frequency than what was being targeted here. have to fail multiple bolts simultaneously. 18 19 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It has a possible cause, 20 which would be human error. That's why it's a little 21 different from the other breaks. It has a possible 22 cause, which is overtightening of bolts. Human error 23 could lead to manway failure. That's why we like the 24 idea in our letter that you were covering that, and

now you're not. So I just noticed that in passing.

MR. HAMMER: Okay. And for the proposed rule, I guess just to summarize, we're proposing that it be based on the largest attached pipe, similar to before, and that it would be applied at the limiting location, wherever that would be, and that it would be modeled as a single-ended break.

MEMBER BONACA: Since you're not using any

more double-ended discharge, I mean to continue to link transition break size the to а pipe misleading. I mean I understand and now I can see it's a single-ended, whatever, but by referring to break size it just raises the question. It seems as if we try to model a limiting break in real terms when we didn't. I mean, yes, it's a size of the pressurizer line but then we're only using one side of this charge. So it really is not related to that. Anyway, just a comment. I can live with that.

I think this linkage is a remnant of the previous version of the rule where we have double-ended discharge, and it stays in but it's unrealistic so therefore is not representative of what happens if you really had a double-ended break on that.

VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: I think one of the conclusions of the elicitation process was that if you

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1	wanted to get an eight-inch hole, the way that you'd
2	most likely get it would be a break of an eight-inch
3	pipe rather than an eight-inch hole in a 24-inch line.
4	MEMBER BONACA: I understand.
5	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: So there is a
6	logical connection, I think, between the pipe and the
7	hole.
8	MR. HAMMER: And if you remember I
9	didn't go back over all of this, remember we had
LO	initially just come up with a nice, big, fat, round
L1	number, 14-inch on PWRs, 20-inch on BWRs. But then we
L2	started to look at, well, if we're looking at pipes
L3	that break, they don't have those exact dimensions,
L4	and as a matter of fact those attached pipes vary from
L5	plant to plant, so shouldn't we customize it a little
L6	bit for that?
L7	MEMBER BONACA: Okay.
L8	MR. HAMMER: Okay.
L9	MR. DUDLEY: Okay. Next, Ralph Landry
20	will talk about the thermal-hydraulic calculations
21	that we're having done.
22	MR. LANDRY: Okay. One of the interesting
23	questions that has come up from the Subcommittee, the
24	full Committee and our own internal discussions as
25	we've gone about formulating this regulation is that

what are some of the safety benefits, what are the changes in risk from a potential change in the rule of the break size?

Subsequent to the meeting which we had in December with the Committee, we met with the industry, the Westinghouse Owner's Group, which included Westinghouse, Framatome and General Electric, and discussed what could be a set of calculations which could be performed by both the industry and the NRC to try to define or determine in some way a risk-benefit. Now, this is not a definitive work, it is not all-encompassing. We due to time could only focus on one particular area, so we have defined, in conjunction with the Westinghouse Owner's Group, a set of calculations which are going to be done by the industry and in parallel by the NRC.

We are going to do reactor coolant system calculations, in other words, the LOCA calculations. The industry is going to perform these calculations, and the NRC is going to perform calculations. We're going to use a more or less generic model for the Westinghouse four-loop, 12-foot core plan. We're are going to use the same basic model for both the industry and the NRC so that we see how the different codes compare.

We are going to do containment calculations, both the industry and the NRC, and the industry is going to take a plant-specific PRA and make modifications in the PRA based on the results of some of these thermal-hydraulic calculations and try to determine what is the change in risk from these operational changes that we're talking about.

Okav. The reactor coolant system calculations which going to perform we're are basically five break sizes. We're going to look at what has been traditionally the worst case, small We're going to look at a hot leg break of break LOCA. the pressurizer surge line, and we're going to look at the cold leg, taking the Accumulator/SI line, but we're going to place that break on the bottom of the pipe, which is traditionally the worst case to have a cold leg break. And then we're going to take that Accumulator/SI line break size and increase it by 20 percent and decrease it by 20 percent, so that we can see if there's an effect from a slightly larger or slightly smaller break size.

These five breaks will then be run in two conditions. We're going to use the normal emergency diesel generator start time of ten seconds, and we're going to use a delay in the start time up to 60

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1 seconds, so that we can see is there a change in the 2 thermal-hydraulic response due to a delay in the 3 diesel generator start. 4 Now, when Wayne Harrison gets up from the 5 industry, Wayne is going to talk more about how they're going to quantify the effect of change on the 6 7 PRA and change of reliability --8 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You're expecting a 9 safety benefit from this? MR. LANDRY: Well, we want to see if there 10 is. These calculations are being designed to tell us 11 12 for an initial cut is there a change in risk from such things as changing the diesel generator start time? 13 14 As I said, this is not an all-encompassing set of 15 calculations. This was only one that we determined 16 initially we could use as a starting point. 17 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But you might look for an optimum start time would make some sense, wouldn't 18 19 it? 20 That's a possibility to MR. LANDRY: 21 optimize, to iterate or perturb the start time till 22 you find what is the optimum tradeoff between change 23 in thermal-hydraulics versus change in reliability. 24 We had to select an arbitrary set of 25 conditions to get the calculations started, and that's

1 why we've selected these as an arbitrary initial set, 2 and we may vary other things at a later date. 3 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are you looking at risk 4 here or are you looking at core damage? 5 MR. LANDRY: We're going to look at the change in the thermal-hydraulic conditions from a 6 7 diesel generator delay. And then that change in start 8 time can be translated into a change in reliability 9 which can be then put into the PRA and determined from 10 the PRA what is the change in risk. MEMBER BONACA: Would the PRA model also 11 the double-ended guillotine break with less capable 12 PCCS system or less capable, I mean, simply with maybe 13 14 single train rather than two? That would be an additional 15 MR. LANDRY: 16 calculation for a later date. This is just -- as I 17 said, this is the initial attempt to try to quantify a change in risk. 18 19 MR. SHERON: Mario, this is Brian Sheron. 20 The PRAs I don't think go into that level of detail. 21 And I'll have to turn to Mark or Steve here but my 22 understanding is that, for example, they will have a 23 success criteria that says if the thermal-hydraulic 24 calculation says you mitigate, the event would say two

accumulators or three accumulators, and your PRA says

1	therefore for those scenarios it's success, it's not
2	core melt. It doesn't get into the question of how
3	much did I increase risk by decreasing margin. We
4	just don't get down to that level.
5	MEMBER BONACA: In fact, you don't get
6	into the issue as long as it's coolable.
7	MR. SHERON: Yes. The intent here is
8	I mean we have heard for a long time that these fast
9	starts of diesels and the testing required actually
10	may be causing more harm than good, and so the whole
11	idea here is that if we can allow a longer start time
12	for the diesels, there's I think a pretty obvious
13	safety benefit in terms of reduced wear and tear on
14	diesels, and that's what we're trying to see what that
15	benefit is.
16	MEMBER KRESS: You have to come up with a
17	new reliability number for the diesel?
18	MR. LANDRY: Wayne Harrison is going to
19	talk about how the industry is approaching that.
20	MEMBER KRESS: Okay.
21	MR. LANDRY: And he presents after us.
22	Okay. We are also going to look at the
23	containment response in a couple of ways. One is we
24	are going to use a generic GOTHIC containment model
25	for what we're calling a generic large dry

1 containment. We're going to use that model to build 2 a contained model also, so that we can look at GOTHIC 3 and contained within the staff. The industry is using 4 just GOTHIC. 5 And with the containment analyses, we want 6 to use the mass energy releases we get from the 7 thermal-hydraulic calculations and then look 8 varying the spray actuation time. Instead of using an 9 automatic containment spry actuation, can we delay the 10 spray actuation, and what is the effect on RWST to some switchover from changing the spray actuation 11 What is the change in washed-out debris? 12 time? is the change in the effect on ECC pump and PSH from 13 14 the sump from this delay? 15 It's interesting that CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 16 you seem to be looking at the consequences of a 17 decision to be made, and the decision's going to be made before your evaluation of the consequences is 18 19 available. 20 We plan on sharing the MR. LANDRY: these analyses with the 21 results appropriate subcommittee as they become available. 22 23 That's very interesting. CHAIRMAN WALLIS:

I think it's very interesting. I'm just interested in

the fact that you're looking at the consequences of

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1	the decision, and yet your analysis isn't going to be
2	available before the decision is made. It's just an
3	interesting way to do business. It may be in this
4	case very appropriate, I donÆt know.
5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: When are the results
6	of these analysis going to be made?
7	MR. LANDRY: That's my last slide.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Keep me in
9	suspense.
LO	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yes, we're a long way
L1	from the final rule. Maybe by the time we get to the
L2	final rule you will have this, and that would be very
L3	helpful.
L4	MR. SHERON: Dr. Wallis, again, let me
L5	just reiterate, this is an enabling rule. It does not
L6	say that licensees will this rule allows licensees
L7	to go automatically off and do this. Even though we
L8	do these calculations, individual licensees are going
L9	to have to demonstrated, for example, if they want to
20	go to manual action for the sprays, they're going to
21	have to show why the timing, why the operators are
22	trained, why this can be done reliably.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's very important,
24	I think. The rule doesn't allow all these things to
25	happen automatically, and therefore the kind of thing

1	that is being done here is going to be very helpful
2	and you're assessing the applications from industry
3	resulting from the rule.
4	MR. SHERON: Yes.
5	MR. LANDRY: The quick answer, George, is
6	the spring.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, that's fine.
8	MR. LANDRY: The PRA, which is being
9	looked at by the industry, is going to look at
10	multiple effects. As we talked about with EDG
11	reliability changes, do the longer start times improve
12	reliability is it less demanding on load sequencing,
13	et cetera? Those effects can be looked at within the
14	PRA. But with respect to the containment, as we
15	already talked about, does changing this switchover
16	time from RWST to sump affect the reliability of the
17	human factor by giving the operator more time in which
18	to make a switchover? Does it reserve water?
19	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What kind of the
20	change, what is it? Because if it's only a few
21	minutes, I donÆt think you're going to see anything.
22	MR. LANDRY: We were talking about the
23	spray actuation time could be changed on the order of
24	hours.
25	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Hours. Oh.

1 MR. LANDRY: The initial discussions which 2 we've had with industry indicate that this could be 3 hours, more than 40 minutes. 4 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Because, as you know, 5 the human reliability models are not that sensitive to changes in time. But if you go to hours --6 7 MR. LANDRY: That's what the staff had said when we started talking about this, that if it's 8 9 only a matter of minutes, it's not going to make a If it's 40 minutes, an hour or more, then it 10 may have an effect. We don't know that until we run 11 12 the calculations. MEMBER BONACA: And still maintain the 13 14 capability to mitigate beyond TBS? 15 MR. LANDRY: Downstream. Another phase in 16 this analysis work is that we are planning on doing work with our Office of Research looking at the 17 18 effects of changes in mitigation strategies, 19 mitigation requirements, what analyses can show --20 MEMBER BONACA: The reason why I'm asking 21 that question is that you want to delay the start of 22 the spray as long as you can, but you still have 23 constraints of mitigating beyond the transition break 24 size which may impose some requirement. I don't know

what it's going to be. So that's why there's a

tradeoff there how much you can gain in the delay of the time.

MR. LANDRY: All right. That gets into a whole different area, because then you start weighing which plants have safety-grade air coolers, which don't. If they have safety-grade air coolers, they may not need sprays for a very long time. This becomes very plant-specific, but right now what we are doing is a first attempt at attempting to quantifying what are some of the risk changes, the safety benefits.

MEMBER BONACA: Yes. All I'm saying is that in quantifying the safety benefits you can't assume that you're going to have all latitude to change these things. You still have the constraints coming from the mitigation necessity beyond transition break size that will limit how much of this can be gained.

LANDRY: Right. We're arbitrarily limited ourselves to the TBS, to the range that would still be the design basis accident, the range which would still require the conservative assumptions for the analysis, single failures, et cetera. We are not looking at the range beyond the TBS the double-ended quillotine break where we would relax the

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1 requirements and say you could use full ECC, you don't 2 have to take single failure or single failure, et 3 cetera. That would be another stage in trying to 4 study and quantify what the safety benefits are. 5 MEMBER BONACA: If that's true, then we're not independent. 6 7 MR. LANDRY: We realize that. 8 MR. DINSMORE: Dr. Bonaca, this is Steve 9 I think what you're asking is whether we're 10 going to select a change and fully implement that change into the PRA so that all the plus and the 11 negatives of this change are reflected in the results. 12 And I believe that's the plan. 13 14 MEMBER BONACA: I'm only saying that if 15 you say that I can delay my actuation of the spread by 16 one hour, it's a great gain and all that kind of stuff, and then when I do the actual analysis I find 17 that I can't do beyond ten minutes because I have to 18 19 deal with still this defense-in-depth capability 20 beyond transition break, then we get the wrong picture 21 of the results. We get some results that give us 22 comfort and they may not be correct. That's all I'm 23 saying. 24 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: We have to finish up

here in about a minute.

1 MEMBER BONACA: Understand that, but 2 important, Ι think. Otherwise we that's 3 mischaracterize the benefits of the change. 4 MR. LANDRY: Okay. Our schedule is to 5 complete these calculations in May of 2005. We wanted to have these calculations available to support the 6 7 development of the reg guide. So we're pressing to 8 have these calculations done in May and, again, we do 9 want to share the results with the appropriate subcommittee. As the results are reviewed and we are 10 sure the results are right, we would like to come 11 forward with you all and share the results and discuss 12 them with you. 13 14 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Next is Mike Tschiltz. 15 16 MR. TSCHILTZ: Go ahead and go to the next 17 slide, please. Next slide, please. Thank you. This slides provides a summary of the four significant 18 19 changes involving the risk assessment that have made 20 to the proposed rule since the staff last spoke with 21 the committee. Next slide. You'll get a chance. 22 slide goes into them in detail. 23 The first issue is late release frequency. 24 I'm trying to be sensitive to the time issue here. 25 The proposed rule has been changed to no longer

1	provide a specific late release frequency acceptance
2	criteria, although a later release frequency
3	calculation will still be required for changes that
4	have an impact on containment performance. It will be
5	evaluated as part of the defense-in-depth assessment
6	to ensure that a reasonable remains between core
7	damage prevention, containment failure and constant
8	mitigation.
9	Why did we make the change? The staff
10	felt that the best place to evaluate the late release
11	frequency was in the consideration of
12	defense-in-depth. More specific guidance will be
13	developed and provided in the associated reg guide,
14	and guidance will provide for consideration of both
15	qualitative and quantitative information.
16	We still need the calculation of late
17	release frequency for changes to the facility where
18	CDF and LERF metrics are not sensitive to the change,
19	such as changes to the containment spray system.
20	If you recall, an inconsequential change
21	has been defined as one when considered by itself and
22	when considered in combination with all other
23	inconsequential changes
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let me understand

something here. It seems to me when you say that LRF

1 will be evaluated when considered in defense-in-depth, 2 in essence what you're saying is we will leave it up 3 to the judgment of the decision maker whether LRF 4 plays any role or not. Is that true? 5 considering defense-in-depth is really a judgment call, and you are removing explicit criteria. 6 7 MR. TSCHILTZ: Yes. And I think there had been a great deal of work done in the early '90s on 8 9 late release criteria, and I think it becomes very 10 complicated as far as coming up with criteria that 11 don't usurp the other criteria that are directly 12 linked to the QHO, CDF and LERF. So I think that the judgment here was that this was a complicated enough 13 14 metric that it needed to have a careful assessment as 15 opposed to an arbitrary type of metric with a set limit, that we needed to consider a number of factors 16 in the decision. 17 The other thing, Dr. 18 MR. SHERON: 19 Apostolakis, is that we looked and we said why is this 20 unique to 50.46 as opposed to 1.174, in general? 21 I think the though was is that at a future revision of 22 1.174 we would consider a late release frequency in a 23 more global context rather than just single it out for 24 this rule change.

Okay.

TSCHILTZ:

MR.

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Back to the

definition of the inconsequential change. It's one that when considered by itself and when considered in combination with all other inconsequential change remains insignificant. It does not become significant. For those type of changes that can be quantified, we've set the limit as one E to the minus seven CDF and one E to minus eight LERF, but we expect most inconsequential changes that are quantifiable will be much less than these limits.

Why did we make the change? The staff felt that requiring licensees to track the cumulative risk of inconsequential changes was overly burdensome and unnecessary and that there were other measures that remain that assure that the facility risk remains acceptably small.

change acceptable? is the proposed rule requires submittal of a 24-month report provides a list of all bу licensees that inconsequential changes. The staff will use this report to evaluate whether the provision for allowing inconsequential changes is being properly applied by licensees, and particularly it will allow us to identify inappropriate parsing of changes numerous inconsequential changes are being made that should have been considered as one change.

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The proposed rule still requires quantification of the inconsequential change where

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be quantifiable from a risk perspective. Next slide.

possible, although there are many changes that may not

Okay. We reduced the level of detail in the rule that was basically a direct excerpt out of 1.174. Why did we do this? Well, when we discussed this before, we felt that since Req Guide 1.174 was guidance and not legally enforceable that some of it needed to be incorporated into the rule. I think our first attempt we basically directly excerpted sections from 1.174 into the rule. Upon further consideration we determined that this level of detail was not necessary or appropriate for the rule itself and that a lot of the guidance -- or a lot of the information could be incorporated in the associated req quide.

Why is this acceptable? What remains in the proposed rule are what we consider to be the high level requirements that provide sufficient control for safety and risk. The requirements that remain in the rule that are related to Reg Guide 1.174 include, first, a requirement concerning the PRA scope and quality. The proposed rule requires that licensees quantitatively address risk from all sources that would affect the regulatory decision in a substantive

manner. And for issues that are addressed qualitatively, the proposed rule requires that the analysis be conservative enough to provide a high confidence in the decision.

Second, a requirement that specifies the risk acceptance criteria. The proposed rule provides high-level criteria that will be spelled out in greater detail in the associated reg guide, and it requires that the risk from 50.46(a) change is small and that baseline risk to the facility remains relatively small.

And, third, a requirement that specifies that as a part of the PRA updates licensees must submit a report to the NRC when changes to a licensee's PRA result in either a greater than 20 percent increase in the baseline risk or a greater than one E to the minus six CDF or one E to the minus 7 LERF, respectively. Next slide.

Bundling. Changes that are enabled by 50.46 or changes that are associated with ECCS performance or associated with the consequences of the LOCA, bundling will allow the tradeoff of risk reductions associated with unrelated changes with risk increases associated with changed enabled by 50.46(a). We only envision this to be necessary or useful in

1	situations where the 50.46(a) changes, the cumulative
2	effect of the changes exceed the acceptance criteria.
3	In these cases, it provides licensees with the
4	incentive to reduce the overall risk of the facility
5	by making other unrelated changes.
6	MEMBER KRESS: Will you allow
7	administrative changes to offset changes in hardware?
8	MR. TSCHILTZ: Administrative changes as
9	far as I'm not seeing how an administrative change
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11	MEMBER KRESS: Some procedure on how an
12	operator does.
13	MR. DINSMORE: This is Steve Dinsmore from
14	the staff. Essentially, the way it's written out is
15	that it would allow that. We'd have the opportunity
16	to review each one individually, because these bundled
17	ones have to come in for review.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So the
19	defense-in-depth consideration, though, probably will
20	veto it.
21	MR. RUBIN: Let me add that excessive use
22	of programmatic methods is discouraged in 1.174, and
23	we will carry that same philosophy through here. So
24	if it relied heavily on a programmatic method for a
25	significant risk reduction, it's likely we would not

1	accept it for bundling.
2	MR. TSCHILTZ: This concept is allowed in
3	1.174. It's described as an unrelated change in
4	consideration of a combined change request. And,
5	basically, 1.174 requires the reviewer to examine the
6	relationships between the proposed changes. Where one
7	proposed change may have a high degree of uncertainty
8	associated with it, the reviewer is supposed to
9	consider that in the decision. The same would apply
10	here to the example, I think, that you gave.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, but I think Mark
12	is right. Excessive reliance on programmatic means is
13	discouraged. And that will be part of the
14	defense-in-depth evaluation, which is separate from
15	the quantitative comparison with criteria.
16	MR. RUBIN: It will all be part of the
17	decision process of whether that particular bundling
18	package was acceptable.
19	MR. TSCHILTZ: Allowing bundling will
20	result in changes that have a result and a net
21	decrease in risk or smaller net increases than would
22	occur if bundling weren't allowed. Next slide.
23	Limitations on bundling. One of the
24	premises of risk-informed regulation is that
25	facilities are built and operated in accordance with

requirements. Therefore, if a change were necessary
to bring a facility in compliance with NRC
regulations, it could not be bundled with other
changes. An example of this would be where a licensee
discovered a section of piping that was required to be
seismically qualified and they made the modifications
to the plant that brought it in compliance and
seismically qualified the pipe. There would be an
associated risk reduction with that change. They
could not bundle that with other 50.46(a) related
changes in order to meet the risk criteria.
There's additional limitations on the use
of bundling that have been derived directly from Reg
Guide 1.174. Specifically, bundled changes must not
increase risk from significant accident sequences,
cause lower rank accidents to become more significant
or create new significant accident sequences.
MEMBER KRESS: Do you have a
quantification of the word, "significant?"
MR. TSCHILTZ: No. It's not quantified in
1.174, as I'm sure you know, and it's not quantified
here.
MEMBER KRESS: Yes, but we always have to
ask this question.
MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You're using the

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1	language that I don't understand why do you have to
2	say, "must not." Why don't you soften it and say that
3	these considerations will be part of the
4	defense-in-depth evaluation as well? In other words,
5	it will be part of the judgment of the decision maker.
6	That makes much more sense. Because you can have an
7	increase in risk from significant accident sequences,
8	but overall that's acceptable if you consider
9	everything else.
LO	MEMBER KRESS: In fact it's more likely.
L1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. I mean this
L2	"must not" is kind of too strong.
L3	MR. TSCHILTZ: I don't know whether those
L4	words are taken directly out of 1.174 or not.
L5	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, you know, 1.174
L6	didn't come down from the mountain.
L7	(Laughter.)
L8	MR. DINSMORE: This is Steve Dinsmore.
L9	The "must" is from the rule because it was written in
20	the rule like that. If we changed it to "should," I'm
21	not sure how that affects the rule language.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: From the rule. Which
23	rule is that?
24	MR. DINSMORE: Well, the proposed rule.
25	I think we have flexibility in defining "significant"
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1	and that kind of stuff, but I think we could change
2	the rule, but I don't know the impact of that.
3	MR. RUBIN: I think the actual process is
4	exactly what Dr. Apostolakis is asking for, is
5	implying. But the word language I think was driven,
6	as Steve said, by our attorneys. But we do of course
7	have the flexibility of determining both significant,
8	what the significant accident sequences are. These
9	aren't defined in the ASME standard either, and that's
10	an issue.
11	MR. SHERON: I was just going to say that
12	we normally don't put "shoulds" in rules, okay? It's
13	"must" or "shalls." Shoulds go to reg guides.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Couldn't you say,
15	"must be considered in the defense-in-depth
16	evaluation"? Then you still use "must."
17	MR. RUBIN: This isn't just
18	defense-in-depth, this is directly impacting the risk
19	profile.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, everything is
21	defense-in-depth.
22	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: We need to move on,
23	George.
24	MEMBER KRESS: Can I ask one more question
25	of these guys? I was a little disturbed to hear that

1 you backed off the late containment failure criteria. 2 Does this mean you're now going to ignore total number of deaths and the total impact of land contamination 3 4 in your criteria? Because those aren't really Well, to some extent CDF addresses them, but 5 6 they're not covered by the quantitative health 7 Those are individual risks. objectives. Well, I think the reason we 8 MR. TSCHILTZ: 9 want to have the late release frequency in there is because we recognize that a significant amount of the 10 dose to the public from an accident would occur from 11 12 a late release. That's why we're including it in our The ability to come up with a meaningful 13 14 metric that we could live with forever or close to forever in the time frame that we are developing this 15 16 rule is a challenge. I understand that, and it's 17 MEMBER KRESS: a lot like the safety goals, and those were like 18 19 pulling teeth. I suggest you give this some thought before the next revision of 1.174. I think that's 20 21 something that is badly needed, some quantifiable risk 22 acceptance metric that deals with societal risk. 23 MR. TSCHILTZ: I think we were already 24 planning on doing that as part of our next review in

Revision 1.174, because this -- when we were doing the

1	work for this rule, we recognized that we could use
2	additional guidance here.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is it necessary to
4	have the last bullet in the rule? Take it out. But
5	if you have to use "must," then take the whole thing
6	out. Nobody's forcing you to put that in the rule.
7	MR. DINSMORE: This is Steve Dinsmore.
8	But then it
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Because this is
10	awfully detailed. A minor increase in the risk from
11	significant accident sequences must not. Leave it up
12	to the decision maker to decide whether it's
13	important.
14	MR. DINSMORE: This is Steve. But we have
15	to have some reason to we have to have some
16	authority to request that and to deny it based on this
17	type of information.
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: They have a lot of
19	freedom.
20	MR. DINSMORE: Yes, that's a lot of
21	freedom, but it's also difficult to fully justify the
22	but if we have this type of language in the rule,
23	it's clear.
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But what is a minor
25	increase? This says, "must not increase," period.
	I .

1 And the increase is ten to the minus ninth. This 2 says, "must not." 3 MR. SHERON: I think you've raised a good 4 point. We can look at the words. I mean I wouldn't 5 want to use the word, "significant," twice in the same line, but we could say, "should not significantly 6 7 increase the risk from significant accident 8 sequences." I think that's what you mean, really. But you're right, there could very small increases 9 that are inconsequential where "must" would -- and I 10 11 think we've suffered with that with the NOED policy. 12 MR. SNODDERLY: Excuse me, Mike. follow up on Dr. Kress' question about late release 13 14 frequency? So is it correct to say then from the 15 period early to, say, 24 hours the design basis of containment now would be driven by the transition 16 17 break size? In other words, after early, say, two to four hours, to 24 hours, in that time period, what 18 would be the design basis of containment? Would it be 19 20 governed by the transition break size? I'm trying to 21 figure out what --22 Which is the most limiting? MR. TSCHILTZ: 23 Right. What would be the MR. SNODDERLY: 24 design basis for containment? It no longer would be 25 the double-ended guillotine break, right?

1 MR. TSCHILTZ: Yes, but the containment 2 would still need to withstand the double-ended guillotine break. 3 It still says they have to 4 MR. SHERON: 5 mitigate up through the double-ended guillotine rupture, which means that the containment has to 6 7 remain in tact. VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Yes, but if you take 8 9 a transition break size with a design basis pressure, will that be more limiting with a large break with a 10 realistic failure criteria? That's the question that 11 12 Mike is after, if I can understand it. MR. SHERON: The double-ended quillotine 13 14 is going to produce the largest mass and energy release into the containment and will produce the 15 16 largest challenge to the containment. 17 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Right, but as I read it, you're going to have different -- you no longer 18 19 have the design basis pressure for the 20 containment. 21 MR. SHERON: We said we would look. 22 think if I remember correctly we would look at whether 23 or not it was acceptable to allow increases, say, 24 above the appropriate ASME code service level. For

example, if the containment design pressure is 55 psi

and let's say a licensee comes in and proposes an uprate in power such that the mass energy release goes up to 60 psi, I think what we said -- help me, Gary, if you remember -- we said that we would take a look at that and as long as we were preserving substantial margin with that, then we would probably allow that. But we were not going to just give up on the design basis for the containment at all. Does that make sense?

MR. LANDRY: That's another one of those plant-specific calculations, because when we talk about the service levels for containment, it's for a particular containment design. The design pressure, the yield pressure and the ultimate pressure for a large dry are significantly different than from a freestanding shell. So that we have to be very careful when we talk about changing allowable pressure limits for a containment. What containment design are we talking about here before we start saying we can allow these changes.

VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Yes. I mean you're going to still have assurance of the containment integrity, but it's not clear to me that the design basis will always be the large-break LOCA, the DEGB. It may, it may not be; I just don't know.

1	MR. LANDRY: The steam line break is still
2	in the design basis. And the main steam line break on
3	pressure is only slightly below the LOCA. It's only
4	a couple psi less than a LOCA for pressurization. It
5	is in virtually all cases the limiting event for
6	temperature in all containments. So simply changing
7	the LOCA requirement or LOCA limitations really isn't
8	going to affect significantly the containment
9	requirements.
10	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: We're going to have
11	to move on now.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, the leak rate would
13	be higher with the larger break, which is also the
14	design requirement. It's possible you may move to a
15	different service level for containment.
16	MR. LANDRY: Leak rate is a function of
17	service level and pressure.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Right. Right.
19	MR. LANDRY: The leak rate doesn't go as
20	a stop function with service level. It's a linear
21	function.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
23	MR. LANDRY: As you go up in pressure, the
24	leak rate is going to keep going up.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: It will go up with it,

1	right.
2	MR. LANDRY: When you go from Service
3	Level A to B, you don't have a step function change in
4	leak.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
6	MR. DUDLEY: Dr. Shack, Brian Sheron has
7	some concluding remarks he'd like to make.
8	MR. SHERON: Well, I just wanted to thank
9	the Committee for allowing us to come down and make
10	the presentation. I just want to point out we've
11	worked kind of long and hard on this. If you counted
12	the number of hours we agonized over this, this was
13	not an easy rule. We think that based on the letter
14	we got from the Committee I think last December, we've
15	actually moved the rule closer to meeting your
16	comments.
17	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Except for
18	containment failure.
19	MR. SHERON: I'm sorry?
20	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Except for late
21	containment failure.
22	MR. SHERON: Well, what we said, I think,
23	is that we agree with you that and I agree with Tom
24	that it's something that needs to be e considered. We
25	need to do it in the context of 1.174. It's not a

1	unique parameter or metric just for this rule, okay?
2	And I think we've said that we would you know, as
3	we go forward with 1.174, it is something we will
4	explicitly consider. And to the extent that we change
5	1.174, it would probably be retroactively applied to
6	this rule as we go forward. But in the same sense, as
7	you heard, we're not ignoring late containment failure
8	considerations when we look at the risk analyses here.
9	I'm going to be mercenary and say we would
10	love to get a positive letter so we could get this up
11	to the Commission and like to go forward with it and
12	at least get the public comment period started. So
13	with that, I'll close.
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So we're way ahead of
15	time.
16	MR. HARRISON: You ready?
17	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Yes.
18	MR. HARRISON: Well, I guess it's still
19	morning. Good morning. I want to thank the ACRS for
20	giving us this opportunity to status the industry's
21	efforts at evaluating the proposed change to 10 CFR
22	50.46. Ralph Landry covered a number of the things
23	that I was going to discuss, so I will be brief.
24	The first slide was intended to put this
25	work in context and I think we've discussed this to

some extent. The point that I want to make here is that we view the proposed rule as a key part of the change in the regulatory structure that will serve the industry and the regulator for the long term. These are example safety benefits. They're not the primary purpose or necessary desired outcome of this proposed rule change.

And I'd like to also point out we think the proposed rule is the right thing. We believe that what we're seeing is that the proposed rule is safe, preserves the safety of the plants. It's consistent with the vision that's up here. It is an optional rule, we want to reiterate that, which makes it easier for the industry and to regulator to implement. And I think it establishes the environment for going forward to identify changes in the future.

I think as Ralph mentioned, we met with the staff in January and had a very effective discussion on how the evaluation should proceed and what kind of information the NRC would need from the industry in supporting their evaluation. And today, we focused on the two examples of safety benefits.

It says here we are supporting development of the implementation guidance. That's still in its very early conceptual stage, so I'm not going to spend

any time on that today. And the discussion on the two examples is going to be qualitative because we donÆt have the final quantitative results that have been vetted through all our stakeholders.

Ralph discussed how we were doing the modeling with the diesel generator start requirements. We expect the longer start times to have an increase in diesel reliability, and we have been doing quantified evaluations of that. We've introduced station personnel that are familiar with diesel reliability. Their response has been very positive with regard to extending start times from the ten seconds to something like 30 seconds or a minute.

And we've also reviewed INPO EPIX data from diesel generators for the past eight years, about 800 diesel generator reports. And the preliminary results are showing a decrease in start failures, decrease in run-time failures due to the reduced wear and tear of fast starts and the potential for decrease corrective maintenance that you have to take to address those start run failures, which clearly affects the availability of the diesel.

We're taking those results and we're going to run those through several plants PRAs. As you would know, plants vary in their susceptibility or

1	sensitivity to the loss of off-site power events.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What results are
3	these, preliminary results? What results? I mean
4	where do they come from? You said preliminary
5	results?
6	MR. HARRISON: Preliminary results
7	indicate we have started to take some of the we've
8	begun to try to quantify the effect of this interview
9	with the station personnel and
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So these are the
11	results of interviews?
12	MR. HARRISON: Interviews and looking at
13	these 600 cases up there on what effect were these
14	cases attributable and how many of these case could be
15	attributable to issues related to fast starts of the
16	diesel.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Which is also a
18	matter of judgment.
19	MR. HARRISON: Well, certainly, the
20	evaluation of the individuals performing those
21	evaluations, yes.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you would say,
23	let's say, from the 600, I don't know, 425 were due to
24	the fact that we started within ten seconds.
25	MR HARRISON: Or however many there are

1 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So now if I didn't 2 have to do that, what would you do? 3 eliminate the 425 failures from the pool? 4 MR. HARRISON: You would evaluate whether 5 that failure could be eliminated from that pool. don't have the exact details on how they have 6 7 addressed those values, and that would be part of our 8 report. 9 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. 10 HARRISON: The containment spray results, as Ralph has indicated, the changes that 11 12 could affect the LOCA accident progression, as we mentioned before, are to reduce the potential for 13 14 human error in performing the manual actions for going 15 to recirc. And they minimize or eliminate major 16 debris transport mechanism to the containment sump. 17 Of those two, the one that we're quantifying is the first one, which is the potential for human error in 18 19 performing the manual actions. 20 Also, for smaller LOCAs, you have the 21 potential for using normal shutdown cooling as a 22 long-term stable state to maximize that. 23 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think it would be very 24 good for the industry if you could show that this rule

would enable you to do something about the containment

sump.

2	MR. HARRISON: Well, I think qualitatively
3	just looking at what we have to do to the models on
4	that is right now the models are based on the existing
5	sump size assumptions and failure probabilities. And
6	you would say, okay, then if I now assume I don't have
7	to initiate containment spray, this is a change that
8	we wouldn't have to make to the model. We haven't
9	really looked at how we would quantify that, so this
10	has just been a qualitative assessment at this point.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: With respect to debris
12	generation and transport, have you tried to estimate
13	how much debris generation and transport comes from
14	the actual jet impingement of the break as opposed to
15	the effective containment spray, which typically has
16	much less energy content?
17	MR. HARRISON: I think there have been
18	I'm sure there might be some people who can address
19	what the and you all have probably heard the
20	discussions on the modeling that has been done. My
21	understanding is that the containment spray transport
22	is a lot of what washes down from loose stuff inside
23	the containment.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Lose all the dust.
25	MR. HARRISON: But it also adds to the

1	volume and velocity that goes into the sumps. And the
2	other detriment that containment spray provides here
3	is the water that's used for containment spray can't
4	be used to inject into the core. So you're competing
5	with safety injection on core cooling.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I'm struck by the
7	word about halfway down there, "eliminate major debris
8	transport." If you have a break, you're going to have
9	debris transport.
LO	MR. DUDLEY: You'll have debris transport,
L1	but the way it's currently done, Jack, it really is a
L2	contributing factor to the amount that makes it to the
L3	sump.
L4	MEMBER SIEBER: I agree with that.
L5	MR. DUDLEY: Yes.
L6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I donÆt think he's
L7	eliminating debris transport. He's eliminating one of
L8	the major mechanisms.
L9	MR. HARRISON: Right. That's correct.
20	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: It's a major debris
21	transport mechanism.
22	MR. HARRISON: That's my understanding, it
23	is a major contributor.
24	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Now, you're going to
25	still address Dr. Bonaca's question of how much of

this benefit you can get and still mitigate.

MR. HARRISON: Well, that's true, and I'm glad you asked it. That was one of the comments that I wanted to make, and I'll go ahead and make it now. We had the question, does the risk from the large-break LOCA increase, and I'd point out that there certainly is no change until a licensee actually makes a change to their plans. That's the first thing I'll point out.

For the standby diesel generator, I'd comment that it probably -- changes, it probably makes no difference in the core damage frequency because the ten-second assumption, remind you, is an arbitrary deterministic time, and we don't -- within the PRAs we don't say that you have a loss offsite power at the time of the break. So I would anticipate that there will be no change in the core damage failure probability for the larger breaks.

MEMBER BONACA: My question was a different kind. I just simply said that you do not have freedom in modifying your parameters, such as price set points and things like this. It's too bound by some requirements that comes from the beyond transition break, and you don't know what they are yet.

1	MR. HARRISON: Right. Now, when you go
2	on sprays, that's a good point. We've always made
3	that statement that diesel improvements, I think,
4	are more applicable across the board to more people.
5	And like I said, it varies with your sensitivity to
6	loss of offsite power scenarios. Containment spray is
7	more plant-specific. It varies a lot with the design
8	of the plant, the size of the containment, what you
9	depend upon sprays for, whether you have
10	safety-related reactor containment fan coolers and so
11	forth.
12	So whether you would change the
13	contribution for the larger breaks for containment
14	spray is going to depend upon your plant design, and
15	it may vary from essentially none for a plant like
16	South Texas, I think we would probably see no change
17	where containment spray is not a contributor to core
18	damage frequency, to other plants, smaller plants
19	where containment spray is credited and they would not
20	see the same benefit. In any case, I think it's going
21	to be zero to very, very small.
22	MEMBER POWERS: Do you run into a Part 100
23	problem to laying the spray?
24	MR. HARRISON: I think the short answer to
25	that is no. The source term would already be

1	addressed by, what is it, 50.67, the source term.
2	There may be, I think, opportunities to use the source
3	term in conjunction with this rule, the alternate
4	source term. If you still have to assume a
5	certainly, for Part 100 in consideration of offsite
6	dose, you'd still have to consider a deterministic
7	source term.
8	MEMBER POWERS: I guess I don't
9	understand. Your worst two-hour concentration is
10	guaranteed to be higher, isn't it?
11	MR. HARRISON: I'm sorry?
12	MEMBER POWERS: Your worst two-hour
13	concentration of suspended radioactivity in the
14	containment atmosphere is guaranteed to be higher if
15	you delay the spray.
16	MR. HARRISON: That is right, and that's
17	why I'm saying you may need to credit alternate source
18	term.
19	MEMBER POWERS: I don't think that will
20	give you any advantage at all, because the amount of
21	particulate that you're going to have in the
22	atmosphere is going to be pretty significant if you
23	don't have that spray operating. Two hours you've
24	gotten everything that you're going to get out of the
25	

1	MR. HARRISON: I can only cite the
2	initial results that we have been able to do in South
3	Texas. The initial results that we have at South
4	Texas suggests that with the that we do not with
5	the alternate source term, we will not need
6	containment spray for dose. Again, I would stress
7	that this is a plant-specific analysis. It may be
8	that not everyone can use the same results or achieve
9	the same results.
10	MR. PIETRANGELO: But that's one of the
11	limiting factors we talked about before, I think.
12	MR. HARRISON: Right.
13	MR. PIETRANGELO: You have to meet that.
14	You cannot get out of that by doing this.
15	MR. HARRISON: I think I made all the
16	points I was going to make on that one.
17	The summary I'll stress that the
18	preliminary results are positive, that the valuations
19	for both examples are showing a safety benefit. I
20	stress again the results are going to be
21	plant-specific.
22	And, again, just for context purposes,
23	that these are example cases, and we're really looking
24	for the rule to establish the framework to identify
25	additional safety benefits for future applications

1	operational benefits.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So there are some
3	benefits, but I didn't see you speaking as if they
4	were spectacular or so you're saying that they're
5	wonderful benefits and that they are benefits.
6	MR. HARRISON: They are benefits. I think
7	of the two that the diesel generator reliability will
8	be the more significant of the two benefits. I think
9	that's implied, if not almost specifically stated
10	here.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is there some way to
12	quantify that benefit so we know how big it is? How
13	big is it?
14	MR. HARRISON: We're in the process of
15	quantifying that. Again, that's not been we don't
16	have the final results, but it will be
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How big is it likely to
18	be? I mean you must have some idea of the order of
19	magnitude.
20	MR. HARRISON: I'm not even going to try
21	to
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let me understand
23	this. To what extent a statement like that depends or
24	our ability to quantify these things?
25	MR. HARRISON: Well, it depends upon the

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MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I mean I question where we are --

MR. HARRISON: You need to be able to quantify and make the relationship between the data -
MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Sure.

MR. HARRISON: -- that we're evaluating. In other words, if we say, "Well, we're going to increase diesel generator reliability by five percent or ten percent," then we need to be able to use the data that we have to say that these data support that change in diesel generator reliability. We can make that relationship between those data.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Right. It seems to me in both cases there will be a considerable use of judgment just to the impact on the safety benefit. On the one hand, as we said earlier, we have to decide which failures of the diesels that have been reported were actually due to the fast start time.

MR. HARRISON: Right.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And then use some judgment to say, "If I didn't have that, something would happen." And with the human reliability, as we discussed with the staff earlier, unless you go to hours, the current models really will not be able to

1	tell you, "Boy, this is really better, because you
2	increased it by 15 minutes."
3	MR. HARRISON: Well, as they're saying, 15
4	minutes doesn't help very much, but if you increase it
5	by an hour, you could probably increase human
6	reliability by maybe a factor of five or an order of
7	magnitude, perhaps. And that can help some plants.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you think the main
9	benefit is the diesel reliability.
LO	MR. HARRISON: That's my judgment. And
L1	the reason I say that is because I think that it would
L2	be more broadly applicable to more plants.
L3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, I see. I see.
L4	Thank you.
L5	MR. HARRISON: And that concludes my
L6	discussion. If you have any questions
L7	MR. DUDLEY: May I ask a question?
L8	Obviously, we're interested in things that are
L9	potential safety benefits. As far as the economic
20	benefits are concerned, is it obvious to you which
21	things you would go after now? I mean is it clear if
22	this is enacted that you're going to go and ask for
23	some changes to the plant that would involve very
24	small increases for economic purposes?
25	MR. HARRISON: We have a pilot plant

that's ready to make an application. I think that we have quantified some business cases for this. instance, looked at, for some of the testing requirements on the diesel generators. We think it's an advantage to us. One of the things that the jury's still a little bit -- still out on is the analytical savings that we would see from not having to do detailed large-break LOCA analysis to the same degree So one of the goals of the implementation we had. quidance is that we don't create a process where we have to do a risk-informed beyond design basis evaluation that looks and has the same impact that the current large-break LOCA does. But I think we're seeing certainly some potential savings in that area.

The fuel savings that we've talked about, that's going to be plant-specific. It depends on whether you're large-break LOCA limited. If you're large-break LOCA limited on peaking, you may have an opportunity there, but I think we all recognize that there are other fuel design limits that may give you a challenge, like DNB or actual offset anomaly or what have you.

So, again, I want to say that we're establishing a framework here that will remove what's been a barrier so that as we move forward in time that

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1 we can gain some of these additional benefits. 2 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think my colleague 3 asked you about economic benefits, and the regulatory 4 analysis that we saw came up with a major benefit 5 being the potential for power uprate. Is that something that you see from your perspective to be a 6 7 major benefit? MR. HARRISON: My personal view is this 8 9 will facilitate power uprates. Power uprates 10 obviously require a lot of other analytical things 11 that you have to consider. I think that this will at 12 least make the large-break LOCA evaluation certainly simpler and much less of an obstacle for a power 13 14 uprate. 15 Excuse me, Mr. Harrison? MR. SNODDERLY: Mike Snodderly back here. 16 17 MR. HARRISON: Oh, Mike. MR. SNODDERLY: The staff told us they 18 19 anticipated completing their analyses in May 2005 and their reg guide by June 30, 2005 and then initiating 20 21 discussions with us in the summer of 2005. Can you 22 give us some idea of your schedule or if you think it 23 will be compatible with the staff's? In other words -- because I think when we review the staff's analyses 24

and their reg guide, we'd ideally like to be able to

1 compare it to what you've developed. 2 MR. HARRISON: We're working with the 3 staff's schedule, so our intent and plan is to support 4 the staff's schedule with our evaluations and actually 5 to give them -- perhaps if we can to even precede their schedule so they'll have something to look at 6 7 ahead of time. 8 MR. SNODDERLY: Okay. 9 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Tony? 10 MR. PIETRANGELO: Before I get into some 11 perspective on the proposed rulemaking and some of the 12 other stuff, I did want to offer a few remarks on behalf of the BWR Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group. 13 14 They couldn't be here today but they did send me some 15 stuff to ask me to include in the remarks here, and I did want to do that. 16 17 Obviously, we haven't seen what's in the proposed rulemaking package with regard to 18 19 specific rule language. The first version of the rule specified the 14-inch and 20-inch for BWR double-ended 20 21 I believe, if I could surmise correctly, that break. 22 the current version says something like single-sided 23 of the largest attached pipe. 24 In the case of the BWRs, that doesn't do

them much good, because it's still 20 inches with

their recirc piping and their RHR lines. So from terms of enabling anything with regard to boiling water reactors, this rule does not do that. And, again, on behalf of the boilers, they do think that there is in the neighborhood of something less than 14 inches, consistent with the expert elicitation results, would allow them to accrue the same types of safety benefits as well as other benefits that they could get with their current topical report that was submitted last year on the separation of loss of offsite power from the large-break LOCA.

Now, that's been in the staff. That's been deferred because of this rulemaking plan, but this rulemaking, given that the GDCs don't apply beyond the transition break size, could accomplish the same purpose that the boiling water reactors were included in the ruling.

So in terms of being enabling, it doesn't do it for the boilers. They did submit comments to the staff in September as part of the regulatory analysis input following the workshop late last summer. I know it's too late for the staff to do anything with the current package and probably even for the Commission to do anything at this point, so this is obviously something that's going to be

commented on in the proposed rule stage, but I'd ask you to -- I'm planting that seed now because we're going to come back to this point when we have further deliberations.

So the boilers think there's a case to be made for their inclusion as being enabling in this rule with regard to break size, and there's lots of benefits like the ones that Wayne talked about diesel generator reliability, on optimized DCCS performance on enhanced decay removal capability as well as the text surveillance simplifying some of spec The same kind of safety benefits we're requirements. trying to quantify here we could do the same thing now if the boilers could play in the sandbox, if you will. So I just wanted to offer that on their behalf.

Okay. Turning to the -- let me start at a really high level. Why are we doing this rulemaking? What is the purpose of this rulemaking? What are the success criteria for this rulemaking? What do you really want to get out of it? And I guess I could go around and poll each ACRS member, but let me just suggest one to save time.

If at the end of the day this rule doesn't provide the option at least to get licensees and the NRC to focus more on safety-significant matters, it's

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1 a failure. It will be perceived as a failure. I mean 2 that is the intent. That goes back all the way to the 3 definition of risk-informed regulation. Focus on 4 things more that matter, more of the stuff that 5 doesn't matter or that's less significant. what this has to achieve at the end of the day. 6 7 Now, we just talked about enabling 8 beneficial changes. That to me is a sub-tier. 9 to -- if you can't do anything that's beneficial as a result of the rule, it's a failure. It's just out 10 there, people won't pick it up. It we go through all 11 this work, staff went through all this work, industry 12 went through all this work, nobody picks it up, it's 13 14 a failure. So it has to enable beneficial changes. 15 I think that's why the boilers want to be included in 16 this. 17 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I noticed you said safety-significant matters were beneficial, but how 18 19 about the power uprates? There are benefits which are 20 not related to safety. 21 MR. PIETRANGELO: There are. 22 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That are enabled by this 23 rule. 24 MR. PIETRANGELO: There are. There are. 25 But at the end of the day, you still have to be able

to make a case that you're focused on safety more than you were before. I you can get some economic benefits out of that and do the same thing, great.

Now, there's another element of this, and I think consistent with the history of risk-informed regulation you see this, and that is, well, how do you control the potential changes that this thing enables? And I think that's where a lot of that part of the rule that the staff worked on comes from. And I understand that. From a regulatory perspective, you don't want to enable something that could have a significant increase in the risk profile or decrease safety at the plant. So I perfectly understand that.

My point is that at the end you have to have a balance, okay, that you can't burden licensees on looking at things that are inconsequential or burden the NRC staff with amendment requests on things that are inconsequential or review of things that are inconsequential, because if you do that, you won't meet the higher-level purpose of focusing on things that matter more. So there's a balance that has to be achieved there. I understand the regulatory perspective, but there's an attention and resources perspective that also has to be balanced.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, that's what I'm

waiting for really is the consequential things. I think that there are a lot of inconsequential things. I'm not really interested in those. But if you can show there are some really consequential changes which matter, then that will be great. I don't think we've got to that point yet.

MR. PIETRANGELO: I'll get to that in a second. To me there's three basic issues wrapped up in this rulemaking, okay? The first has been the focus on the break size. A lot of -- that's the whole expert elicitation, three years worth and even before that talking about it has been focused on this expert elicitation. So when that effort's over, I mean you've looked at it six times now, you're going to get a seventh shot at it later, I think we're going to have a pretty sound rationale for saying this is it. And it will be reflective of the expert community.

Part of the safety benefits calculations that Wayne talked about and that Ralph Landry talked about before are really aimed, I think, at trying to give us some more confidence that when you put the TBS at a certain spot consistent with that expert elicitation, you can in fact enable beneficial changes. You don't want to set it so high that it doesn't enable anything. So those calculations, those

1 quantifications will help to inform that. 2 But I've got to tell you, I don't need a 3 PRA calculation that tells me if I increase the diesel 4 start time from ten seconds to 60 seconds, I don't 5 need a calculation to tell me that's better. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 6 It's better, but how 7 consequential is it? 8 MR. PIETRANGELO: Doesn't matter. Doesn't 9 matter. Doesn't matter. 10 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But you said you used --MR. PIETRANGELO: I don't need to have it 11 12 quantified. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Don't want it to be an 13 14 inconsequential thing. 15 I know, and I MR. PIETRANGELO: Why? 16 think the qualitative data will tell you that it's 17 better. To delay containment spray, and Dr. Powers 18 brought up the part about the Part 100, I mean we 19 already have to assume that you have a degraded core 20 in order to scrub the containment spray. 21 delaying containment spray it doesn't mean that there 22 can't be some operator actions that look at actual 23 radioactivity levels in the containment post-accident or have interlocks with radiation monitors that would 24

actuate containment spray versus let's just assume it

1 is per the current design basis and just flood the 2 containment with all that containment spray, bypass 3 the core, wash all that debris down in the screens. 4 I mean, intuitively, I know that it's 5 better if we do it smart, and we can quantify what the delay and emptying the RWST is and the delay to switch 6 7 over and how much that will improve the reliability in 8 doing that. And we'll do it. But I don't have to do 9 it to know that it's better. And there's thousands of examples like that. I don't have to know that if the 10 diesel starts in 11 seconds instead of 10 today I've 11 got to tear the diesel down and go fix something to 12 get it to start at ten seconds. That takes the diesel 13 14 out of service. It's unavailable, okay? Is that good 15 for safety? 16 MEMBER RANSOM: But the real question is 17 is 60 seconds any better? 18 Right. MR. PIETRANGELO: 19 MEMBER RANSOM: Significantly better. 20 MR. PIETRANGELO: Right. 21 Because starting a diesel MEMBER RANSOM: 22 engine it takes maybe an hour to bring it up to 23 thermal --24 MR. PIETRANGELO: Right. But even beyond 25 just the diesel itself there's the sequencing of the

loads, and most of these are done right up to the max of what those buses can handle. So I think by allowing those loads to come on more gradually, okay, that you can actually improve the reliability of the whole ECCS. And we don't have time to go do all that different stuff, calculations on intuitively, and I think if we apply expert opinion and judgment to this, we can say it's better. we're going to do the quantifications and I hope to get some of the other owners' groups in on this because I think there are benefits associated with this and it makes a strong safety case. Again, the rule has to enable that.

The second part of the issues or the second important issue to me that's with this rulemaking is this demonstration of capability, and that's what Dr. Bonaca raised before. You're going to change the design basis of the facility from this double-ended largest break in the RCS to something smaller, the TBS, all right? To me, a big part of the defense-in-depth is this mitigation capability all the way up to that largest break. still have to demonstrate that.

There's been next to no discussion, even in the industry or with the NRC staff, on what's good

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enough or that demonstrating of the mitigation capability. And I won't be able to answer Dr. Bonaca's question sufficiently until I know what's good enough there, because then I'll know what leeway I have between my new design basis and what's good this mitigation enough for demonstration of capability.

At least from my perspective, this is probably the most important part of this rule, because that's what's different. If I'm a licensee and I'm going to opt for the new 50.46, okay, for up to my TBS I'm going to use the same method, same rule, same requirements that I was using before; nothing changes. What changes is I've got this other thing, this demonstration of mitigating capability. I don't know whether the staff wants to review and approve it, I don't know what to do for current code. There hasn't been any discussion on that. So we need to have that.

But if the licensee ops, I'm guessing that be interested in what staff's going to their mitigating capability is, because that's going to be part of the license. It won't be the design basis, but it will be part of the licensing basis. you're going to be asked to maintain that going So that's a significant piece. forward.

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1	MEMBER BONACA: I'm sorry, I thought,
2	however, reading the statement of consideration, that
3	there is a significant intent or an accession. I mean
4	there is a lot of concessions being done. Now,
5	clearly, it's not fully defined yet in the reg guide.
6	MR. PIETRANGELO: Right. Right. And that
7	to me is the focus of the rule, should be the focus of
8	the reg guide, all that stuff.
9	MEMBER BONACA: Yes. But I'm saying that
10	on that issue the door is open, it seems to me.
11	MR. PIETRANGELO: I hope so, yes. I hope
12	it's open. Yes, because we haven't had any
13	discussion, we haven't see that. So I'm glad to hear
14	you say that.
15	MEMBER BONACA: Oh, okay.
16	MR. PIETRANGELO: I haven't seen it.
17	Okay.
18	Now, the third issue wrapped up in this is
19	one I alluded to before, this kind of change control.
20	Now, one of the kind of principles we've always used
21	in risk-informed regulation is we try to build on the
22	existing regulatory framework before you invent
23	something new. And if you're going to invent
24	something new, you'd better have a really good reason
25	why you've got to go it differently than what the

current framework tells you to do.

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So what do we do today for change control? Well, we've got 50.59. Been in place since the mid-60s. It was significantly improved, I think, in the late 1990s. Licensees have been using it every Every change that's for something that's described in the FSAR and even some that's not described in the FSAR are run through this 50.59 The SAR's updated as appropriate, the safety process. analysis report. These changes are reported to the NRC periodically. And you don't have to do any risk assessment on any of these changes. You don't. That's what we have in place today.

Now, we're going to do this new TBS for the 50.46. Was PRA used as the basis for this change? I don't see any. I do know that any change I make going forward I still have to meet the current design basis, the SAR analysis up to that transition break size. I still have to demonstrate that I have the mitigating capability for up to the double-ended -- so we will have change control in place with the current framework.

Now, a lot of the talk has been about we have to do more than 1.174 and this and that. Well, those are for risk-informed license amendments, when

you have to come into the staff, and even in 50.59. We give examples in the deterministic guide to what a more than minimal increase in risk is or consequences. That's when you have to come in. But 1.174 has a similar threshold about what's small and very small. 1.174 is But all is а broad framework for risk-informed decision making on amendment requests and changes to the current licensing basis. And it tells you you've got to look at all the sources of And it tells you how to input defense-in-depth and safety margins and risk insights. And it's worked pretty darn well, I think.

And a lot of the changes I think that the staff's concerned about things that are are necessarily going to involve amendment requests. You can't do a power uprate without coming into the NRC. You can't change your technical specifications without coming into the NRC. And I'm hard pressed to think of any of the changes the staff would be concerned about that wouldn't drive an amendment request. And in that have guidance on submitting And even if the licensee doesn't use a risk requests. argument as part of that amendment request, the staff has the leeway to ask for risk information if they think it's important to that amendment request.

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1	So at least from perspective, the
2	framework's in place to handle this already, without
3	trying to redo it as part of this rule.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are you saying we don't
5	need a rule at all?
6	MR. PIETRANGELO: Well, this is supposed
7	to be an enabling rule that incorporates this insight
8	about big pipes don't break as often as little pipes.
9	And that's the insight, okay without any of the
10	quantification and all this other stuff. And it's not
11	at least it wasn't our intent when we began
12	deliberations with the staff to turn this into the
13	configuration control change we'd use in risk and
14	codify all that in the rule. Now, it's evident from
15	the staff's presentation
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Tony, I want to ask my
17	question again.
18	MR. PIETRANGELO: Okay.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You seem to be saying
20	quite eloquently that we've got a lot of stuff in
21	place already, 50.59
22	MR. PIETRANGELO: Right.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: and 1.174. And you
24	seem to be questioning whether we need any rule at
25	all. That seems to be where you're going.

1	MR. PIETRANGELO: No, I didn't say we
2	don't need a rule at all. I'm talking about this
3	portion that deals with change control.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The 1.174 part of the
5	rule.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Oh, that part. It's
7	that part.
8	MR. PIETRANGELO: That part. That part.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Tony, what you're
11	saying is that that is not needed at all.
12	MR. PIETRANGELO: Well, we haven't had a
13	lot of discussion with the staff on this. I really
14	haven't heard a case yet that tells me why I need this
15	all other stuff in the rule. I think the changes that
16	the staff are concerned about are things that are in
17	the current license, that are in tech specs, that
18	you've got to come in with an amendment request
19	anyway.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Why does it bother
21	you that it's in the rule? I mean it's just
22	redundant.
23	MR. PIETRANGELO: If it's in the rule?
24	Why add extraneous stuff? I mean that's just a bad
25	practice.

1 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I mean is it just the 2 beauty of the rule? MR. PIETRANGELO: No. 3 To me the rule was 4 supposed to be about enabling beneficial changes and 5 getting focused on safety significance. doesn't. Look at the staff lines about 6 7 inconsequential changes and reporting all that and 8 bundling. Is that what the rule was supposed to be 9 about? It's supposed to make you focus on the more 10 safety-significant things. And I don't want to reinvent a process that's worked, whether it's 50.59 11 12 or 1.174. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But isn't the 13 14 inconsequential part the equivalent of 50.59? I mean 15 that's what they're trying to do. They're trying say, "Well, look, we don't want to review everything." 16 17 MR. PIETRANGELO: No. Well, they just told you to report them all. And if they're 18 19 quantifiable, you should do it and put it in your risk 20 model. Now, I'm not saying that's a bad practice at all. I already report all my changes, whether they're 21 22 inconsequential or not, under 50.59. 23 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's what I'm saying. 24 25 MR. PIETRANGELO: So why do I have to

repeat it in this rule?

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MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So it's really the elegance of the rule that bothers you.

MR. PIETRANGELO: No, it's not the elegance. It's people see -- they're used to a certain way of doing it, and if you're not intending anything differently, don't create something new that makes them do the same thing, because they'll read the words differently, they'll intend something differently, and I already talked about developing additional regulatory guidance

And any specific application like whether it's power uprate or even some of these tech spec things typically what do is we do we application-specific regulatory guidance, especially if it's a risk-informed one. What parts of the PRA am I going to tinker with to show the delta CDF, the delta LERF, late release, whatever? It will be on an application-specific basis. We'll probably develop the guidance and ask the staff to endorse it. We'll even clip it to make sure that everybody does it in a template that the staff's familiar with and facilitate the changes.

So it's hard to say at the outset of this rule how many of those I'm going to need or try to

1 guess on what I need to put in the rule to cover all 2 those things. I understand the urge to do it, I'm just not convinced that the basis is there to do it 3 4 yet, because no one's shown me that the current 5 framework won't work. Now, again, I know that's not going to be 6 7 changed in the current version. We will comment on it 8 when it comes out. I'm not trying to delay the 9 current thing, but we will have this discussion again 10 some day, and I just want to get on record our And it's obvious there's been movement 11 concerns. Evidently, the staff took a lot 12 since the last time. of the prescriptive stuff that was in 1.174 and in 13 14 this rule and taken it out, so I think it's a step in 15 the right direction. That's a good thing. One last piece about -- I think I've 16 17 covered it. I've probably said enough. Thanks. 18 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Could I comment on what 19 you said, Tony? 20 MR. PIETRANGELO: Sure. 21 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Listening to you, a 22 great deal of what you said, not all of it, but a 23 great deal of what you said I felt could have been 24 said by an ACRS member. We have the same sorts of

questions and concerns that you have. You maybe are

1	freer to be more outspoken and eloquent in expressing
2	it, but I was struck by the fact that a lot of these
3	concerns really are things we've mulled over too.
4	MR. PIETRANGELO: I'm sorry that you feel
5	constrained to speak your mind in here, Dr. Wallis.
6	That wouldn't have been one of the attributes I
7	thought was yours.
8	(Laughter.)
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I don't pay attention
10	to that. I don't feel constrained.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Thinking is a protected
12	activity.
13	MR. PIETRANGELO: Well, I'm glad to hear
14	that.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The problem is, you see,
16	if I say something that's too outspoken, you will get
17	criticize it, and it will get in the newspaper, but
18	you can say anything you like and I can't criticize
19	you quite the same way.
20	(Laughter.)
21	MR. PIETRANGELO: I think the discussion
22	this Committee is absolutely essential to this
23	activity.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think it was very good
25	to have your input, and maybe I'm not speaking for the

1	Committee at all, but personally I felt a lot of the
2	things the questions you raised are ones that we
3	have raised ourselves and mulled over too.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I'm looking forward
5	to debating the last point that you made, because I
6	still think you worry about elegance.
7	MR. PIETRANGELO: No, it's no.
8	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, you're
9	concerned that maybe these new requirements, which
10	really are intended to be the same as before but now
11	they're qualified in the rule, they might be
12	misinterpreted by people who are already doing this
13	work. Isn't that what you said?
14	MR. PIETRANGELO: Again, I haven't seen
15	what's in the I'm
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, I understand
17	that.
18	MR. PIETRANGELO: Yes. And there may be
19	a need to put something in the rule. But we've
20	already got even if it just points you to the
21	existing framework, that's better than trying to
22	repeat a lot of the other stuff.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. That's a good
24	statement. But you are not I mean the final
25	conclusion from your speech is that you are not

1 objecting, based on what you've heard, to having this 2 released for public comment. In fact you are looking 3 forward to submitting --4 MR. PIETRANGELO: Because of the schedule 5 there's been precious little opportunity for interaction, and maybe once the proposed rule's out 6 7 that we can actually engage on what should be in the 8 regulatory guide and that kind of thing. So we want 9 to get on with it. There are certain things that, 10 Ι haven't seen it, that we might differently --11 12 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Very good. MR. PIETRANGELO: -- in the proposed rule, 13 14 but I know, trying to be practical, that trying to 15 change it now isn't going to speed up this process at 16 all. But I would hope that we keep open mind to 17 changes to the proposed rule once everybody can really 18 engage and weigh in. 19 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Any more comments or questions from the Committee? Turn it back to you, 20 21 Mr. Chairman. 22 Thank you. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I was trying 23 to finish on time but we just missed. We will now 24 take a break for lunch until 1:15, and I'd like to 25 thank all those who contributed to our discussions

1 this morning. Thank you. 2 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off 3 the record at 12:12 p.m. and went back on 4 the record at 1:11 p.m.) 5 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The topic we will consider now is the draft safety evaluation report for 6 7 the North Anna early site permit application. 8 I'll turn to my colleague, Dana Powers, to 9 lead us through this one. 10 MEMBER POWERS: "Lead" may be too strong of a term. 11 We're going to talk about an early site 12 As most of you are aware, approval of early 13 14 site permits is a statutory obligation of 15 committee. All of this playing around on pressurized thermal shock, that's a sidelight. 16 This is the real line business. 17 This is the first of the early site 18 19 permits that come in, and for those of you that 20 thought we would get it for enough time to study it, 21 to devise procedures, to test procedures and whatnot, 22 I'm going to have to apologize. The subcommittee was 23 mean enough on yesterday's subcommittee meeting that 24 Laura Dudes promised that she would get even by

inflicting about three of these on us at two-month

1 schedules, and that any further obstreperousness on 2 our part, she would invent four or five more to 3 inflict on us. 4 What we're going to hear is a synopsis of 5 discussions that were presented at a subcommittee meeting yesterday. All of the speakers had promised 6 7 to attenuate the use of geological jargon in their presentations, though they equally promised that if 8 we're too obstreperous they will lapse back into 9 "geologicese." 10 What the staff has done is receive the 11 12 application and prepared a draft safety evaluation report, following a review standard that has been 13 14 developed, and they're asking from us for an interim 15 letter which would be rather similar to the interim letters that we prepare in connection with design 16 certification. 17 There are still a few outstanding open 18 19 items and discussions of conditions on the license 20 that are going on. Apparently there was a meeting 21 today. 22 MR. GRECHECK: There will be a letter sent 23 in today. 24 MEMBER POWERS: And so things are going 25 on, but by and large, I would say that the safety

1 evaluation report and the application are pretty 2 complete and pretty well done. 3 The rules are fairly prescriptive for what 4 the staff has to do once they receive these 5 applications. It is prescriptive on what the application should contain, and consequently fairly 6 7 prescriptive sense of analyses, and it looks to me 8 like they're pretty well through all of that process. 9 So it's more of a mopping up operation than were made 10 to be done. So unless any of the members of the 11 subcommittee have points to add, and I don't see any, 12 let us start with a presentation from Dominion by the 13 14 Vice President, Gene Grecheck. 15 MR. GRECHECK: Good afternoon. I'm Gene Grecheck, Vice President of Nuclear Support Services 16 for Dominion. 17 And what I'm going to do in the next few 18 19 minutes is just to try to give you a quick overview of 20 what the ESP application is and then also a little bit 21 more about the North Anna site if you're not familiar 22 with it. 23 First, the reason that we made 24 application to start with was to determine the 25 suitability of a potential site without having gotten to the point of determining a specific technology that we would like to deploy there. The benefit of the ESP process, at least in theory, is that you can resolve the siting issues early, before you have spent a great deal of resources trying to finish the design of a particular technology.

So that's what we're doing. We've been working with the staff for about the last year and a half on the site itself, and we still have not made a decision or a final decision on a technology or whether we would submit a COL application for this particular site, but at least we're working through the siting options.

The next slide.

Just a little bit about the North Anna Power Station. The site that we are proposing is within the North Anna site boundary. North Anna was originally planned as a four unit site back in the 1970s. Two units were Westinghouse three-loop PWRs. Those were licensed in 1978 and 1980.

Adjacent to that construction permits were issued for two additional BNW units. The construction had actually started. There was actually the steel frame for the containment buildings were actually erected at both of those, when first Unit 3 and

1 then -- well, first Unit 4 and then Unit 3 were 2 canceled, one of those in the last '70s and then Unit 3 3 was canceled in the post TMI contraction. 4 All of the above ground hardware that was 5 installed as part of that construction effort was removed. The base mats for the containment are still 6 7 there down at the bottom of the pit somewhere, and 8 you'll see on the picture shortly that the intake and 9 discharge structures for those plants still exist, and 10 studying whether to use those existing structures as part of a proposed additional unit. 11 12 The next slide is a 50-mile overview of the North Anna site. North Anna is in western central 13 14 Virginia south of Washington here. You can see right 15 at the center is Lake Anna. Lake Anna was formed by damming the North Anna River in the early '70s. 16 dam was built for the purpose of constructing a 17 cooling water lake for the plant. 18 19 Within this 50-mile circle, you can see off to the west Charlottesville is about 40 miles or 20 21 so due west. Richmond is to the southeast about 45 22 miles or so. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: What is it, South Anna? 23 24 MR. GRECHECK: South Anna? 25 PARTICIPANT: Another river.

1	MR. GRECHECK: There's a North Anna River
2	and a South Anna River.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I thought you said
4	"nuke."
5	MR. GRECHECK: Oh, NUG, N-U-G, that's a
6	non-utility generator. There's an independent
7	merchant power plant there.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's not N-U-C.
9	MR. GRECHECK: No.
10	All right. The next slide is a little bit
11	closer view. This is a ten-mile view of the site.
12	You can now see the lake. Down at the very bottom
13	there where you see the North Anna River designation,
14	that's where the dam is, and you can see that the Town
15	of Mineral is about seven miles or so from the site.
16	The Town of Mineral, I think, at the
17	latest population estimates were about 400 people.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: It has a post office.
19	MR. GRECHECK: Yes, it does.
20	The lake is quite popular for recreation
21	use over the years since the plant was installed. You
22	can see just to the northwest of the plant is a state
23	park, Lake Anna State Park, that has a large,
24	transient population of boaters and water skiers that
25	come in through there.

1	And also there has been a significant
2	amount of residential development around both shores
3	of the lake.
4	The next slide is zeroing in on the site
5	itself. This is the exclusion boundary of the site.
6	Right in the middle where you see the red X, that is
7	North Anna or Unit 1. The exclusion boundary is
8	measured as a 5,000 foot radius around that, and then
9	off to the left there, that cross-hatched area is the
10	ESP site. That is the site that is being examined for
11	the application.
12	The area that is right in the center
13	immediately to the left of the two plants where as
14	a matter of fact, where the words "Unit 2 Containment"
15	are that is the location of the previously proposed
16	and started construction of Units 3 and 4.
17	We extended the site a little bit off to
18	the west there to provide room for the cooling tower.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Now, the center of that
20	circle is not at the red X.
21	MR. GRECHECK: It's intended to be. Okay.
22	MEMBER POWERS: It may not be germane
23	either.
24	(Laughter.)
25	MR. GRECHECK: And the next slide is a
I	I and the second

close-up of the proposed early site permit slide.

Again, the rectangular, roughly rectangular space right in the middle of the figure is where North Anna 3 and 4 were, and it is most likely the location of the units if we were to proceed with building them, and then off to the left is a large open area that would be the location of cooling towers if they were to be built.

Next slide is a photograph. This is a photograph of Units 1 and 2. You can see immediately to the left of Units 1 and 2 is a pit. That pit is where the Unit 3 and 4 construction was. Actually there was another construction project, and as a matter of fact, you can see some concrete there at the bottom of that pit. There was a rad waste handling facility that construction had begun in the mid-'80s, and then that project was also terminated. So that area has had several stops and starts, but that would be the area.

But one of the things I wanted to point out on this picture is you can look in this area here. This area right in that area is where the Units 3 and 4 intake is. You can see that there's a cofferdam or a, you know, embankment that's been built there to keep the lake out of that pit, but that would be

1 removed, and that would be the intake for Units 3 and 2 4. 3 And the discharge for Units 3 and 4 is up 4 here on the right that would discharge into the 5 existing discharge canal that comes out. MEMBER KRESS: Are there any dry storage 6 7 on the site? 8 MR. GRECHECK: Yes, there are, and that is 9 about right here. And the final picture in this set is just 10 a very conceptual idea of a generic plant built on 11 That's not intended to represent any 12 that site. design that you might be able to recognize. 13 All right. The next slide. 14 15 This is a little bit about the chronology of the application that was submitted in September of 16 We have submitted three formal revisions to the 17 2003. application as you can see on those dates. Revision 18 19 was primarily an environmental, responding to 20 environmental for additional various requests 21 information. Revision 3 was mostly answers to the 22 various safety related questions. 23 The Revision 2 is also significant because 24 we did modify in that revision the cooling design of

Unit 4, and I'll get to that a little bit later, but

1	that was where we officially change the design.
2	NRC issued the draft SER in December of
3	2004. That's what the staff will be discussing with
4	you, and later this afternoon, we will submit the
5	response to all of those open items but one. So we
6	will pretty much have all of those open items resolved
7	today.
8	There are a few items I just wanted to
9	point out to you. I'm sure if you've read the
10	application you've seen that we used something called
11	the plant parameter envelope. This is just a way to
12	represent a potential unit without having specifics
13	about what that unit looks like.
14	What we have proposed is two 4,300
15	megawatt conceptual units that could be built at this
16	site, and that envelope envelopes six different
17	reactor technology designs.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is this allowed to be
19	built now? That seems to be awfully big in
20	megawattage.
21	MR. GRECHECK: Yes, they would be allowed
22	to be built.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I thought there was a
24	limit.
25	MR. GRECHECK: We had that discussion

1	yesterday, and we're not aware of any
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I wasn't here.
3	MR. GRECHECK: I mean, I think there
4	perhaps was some de facto limit based on the plants
5	that were being built at the time, but most of the
6	advanced designs, if you look at the G.E. BWR, for
7	example or, as a matter of fact, Framatome is
8	currently marketing the EPR; all of those units are
9	significantly larger than the previous one.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You're actually very
11	specific when you say 4,300.
12	MR. GRECHECK: Well, that was based on the
13	plant parameter envelope of the designs that were
14	provided.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: These are megawatts
16	thermal.
17	MR. GRECHECK: That's correct.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: So you basically divide by
19	three to get electric.
20	MR. GRECHECK: In general we're looking at
21	about 1,400, 1,450 megawatt electric plants.
22	And when you look at the conceptual units,
23	include the designs, for example, of a pebble bed or
24	a gas turbine GTMHR, which means that these units as
25	defined as 4,300 megawatt thermal could be composed of
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1 multiple modules of smaller units and --2 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Would they be put in? MR. GRECHECK: Yes, they would. 3 4 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It would be an awful lot 5 of pebble beds to get 4,300. MR. GRECHECK: There would be, but the 6 7 site does accommodate that, and that site boundary, we 8 have a layout that shows how they could fit on that 9 particular site. 10 Finally, there have been several issues 11 during the review. Again, we believe that all of the 12 remaining issues that the staff will discuss from the draft safety evaluation report are resolvable, but 13 14 there has been a tremendous amount of discussion about 15 seismic issues, and I know that we've promised not to talk about that too much, but it has been the first 16 application or the first time we've used the revised 17 NRC quidance that came out during the 1990s about 18 19 using a different methodology for approaching the 20 design seismic of a plant, and it has been a learning 21 experience, I think, for all parties trying to work 22 through that. 23 I did want to make a point that one of the 24 issues that is resolved or discussed during an early

site permit process is the emergency planning or major

features of emergency planning. Clearly, we do have two existing units here, and we have referenced that existing emergency plan and would use all of the features of that existing emergency plan if these units were built.

And finally, Lake Anna water usage has been an issue here because as we indicated, the lake was originally built for four units, and if you go back and look at the licensing history of Units 3 and 4, there was some uncertainty about the overall effect of four large units on this lake, and there were some questions that were left open during the construction permit phase.

As we went through that process for these units, we did make a determination that we would use the lake as cooling for a proposed Unit 3, but for Unit 4, the issues of both thermal effects on the lake, but even more importantly than thermal effects would be water consumption and thereby water level of the lake. Those issues seemed a bit steep for Unit 4.

So in the application we do propose the use of a dry atmospheric cooling tower for Unit 4. So Unit 4 does not use any water from the lake other than for miscellaneous make-up.

Again, I look forward to the discussion,

1	and if there are question I can answer, I'd be happy
2	to do that, but I think that just gives you a good
3	overview of what the application looks like.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How do you consumer
5	water from the lake if you're not having cooling
6	towers and things? You don't consume much of it. It
7	doesn't disappear.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: Evaporation.
9	MR. GRECHECK: Well, the majority of the
10	water leaving the lake is by evaporation. If you had
11	a cooling tower you have to make up to the cooling
12	tower, and that is a significant drop in
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Why is it so much?
14	MR. GRECHECK: It's actually more usage
15	than a once through cooling system.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: And a dry cooling tower,
17	so to speak, would have to have a tremendous amount of
18	surface in order to operate a unit.
19	MR. GRECHECK: It would require a great
20	deal of surface. It would also require motive force
21	with fans.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: With fans, yeah.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah.
24	MR. GRECHECK: And it would be a rather
25	significant use of electricity in order to make that
J	I control of the cont

1	happen. So our thought is that it is not likely that
2	a lightwater reactor would be built on this site using
3	that cooling system, but there are other reactor
4	technologies included within the PPE that have much
5	less thermal effect, and if one of those were ever
6	built on this site, it's more likely that that would
7	be the way we would go.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, my question is:
9	have you looked at the size of the site to accommodate
10	such a cooling
11	MR. GRECHECK: Yes. That large area that
12	I showed you on the diagram will accommodate that.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, okay. Thank you.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: They'd have less cooling
15	effect because they're more efficient?
16	MR. GRECHECK: Well, they don't use a
17	water exchange as the cooling medium. The heat
18	rejection is to the air directly.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But it would still have
20	to reject it.
21	MR. GRECHECK: Yes, but it's rejected to
22	the atmosphere.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So it would still have
24	to take the same mass of air through something.
25	MR. GRECHECK: That is correct.

1 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you would still have 2 to have fans and all of that. 3 MR. GRECHECK: Yes. But I think what I'm 4 saying is that with other reactor technologies, their 5 thermal discharge to the environment is less because they're more thermally efficient. 6 7 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's correct. would have less heat to reject and there would be a 8 9 smaller cooling tower as a result. 10 MEMBER POWERS: Of the many elements of the application, which did you find the most difficult 11 12 to do? MR. GRECHECK: Again, I would have to say 13 14 seismic because I think that was --15 MEMBER POWERS: It was seismic? 16 MR. GRECHECK: What has happened with 17 seismic is that many -- and we had some of these discussions yesterday -- many of the paradigms and the 18 19 rules that many of us remember from many years ago 20 about what a design basis or what an SSE is and how you select that acceleration, much of that has 21 22 changed, and as a result of that, it's a learning 23 process to understand what's significant and what 24 isn't and how do you define that SSE and how do you

define what geological features are significant and

how do you handle those.

And I'm sure that even once we complete the ESP process, should we get into a COL process at a later date, I'm sure many of those questions will come up again.

MEMBER POWERS: Which of the many elements were you frustrated the most with?

MR. GRECHECK: I think for us it was probably most surprising and what was most frustrating was the review of emergency planning. As I indicated, we did reference an acceptable in-place emergency plan that's been in place for many, many years, which is periodically exercised and inspected and verified, and verified not only by the NRC, but also by FEMA for the off-site processes.

And I think we were a bit surprised to find that the review standard as it's currently in place seems to require a detailed re-examination of many, many things in that plan which, you know, down to the level of -- as a matter of fact, we had requests for additional information talking about how many hospital beds are available in various hospitals and how the equipment in various state and county emergency centers is configured, and some of that seemed to be, first, misplaced in terms of timing,

1	given that the plant would be built many years from
2	now, but in addition to that, again, we're talking
3	about existing plans that would not have to be
4	appreciably modified for the additional units, and yet
5	there was this extensive review required.
6	And I think I would certainly suggest that
7	as part of any lessons learned process that would come
8	out of this, we would have to take a look as to why
9	does that seem to be necessary in this review.
10	MEMBER POWERS: Which of the sections do
11	you think you did the best job on?
12	MR. GRECHECK: Well, I wouldn't want to
13	make any
14	MEMBER POWERS: Oh, come on.
15	MR. GRECHECK: I wouldn't want to make
16	anybody feel they
17	MEMBER POWERS: Well, you did an excellent
18	job on all of them. Now, which one is a little more
19	excellent than the others.
20	PARTICIPANT: First among equals.
21	MR. GRECHECK: Right. Well, I think going
22	into the application, I think we suspected that there
23	would be lake usage issues, and I think we spent a lot
24	of time on that and a lot of effort, and I'm rather
25	proud of the work that was done in terms of

1	reconstructing the thermal models that existed from
2	the previous applications and then updating those and
3	making some sense of all of that.
4	So I think that was probably a significant
5	work that we're proud of.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You have about a three-
7	page theses on geology.
8	MR. GRECHECK: Yes.
9	MEMBER POWERS: That's actually required
10	explicitly in the requirement, in the regulations.
11	They had no choice but to.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Can't you go back
13	billions of years and everything?
14	MEMBER POWERS: Well, that's a feature of
15	geology, is it goes back billions of years.
16	Any other questions?
17	(No response.)
18	MEMBER POWERS: Okay. Let's turn to the
19	staff. Ms. Dobbs
20	MS. DUDES: Dudes.
21	MEMBER POWERS: are you going to give
22	an introduction or are we going to go straight to
23	beating on Mike?
24	MS. DUDES: Well, I'd like my introduction
25	to include beating on Mike, but I'd like to just do an
	I

1	introduction, and I know I did this with the
2	subcommittee yesterday. So I'll try and make it
3	brief.
4	MEMBER POWERS: So you should be
5	practiced, right?
6	** MS. DUDES: Yeah, yeah. We'll change it
7	up a little bit.
8	First and foremost, my name is Laura
9	Dudes. I'm the Section Chief for New Reactors. I
LO	wanted to introduce Michael Scott, the Senior Project
L1	Manager. I'm probably introducing him for the last
L2	time as a New Reactor staff member, but I'm sure
L3	you'll all get used to seeing Mike around here
L4	shortly.
L5	So that's the bad news for us, good news
L6	for the ACRS. The good news for the North Anna
L7	project is Ms. Belkys Sosa will be taking over as the
L8	Senior Project Manager for the North Anna ESP.
L9	MEMBER POWERS: They might want to check
20	with the Canadians before they celebrate too much.
21	MS. DUDES: Well, I think regardless, the
22	Canadians were pretty happy, and I know ACRS was
23	pretty complimentary of her work for our pre-
24	application review on that. So we're very lucky to
25	have her step in at this critical time in this

project.

And I say "critical" because the early site permits are first of a kind projects. We have come to an interim milestone, which is the completion of the draft safety evaluation report, which we have provided to all of you, and I must say the introductory remarks were correct. They do plan on bringing two more of those to you in two-month intervals.

MS. DUDES: Nothing, but I was thinking of a mitigative strategy last night in terms of if we step back a little bit and look at some of the activities that are going on nationally in Congress and other things, we are now planning and looking at

a much higher level of new reactor activities,

including combined license applications.

MEMBER POWERS: What did we do to you?

Another design certification is expected in June, and more early site permits. So I think one thing that we can do to maybe help the committee, and you'll have a pretty good support system with Mr. Scott next week, and we'll be able to maybe figure out with him how we can get you more information in a timely manner is once we docket these applications, the applications are 2,000 pages. They're big.

1 The staff review is slightly smaller. 2 we could probably get you the applications much sooner 3 and try and condense and point out some critical areas 4 so that we're not waiting until the last minute when 5 we're handing you the draft safety evaluation report. said, 6 So the Clinton 7 application should be -- these applications were all received within about a month of one another in 2003. 8 9 We staggered the reviews by two months to make 10 efficient use of resource teams because we just 11 physically couldn't review all of them simultaneously, 12 and I think we're learning lessons as we go through this. 13 14 So Mike is going to go through the North 15 Two months later we'll see Clinton and Anna ESER now. 16 then two months after that Grand Gulf, and then just 17 in case, you know, you're afraid that we're going to let you have a little bit of a breather, we'll be back 18 19 again to do the final safety evaluation for North 20 Anna. 21 MEMBER KRESS: One question. 22 MS. DUDES: Yes. 23 MEMBER KRESS: Did you guys, the same 24 group, review the environmental impact statement or is 25 that a different group?

1 MS. DUDES: We're within the same division 2 in NRR, but it's a different section, yes, that does 3 the environmental impact statement. 4 MEMBER KRESS: Should we be hearing from 5 them also on these? I don't believe so because the 6 MR. SCOTT: 7 statutory charter that was mentioned earlier is that 8 you all report on safety aspects of the application. 9 MEMBER KRESS: And there are no safety 10 aspects in the environmental impact statement? MEMBER POWERS: Well, the questions you 11 12 were asking, Dr. Kress, about the severe accident and doses, whatnot, is all in the environmental part of 13 14 it, and as portrayed yesterday, it's all there. 15 as portrayed yesterday, the potential dose to the public is all dominated by the existing reactors. 16 17 reactors have very low core damage frequencies. 18 MEMBER KRESS: I think that's a good 19 think, yeah, as long as the constraints are there that 20 says these have to be one of the new reactors. 21 MR. SCOTT: If we can get started, I'd 22 like to, first of all, defend my lengthy slide show. 23 I have taken some comments already before we even 24 started on it, but I would ask you all to be a little 25 There are really only 21 slides here patient with me.

1 and the rest are all back-up, and some of the 21 2 slides we should be able to get through quickly 3 because they are somewhat repetitive either to what 4 Laura said or what Dominion said earlier. 5 In addition to the slide package, you have two individual pieces of paper there. One of them is 6 7 a brightly colored map of the area and another one is 8 the seismic source zone map. Those are also in your 9 slide show as the very last two pages, but I was a little concerned that there might be a vision test 10 11 issue with those. So the separate copies are just 12 larger font so that you would be able to see them if you wish. 13 14 And I don't plan, unless you all have a 15 particular question on any of the back-up material to get into that back-up material. We discussed it with 16 17 the subcommittee yesterday. So moving into the presentation, 18 19 purpose, of course, is to brief the committee on the 20 draft safety evaluation report and support your view 21 and the ultimate issuance of an interim letter to the 22 Commission.

Next slide is the agenda, which I'm anticipating we would spend approximately 30 minutes on.

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Slide No. 4, as was mentioned earlier, Subpart A to 10 CFR 52, Part 52 governs what we're doing here, and Part 52, of course, references Part 100, and we talked about the ACRS does have a statutory role in this, and Laura mentioned already this is the first one you're getting. So we can move right on.

The subcommittee asked us to come back with the purpose of an early site permit, and Dominion came back with the purpose from their perspective, and we developed a slide here that shows the purpose of an early site permit, more generically speaking. It separates to the extent feasible; ideally it would be completely feasible to separate, but it turns out that there are some cases where it's a little difficult to draw the line, as we discussed with the subcommittee yesterday.

In any event, the intention is to separate the review of the site from the review of the design, and that allows the resolution of site related issues before the applicant has spent significant resources either developing the design or actually constructing the plant.

And it allows the early site permit holder who is successful to bank the site for up to 20 years

for future use. So if the applicant anticipates they may want to build a nuclear power plant but isn't in an immediate rush to build one right now, then the early site permit could facilitate a step-wise review for them to reach the finish line.

Next slide.

Dominion talked about the past milestones.

I'd like to talk a little bit about the future milestones. Laura, of course, referred to some of these.

Our schedule assumes an interim letter from the ACRS this month. Staff provides the final SER to you in late May. It will be in close to final form, and then we will issue the FSER, the final safety evaluation report, in the middle of June. Hope to have a letter from you all, your final letter, in July. We have a nominal date here, but of course, just some time in July.

And then we will incorporate the ACRS letter and issue the final safety evaluation report as a NUREG, and that schedule date is August 29th, '05.

Once the SER is issued and the EIS, the final EIS is issued, and the ACRS letter is received, then that will trigger the remaining events that will take us to a mandatory hearing, which we assume will

begin in the fall of 2005.

There will be a contested hearing, as we discussed with the subcommittee, because there is currently one environmental contention that is before the Board, and of course, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board keeps its own schedule. So these are only assumptions on our part as to when the hearing would actually occur.

And also have an assumption, as you see in the bottom bulleted slide that the Commission would make its decision in mid-2006, but that's, again, just a staff assumption.

Dominion. I'd just mention here they are seeking authorization for limited work in accordance with 10 CFR 52.17. The applicant for this early side permit is a company that, like Virginia Power, is owned by Dominion Resources, Incorporated, but the applicant is not the same identical entity as the one that owns

North Anna Power Station. That has some import in the review that's discussed in the safety evaluation report.

Slide 8. Dominion talked about what they're asking for capacity-wise. They mentioned the fact that a unit might be one large reactor or

1 multiple smaller reactors. They mentioned the fact 2 that they have submitted a plant parameter envelope. 3 The point that we would make there is that 4 when an applicant submits a plant parameter envelope, 5 they are retaining additional flexibility that they 6 might want to choose their reactor design later 7 instead of choosing it at the early site permit stage. The down side to that is that we do not 8 9 issue -- if we do issue an early site permit to an applicant who submits a PPE, that permit will not 10 speak to any particular reactor being approved, and 11 12 our review of the PPE values at the early site permit stage will be limited to whether they are reasonable 13 14 or not. 15 And then the combined license applicant is burdened with showing that their actual chosen design 16 falls within the PPE. For cases where it does not, 17 then the issue needs to be reevaluated at combined 18 19 license. Slide 9, this is additional information 20 21 that we provided in response to a request from the 22 subcommittee. Of course, this is a rock site. 23 are regional geologic faults and the very colorful 24 drawing that you have there that I mentioned that's

separate shows the faults in the vicinity, and

1 Dominion did develop their application ultimately for 2 the seismic hazard using Regulatory Guide 1.165 method 3 and the low and high frequency earthquakes that are 4 noted there. 5 Should you be interested, the drawing that shows the resulting safe shutdown earthquake is in the 6 7 back-up slides on page 27 -- I'm sorry -- 26. 8 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This earthquake M7.2 is 9 Charleston, is it? MR. MUNSON: Yes, that's correct. 10 That was Cliff Munson speaking 11 MR. SCOTT: 12 for the staff. Next slide. 13 14 I believe Dominion talked about their 15 cooling system. I won't address that again. They do 16 plan if they elect to place a unit on the site that requires an ultimate heat sink, they plan to provide 17 an underground ultimate heat sink which also has had 18 19 some import on the review as is discussed in one or 20 two of the staff's open items. 21 Slide 11. Talked about the draft safety 22 Of course, this is the first of a kind. evaluation. 23 It has, therefore, been an interesting review for the 24 staff, just as I'm sure that it was interesting and

challenging for the applicant in developing a first of

a kind early site permit application.

We did have a generic issue resolution process that we used prior to the receipt of any early site permit applications to attempt to resolve as many generic issues as we could identify before the applications came in.

As you can imagine, while we were successful in identifying a number of issues, others popped up. We actually got to look at an application, and so some of those, a few of those are being resolved as part of what's going on with the review of these three applications, and I'll speak briefly to that in a minute.

Slide 12 shows the review areas for the safety review and the staff reviewers. As you can see there, we have an able group of reviewers, many of whom you all have previously interacted with. We also have some very important contract and consulting support in the hydrology area. We received contract support from Pacific Northwest Laboratory. They also supported the site hazards review. Geology and seismology we were assisted by the U.S. Geologic Survey, and in the emergency planning area, the staff consulted extensively with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Next slide.

I'd like to talk briefly about a few issues that came up during the review of the early site permit application for North Anna. Some of these are more generic in nature, but of course, we do have the three applications before us. So they affect those applications.

The first one is regarding emergency planning. Of course, Gene Grecheck referred to their concerns regarding emergency planning, and we have accumulated some lessons learned from the review in this area.

Dominion, like the other two applicants has elected to seek acceptance of major features, which is authorized by 10 CFR 52. The concept, however, is not to find in detail, and when we got into the review of these three applications, we ended up having discussions regarding what is finality when you have limited information presented to you on a given subject.

And what we've concluded is that the staff, of course, must be able to make its required findings at the combined license stage. So if we receive information on a major feature, we can approve and provide finality for the review of that major

1 feature, the description of the major feature at a 2 high level. 3 However, the implementation details 4 underneath that major feature are open to additional 5 valuation at the combined license stage. And this, as was mentioned, perhaps, was not what was expected 6 7 going in. So this has been a bit thorny. Slide 14, I mentioned in an earlier --8 9 yes? 10 MEMBER POWERS: Let's come back to this. As I read the regulations, which, I mean, doesn't say 11 12 very much, but I get the impression that what they were looking for on the emergency plans was a much 13 14 more high level sort of thing than what hospital beds. I mean, they were looking at are there any changes 15 16 that are going to change the evacuation routes that are going to be a problem, not the more microscopic 17 features in the emergency plan. 18 19 Am I wrong in reading it that way? 20 MR. SCOTT: Oh, no. You are correct. 21 believe that, again, Gene Grecheck referred to that. 22 This applicant and -- well, let's just say this 23 applicant -- Dominion did submit emergency planning information that included a reference to the existing 24

emergency plan and the evacuation time estimate for

the North Anna Power Station.

The staff had previously dealt generically with the question of what do we do with submittal of preexisting information, information previously submitted to the NRC, and we absolutely communicated with the Commission on that in the approval of RS002, their early site permit review standard.

When we got into the reviews, the staff did choose to do a review in some detail of both the on-site and off-site emergency plans and the evacuation time estimate, and as we remarked to the subcommittee yesterday, that is an area in which we have accumulated some lessons learned that perhaps next time it will be different.

MEMBER POWERS: As long as we're going back, at the subcommittee we did not go into much of the detail on population projections. Safe to say that you did them. Could you talk a little bit about population projections?

MR. SCOTT: Population projections figure into the safety side review both in the emergency planning area and in the Part 100 area, and there are, as we mentioned yesterday, there are some regulatory guides that provide a methodology for determining actually whether population density is adequate or not

1	or excessive or not.
2	The review standard provides guidance on
3	doing a population projection, and as we mentioned,
4	the population projections that were done run out to
5	a total of 60 years, which would be the 20-year
6	assumed period for the early site permit, and then
7	assuming an application is submitted towards the end
8	of that period and a plant is built, then we assumed
9	another 40 years on top of that.
10	And when we looked at the and when the
11	applicant looked at the resulting population density
12	figures, they were all the way out to 2065, I believe
13	is the end year. They were within the criteria for a
14	population density that the regulatory guides provide.
15	If you want details on what the numbers
16	are in the regulatory guides, I have somebody here who
17	can answer that.
18	MEMBER POWERS: I'm more interested in the
19	resources available to make those projections.
20	MR. SCOTT: Can you clarify, please?
21	MEMBER POWERS: Yeah, how do you know? I
22	mean, have you got a crystal ball that
23	MR. SCOTT: What's the basis of the
24	projections?
25	MEMBER POWERS: Count the number of women?

1	MR. SCOTT: Okay. The first place I'll go
2	to ask that question is the tech staff over here. Jay
3	Lee, can you speak to that? Yeah, that would be your
4	area, I believe.
5	Did you understand the question?
6	MR. LEE: Yeah, yeah, I do. Perhaps maybe
7	applicant can address that better than I can. They
8	use the special formula they developed projecting
9	future population distribution.
10	MR. SCOTT: And we looked at their method
11	and found it to be acceptable.
12	MR. LEE: Right.
13	MR. SCOTT: Okay. I don't know if
14	Dominion would have anybody here that could address
15	that question. Do you happen to have?
16	PARTICIPANT: We don't have a way to do
17	that in detail, but it was
18	MR. SCOTT: It's documented in the
19	application, I believe.
20	MEMBER POWERS: There's a lot written on
21	it.
22	MR. SCOTT: Marvin Smith, I believe, from
23	Dominion wants to say something.
24	MR. SMITH: It's Marvin Smith from
25	Dominion.

1	It is documented in the application as to
2	how that was done, but use the 2000 census as a basis
3	point and then you have formulas that project
4	population trends over time that were applied to the
5	population and the area around the early site permit
6	site.
7	But, again, the details would be, I think,
8	pretty well described in the application.
9	MR. SCOTT: And referenced in the safety
10	evaluation report.
11	Jay, what section of the SER is that? Is
12	that 2.1.3?
13	MR. LEE: Correct, yes.
14	MR. SCOTT: So that information is, we
15	believe, contained in there.
16	MEMBER POWERS: There was an ulterior
17	motive.
18	MR. SCOTT: Okay.
19	MEMBER POWERS: And it is you can project
20	on population, but you don't project on weather.
21	MR. SCOTT: That's correct.
22	MEMBER POWERS: They would seem equally
23	challenging to me.
24	MR. SCOTT: I'm going to have to say that
25	we have no new information for you on the subject of

1	forecasting the weather based on what was said
2	yesterday.
3	MEMBER KRESS: Point of clarification on
4	the siting rules on population density.
5	MR. SCOTT: Yes.
6	MEMBER KRESS: There's a number in there,
7	I guess, a certain number of people per square mile,
8	right?
9	MR. SCOTT: Well, there's
10	MEMBER KRESS: A limit.
11	MR. SCOTT: a population center
12	distance and there is a number per square mile taken
13	out to certain radiuses, yes.
14	MEMBER KRESS: Now, my question about that
15	one, that part of it.
16	MR. LEE: Right. Population density
17	guidance is 500 persons per square mile.
18	MEMBER KRESS: How is that determined? Do
19	you take a ten-mile limit and get the area and divide
20	by the number of people, divide that into the number
21	of people in there?
22	MR. LEE: No, no. We use 20 miles from
23	the site.
24	MEMBER KRESS: But you use the full area
25	of the 20 and the total number of people?

1	MR. LEE: Right, average, average.
2	MEMBER KRESS: And the number of people
3	there?
4	MR. LEE: But average population density.
5	MEMBER KRESS: Okay. It doesn't involve
6	the wind rows or bunches of people at given spots in
7	that 20 miles?
8	MR. LEE: Well, that's included, transient
9	population, as well.
10	MEMBER KRESS: But that's an average in
11	the full 20 miles?
12	MR. LEE: Right. Twenty miles. So you
13	have the area and then you project so many population
14	including weighing the transient population. Then you
15	divided that number by area.
16	MEMBER KRESS: That's what I thought.
17	MR. LEE: To come up with
18	MEMBER KRESS: Thank you. That's what I
19	thought it was.
20	MR. SCOTT: It's concentric rings, right?
21	MR. LEE: Right.
22	MR. SCOTT: Are we ready to move on?
23	Slide 14. We did identify some issues in
24	the seismic area. As was mentioned earlier, Dominion
25	ultimately used the NRC approved method in Regulatory

1	Guide 1.165. They had come in with a performance
2	based approach, which is a new approach the NRC has
3	not yet evaluated, and therefore, we informed the
4	applicant that use of this performance based approach
5	would likely result in a delay in completion of the
6	review, and so the applicant revised its application
7	to
8	MEMBER POWERS: But it would seem to me
9	they'd still use the EPRI-1, but they just noted that
10	it bounded the Reg. Guide 1.165.
11	MR. SCOTT: Well, that's correct. If we
12	can flip back to Slide 27, please, or 26 rather. Can
13	you take us there?
14	If you used the NRC approved method, you
15	come up with an SSE that's addressed by taking the
16	higher of the blue and the red lines that you see on
17	this figure. When the applicant used their
18	performance based approach, they came up with a line
19	that exceeds or is equal to those blue the higher
20	blue and red curves throughout.
21	So the NRC found it acceptable because by
22	our standards it's conservative, but they could have
23	chosen another number and used another method, and it
24	still would have been conservative.
25	So while we accept their choice of SSE, we

1 did not accept it on the basis of a review of the 2 performance based approach. 3 As we mentioned yesterday, the second of 4 these applications you're going to see from Entergy, 5 they have chosen to retain a performance based approach, and so the staff is reviewing that. 6 7 you'll hear considerably more about the performance 8 based approach next time around. 9 MEMBER POWERS: I have to admit that that 10 is the most confusing language. I mean, the idea of a performance based approach, I think, I could imagine 11 somebody in Japan coming to me and saying, "Well, I've 12 got a performance based approach to earthquakes, " but 13 14 the East Coast of the United States? 15 MR. SCOTT: Cliff Munson can correct if I'm wrong here. I believe that the performance based 16 17 approach refers to other aspects of the methodology, doesn't it? 18 19 MR. MUNSON: It refers to the performance 20 of systems, structures, and components undergoing 21 ground motion. 22 Which is not the way we've MR. SCOTT: 23 done these evaluations in the past. So I think that's 24 what they had in mind rather than it's based on a 25 large series of earthquakes and what happens to

1 equipment, you know, in that kind of thing. 2 Let's see here. Okay. The bottom bullet 3 here, another issue that's come up, and this will end 4 up being a combined licensed item to be addressed. 5 I mentioned, North Anna is a rock site. So the site, safe shutdown earthquake exceeds the design safe 6 7 shutdown earthquake for the applications that have been either certified or submitted for certification 8 9 to date. That is depicted graphically on Slide No. 10 11 27, if you're interested in looking at that, and we 12 fixed Slide 27, by the way. The legend was backwards It's now on straight. 13 yesterday. 14 So that issue, the applicant has defined 15 a safe shutdown earthquake and once the open items are all addressed, if presumably the staff finds it 16 17 acceptable, then that will be adequate for the early site permit. 18 19 And then the comparison of that safe 20 shutdown earthquake with the design will be a function that we'll need to happen to the COL. 21 22 Slide 15. MEMBER POWERS: I mean, it still raises 23 24 the question of once again we run into this finality 25 issue that now if you open up the design, the

certified design to say, okay, you've got to X this thing in order to put it on this site. How much do you open it up?

Well, I guess I don't see that MR. SCOTT: as the same thing as some of these other The SSE as specified for the site considerations. will be final, subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 52.39, and the design SSE is a design issue, and our purpose here is not to resolve design issues at the ESP stage.

So I don't see that as a finality issue so much as an item of matching the site and the design, and in the perfect world, you would have those two match up. The site would fully bound the design, and so at combined license, the applicants' task would be easier, but because that's not the case here, if they don't come in with the design that is bounded by the site at that stage, then they're going to have to demonstrate that the design can be safety put on the will be subject site, and that to all full consideration at combined license.

Slide 15 speaks to another question that's come up, site characteristics versus design inputs.

We have given Dominion credit in our SER for appropriate consideration of the most severe and

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natural phenomena that have been reported for the site with allowance for margin and uncertainties, which is, of course, the language that they will ultimately need to comply with in General Design Criterion II, although GDC II largely does not apply at the ESP stage.

The staff was of the objective that if the applicant has been able to partially demonstrate compliance with a rule that will apply at combined license, we should give them credit for that, and we did where appropriate.

However, Dominion was concerned about the language in our safety evaluation report that refers to design bases, and they wanted to clarify that site characteristics are not necessarily the design bases. Site characteristics are the minimum design bases, and an applicant can always choose to use more conservative design bases for their actual design, and the staff is all right with that.

Slide 16. I mentioned earlier that the interface between site and design, which we would like to separate the review of the site and the design to the extent we can because that, of course, is the purpose of the step-wise process in Part 52. There are some cases where it's not quite clear how we do

1 that, and some of the examples that we've come up 2 against in this evaluation you see in front of you. 3 For most of these we have worked through 4 it and determined a site characteristic that can be 5 suitable for addressing the issues involved. that we're still under discussion with in the staff is 6 7 potential interferences between new and existing 8 plants. The subject who actually brought this up 9 was the fact that the normal service water discharge 10 for the new plants will run underneath the safety 11 12 related service water piping going to and from the ultimate heat sink for the existing plants, and we 13 14 have wrestled with how do we insure that the impact of 15 the construction of the new plants is appropriately 16 addressed. The applicant believes that that should be 17 addressed under Part 50, that it's not necessary to be 18 19 part of the ESP considerations, and the staff is still 20 evaluating that. 21 Now, other examples of these are discussed 22 in the back-up slides, but I don't propose to address 23 them today unless the committee would like to discuss any particular one of them. 24

MEMBER POWERS:

25

Let's go through the

1 frazil and anchor iced again. 2 Okay. The issue there --MR. SCOTT: 3 well, I'll tell you what. Rather than me go through 4 it, I'll just get Goutam to come up here. Goutam, are 5 you back there? Would you please speak to the open item 6 7 regarding frazil ice and anchor ice? The staff was looking for 8 MR. BAGCHI: 9 some kind of criterion to insure that frazil and anchor ice is considered as a characteristic of the 10 site that would be incorporated in the future design 11 12 of the intake and the screen and so forth. SCOTT: And what we ended up 13 MR. 14 concluding the right thing to do at this stage is to 15 have a site characteristic simply that there are conditions that could arise at the site that would 16 cause frazil or anchor ice to occur. 17 There was not, to the best of we could 18 19 determine, a site characteristic that we could rely on 20 that would say this is what will bring about frazil 21 ice because there's a combination of conditions, and 22 so what we are simply stating is that at ESP frazil 23 and anchor ice could occur, and that will mean that 24 when we stated that, that the combined license

applicant will need to provide appropriate design

1	features to deal with that.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Have you got frazil ice
3	in lakes, do you?
4	MR. SCOTT: Yes.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I've seen it in rivers.
6	It just floats around in a lake?
7	MR. BAGCHI: Well, in the application
8	itself they accept that it can occur in lakes, lakes
9	and rivers, yes.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But rivers, it's moved
11	by the river. So it's mixed up with the water in the
12	river. In the lake I would think it would float to
13	the surface.
14	MEMBER POWERS: Well, the application
15	itself defines a turbulent condition to get the
16	necessary mixing.
17	MR. SCOTT: The actual combinations of
18	conditions that would result in that occurring at Lake
19	Anna, Virginia are not going to be common.
20	MEMBER POWERS: Yeah, basically, as I
21	interpret the argument, it is that if the Units 1 and
22	2 are operating, you don't get cold enough to get ice.
23	If they're not operating then there's not enough
24	turbulence to mix any ice up, and so that it's a
25	relatively rare occurrence.

1	MR. SCOTT: As I recall, the issue could
2	emerge if you've had a large number or say all of the
3	units shut down and now you're getting ready to start
4	one up. The cold water is there, and no you have the
5	turbulence.
6	MEMBER POWERS: But you handle it just by
7	saying, yeah, it can occur.
8	MR. SCOTT: It can occur, and so the COL
9	applicant is going to need to provide design measures
10	to deal with it, and that is not something that's
11	unprecedented.
12	MEMBER POWERS: Oh, yeah, yeah.
13	MR. SCOTT: And this was one of those kind
14	of lessons learned again. Do we ask the applicant at
15	the early site permit stage to show us what design
16	feasibility is out there?
17	And ultimately we concluded that that's
18	not the role of an early site permit review.
19	MEMBER POWERS: Yeah, because I mean if
20	nobody had ever had frazil ice before in the world,
21	you might well want to look at that for feasibility,
22	but since Wolf Creek, we're all attuned into frazil
23	ice. You know, there are ways of handling it.
24	MR. SCOTT: Right. Slide 17 just speaks
25	to largely the collection of items that we've given to

1	you in the back-up slides. We do have some open
2	items. There are about 30 of them. Twenty of them
3	are in the emergency planning area and half of those
4	are related to the fact that some of the requests for
5	additional information responses came in late.
6	And then there are another ten or 15 that
7	are related to various site issues, and as Gene
8	Grecheck mentioned, we are working through those, and
9	the applicant expects to provide most of that
10	information today.
11	So we're anticipating that, and we'll have
12	the staff reviewers looking hard at how the applicant,
13	how Dominion is resolving those.
14	MEMBER POWERS: You tantalized us by
15	saying all save one. Do you happen to know what the
16	one is?
17	MR. SCOTT: The issue is, yes let me
18	see if I can find it.
19	MEMBER POWERS: He's a dirty guy. He
20	leaves me curious for long periods of time. I know he
21	did it deliberately. He's grinning back there.
22	MR. SCOTT: A whole lot more credit than
23	it's due.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Are you going to revisit
25	seismic or are you going to go to the end?

1	MR. SCOTT: Well, actually as it happen,
2	the item that they're going to be a little late on is
3	seismic. If we could say again? go to page 35,
4	actually I'm going to say it's 36.
5	Thirty-six is open item 2.5.2, which is to
6	incorporate site specific geologic properties and
7	their uncertainties into the determination of the SSE.
8	Dominion has provided their method for determining the
9	SSE at a hypothetical rock outcrop, which is
10	consistent with NRC guidance on the subject, and as
11	noted on the slide here, the staff has no questions on
12	it, but the actual results of the method will not be
13	provided to us until the end of this month.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Now, this is a rock
15	site.
16	MR. SCOTT: It is a rock site, yes.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yet you have concerns
18	with the liquefaction in the
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How does that come
21	about?
22	MR. MUNSON: This is Cliff Munson.
23	They have a thin layer of soil. It's
24	considered a rock site. There is a thin layer of soil
25	at the top. This will be removed when they build a

1	reactor. It will be excavated and removed, but they
2	did do a liquefaction analysis propagating the ground
3	motion up through the site, and that included this
4	weak soil layer
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's going to be
6	removed?
7	MR. MUNSON: Right.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So liquefaction issue
9	goes away?
10	MR. MUNSON: Right.
11	MR. SCOTT: That's a permit condition,
12	too, that we're planning to propose.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: Actually they're going to
14	do a couple of things. They're going to improve the
15	soil that's located not under safety related
16	structures.
17	MR. SCOTT: Right.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: And remove the soil where
19	safety related structures would be. So there's a lot
20	of shoveling.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Now, do these pipes go
22	through the rock or through the soil?
23	MR. SCOTT: Are you speaking of the
24	service water piping?
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yes. Do they go through

1	the rock or through the soil?
2	MR. SCOTT: As I think Mr. Grecheck
3	mentioned, Dominion is planning to use the existing
4	service water structure to the extent possible. I
5	don't know. Cliff, can you speak to whether it's in
6	the rock?
7	MR. MUNSON: I have no idea.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Presumably, it's a
9	seismic response of the piping?
10	MR. SCOTT: Dominion, do you have any
11	insight on this?
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It depends on what it's
13	in?
14	MR. GRECHECK: First, the piping that's
15	being referenced
16	MR. SCOTT: That's Gene Grecheck.
17	MR. GRECHECK: Yes, this is Gene Grecheck
18	The piping that's being referenced here is
19	the circ water piping for condenser cooling. That's
20	non-safety related, and that's the large cooling
21	structure. That is through soil. That is not.
22	But this soil at this site is a mixture of
23	soil and then something called saprolite, which is a
24	crumbled rock type material, but the excavationand
25	part of the reason that we are seriously looking at

1 using this existing piping is because all of this 2 excavation in construction was done some years ago, and if we can reuse that, there's no reason to do all 3 4 of that again. 5 But the rock layer, the safety related structures are founded on the bedrock underneath all 6 7 of that. So when we're talking about what we'd do is 8 remove that cover material, found the structures on 9 rock, and then refill it, and much of the discussion that we have about seismic response is the response of 10 that fill material and how that interacts with the 11 12 structure. And as I read your 13 MEMBER POWERS: 14 application, you had agreed to backfill not with the existing soil but with a different soil. 15 16 GRECHECK: And with an improved 17 material. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You have safety related 18 19 You have an ultimate heat sink and things like 20 Presumably you have safety related pipes that that. 21 go through this soil. 22 If they use an ultimate heat MR. SCOTT: 23 sink. 24 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Do you do a seismic 25 analysis of these pipes then?

1 MR. SCOTT: Not at this stage. 2 MR. GRECHECK: For the existing station, for North Anna 1 and 2, there is safety related piping 3 4 that does run through the soil, but that piping is 5 anchored at various points, and there is a seismic analysis that discusses how that would response. 6 7 MR. SCOTT: But that would be outside our 8 scope here. 9 In addition to the open items, there is a Just briefly, it's regarding use 10 confirmatory item. 11 of the Internet for information supporting safety 12 related analyses, and the applicant addressed that, and the staff has inspected it and has no additional 13 14 questions on it. 15 COL action items. There are a number of items which, again, are in the back-up slides here. 16 There are items that are site related, but for various 17 reasons the staff believes will more appropriately be 18 19 addressed at the combined license stage. 20 Just as an aside, as part of reviewing the 21 responses to the open items discussing these issues 22 with the applicant, the staff has considered and there's some chance that some of these combined 23 24 license action items may be revised or deleted by the

time we're complete with the final safety evaluation

1	report.
2	For example, we have one speaking to this
3	separation distance, and it doesn't make sense given
4	the actual physical condition or configuration of the
5	site.
6	Finally, we have a number of permit
7	conditions. Again, these are in the back-up slides as
8	well. These are items that we believe are applicable
9	to the ESP holder, and there will be constraints on
10	the ESP holder if an ESP is issued for the site.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: To go back to seismic,
12	what's the effect of seismic on the dam that retains
13	the lake?
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay. Again, the lake
15	is not the safety related ultimate heat sink for the
16	site, for the early site permit site.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: They don't need the
18	lake.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: No.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: For safety purposes.
21	MR. SCOTT: That's correct.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So if you lost the lake,
23	it wouldn't matter.
24	MR. SCOTT: Well, it wouldn't be good.
25	MR. BAGCHI: Well, that's right.

1	This is Goutam Bagchi.
2	We did look at that for availability of
3	water, and the dam failure is postulated.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: On the other hand, the
5	ultimate heat sink is that big pond.
6	MR. SCOTT: That's correct.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: No, no.
8	MR. SCOTT: Well, there's an underground
9	facility if they use one, correct, Goutam?
10	MEMBER SIEBER: That's for the new.
11	MR. SCOTT: The new ones, yes, as opposed
12	to the old ones.
13	MR. GRECHECK: Again, this is Gene
14	Grecheck.
15	Just to clarify that, remember on the
16	picture there was that pond. That is the service
17	water reservoir, and that is the ultimate heat sink
18	for Units 1 and 2. For the ESP units, we are
19	proposing if an external ultimate heat sink is
20	required, then it would be an underground width band.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I wonder if it's
22	underground what do you do. You have welds or
23	something? Is that what you mean?
24	MR. SCOTT: No, the make-up would come
25	from the lake.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But the lake is gone in
2	my scenario.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you fill it first.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You fill it first. It's
5	an underground pond. Is that what it is, rather than
6	groundwater? It's actually underground reservoir?
7	MR. BAGCHI: It's a very large tank. It's
8	230 feet by some 100 feet by 50 feet.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So it's an actual tank.
10	MR. BAGCHI: It's an actual tank buried
11	inside the ground.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Big.
13	MR. BAGCHI: Very big.
14	MR. SCOTT: The next slide, Slide 18,
15	please.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: from the tank on the
17	surface. It's just a tank of water.
18	MR. SCOTT: Yes. The DSER, being the
19	first cut at the safety evaluation report and having
20	open items associated with it, defers general
21	regulatory conclusions regarding site safety and
22	suitability to the final safety evaluation report,
23	which I mentioned we will plan to issue in June.
24	However, there are some sections of the
25	report for which there are no open items, and in those

1 sections we have reached conclusions that are shown 2 As you will note, the applicant has provided 3 appropriate quality assurance measures equivalent to 4 those in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. 5 Part 52 does not require compliance with Appendix B, but the staff has clearly stated to the 6 7 applicants that we need for the ability to have confidence in the review findings, that the measures 8 9 the applicant applies be equivalent in substance to those in Appendix B, and Dominion has done so, and the 10 staff has accepted that. 11 Site 12 characteristics are such that adequate security plans and measures can be developed. 13 14 As I understand, the committee is not evaluating So we'll move on from that one. 15 security. 16 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We just note that it is 17 on a lake. It is on a lake. 18 MR. SCOTT: 19 MEMBER POWERS: Our specific charter is to 20 items related to safety, and look at the 21 Commission has expressed no interest in advising them 22 on security issues with regard to these early site 23 permits. So we've kind of said, okay, we won't do 24 that. 25 I think we have enough to do without it.

1	MR. SCOTT: Additional conclusions. We
2	talked about this earlier. The population center
3	distance is defined in 10 CFR 100.3. Meets the
4	criteria for being one and a third times the distance
5	from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low
6	population zone, and is compliant with the applicable
7	regulations.
8	The applicant has also established
9	appropriate atmospheric dispersion characteristics to
LO	support its radiological calculations, radiological
L1	dose consequence evaluations.
L2	And based on that information, as well as
L3	the PPE value
L4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I'm curious about this
L5	population center distance. How do you decide what
L6	the distance is? Is it the outer boundary of the
L7	population center or is it the center of the if
L8	it's a big area, how do you decide how to measure the
L9	distance?
20	MR. SCOTT: Jay, can you speak to that,
21	please?
22	MEMBER POWERS: It's mineral.
23	MR. LEE: The distance is from the
24	reactor.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's easy to define,
1	I control of the cont

	234
1	but what's the other end of the distance?
2	MR. LEE: That's the one and one-third
3	times
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yeah, but what's the
5	MR. LEE: the distance to the LPG,
6	which is 6.8 miles.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I understand.
8	MR. SCOTT: I think he's asking what the
9	population center is.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: What is the location of
11	the population center? Is it the outer boundary or
12	what? We have a city. Is it the distance to the
13	first suburb or is it the distance to the city limits,
14	City Hall?
15	MR. SCOTT: What is the definition of a
16	population center is where he's going.
17	MR. LEE: I don't think we defined that.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It seems to me important
19	because the city could be bigger than one and one-
20	third times the distance.
21	MR. SCOTT: I think it is dispersed.
22	MEMBER POWERS: It could be, but it's
23	Mineral, Virginia. So
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah, Mineral is not
25	MEMBER POWERS: You could take either one

1	of them. It's the same distance.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's like a small town
3	in Vermont.
4	MEMBER POWERS: It's not quite that big.
5	MR. SCOTT: There are criteria for this
6	and we can get back to you on that as to what those
7	criteria are. I mean, there is a method for doing
8	this that we went through in this evaluation.
9	MEMBER POWERS: Well, the first population
10	center has to have a population of less than 25,000,
11	and unless it's an extremely peculiar 25,000 city,
12	there's not going to be a huge amount of distance
13	between the outer limits and the town center.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well
15	MEMBER POWERS: A town of 25,000?
16	PARTICIPANT: Oak Ridge would be a huge
17	area.
18	MEMBER POWERS: Unless it's extremely
19	unusual. I excluded that. There's a possibility on
20	the off chance you might bring up Oak Ridge, which by
21	definition is a very eccentric place.
22	PARTICIPANT: You're right.
23	MR. SCOTT: The nearest relatively large
24	town in the vicinity of this site, as Mr. Grecheck
25	mentioned is over 30 miles away.

1 Slide 20. The staff also concluded that 2 potential hazards associated with nearby transportation routes, industrial-military facilities 3 4 pose no undue risk to a facility that might be 5 constructed on the site. In other words, we evaluated the hazards in the area, and did not find issues 6 7 related to significant hazards, off-site hazards. 8 Slide 21. This is just a wrap-up on the 9 presentation. The staff has, of course, issued a 10 first of a kind DSER. We expect today to have open item responses for most of them. We are working 11 12 through some issues that we've talked to you about. We're looking forward to seeing 13 14 interim ACRS letter and to coming back -- well, to Belkys coming back in July and bringing you again on 15 the final safety evaluation report. 16 And we are identifying a number of lessons 17 learned related to these three reviews. 18 As you can 19 imagine, first of a kind, it's fertile ground for 20 identifying things that you didn't expect to identify, 21 and we plan to revise our guidance in the future to 22 address these lessons learned and that which supports 23 review of any future early site permit applications 24 that might be submitted. 25 And there is some industry discussion that

1 there may be additional early site permits, although 2 we do not currently have a commitment letter from any 3 particular entity for seeking one. 4 MEMBER POWERS: I think we'd be interested 5 in working with you on that, the lessons learned activities. We can help you provide input from our 6 7 perspective, but not to -- you know, if it's not too 8 terribly much of an imposition on you, once you get 9 your thoughts together, maybe come down and give us a chat, and we can give some feedback, and maybe we can 10 put something together kind of jointly on this. 11 SCOTT: We would appreciate your 12 MR. 13 input. 14 MEMBER POWERS: You know, I mean, in the spirit of what is efficient and good guidance and is 15 efficient or review is possible and things like that. 16 So I think we'd be interested in working with you on 17 18 that. 19 MR. SCOTT: Thank you. 20 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That would be very 21 It would help us to know what to focus on useful. 22 next time around and that sort of thing. 23 MR. SCOTT: Sure. That concludes --24 MEMBER POWERS: I think it's going to be 25 I mean, it sounds like they're going to possible.

1	exercise us pretty good on this, and if we're just
2	careful on keeping track of where we find rough spots
3	and things like that, and then we get together with
4	them and get their notes and where they found rough
5	spots and we might be able to put together a pretty
6	good story here.
7	I'm quite sure the Commission is very
8	anxious for us to work like that, in a, you know,
9	cooperative fashion like that.
LO	Similarly, I would invite comments, Gene,
L1	from your crowd, too, just you know, some input on
L2	what you found easy, difficult, hard, and things like
L3	that, and confusing or whatever. I just think it
L4	would be useful.
L5	MR. SCOTT: That concludes my prepared
L6	remarks, subject to your questions.
L7	MEMBER POWERS: Do you have any questions
L8	for the speaker?
L9	(No response.)
20	MEMBER POWERS: Well, for those of you who
21	have not had a chance to look at the massive
22	documentation sent to us primarily, I think, in
23	electronic format, it's actually the application is
24	impressive, but the SER is a fairly readable document,

and if take a chance to look at it if you haven't.

1	Now, are there any questions the members
2	have of either set of speakers?
3	(No response.)
4	MEMBER POWERS: And I'm not aware of
5	anybody from the public wanting to make comments. So
6	I'll thank you.
7	MR. SCOTT: Thank you.
8	MEMBER POWERS: And welcome aboard, Mike.
9	MR. SCOTT: Thank you.
10	MEMBER POWERS: And thank all of the
11	speakers and turn it back to you, Mr. Chair.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you.
13	So we have gained some time, but we can't
14	use it because we're not allowed to start until three
15	o'clock. So we will take a break until three o'clock.
16	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
17	the record at 2:24 p.m. and went back on
18	the record at 2:56 p.m.)
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Let's come back into
20	session.
21	We're going to hear about pressurized
22	thermal shock rule. We're very much looking forward
23	to what we hope will be the end or almost the end of
24	this process. I will hand the chair over to Bill
25	Shack to get things going.
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1	** VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Okay. You know,
2	we've had a number of meetings to discuss pressurized
3	thermal shock. At our last meeting since we reviewed
4	much of the documentation which really provides the
5	technical basis for pressurized thermal shock, and we
6	said, you know, this project was out to develop the
7	technical basis. It really comes down to the reports
8	that were available.
9	And today we'll be talking about another
10	one of those reports covering the thermal hydraulic
11	evaluation of thermal shock. And again, you know,
12	there's a PRA part. There's a thermal hydraulic part,
13	and a probabilistic fracture mechanics to PTS.
14	The thermal hydraulic calculations have
15	been done with RELAP, and being a structures guy, I
16	never understand exactly how this works when you do
17	these things with RELAP.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's magic.
19	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Its magic. They
20	used 2D models with their axial azimuthal segments
21	here. We deactivate the momentum flux in the
22	downcomer because otherwise we get unrealistic
23	circulations, but
24	MEMBER POWERS: And that part is wrong
25	anyway, right?

SHACK: Six azimuthal 1 VICE CHAIRMAN 2 We looked at NUREG 1806 last time. 3 are comparisons with experiments in NUREG 1806, and 4 they focused on comparisons of the pressure and the 5 fluid temperature in the downcomer in experiments and RELAP calculations. Those were fairly good. 6 7 However, there were no comparisons of the 8 wall temperature or the heat transfer coefficient H, 9 and in reality it's really the wall temperature that 10 controls the pressurized thermal shock. There was some sensitivity studies that 11 12 the downcomer showed that fluid temperature is relatively insensitive to H, and again, that's not 13 14 totally unexpected, but it's really the 15 temperature that we're worried about. RELAP uses the maximum of the Churchill-Chu or the Dittus-Bolter 16 17 correlations to compute age for the baseline calculations, and they use plus or minus 30 percent on 18 19 those values for an uncertainty analysis. 20 Why 30 percent? MEMBER POWERS: 21 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Well, we'll let them 22 discuss that. sensitivity 23 1806, they did some studies, Petcherkoff-Galinski, with the Swanson-Catton 24

multiplier for buoyancy opposed mixed convection, and

when they did those calculations, they got a through wall cracking frequency for the 12 transients they did increase or change by factors ranging from .4 to 1, with an average of about five.

And so if you take a simple minded point of view, you might say that if you use those correlations you would increase the through all cracking frequencies you were getting by something on the order of a factor of five.

Now, that's interesting. That would still leave a significant margin for plants at the end of license renewal. So it's not the end of the world, but it certainly would be different than the kind of values that we've had.

We have a new report now, NUREG 1809 that's intended to provide further information on the comparison of RELAP with experiments. One of the things that I'd like to get out of this discussion is the basis that we should find acceptable either way of calculating age that we use, either the conventional baseline RELAP calculations or the Petcherkoff-Galinski with Swanson-Catton multiplier.

And so what evidence do we have that either one of those provides a realistic value of H?

Which H correlation should we be using? The baseline

1	calculations have been done with one. We have an
2	alternative sensitivity calculation with another, and,
3	again, any more insight on how much difference it
4	really makes.
5	And I believe Jack Rosenthal wants to.
6	** MR. ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
7	I'm Jack Rosenthal. I'm the Branch Chief
8	of the Advanced Reactor and Regulatory Effectiveness
9	Branch in the office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.
10	I've been given the opportunity to provide
11	some opening remarks.
12	This February we provided our report,
13	NUREG 1809, entitled "Thermal Hydraulic Evaluation of
14	Pressurized Thermal Shock," and that was intended to
15	summarize our work and answer questions. Dr. Bessette
16	is our principal spokesman today to summarize the
17	report of which he's really the author and to respond
18	to questions.
19	Dr. Kirk also is at the table. He's from
20	Materials Engineering Branch, and he will actually
21	start the discussion to try to put what we have to say
22	in perspective.
23	Roy Woods is in the room, and he's from
24	the Probabilistic Risk Analysis Branch should
25	questions arise.

And Professor Griffith and Professor

DiMarzo, who are consultants to the staff, are next to

me to answer questions should they arise.

We've been doing thermal hydraulic work

for over four years in this area, and we've had an extensive analytic effort and experimental program, and we think that we've made significant progress over what we knew 20 years ago, in part due to increased understanding and in part due to the fact that we now have computers that just allow us to do multiple, multiple calculations.

We have performed assessment of our code against experiments, and find it surprisingly predicts rather well, and you'll hear an explanation of why.

Using the tools we've performed hundreds of calculations to examine a spectrum of transients and accidents relevant to PTS, ranging from a stuck open safety valve which subsequently receives to a large break loss of coolant accident.

We've performed extensive sensitivity studies of the thermal hydraulic aspects alone, as well as coupling the thermal hydraulics and the fracture mechanics, and the body of work provides confidence that we've addressed what we believe are the significant issues.

1 We've had the benefit of peer review both 2 by the ACRS and an independent peer review committee 3 in which we spent days going over the details and 4 have had the benefit of their wisdom, and I believe 5 that we've addressed their comments. I believe our effort at this point is 6 7 complete. While questions may exist and you can always make refinements, we believe that the work is 8 now technically robust and provide the technical basis 9 to move forward with rulemaking. 10 With this, Mark. 11 12 MR. EricksonKIRK: Okay. Could I say something 13 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 14 here? 15 MR. EricksonKIRK: Sure. 16 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yes, we've heard a lot about your calculations and the effect on each and 17 temperature distributions and all of that sort of 18 19 The bottom line is: how does this affect PTS? thing. 20 And you know, seeing temperature 21 distributions in the wall is very interesting, but if 22 they have no effect on PTS, there's no 23 conclusion. 24 So I'd like us to eventually get to that 25 bottom line, as what is the effect on all this stuff,

1 on crack initiation growth and the real sort of issue 2 with PTS. Well, I've got 3 MR. EricksonKIRK: Okay. 4 the easy part here because I've only been asked to 5 explain one slide and then Dave gets all of the hard questions. 6 7 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You're not going to show 8 us that big scatter plot again, are you? 9 MR. EricksonKIRK: I'm going to make a big 10 copy of that for your wall at home, but I'll be here know, questions about fracture 11 to answer, you mechanics calculations and so on. 12 But just to orient people, and I think 13 14 this is all fairly familiar in terms of overall how we 15 conduct the analysis. We begin with a PRA and then sequence analysis, and that defines for us both the 16 sequences of things that could go wrong that would 17 18 lead overcooling event, perhaps to an with 19 repressurization, perhaps not, and also the frequency 20 with which those events would occur. 21 Those sequences of bad things would then 22 be passed to the thermal hydraulics code RELAP, which 23 would then -- and since I'm a structural analyst, I 24 don't understand what goes on in there either. So I

have some sympathy for Dr. Shack, but something

happens inside and out comes pressure, temperature, and heat transfer coefficient, all varying versus time.

That is then passed to our probabilistic fracture mechanics code, which takes that information in combination with information on the vessel material properties, the flow distribution within the vessel, refluence, and out of that code comes a conditional probability of through wall cracking, and it's called conditional because it's conditioned on or premised on the fact or the assumption that a certain transient has occurred.

Of course, those transients occur with certain frequencies or probabilities. So the last step in the calculation is to actually multiply the frequency with which we believe these events occur with the probability of generating a through wall crack, presuming that they occur, and that gives us our yearly frequency of through wall crack.

And we then perform those analyses for a number of different plants at a number of different embrittlement levels, and use that information to develop proposals for materials based screening limits, and we would then recommend to our colleagues in NRR for their use.

1 So that's the overall scope of the 2 calculation, and now we're going to focus in on the 3 thermal hydraulics part. 4 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Can we also at some time 5 discuss the effect of uncertainties, fluctuations and so on in the thermal hydraulics on the favor code? 6 7 How robust is the favor code when fed uncertainties in the thermal hydraulics? Can we address that at some 8 time? 9 10 MR. EricksonKIRK: Yeah, I can. I think that will come up, but I can take a shot at it just 11 right off the top. 12 I think if we were asking Favor to analyze 13 14 the response of the probability of a vessel failing 15 relative to one specified transient, then these small differences that Dave will show you between what RELAP 16 predicts and what reality is could, in fact, be very 17 troublesome, and I can just give you some thought 18 19 experiments to tell you why. 20 For example, you'll see figures like RELAP 21 is off or can be off by ten degrees C. Is ten degrees 22 C. a big difference? Well, it could be a very big 23 difference if, say, the -- and, again, these are 24 comments restricted to analysis of a particular 25 transient and its effect on the vessel.

	If RELAP predicted values that were
2	systematically ten degrees C. too high so that the
3	real transient was ten degrees C. lower and,
4	therefore, the fracture toughness was lower and the
5	thermal stress was higher, and so in the real
6	transient you actually got a failure probability, but
7	in the analyzed transient the driving force was too
8	low and the resistance was too high and you didn't get
9	a failure probability. You'd then have a difference
10	between reality when you actually have some finite,
11	albeit small, failure probability and the analysis or
12	representation of reality where you calculate a zero,
13	and that's obviously
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Because you have a
15	critical event. You're either above it or not.
16	MR. EricksonKIRK: That's right. That's
17	right.
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And thus your
19	uncertainties begin to really matter.
20	MR. EricksonKIRK: That's right, and
21	that's just a natural consequence of the material.
22	But all of those comments were with
23	regards to one particular transient, whereas in the PT
24	analysis coming out of the PRA are sequences of events
25	where we analyze anywhere between 30 and 100 different

events for their PTS significance.

And what the assessment results that you've seen before and Dave will summarize again show is that, you know, yes, RELAP can be a bit off by something of the order of ten degrees C. and similarly small values in pressure. But it's neither systematically high nor low. Sometimes it's high; sometimes it's low.

And you know, I can't give you a proof that this is so, but the fact that it's sometimes high, sometimes low gives me, you know, as the guy that's sitting in the third blue box a reasonable degree of confidence that since we're analyzing a family of different events that are sometimes going to be predicted high with respect to reality, sometimes predicted low, that on average my results out the end will be a reasonable representation of reality.

If we were in the other situation where I was asked to analyze one particular transient, then I must admit I'd be getting much more wrapped around the axle about these small differences.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But that's okay for temperature. Now, when we talk about heat transfer coefficient, I think you would agree if heat transfer coefficient is big enough it doesn't matter what it

1	is, and the question then would be, well, suppose it's
2	infinite. Does it really make a difference whether
3	it's 3,000 or any
4	MR. EricksonKIRK: I think in concert the
5	same comments apply to heat transfer coefficient in
6	that if RELAP is systematically always one way or the
7	other relative to the reality of heat transfer
8	coefficient, that's a bad thing.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Is it a bad thing or
10	does it matter if it's big enough?
11	MR. EricksonKIRK: If it's big enough, it
12	doesn't matter, but I think now we're getting into the
13	point where
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It does make a
15	difference. He's going to tell us it does matter.
16	MR. EricksonKIRK: Yes.
17	DR. ROSENTHAL: I think now we're starting
18	to get ahead of ourselves. We'll bring it up again in
19	about Slide 8, and then we'll bring it up again when
20	we talk about the heat transfer coefficient, and I
21	would remind you that you have to think it through,
22	the transients, the small break LOCAs, the large break
23	LOCAs because what's important changes, and of course,
24	the commensurate frequency.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The reason I'm asking

1	these questions is that the draft report we have from
2	Dave has a lot of thermal hydraulics in it, has very
3	little of the coupling of that to the fracture
4	mechanics, and that's why I'm asking questions now
5	about that coupling.
6	MR. EricksonKIRK: I'm just going over
7	there to be comfortable.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Perhaps we'll come back
9	to that later.
LO	MR. EricksonKIRK: Yeah.
L1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's the bottom line
L2	really.
L3	MR. EricksonKIRK: Well, yes, that's the
L4	bottom line, but it's also true that even before you
L5	get to that bottom line you need to, you know, we all
L6	need to convince ourselves that the thermal hydraulics
L7	models are either right or adequate.
L8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Or it doesn't matter.
L9	MR. EricksonKIRK: But I would
20	respectfully disagree because the sensitivity or
21	insensitivity of a result coming out of a fracture
22	mechanics code to input says nothing about whether the
23	input is right or wrong. I think we have to start by
24	saying that we believe what's going in.
25	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Well, would vou

1	agree with my sort of extrapolation from the
2	sensitivity results you do present in 1806 that if we
3	change the heat transfer correlation, we would be
4	talking about changing
5	MR. EricksonKIRK: Yes.
6	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: the failure rate
7	by something like a
8	MR. EricksonKIRK: Yes, yes, yes.
9	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: factor of five?
10	MR. EricksonKIRK: Yes.
11	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: And would that
12	bother you?
13	MR. EricksonKIRK: A factor of five would
14	turn into something like 20 degrees on the screening
15	limit, and yes, that would bother me. So yes. But I
16	think before we get into saying it's a factor of five,
17	we need to first qualify that and say what has
18	produced the factor of five, and is the difference
19	between the base calculation and the sensitivity, are
20	those both credible models?
21	If those are, indeed, both credible
22	models, then we need to worry about the factor of
23	five. If either of those models is incredible, then
24	the factor of five is meaningless, and that's the
25	thing that I think is important for the thermal

1	hydraulists to establish before we get into structural
2	mechanics.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: There's nothing
4	universal about this factor of five. If you have a
5	long, slow transient as we have seen in some of the
6	reports where things happen on the scale of 50 minutes
7	or 3,000 seconds, then the wall sort of cools down
8	with the water and nothing much happens. So the heat
9	transfer coefficient doesn't become important.
10	If it's a long, slow transient, you don't
11	care too much about age I think you'll find.
12	MR. EricksonKIRK: Well, if it's a long,
13	slow transient, I don't care much about it anyway.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: If somebody quenched the
15	wall, a double ended guillotine break, things happen
16	very quickly. Then that H assumes a much bigger role.
17	So I think we have to be careful about sort of a
18	factor of five being bandied around. It may be that
19	for certain transients the factor is much bitter. For
20	certain other transients it doesn't matter what H is.
21	That was, again, not too clear from the
22	report. Maybe it will be made clearer today.
23	MR. EricksonKIRK: Okay.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I'm sorry to hold you
25	up, Dave. I'm sure you're eager to go.

1	DR. BESSETTE: Take up the whole two hours
2	if you like.
3	(Laughter.)
4	** DR. BESSETTE: I have about 15 viewgraphs
5	to go through.
6	So where we were in December is described
7	the assessment performed to determine the ability of
8	RELAP to predict pressure, downcomer temperature, and
9	part of the presentation was devoted to showing that
LO	plumes would not be an issue.
L1	It also showed results of a sensitivity
L2	study we did prior to the start of the current PTS
L3	reevaluation that showed that even if plumes did
L4	exist, they did not materially affect the
L5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Now, were these plumes
L6	with 100 degrees of subcooling that you got in the
L7	cold leg or are they that's a much bigger, stronger
L8	plume than no plume.
L9	DR. BESSETTE: Are you speaking of the
20	sensitivity?
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I'm saying if plumes did
22	exist in fact it was negligible. How strong were
23	those plumes?
24	DR. BESSETTE: They were 40 degrees C. and
25	80 degrees C.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Because you've got over
2	100 degrees C. stratification in the cold leg.
3	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you didn't look at
5	the worst plume.
6	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I think there's no
7	evidence that any experiments or modeling -
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I know.
9	DR. BESSETTE: that you can get such
10	plumes.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But if you're going to
12	make this categorical statement if they exist, the
13	effect is negligible, you're not looking at the worst
14	case. You're looking at something more realistic.
15	DR. BESSETTE: I am looking at something
16	more realistic, but it was
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The first thing you
18	might do is look at the extreme case, and if nothing
19	matters, then forget about it.
20	DR. BESSETTE: What we looked at in that
21	study was conservative to everything we knew at the
22	time. And the 40 degree case was conservative, and
23	then we did twice that at 80 degrees and still could
24	not see an effect.
25	So today I've got to

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And you concluded that
2	the plumes are no stronger than ten degrees, I think,
3	from the experiments.
4	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You haven't seen any
6	plume stronger than ten degrees.
7	DR. BESSETTE: Not in any integral system
8	test, no.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Except on the inner call
LO	and the QRA (phonetic) test.
L1	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah. So today I was going
L2	to just go over those results quickly. So at the
L3	December meeting, I think the main questions that were
L4	lingering regarded RELAP's the adequacy of RELAP's
L5	modeling in the downcomer heat transfer, particularly
L6	suggested that RELAP could be nonconservative and what
L7	would be the effect.
L8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Could we get it
L9	absolutely straight at the beginning what RELAP you're
20	talking about? Because there's 1D RELAPs mentioned
21	very often in your report, but the downcomer modeling
22	is 2D always, right?
23	DR. BESSETTE: Well, when I spoke of RELAP
24	as 1D, I spoke of it in terms of the formulation of
25	the transport equation.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: When it's 2B, it gets
2	you circulation patterns which are much stronger than
3	the average.
4	DR. BESSETTE: But for all of our analyses
5	and assessment, we use a consistent two dimensional
6	downcomer.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And what do you do for
8	an H then? Because in the circulation pattern, you've
9	got various losses in various places. So what do you
10	say is the H?
11	DR. BESSETTE: Well, the H is dependent on
12	if you're a free conduction regime, velocity doesn't
13	come into it.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yeah, but when you have
15	circulation patterns in the downcomer
16	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: there are some places
18	where there's no velocity, and there's some places
19	where it's up four and a half meters a second. What
20	do you use for the velocity to calculate H? Do you
21	vary H around the thing or what do you do?
22	DR. BESSETTE: Well, the way RELAP works
23	is it takes the maximum of free convection and force
24	convection.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It takes the maximum H.

1	DR. BESSETTE: The maximum free. So if
2	velocity dropped to zero, heat transfer does not drop
3	to zero. It drops to a free convection number.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yeah, but when it has
5	got force conduction cells, it takes the maximum H
6	from the force conduction?
7	DR. BESSETTE: For each cell, it looks at
8	the velocity within that cell and takes the maximum of
9	free and forced convection.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think these are
11	important details I didn't get from your report.
12	Maybe they were buried somewhere or maybe they weren't
13	there.
14	DR. BESSETTE: Well, maybe it's another
15	level of detail that I didn't go to.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But it's important.
17	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah. So it's not like if
18	you had a zero velocity heat transfer drops to zero.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's very important to
20	know what you're using in this to get age. It's very
21	important to specify clearly so that the reader knows.
22	DR. BESSETTE: It is in there. I'll give
23	you the page number.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is the document
25	that's going out to the world about how to calculate

1	PTS and how to calculate
2	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, my only thing is
3	definitely without the balance is in there with the
4	equations.
5	MEMBER RANSOM: And that 2D representation
6	of the downcomer, I gather you had to turn off
7	momentum flux in order to avoid these artificial
8	recirculations?
9	DR. BESSETTE: Well, let's say 98 percent
10	of the time, for 98 out of 100 transients we analyze,
11	it wasn't a factor.
12	MEMBER RANSOM: Oh, only once in a while?
13	DR. BESSETTE: Only once in a while did it
14	turn up as a factor.
15	MEMBER RANSOM: And I guess you're using
16	a cross-flow approximation to the 2D effects in the
17	downcomer?
18	DR. BESSETTE: That's correct. You know,
19	it's parallel channels with cross-ros (phonetic)
20	junctions.
21	MEMBER RANSOM: Now, one thing, the volume
22	average velocity in that case is only an axial average
23	of the velocities computed at the top and bottom, more
24	or less, of the volumes, aren't they?
25	DR. BESSETTE: I think that's correct.

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1	too.
2	MEMBER RANSOM: And that's what goes into
3	the heat transfer correlation.
4	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, but like I say, you
5	get quite a significant amount of heat transfer in
6	free convection. It doesn't drop to a low value.
7	MEMBER RANSOM: And that's just based on
8	a Grashoff number correlation.
9	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah. So that I think the
10	residual questions were mainly focused on the heat
11	transfer because at that time we did not have
12	integrated assessment results of RELAP against
13	experimental data. Since then we performed additional
14	assessment based on data from UPTF, APEX, and we also
15	looked at CREARE.
16	The comparisons indicated that RELAP heat
17	transfer modeling is appropriate, and secondly,
18	there's another issue that was still lingering in
19	December, was the question of whether we get down to
20	low enough
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Can we look back at the
22	CREARE tests where they have a plot? It's in your

report, a Dittus-Bolter versus the actual measure of Do you remember that? each.

DR. BESSETTE: Yes.

23

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1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: They had to take the
2	average velocity and multiply it by 20 to get all of
3	that stuff.
4	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: There is an error there,
6	a factor of about two even there, I think, in that
7	box, but this factor of 20, that comes from the two
8	dimensional RELAP calculation?
9	DR. BESSETTE: No, the factor of 20 comes
10	from the experiments.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But it must also come
12	from RELAP. Otherwise RELAP isn't a useful tool.
13	DR. BESSETTE: Well, yes. RELAP comes out
14	with a consistent with a factor of 20 that's
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That also predicts the
16	factor of 20?
17	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, but the when I quote
18	a factor of 20 and a half and it flows, it's from the
19	experimental data with measurements of flow
20	velocities.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But you have to also
22	convince us that RELAP with the momentum flux
23	suppression and all of that is realistic enough to
24	predict the right circulation velocity.
25	MR. ROSENTHAL: Yeah, and when we compared

1	RELAP with the data, it was consistent velocities.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It also had the 20 times
3	or something close, but not necessarily in the same
4	place.
5	DR. BESSETTE: If you take a certain point
6	in the vessel, it could be off, but overall obviously
7	it's probably time and spatial varying.
8	MR. ROSENTHAL: I think that we're
9	discussing what's about Slide 15, and if we let Dave
10	rapidly go through the beginning, it will set the
11	stage, and then we can dwell on the phenomenological
12	issues which are the real reason that we're here.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you think you've
14	required a little more?
15	MR. ROSENTHAL: Can we just give Dave five
16	minutes?
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, we can probably
18	skip this slide.
19	DR. BESSETTE: So I just show this just to
20	list the six reports that we've written, and this is
21	in addition to the ESR. I just show this just to
22	remind you.
23	So when we talk about the main
24	contributors to uncertainty, the thermal hydraulic
25	issues can basically be distilled into how good a

predictive tool is RELAP, and from that governing issue, the main subissues included experimental evidence for plumes and the heat transfer modeling in RELAP. I was going to talk about that today.

This is along the lines what Mark was talking about earlier. The overall determination of uncertainties includes contributions from PRA, fracture mechanics, and thermal hydraulics. The bottom line risk number incorporates each of these three sources of uncertainty, and each needs to be considered within the context of the overall analysis.

The PRA uncertainty is reflected in the estimates that have been frequency, which is shown in the left-most histogram. The bin frequency is an estimate of the total frequency of all the individual event sequences that comprise a bin. For example, the medium break LOCA bin includes all of this spectrum of from four break sizes inches to eight inches, different break locations, different decay heat levels either coming out of full power operation or shutdown, winter or summer ECC conditions, and so on.

The middle histogram illustrates the resulting range of behavior that can occur within a given PRA bin so that each PRA bin has a certain family of 100 to 1,000 sequences in it, and you have

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1	a variation, an outcome within that bin. We
2	characterize the range of that behavior for the
3	various bins by analyzing a number of sequences or
4	scenarios within each bin that are using RELAP.
5	In the last histogram, these tended to be
6	qualitatively indicating the actual uncertainty.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Those are temperatures
8	and impression.
9	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah. It represents the
10	uncertainty in the RELAP code itself. It's the
11	physical models in the code. So it says heat transfer
12	and natural circulation.
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, your message is
14	that the thermal hydraulic uncertainties, perhaps
15	because it's scaled this way, are smaller than the
16	uncertainties in defining the event itself.
17	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I think, yeah, that's
18	the correct conclusion.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So as in so many of
20	these things, the uncertainties in the PRA dominate
21	the uncertainties in the physics.
22	DR. BESSETTE: Believe it or not, the
23	thermal hydraulics code is rather exact compared to
24	the other uncertainties.
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: With the PRA, yeah.

1	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Taking advantage of
3	the fact that I came late
4	(Laughter.)
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Did you say something,
6	George?
7	DR. BESSETTE: The main contributors to
8	hydraulic uncertainties are actually
9	PARTICIPANT: Next slide.
10	DR. BESSETTE: I hit at the button and it
11	didn't go. Wrong button this way. Human factors
12	problem.
13	The main contributors to thermal hydraulic
14	uncertainty is the boundary conditions. The range of
15	thermal hydraulic response in a given PRA bin is large
16	compared to the predicted capability of RELAP. So,
17	therefore
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Could you remind us
19	which of these sequences is most important in
20	determining the fracture potential? It seems to have
21	changed with time over the evolution of this project.
22	MR. ROSENTHAL: Mark, you explained that
23	to me yesterday, you know, what was important and it
24	depended on what time of life, how much irradiation.
25	Why don't you take that?

MR. EricksonKIRK: The general answer 1 2 that's true at any point in the embrittlement life of 3 the vessel is the primary side events way dominate 4 over secondary side events, irrespective of 5 embrittlement level. At the next level of refinement, you'd 6 7 have to say that at levels of embrittlement that are 8 characteristic of the plants that we have operating 9 today, when you take them out at either the end of 10 their current 40-year license or even the end of license extension at 60 years, it's the stuck open 11 valves that reclose later, and this is sort of a 12 general statement, that would dominate for 13 14 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So it's the pressurized 15 thermal shock. 16 MR. EricksonKIRK: It's the pressurized 17 thermal shock. When you get down to the lower levels of embrittlement, the mild thermal shock that comes 18 19 from the stuck open valve, which is equivalent to 20 punching like a two to three inch hole in the primary 21 is enough to initiate the cracks, but to get it all 22 the way through the vessel, you need that late stage 23 repressurization. 24 get out to the levels of you

embrittlement that are characteristic of our more

1 embrittled vessels at the end of the 20-year license 2 extension, at the end of 60 years, then you're starting to get into a mode where the medium and large 3 4 pipe breaks on the primary side are starting to be 5 like 50-50 contributors relative to the stuck open 6 valves with late stage reclosure. 7 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And that's with no 8 pressurization presumably. 9 MR. EricksonKIRK: Yeah, the pressure is 10 what it is, and it's not much when you put that big a hole in the vessel. 11 So, by list, the main 12 DR. BESSETTE: contributors of the medium and large breaks and the 13 14 stuck open SRV. 15 So in terms of the thermal hydraulic response of the plant for these bins, the outcome is 16 mainly a function of the boundary conditions. 17 LOCA the most important factor is the break size. 18 19 This affects both the energy removal from the RCS and 20 the rate at which you add cold water to the ECC 21 system. 22 For stuck open SRV scenarios, the 23 important factor is whether the valve recloses or not, 24 and if it did, how long did it stay open, and when it 25 does close whether the operator throttles HPI to

1	prevent the RCS from going water solid?
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So the size of the
3	break is a random variable?
4	DR. BESSETTE: Well, it's not known a
5	priori. So you analyze the whole break spectrum.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But you're saying
7	that it's a random variable that can be anywhere from
8	1.4 inch to 24 inches?
9	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
10	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: But they have
11	different frequencies.
12	DR. BESSETTE: They have different
13	frequencies, yes. So it's not conclusive or anything.
14	It's not a uniform distribution, but you don't know
15	the size of the break a priori.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And if you had 100 of
17	these, you would get 100 different break sizes.
18	That's what they're saying.
19	DR. BESSETTE: Yes, yes.
20	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Because it's random.
21	DR. BESSETTE: Yes. It may not be
22	completely random, but because of certain pipe sizes
23	you
24	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Essentially it would
25	be random.

DR. BESSETTE: But it's essentially random.

VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: One of the things that bothered me in the 1809 report is that your measure for the effect is the downcomer fluid temperature, whereas the thing I'm really worried about is the downcomer wall temperature or the vessel wall temperature, and I'm sort of worried whether you're underestimating the effect of the heat transfer coefficient in these calculations because I'll agree that the heat transfer coefficient doesn't do much to the downcomer fluid temperature, but it may have a rather more significant effect on the vessel wall temperature.

And so the measure that you have chosen for much of this on whether something is important or not is the fluid temperature when the reality the thing that drives the rest of this problem is the wall temperature.

DR. BESSETTE: Well, I'll try to show that if you have to choose a single variable in which in this case we had to choose a single variable, fluid temperature is the thing to choose. I mean the wall temperature reflects the fluid temperature and the heat transfer, but so you could choose like a heat

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1 flux number, let's say, that would incorporate both --2 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: I could just choose 3 a wall temperature. 4 DR. BESSETTE: Or wall temperature. 5 MEMBER RANSOM: Well, certainly it seems like the most uncertain parameter in this is the heat 6 7 transfer coefficient itself. You know, the pressure 8 the temperature are pretty much global 9 macroscopic variables that their accuracies are more easily determined, I would guess. 10 But the thing that I think derives thermal 11 stress on the wall is the gradient of temperature at 12 the wall, and the boundary condition that is in force 13 14 is the heat transfer coefficient times the wall delta 15 T equal to minus K times the gradient of temperature in the wall. 16 It's the gradient that drives the thermal 17 18 stress. 19 DR. BESSETTE: But I think though that 20 we'll try to show that the fluid temperature, and 21 average, an average downcomer fluid temperature is a 22 suitable or the most is a good indicator of the 23 severity of any given transient or comparing one 24 transient to another and comparing the effect of 25 different -- if you're trying to do sensitivity

1 studies to look at the importance of different boundary conditions or physical models in the code, 2 it's the best indicator or certainly there's no better 3 4 indicator for our purpose than just simply choosing 5 the downcomer fluid. MEMBER RANSOM: Well, I don't doubt that 6 7 the fluid temperature -- certainly that's important 8 because that's the heat transfer to the wall, but in 9 terms of uncertainty and, you know, trusting the system calculations, the one that I believe probably 10 the greatest uncertainty would be the heat 11 transfer coefficient itself. 12 I'll try to show the 13 DR. BESSETTE: 14 uncertainty in the heat transfer coefficient similar to the uncertainty effect of the downcomer 15 16 fluid temperature. 17 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The preferred temperature is the key thing. 18 It must mean that the heat transfer is effective because if the heat 19 20 transfer were very poor, the wall would not follow the 21 fluid. 22 And it's really significant that what the heat transfer coefficient was, but you're telling me 23 24 the fluid temperature matters the most. That seems to

indicate to me that the heat transfer coefficient is

1	big enough that it doesn't exert much influence.
2	DR. BESSETTE: Well, you could have a
3	transient with a fluid temperature that went to 300
4	F., and it does what the heat transfer doesn't
5	matter because the vessel doesn't get cold enough. So
6	the key indicator is
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It doesn't get cold
8	enough?
9	DR. BESSETTE: Essentially, no. Three
10	hundred F. is not
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How could that be a
12	measure of what's happening then if the vessel doesn't
13	respond?
14	Well, maybe you're going to go ahead.
15	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I'll try to proceed
16	and see if I answer the question.
17	So for a stuck open SRV scenario, the
18	important factor is what oh, I went through that.
19	So anyway, these boundary conditions don't
20	involve the physical modeling capability of the code.
21	They're all associated with the input model of the
22	code.
23	This is an example of the medium break
24	LOCA bin for Palisades, where I plotted the risk
25	significant transients that fall into the medium break

1 LOCA bin, and you can see the family of curves here in 2 terms of pressure and temperature, and I hope we can 3 make it out. 4 These are the error bars or uncertainty 5 bars the RELAP predictions of pressure temperature, and the idea, this illustrates that the 6 7 RELAP uncertainty in predicting these parameters is 8 small compared to the range of behavior, the family of 9 curves that characterize a range of behavior in this 10 particular PRA bin. 11 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Now, that RELAP 12 uncertainty is what you're getting when you're varying the break flow model uncertainty and the heat transfer 13 14 coefficient uncertainty? 15 DR. BESSETTE: No, this is the uncertainty we determined. Well, I guess when I say "RELAP," it's 16 experimental data. So this is the code data 17 comparisons for a bunch of experiments. 18 19 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And just to put this in the wall 20 perspective, the response time of 21 something like 50 minutes or 3,000 seconds in terms of 22 the wall. 23 DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, it's about 1,000 24 seconds or so, or more. 25 So from here on I'll get more into the

1 RELAP modeling issues. I hope this shows that the 2 basic idea is that the uncertainty from RELAP itself is small compared to what we're trying to measure with 3 4 RELAP, what we're trying to characterize with RELAP, 5 which is a good thing. Otherwise, it would be a 6 problem. 7 MEMBER RANSOM: That's true of PNT, but 8 I'm not sure it's true of H. 9 Well, we'll get into DR. BESSETTE: that. 10 MEMBER RANSOM: Which you can't measure. DR. BESSETTE: I'll discuss that. 11 12 Well, we can measure it. So your approach to this 13 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 14 is not to say analyzing the system, the important 15 dimensionless parameters are the Froude number, the 16 BO number, the this and the that, and we're going to 17 make sure that we cover a range of these variables. 18 You're going to say you have integral 19 system tests representative of transients and because 20 the facilities have been properly scaled, these cover 21 the range of interests. That's your argument, rather 22 than a dimensionless group sort of scaling thing. 23 You're going to say all of these experiments suitably 24 scaled, the range of transients we're interested in. 25 That's your --

1	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, in a sense, that's
2	kind of
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That needs to come
4	across.
5	DR. BESSETTE: a short circuit way of
6	saying it, yeah.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: in the report, too.
8	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How you assured yourself
10	that the experiments covered the field of interest.
11	DR. BESSETTE: Well, we knew, of course,
12	what the dominant bins were, or at least early on we
13	had some indication what the dominant bins are going
14	to be, and they turn out to be medium break LOCAs.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: See, if you read your
16	report, there's the one page where it will say the
17	only Froude number of interest is .05, and then you
18	have the table where it goes to 60, and then there's
19	no indication in any of these experiments what the
20	Froude number really was, and the reader is left
21	saying, "Well, now what Froude number is he really
22	interested in?"
23	DR. BESSETTE: Well, in fact, I did look
24	at the Froude numbers for the cold legs. I thought it
25	Wag

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, you see the
2	problem the reader has here, but you actually say the
3	Froude number is an important variable, and you give
4	conflicting values for what it should be, and it's
5	never related to these experiments, and the reader
6	says, well, you know, "What's going on here?" There's
7	something important which never seems to be tied
8	together with the experiments.
9	DR. BESSETTE: I'm pretty sure it's
10	discussed in the report, but we show that the Froude
11	number obviously the Froude numbers in the cold
12	legs indicate stratification for the experiments and
13	for the plant, and indeed for all
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, what are they in
15	reality? Are they always low?
16	DR. BESSETTE: They're always low.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: They're always much less
18	than one?
19	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I didn't get that from
21	the report because I have a table which has it going
22	up to 60.
23	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I sent you a
24	correction to that. There was a
25	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yeah, but you see it

1 doesn't tell me what really happens. You have table 2 going up to 60. It doesn't tell me which of those numbers in that table are realistic and which are just 3 4 academic. 5 MEMBER POWERS: I'm shocked that you would 6 use such a term. 7 DR. BESSETTE: So one of the -- this is how we obtained the uncertainty values with RELAP. 8 9 objectives for determining what are the 10 uncertainty due to the physical modeling in the code? To do so, we assess RELAP against both 11 12 integral and separate effects tests, and then integral tests were used to assess the code's ability to 13 14 predict temperature or pressure and heat transfer. 15 included 12 experiments from UPTF, LOFT, ROSA, APEX and MIST, and these facilities cover a range of scales 16 17 up to full scale. Their geometrical representations included all three vendor designs, and LOFT and ROSA 18 19 based on Westinghouse, APEX on Combustion 20 Engineering; and MIST on Babcock & Wilcox. 21 So one scaling factor common to all was 22 the power-to-volume, which was the basis of all the 23 LOCA integral system test programs that we performed. 24 Now, the PTS PERT was used to guide the

assessment of RELAP in terms of important phenomena.

The overall conclusion from all this was that the code 1 2 compared well with the data. Now, can I ask you about 3 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 4 That's a qualitative sort of statement, and 5 somewhere here I've got an APEX result where RELAP starts off doing fairly well, but ends up being off by 6 7 20 degrees in downcomer temperature. Is that good 8 enough or not? 9 I mean I don't know what you mean by 10 "compared well." How good does it have to be is perhaps the question. 11 12 Well, all I can say is, CHAIRMAN WALLIS: you know, we generated the uncertainties using the 13 14 whole set of experiments, but the answer of how good does it have to be goes back to the question that was 15 16 posed to Mark a little earlier. 17 I can tell you how good it is, and I can 18 tell you --19 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think your 20 measurements of goodness are qualitative statements, 21 aren't they, in your report? 22 In terms of comparisons DR. BESSETTE: 23 with a separate effects phenomena, I used qualitative 24 indications. In terms of an integral system test, 25 we're actually generating statistics for the pressure

1	and temperature as well as looking in detail comparing
2	phenomena to make sure that we're in the right
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You see, I've got here
4	a curve which compares RELAP with APEX CE tests, and
5	after a while it's off by 20 degrees or more, and the
6	APEX is colder than RELAP is predicting.
7	So that would mean that RELAP is not being
8	conservative. I just wonder if that's important or
9	not.
LO	DR. BESSETTE: Well, like I say, you have
L1	to look I mean, I've said the one uncertainty in
L2	RELAP for temperature is ten degrees C., meaning five
L3	percent of the time it's going to be more than 20
L4	degrees C. high or low.
L5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I don't know if it
L6	matters. You see, if you're very close to fracturing
L7	the wall, 20 degrees might make a big difference. I
L8	don't know.
L9	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Because if you come
20	back again to his Slide 8 where he's showing his RELAP
21	uncertainty
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's very small.
23	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: with all of the
24	variations that he gets from his boundary condition,
25	T mean, he does have three orders of magnitude of

1	scatter in the through wall cracking results. I mean,
2	there's no question there's large uncertainty in the
3	prediction of the frequencies, but you know, his
4	answers here do seem to be dominated by these
5	uncertainties in the boundary conditions.
6	DR. BESSETTE: And in fact, I think that
7	particular what you're referring to, if I remember, is
8	the fact that we had suppressed circulation in the
9	cold legs. So we constrained the mixing volume that
10	RELAP was using, you know, in terms of a remix type of
11	approach. The mixing volume includes all of the cold
12	legs at a downcomer in the lower plenum.
13	By suppressing circulation in the RELAP
14	model in the cold leg to prevent circulating flow, we
15	truncated the mixing volume, and I think that was the
16	explanation for that divergence.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So the bottom line here
18	is that your 12 integral system tests
19	DR. BESSETTE: They were chosen to
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: offered enough of a
21	feel that you really covered everything of interest
22	DR. BESSETTE: I think so.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: from the smallest
24	break to the largest break?
25	DR. BESSETTE: We covered small breaks,

1	medium breaks, large breaks, like open SRVs, main
2	steam line breaks. The idea was to choose from the
3	best facilities that we had for the same transients
4	that showed up as being risk significant in the PTS
5	analyses.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So that what you
7	actually could cite in your report are the significant
8	transients or just some typical transients?
9	DR. BESSETTE: I cited all transients that
10	we did assessments for.
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But only in one to two
12	cases did you ever get to the point of giving us any
13	information about whether or not a crack would form.
14	DR. BESSETTE: Well, in my report I didn't
15	get into the combined analysis. I focus on the
16	thermal hydraulic validation of RELAP.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you didn't get to
18	what's my bottom line here.
19	DR. BESSETTE: That wasn't really the
20	intent. The intent was to show the validity of RELAP
21	for the PTS analysis.
22	MR. EricksonKIRK: I think I'd like to
23	just interject a thought experiment here. I really
24	think we need to and if the committee wants to see
25	effects on the bottom line, that's a reasonable

283 question, and I think clearly we haven't come prepared to answer that today, but I do think we need to structure the discussion in terms of first establishing what do the relevant topical area experts feel is a credible model and then assess the effect of variations between potential credible models on the bottom line. And I'll just, you know, throw out this question as a thought experiment, and this applies to any part of the calculation. Would the committee be prepared to accept a completely ludicrous model as part of the whole if I could show you that it had no effect on the bottom line? For instance, would Dr. Ford let me get away with an embrittlement model that says as I embrittle

the material it becomes -- as I irradiate the material, the fracture toughness goes up, if I could show him that it had no effect on the model?

Certainly it wouldn't because it's absurd, and so I think that the focus of Dave's paper and what we need to focus on today is to say: is the heat transfer coefficient model credible? Are there potential alternative credible models that we need to investigate? You know, are plumes credible or not?

And once we establish those answers, then

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1 we'll be prepared to move on and say, "Okay. 2 our baseline model. Here are the potential credible 3 alternatives, be they slight variations in heat 4 transfer coefficient, slight existence of plumes or 5 not, and then we can crank those things through the fracture mechanics analysis to see what the effect of 6 7 potential credible variations is on the bottom line. 8 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You see, the reason I 9 keep saying this is I like figures like Figure 420, 10 where you've got a KR versus time versus various Hs, and then there's a statement in the text that if KR 11 12 gets above one, then you have to worry. Well, it's quite clear that by varying H 13 14 by a little bit, you can make KR go above one or not, 15 and so this tells me I'd better get H right. 16 And that's to me being a much more 17 important message than seeing a whole lot of Hs predicted by RELAP maybe or maybe not agreeing with 18 19 That tells me how well I have to get my H 20 I think that's a very important part of the 21 report. 22 MR. EricksonKIRK: Yes, it is, but you 23 also have to remember that the bottom line that we keep talking about is not the through wall cracking 24

frequency or the conditional probability of failure

1 associated with one particular transient. 2 If we were trying to predict with high 3 accuracy the response of the vessel to one particular 4 transient, I'd go find myself another job because I 5 know we can't do it. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 6 Yeah. 7 MR. EricksonKIRK: But, I mean, because of the uncertainties and the systematic biases in all of 8 9 the parts of this analysis, but because we're trying to predict the response of the vessel to a series of 10 11 different postulated transients, and again, you know, 12 the assessment results showed, some of which are high, some of which are low, and they're not off by that 13 14 You know, I think we can get a reasonable 15 result that can be used in an engineering analysis to 16 set a screening criteria. Go back to the argument. 17 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Because we're so uncertain about the PRA results we 18 19 can be really sloppy about the thermal hydraulics. 20 MR. EricksonKIRK: I'm not sure I want to 21 agree with that. 22 MEMBER RANSOM: I thought the report did 23 quite a good job though of pointing out that you can

screen out many of these transients because if you

any pressure on the vessel,

don't

have

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1 certainly not going to contribute to the stress. 2 So there is a selected break size of 3 importance, and a set of scenarios and pretty much 4 need to just focus on those. 5 In terms of the heat transfer coefficient, too, I suspect again you can probably show it's not 6 7 very important because these are very low flow type 8 situations that are not going to result in high 9 convective heat transfer. So I thought it did a pretty reasonable 10 job of leading you through all of that for us. 11 12 And I'm planning to go DR. BESSETTE: through that story today. 13 14 This is sort of the bottom line in a way 15 that shows that the statistical results obtained for comparing RELAP with the 12 experiments from the five 16 17 facilities I mentioned. As you can see, RELAP had a bias of 13 psi in pressure with a standard deviation 18 19 of 46 psi. 20 These differences, these numbers 21 equivalent to about one to two percent of the vessel, 22 the pressure during normal operation. It's less than 23 one percent of the yield stress. So obviously these are small numbers. So these uncertainties are not 24

important.

1	MEMBER POWERS: When you do a comparison
2	of the code against the experiments and you look at
3	what might be called residuals between the
4	experimental measurements and the "could" predictions,
5	do you try to characterize the distribution of those
6	residuals?
7	DR. BESSETTE: I'm not
8	MEMBER POWERS: Well, you've used the
9	language here as though you saw these residuals as
10	normally distributed, and that's not uncommon. Most
11	people do that. But I wondered if you actually went
12	and tried to verify that, in fact, those residuals
13	came from a normal population.
14	DR. BESSETTE: I don't think we looked at
15	that.
16	Is Bill here? We didn't look no. No
17	we did not.
18	MEMBER POWERS: Is it important to do
19	that?
20	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I don't think so. I
21	think this first order numbers are adequate for what
22	we're trying to do.
23	You can see with respect to temperature
24	RELAP had essentially no bias. That's one degree C.,
25	and the standard deviation of one sigma was ten

1	degrees C. Heat transfer
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This temperature is the
3	downcomer?
4	DR. BESSETTE: Downcomer temperature,
5	yeah.
6	The heat transfer, the integral system
7	assessments that we performed showed RELAP to be
8	realistic or conservative.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Now, is there some
10	evidence for that? And what you mean by conservative
11	is that the heat transfer in the experiment is always
12	less than what you predicted. Is that what you mean
13	by that?
14	DR. BESSETTE: The heat transfer
15	coefficient in RELAP, that would be derived from RELAP
16	was higher than the experiment.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: In every case?
18	DR. BESSETTE: The cases we looked at. We
19	didn't
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The CREARE tests, you
21	got that factor of 20, and Dittus-Bolter. The
22	experimental points are above the predicted.
23	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, well, the Dittus
24	we didn't actually try to calculate Dittus-Bolter. We
25	calculated APEX and I mean, we didn't try to

1	calculate CREARE. We tried to we calculated UPTF
2	and APEX.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But you see, that's the
4	problem, again, I have with parts of the report. You
5	make this statement, and then I look at that figure
6	from CREARE, and the data are all about a factor of
7	two above the predictions.
8	DR. BESSETTE: Well, it's about 50 percent
9	higher.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, at least it's not
11	conservative.
12	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, it's consistent with
13	Dittus-Bolter, but lying above the line.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The problem I have,
15	again, sort of reading bits of the report, we say,
16	well, is this evidence compatible with the conclusion
17	or not?
18	DR. BESSETTE: The evidence that it does
19	match it does follow Dittus-Bolter with a 1.5
20	multiplier
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It never reached a
22	conclusion like that. It's a very strong conclusion
23	really, and I think you ought to be careful that there
24	isn't something else in the report that's inconsistent
25	with it.
	I control of the second of the

1	DR. BESSETTE: Well, we chose UPTV, and
2	see CREARE has, let's say, what you might call an
3	atypical geometry. It has a thermal shield in it, and
4	the measurements that were taken that led to where
5	those data came from were just slightly downstream
6	from the entrance to the thermal shield region, and we
7	weren't sure how valid or how applicable those data
8	were.
9	So we concentrated on APEX and UPTF
10	instead.
11	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Now, as I read the
12	APEX though, there were only a very limited number of
13	tests in which you actually made the wall temperature
14	measurements.
15	DR. BESSETTE: Well, they're there for all
16	of the tests, but we had just
17	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: But you only
18	presented them
19	DR. BESSETTE: We only did one test. We
20	only picked one test.
21	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Oh, so you only made
22	the comparison for one test.
23	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah.
24	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: So for that test it
25	was okay, and you, therefore

1 DR. BESSETTE: We looked at the APEX, at 2 the APEX and UPTF, and they both produced similar 3 results. 4 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So that's another thing, 5 is were you extrapolating some very limited results from one test to make a general conclusion about all 6 7 conditions. DR. BESSETTE: Well, what I said is for 8 9 the test we looked at and we compared against data 10 from UPTF and Apex under conditions of loop flow stagnation, and for these tests the code was realistic 11 12 or conservative. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And do you generalize 13 14 this conclusion to all conditions of interest in that? 15 DR. BESSETTE: No, I don't think I say 16 that. 17 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But you have this 18 conclusion to your report that each is predictive 19 conservatively by RELAP, and I just wanted to find out 20 how broad a base of evidence you have for that 21 conclusion. 22 DR. BESSETTE: Well, I mean, that's why I 23 didn't go as far as to try to generate statistics and 24 whatnot, is because I figured I didn't have a large 25 enough database to be definitive that in all cases

1	this would be true, but all I can say is we had a
2	short time to do it. We looked at the best data we
3	could find at least from two facilities, and from what
4	we looked at, the code looked okay.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, I would still ask
6	the question if it's a very limited data set, is it
7	one extreme or the other? If it's for a very slow
8	transient, maybe you don't care what H is anyway and
9	the fact that it's conservative or that's unimportant.
LO	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
L1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But maybe it's for a
L2	rapid transient where you do really care about it, and
L3	in that case it's conservative. So when it really
L4	matters, you've got some evidence that it's
L5	conservative.
L6	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
L7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I can't put it in
L8	perspective if it's just one test, and I don't know
L9	which one it is.
20	DR. BESSETTE: I'm going to get into that
21	later.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay.
23	DR. BESSETTE: A few slides later.
24	So I'm going to talk about impact of these
25	uncertainties first in terms of pressure, then

temperature and then heat transfer.

So by itself, the uncertainty in the RELAP prediction approach was small compared to the range of conditions found in the various PRA bins, and without uncertainty value was considered in terms of the contribution of vessel wall stress. The effect also seemed to be small, as well.

For example, I said the uncertainty in the RELAP calculation of pressure amounts to approximately two percent of the normal operating stress.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: No problem.

DR. BESSETTE: So off the table.

Now, for stuck open SRV scenarios, the pressure at the time of vessel failure, for predicted vessel failure is determined by the set point of the SRVs themselves, and not by the thermal hydraulic uncertainties. So the most important factor is the timing of reclosure, which is a boundary condition.

Now, with respect to temperature, the heat flux is a function of the downcomer temperature and the heat transfer combined, and from these two parameters the favor calculates the temperature distribution and vessel walls as a function of time. And the vessel temperature distribution, of course, determines both thermal stress and the local fracture

1 toughness. 2 Therefore, temperature enters twice into 3 equation and determines the vessel failure 4 probability. 5 So it showed RELAP calculates temperature with no bias, while the standard deviation is ten 6 7 degrees C. This standard deviation number of ten degrees C., while it seems small, can still affect the 8 9 probability of vessel failure, as I think we've been 10 discussing. 11 However, in context, this ten degrees is 12 small compared to the absolute change in temperature, which gets back to why we chose average downcomer 13 14 temperature, which during these risk significant 15 transients, the absolute change in temperature is about 200 degrees C. 16 So the uncertainty of ten degrees compared 17 to the absolute change is about five percent. 18 19 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's okay unless 20 there's no crack growth until you get to 200 C., and 21 if you get to 210 degrees C. maybe it makes a big 22 I mean, again, I don't know. difference. 23 DR. BESSETTE: That's why I say it can't be dismissed. 24 25 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think this is rather

1	a cliff sort of thing. It's not a continuum where you
2	can say five percent doesn't matter.
3	DR. BESSETTE: No.
4	MS. DUDES: It's like going through a
5	door. If you're six feet, six, you go through a door.
6	If you're six foot, nine you hit your head. I mean
7	just the fact that it's a small percent change doesn't
8	really help you.
9	DR. BESSETTE: It depends where you are.
10	But secondly, it's small in comparison to
11	the range of behavior that characterizes a given PRA
12	bin, which is typically 50 degrees C. to 150 degrees
13	C. or so.
14	Now, the impact of the heat transfer
15	coefficient.
16	So I think the situation is probably clear
17	with pressure and temperature. Now, we turn to the
18	heat transfer coefficient. Now, the change in the
19	heat transfer coefficient has a similar effect to a
20	change in the downcomer temperature as the heat fluxes
21	a combination of the two.
22	So the impact of an uncertainty in heat
23	transfer depends on a transient, of course, and like
24	I've said, the faster the transient, the greater is
25	the wall to fluid temperature difference. So fast

1 transient has got to be sensitive to uncertainty in 2 heat transfer than slow transients. 3 So a small break LOCA is slow transients 4 obviously. For slow transients, a downcomer wall 5 attracts the fluid temperature quite closely with a small delta T, and a large break LOCA is fast 6 7 transients, and the downcomer cools quickly. fluid cools quickly, and you build up more of a lag 8 9 wall temperature and between the the fluid 10 temperature. CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This is one of my 11 12 questions again. You chose to show only one figure of the effect of H on as pressurized thermal shock 13 14 parameter, such as K sub R, and that was for a transient of 30 minutes tau, which is much longer than 15 the large break that you show here. 16 17 And so my immediate sort of curiosity is, well, suppose you had shown some other curves for a 18 19 shorter transient. What would it have looked like? 20 Well, I didn't choose that. DR. BESSETTE: 21 I was taking a historical document and --22 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But you see, it 23 immediately raises the question by the reader: did he predict this long, slow transient which really 24 25 isn't that much of a threat to the vessel?

1	interested in the other ones.
2	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So I'd like to see more
4	figures like 420 for other
5	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, I'll try to address
6	that to some extent today at least.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I notice this difference
8	in this large break, the big temperature uncertainties
9	here. Anyway, when you get this 29 degrees C. and
10	you've talked about ten degrees C. not mattering,
11	being where things don't matter, it immediately raises
12	a flag.
13	DR. BESSETTE: Well, it goes back to
14	putting things in context and showing where things
15	might matter and where things might not matter.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's good, that's
17	good.
18	DR. BESSETTE: So you get some things off
19	the table and you concentrate on the other things.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah, now when you did the
21	through wall cracking sensitivity study with the other
22	heat transfer coefficient, four of the 16 inch hot leg
23	break, you increase by a factor of an order of a
24	magnitude.
25	DR. BESSETTE: Yes.
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1	PARTICIPANT: So, you know, it was
2	sensitive to
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It was significant. It
4	would have been good to bring that out more in the
5	report.
6	DR. BESSETTE: So you can see here
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, the results are
8	pretty reasoned, but you can see that for a large
9	break it would be double the heat transfer
10	coefficient. This is equivalent to decreasing the
11	fluid temperature roughly by 20 to 30 degrees C.
12	So even though a large break is a fast
13	cool-down, you can still boost the heat transfer even
14	more.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah, but you can't get
16	the pressure back up, right?
17	MR. GRIFFITH: Peter Griffith.
18	I think you should mention here that the
19	probability of those three breaks is not the same.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's right.
21	MR. GRIFFITH: But you could have another
22	column over there which showed the
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's what he has on
24	the bottom.
25	MR. GRIFFITH: That's right. The event

1	frequency for large break is very low to begin with.
2	So
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But it might dominate
4	the risk because it might lead much more frequently to
5	disaster, and so I understand that when you go to high
6	levels of embrittlement, this large break LOCA becomes
7	a more dominant thing. So if you're going to come up
8	with a number for probable failure, but if the large
9	break LOCA, even though very unlike is the dominant
10	sequence.
11	DR. BESSETTE: So you can see from the
12	previous slide that
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Then you can't just
14	dismiss it because its event frequency is low to begin
15	with.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, let me understand.
17	If you have a large break and you get a rapid cool
18	down, because you have the break, you can't
19	repressurize, and so you can't put stress.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That's right.
21	DR. BESSETTE: So there's no pressure.
22	That's right.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So it breaks from the
24	thermal stress alone.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: So why worry about that.
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1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The thermal stress alone
2	can break the vessel.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: That's true, but whether
4	it breaks or not, you know.
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You can do the
6	experiment by taking a glass.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: I've done that.
8	MR. EricksonKIRK: You're getting into the
9	question of consequence after the break.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Right. You've got a
11	messed up plant. On the other hand, the consequence
12	from a public health and safety standpoint really
13	doesn't change.
14	MR. ROSENTHAL: Actually Jack Rosenthal
15	actually it does.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
17	MR. ROSENTHAL: Let's just take this in
18	pieces.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: All right.
20	MR. ROSENTHAL: We have a large break
21	LOCA. ECCS works or doesn't work.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
23	MR. ROSENTHAL: If ECCS doesn't work, then
24	it's a severe accident, and we're in a different
25	regime and discussion.

1	MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah.
2	MR. ROSENTHAL: We're talking about large
3	break LOCA in which ECCS does work. You reflood the
4	core. You don't melt the core or you reflood the
5	vessel and you don't melt the core.
6	Now, let's say and in your event tree,
7	you would write okay at the far right. Now if you do
8	crack the vessel, then you have the initiating event.
9	ECCS did work, but the vessel, should the vessel have
10	cracked, now I may not be able to maintain a covered
11	core, and so I may have a sequence in which even
12	though I had my LOCA and ECCS worked, I'm still in
13	trouble.
14	So it is a relevant consideration, and the
15	argument would be that it's unlikely that you're going
16	to fail the vessel, even with injecting cold water and
17	successfully mitigating the LOCA.
18	DR. BESSETTE: So where heat transfer is -
19	- where the outcome is most sensitive to heat
20	transfers for large breaks, and we're dealing with the
21	run frequencies. Current numbers are like ten to the
22	minus seven. It brings it
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So we might as well not
24	consider them at all.
25	DR. BESSETTE: So even if they're

1 sensitive to heat transfer, it's still, you know. 2 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Although again, 3 we'll come back to the sensitivity study, I just keep looking at the numbers here. The one that I have the 4 5 biggest thing tacked on gives me a factor of 30 increase in through wall failure frequency, and that's 6 a two-inch break. 7 EricksonKIRK: At the risk of 8 9 contradicting my colleague, the fact remains that 10 large breaks are an important to PTS risk. So you can say that it's a low event frequency, which is true, 11 12 but when you roll all of the calculations together, they show that medium to large breaks are important 13 14 contributors at high levels of embrittlement. You're 15 not going to get rid of it. 16 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: They're important 17 contributors, but the total risk is still very small. MR. EricksonKIRK: Yes, that's absolutely 18 19 true, nd that's a true statement across the board. 20 You can say that about anything we discuss today. 21 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So what about this 22 sensitivity factor of 30 that my colleague Bill Shack 23 is raising here? 24 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: I'm just looking at 25 another case with a two inch line break which does

1 occur more frequently, and it's got a factor of 30 increase with a change in the age, and that actually 2 3 strikes me as somewhat plausible, but you know, if I 4 only have a small thermal insult, the question of 5 whether I get that thermal insult from the fluid to the wall is kind of a critical question. 6 7 So, you know, with a large break LOCA, the insult is so big it almost doesn't matter what I 8 9 you know, it's going to get to the wall and do me in 10 anyway, but I'd sort of worry about medium and small breaks where, you know, how much I get to the wall 11 really starts to become important. 12 MR. EricksonKIRK: At the risk of beating 13 14 a dead horse because I've tried this twice and we keep veering off --15 16 (Laughter.) EricksonKIRK: I think it's 17 MR. extraordinarily important because you know, the nice 18 19 thing about calculations is you can make them tell you 20 anything that you want. 21 think it's exceedingly important to establish what the technical area experts 22 23 consider to be credible variations in the heat 24 transfer coefficient or any other parameter we want to

examine, and then we'll do the sensitivity studies.

1	It isn't at all clear to me that
2	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Well, we were just
3	studying impact of heat transfer coefficient.
4	MR. EricksonKIRK: Yes, yes, and it's big
5	It can be big, sure.
6	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Okay.
7	MR. EricksonKIRK: So the question really
8	is back to we need to reach some consensus between the
9	review committee and the staff as to what a credible
10	baseline model is and what credible perturbations are,
11	and then we can do sensitivity studies with meaning.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But the sensitivity
13	studies help to define the requirements for the
14	accuracy of the thermal hydraulics. If it was a
15	factor of 30 in your predictions by getting an error
16	in new transfer coefficients, then it seems to me you
17	would say, "Well, go back and get the heat transfer
18	coefficient more accurately."
19	I don't think you can just look at how
20	good thermal hydraulics is without asking what are you
21	going to use it for. Then you're not being an
22	engineer.
23	DR. BESSETTE: What I'm trying to show
24	here is, you know, that your question is concerned
25	with heat flux, and the heat flux is temperature and

1 heat transfer coefficient. If the effect of a factor 2 of two change in heat transfer coefficient is within well you 3 uncertainty as to how know 4 temperature, so it's not a uniquely important problem. 5 It's not more important than how well you know the 6 fluid temperature, and we know the fluid temperature 7 to with --8 VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Well, unless there's 9 a systematic. 10 DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, and we don't see a systematic -- we haven't seen a systematic error or 11 12 bias in fluid temperature or in a more limited assessment we did, a heat transfer. 13 14 EricksonKIRK: To return to Dr. 15 Wallis' last point, isn't there a question of state of 16 the art? And I'll get this in something that the 17 materials people can understand so that I have a 18 chance. 19 The uncertainty in fracture toughness data 20 is what it is, and that's the plot with the gas leak 21 scatter that you keep referring to, and members, you 22 Shack and Ford cannot like that degree of 23 uncertainty, but it's controlled by physics. I can't 24 make it any better. So we just simply have to deal

with it, and can't a similar -- can't an analogous

1 point be raised here regarding the overall fidelity of 2 the thermal hydraulics model? I mean there has to be 3 a question of practical state of the art that puts in 4 that maybe we don't know the heat transfer 5 coefficient better than plus or minus 20 percent. If that's the consensus of the technical 6 7 community, then that's what we need to feed through 8 our analysis, but I don't think we've gotten there 9 yet. 10 I mean, certainly, yes, you're absolutely right. You need to understand the sensitivity of your 11 results on your input, but I'm seeing that we've gone 12 quite a bit further than that and that we're letting 13 14 the results, be they sensitive or insensitive drive our acceptance of models that either may be at state 15 16 of the art or may be completely ludicrous. 17 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I understand your point, and I think it's a very good one, but inevitably when 18 19 we look at the results that they present, we sort of 20 say, "What does it matter?" We can't help asking 21 ourselves that question. 22 And you know, when you look DR. BESSETTE: 23 at a sensitivity studies plot, sometimes it doesn't 24 make any difference. Sometimes you can find a factor

of 30, and you just have to look at the bottom line

1 and just put everything in context. 2 In fact, you can see we're dealing with --3 you can see the order of magnitude in terms of the 4 frequency estimates in the last column between the 5th 5 and the 95th percentiles. So within that kind of context, a factor of 30 is certainly within that 6 7 range. So one of probably the key issues raised 8 during the peer review that we had of the PTS work was 9 10 with respect to the buoyancy opposed mixed convection. 11 So if flow velocities were to be sufficiently low, one 12 could get an enhancement in heat transfer over that predicted by the three or fourth convection models in 13 14 RELAP. 15 Sine the December meeting, we looked at data from UPTF, APEX and CREARE, the same data we've 16 just been discussing, that provide flow velocity 17 measurements in a downcomer. 18 19 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: These are the maximum 20 velocities reported? 21 I reported the range. DR. BESSETTE: 22 i have here, this one third to -- we saw velocities. 23 The total range of velocities we saw amongst the three 24 experiments was between one-third of a meter, one foot

a second and four or five feet a second.

1	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Our cells are probably
2	some places where there's at least some of the time no
3	velocity at all. So you may not
4	DR. BESSETTE: That zero velocity, that
5	stagnation point is probably changing the design in
6	space.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And probably their
8	velocity meter measured fluctuating velocity, no?
9	DR. BESSETTE: Well, these velocities, of
10	course, they're measured at fixed locations, a certain
11	number of fixed locations, and
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It did vary with time
13	presumably.
14	DR. BESSETTE: You see, of course, noisy
15	data.
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think was it APEX.
17	The heat transfer coefficient fluctuated by a factor
18	of about five. So something is certainly going on
19	there.
20	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah. Well, certainly if
21	you look, for example, if you look at either velocity
22	data or temperature data, you see fluctuations.
23	That's like the passage of eddies or whatnot.
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Right. So what you mean
25	here is the maximum velocity when you talk about

1	downcomer velocity?
2	DR. BESSETTE: What I'm talking about here
3	is the velocities that we saw fell within this range.
4	Sometimes there would be it was all within this
5	range. I didn't see anything lower than about a foot
6	a second.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So which one are you
8	going to use? You're going to use the maximum one for
9	your heat transfer predictions?
10	DR. BESSETTE: No, I'm just saying
11	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: No?
12	DR. BESSETTE: What we did, I said this is
13	their range of velocities. Well, the point on this
14	viewgraph is the to say for these kind of velocities,
15	you're well outside the range of buoyancy opposed
16	mixed convection.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's Reynolds number
18	dominated.
19	DR. BESSETTE: This is Reynolds number
20	dominated.
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So you want to get the
22	velocity right.
23	DR. BESSETTE: So, I mean, for these
24	velocities, what we get is downcomer reynolds numbers
25	of 500 000 to three million. So the idea is that this

1	whole issue of buoyancy opposed mixed convection was
2	something of a red herring.
3	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: On this, I noticed
4	on the staff replied review comment number 65, no
5	experiments of measured velocity in the downcomer.
6	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I was pretty ignorant
7	when I wrote that.
8	(Laughter.)
9	DR. BESSETTE: I looked harder and found
10	data.
11	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Ah, you looked
12	harder. Okay. That solves that problem.
13	DR. BESSETTE: Anybody can be wrong in
14	this, but there's always a chance for reforming.
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: That business of
16	centimeters, it's just a typo. Centimeters in the
17	second one is a typo.
18	DR. BESSETTE: That's supposed to be
19	that was a typo. That's meters.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So RELAP is predicting
21	similar velocities at the maximum, although the cells
22	are not quite the same, and you think that's good
23	enough to give a characteristic velocity on which to
24	base age.
25	DR. BESSETTE: I think what we can say is

1	that RELAP velocities are consistent with these
2	experiments.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: See, 2D RELAP without
4	momentum flux is not a very good tool, is it, in
5	general?
6	DR. BESSETTE: The 2D RELAP with momentum
7	flux off aid these same range of velocities that we
8	saw in the experiments.
9	MEMBER RANSOM: Well, when they emit the
LO	momentum flux, they're not emitting all the other
L1	forces, you know, pressure driven forces and that kind
L2	of buoyancy and gravitational. So those forces are
L3	still included.
L4	If you're in a constant area passage and
L5	an incompressible fluid, you don't have any real
L6	change in momentum flux.
L7	DR. BESSETTE: But you may be seeing to do
L8	is disable a potential demiracle (phonetic) effect.
L9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Right. So a user who
20	runs RELAP 2D form in the downcomer for this problem
21	is not going to encounter erratic, whimsical, large
22	velocities, unrealistic just due to the numerics and
23	the running of the code under any circumstance?
24	DR. BESSETTE: We ran hundreds of
25	calculations. We looked at the output of every

1	calculation and checked for downcomer velocities just
2	to make sure we weren't getting anything.
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And they were all
4	DR. BESSETTE: They were like typically
5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Erratic ones only come
6	in when you put in some momentum flux terms.
7	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah, it's like for the
8	whole set of Oconee transients, there's only one
9	transient. When we ran a whole set of 75 Oconee
10	transients with momentum flux on or off, only one out
11	of those 75 was affected.
12	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So we're trying to
13	establish a MOX requirement in this, the state of the
14	art. The state of the art is the RELAP can predict
15	this thing, and it can predict it well enough on some
16	basis?
17	DR. BESSETTE: I think the state of the
18	art is, I think, reflected in these ten degrees C. and
19	the fact that if you change heat transfer by a factor
20	of two, the effect is similar. It's within this ten
21	degrees C. uncertainty.
22	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: This factor of 20 is
23	also 20 in RELAP or in 16 or 25?
24	DR. BESSETTE: Yes. Without that factor
25	of 20, you just have flow creeping along at about an

1 inch a second in downcomer instead of what we see of 2 one to --But the story has 3 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: 4 changed here. The old story I heard was that the 5 reason you get good mixing is because you have flowthrough there which is mixing injected flow. 6 7 It's not that at all. It's that the injected flow itself sets up cells. 8 9 That's correct, yeah. I DR. BESSETTE: 10 think we characterized it as mysterious last time, but --11 12 (Laughter.)_ So this is the issue of, 13 DR. BESSETTE: 14 say, temperature distribution in the downcomer, and we 15 looked at the same body of integral system test data that I have been talking about, these 12 experiments, 16 and we looked at the temperature measurements both 17 axially and azimuthally and couldn't find any plumes 18 19 in any of the integral system test data. I'm speaking 20 of a plume now. I'm speaking of any temperature 21 differences beyond ten degrees C., but typically we 22 didn't even find anything close to ten degrees. 23 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: All because the 24 stratified flow coming out of the cold leg in some way

fixes with about ten times as much fluid and 140

1	degrees certification becomes ten degrees.
2	DR. BESSETTE: That's right if you have a
3	mixing
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But not insight as to
5	what that mixing process is.
6	DR. BESSETTE: They have a mixing ratio of
7	ten. Then the 100 degrees becomes ten.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: There's an awful lot to
9	happen at that one place instantaneously. I agree
10	there's a lot of evidence, but it seems a very
11	strange, extraordinary amount of mixing in one place.
12	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I think what we
13	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: If you look at pictures
14	of salt plumes, they don't show all stirring around
15	and so on.
16	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I think maybe a part
17	of that is, you know, you see these salt plumes in
18	these separate effects tests. I think there are
19	additional mixing processes going on.
20	The other thing
21	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: My instinct would be
22	that if you had a low Froude number, you'd simply be
23	pouring the stuff down the wall like pouring maple
24	syrup out of a container, and it's running down the
25	container into of onto your plate, and it doesn't mix

1	at all. This stuff would just ooze out and run down
2	the wall. There's no reason for it to mix.
3	It jumps the gap and impinges on the wall
4	and spreads out, and that's great.
5	DR. BESSETTE: Well, the CREARE data
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: The Froude number must
7	have something to do with this.
8	DR. BESSETTE: The CREARE data, for
9	example, flows up the gap.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Then that would be a
11	mechanism for it spreading and getting a lot of
12	mixing.
13	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah.
14	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But that would depend on
15	the Froude number.
16	DR. BESSETTE: Yeah.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And does the Froude
18	number vary a lot between plants? Well, it did
19	between CE plants and Westinghouse.
20	DR. BESSETTE: Well, see, I think the
21	injection Froude number varies a lot. I mean, CE and
22	Westinghouse have low injection Froude numbers and BNW
23	high,b ut no matter what
24	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How high is high for
25	BNW?

1	DR. BESSETTE: Like any of the velocities,
2	I can't remember the exact numbers. CE and
3	Westinghouse flow comes in at about a foot a second or
4	so, and BNW comes in at 20 feet a second. So in
5	Westinghouse, let's say the flow comes in, drops to
6	the bottom of the cold leg, and then it spreads out.
7	There's some mixing in the cold leg obviously.
8	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It's extraordinary to
9	me. It's not just low velocity. It's being squirted
10	in I thought very rapidly in order to save the core.
11	In fact, it was just dribbling in.
12	DR. BESSETTE: Well, I'm talking about
13	high pressure injection flow rates, and everything is
14	coming in through the same pipe. So each
15	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: High pressure would
16	presumably create high velocity.
17	DR. BESSETTE: Well, no. High pressure
18	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: It goes through a
19	throttle valve or something?
20	DR. BESSETTE: No, no.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Everything is high
22	pressure.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: But it's into low
24	pressure once the pressure drops down in the system.
25	DR. BESSETTE: the low pressure pumps a

	fingin capacity. High pressure pullps a low capacity.
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Well, this is part of
3	the report I thought could b improved, where you talk
4	about Froude number being so important, and clearly it
5	does affect some of these phenomena, and yet you don't
6	then tell us what it is for various plants and various
7	conditions. So we don't have a perspective as to, you
8	know, why it's important, what its range is, whether
9	you've covered the range and all of that.
10	So maybe you could do that for us when you
11	rewrite the report.
12	DR. BESSETTE: I will try to clarify it.
13	I thought it was in there. Obviously I'll take
14	another look at it.
15	Well, about the these dye tests, of
16	course, you know, it's qualitative indications.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And also the salt tests
18	at APEX I guess have been thrown out because if you
19	look at them they're quite anomalous.
20	DR. BESSETTE: I think the uncertainties
21	are so high it's best not to draw anything more than
22	some qualitative indications.
23	So at any rate I already talked about the
24	sensitivity studies. Earlier we talked about the
25	sensitivities we did on plumes before we started this
	I

1 whole reanalysis, and we used plumes of 40 degrees C. and 80 degrees C., and so almost no effect on the 2 probability of vessel failure. 3 Nevertheless, we thought it was one of the 4 key reasons we did the whole APEX program, was to make 5 sure that our understanding that plumes were not 6 7 important was, indeed true, and I think APEX certainly 8 bore that out. We ran more than 20 different tests, 9 and I looked at data from every test we ran, and 10 typically the axial or azimuthal temperature variations were less than five degrees C. Generally 11 they're unobservable. 12 So in conclusion what I tried to show is 13 14 that the most important thermal hydraulic uncertainty, and I don't even know if you can call it thermal 15 16 hydraulic uncertainty. It's the range of variations 17 that characterize any given PRA bin. Within that physical model 18 range the actual uncertainty 19 contributed by RELAP --20 CHAIRMAN WALLIS: -- analogy. It's like 21 the break size. You can argue about what model you 22 should use for critical flow out the break, but if the 23 break itself is uncertain over a huge a range, it's 24 not so important that you get your model right. 25 Yeah, the break flow DR. BESSETTE:

uncertainty may be 20 percent, but when you double the size of the break you don't care about the uncertainty, and that's the whole bottom line.

So since the RELAP modeling uncertainty is small compared to the bin uncertainty, the method we use to characterize the variations within a bin by running a set of RELAP calculations that cover the range of the bin was sufficient to represent the behavior of that bin, the map of the behavior of that bin.

We established the accuracy and uncertainty of RELAP, assessing it against a body of experimental data, and it was also assessed against additional separate effects data for important phenomena identified by the PTS PERT, and I think particularly with pressure and temperature, the agreement is very good, and it can be attributed to the integral nature of temperature and pressure as a measure of energy and inventory, conservation of energy and inventory.

And I think we've addressed the issues of fluid temperature distribution and downcomer and of mixed convection and have showed these two to be resolved or unimportant.

CHAIRMAN WALLIS: There you say RELAP

1	compared well to data. That doesn't mean anything to
2	me. A well comparison in fracture mechanics, I think
3	I know what that is.
4	DR. BESSETTE: It's qualitative, but
5	you've got to say something.
6	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Yeah, but I think you -
7	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Well, but you do
8	have uncertainties.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: You have uncertainties.
10	You have real numbers.
11	DR. BESSETTE: And quantify the
12	uncertainties to the extent we can.
13	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: I have the same
14	problem with this slide that I do with your report,
15	and that is bullet three really seems to me to be
16	bullet one. You know, the report should have been
17	organized to tell me that RELAP agrees well with
18	experiments, and I can sort of believe RELAP
19	predictions.
20	Then you can go on and tell me how you can
21	deal with the uncertainties, and the last thing I
22	should hear about is the argument that maybe H
23	variations aren't so important because when you start
24	out with and I start to get to discuss variations on

H, then I can run to my sensitivity calculations and

1	I come up with factors of 30, and it sure is hard to
2	convince me that H is unimportant until you've
3	convinced me that I'm using the wrong H.
4	DR. BESSETTE: I'll schedule a dry run
5	with you next time.
6	(Laughter.)
7	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Well, you know, I
8	should have read the report backwards.
9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: No, you shouldn't have
10	done that. You shouldn't have done that because where
11	is the section? There's a section called "Sensitivity
12	of Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Analysis to
13	Thermal Hydraulic Variations," which I thought was one
14	of the bottom lines, is one page, and there's nothing
15	there or almost nothing there.
16	Now, this is one of it seems to me it's
17	one of the key questions.
18	DR. BESSETTE: Do you want to handle that
19	again, Mark? Do you want to go for it?
20	MR. EricksonKIRK: No, I believe I would
21	say the same thing again. Comments with regards to the
22	organization of the report notwithstanding, I mean,
23	you're right. That's an important part of the story,
24	and I think the comments we've received from the

committee suggest that some reorganization of the

1	report and perhaps an additional
2	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I think that might be in
3	order. I think that generally speaking you've got
4	enough here to make a case.
5	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: And review that
6	section on the ratio of K applied and K fracture
7	mechanics so that it isn't a stress.
8	MR. EricksonKIRK: That section will be
9	removed.
10	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Good.
11	MR. EricksonKIRK: Because that's not a
12	bottom line.
13	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Well, it's also
14	wrong.
15	MR. EricksonKIRK: Yes. Minor issue.
16	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Minor issue.
17	MR. EricksonKIRK: That's why it's easy to
18	remove it.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: So it makes no difference.
20	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: So if we were to suggest
21	that you rewrite the report, what would be the
22	mechanics of it and the time line and so on?
23	MR. ELTAWILA: this is Farouk Eltawila
24	from the (unintelligible) staff.
25	I think we really appreciate the comments

1	that we got from the committee here, and we definitely
2	need to sharpen our message, and reorganize the
3	report, but I think it should not be germane for the
4	committee to write its own report to the Commission
5	about that we have enough information to proceed with
6	the rulemaking so that we can transfer the report to
7	NRR so they can work on it.
8	So having said that, we definitely are
9	going to go and reorganize the report, and we're
LO	putting the message to put more clarity in it, and all
L1	the recommendations that you made, we'll incorporate
L2	them.
L3	But again, it should not be any conditions
L4	for the
L5	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And remember that the
L6	report doesn't just go to NRR. It goes out in the
L7	world.
L8	MR. ELTAWILA: Absolutely.
L9	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Other countries, other
20	experts are very much interested in this problem. You
21	have to make your case clear so that they can
22	understand it.
23	MR. ELTAWILA: No doubt about it, but the
24	NRR needs to know now that we have enough technical
25	basis to support a rulemaking, and they can put that

1	into their schedule and they can work on the process,
2	and we will be working on modifying the report, and we
3	can do that in the next few months.
4	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: And the rule goes out
5	for public comment in time to
6	MR. EricksonKIRK: Oh, yes.
7	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: really get the report
8	in shape before the rule is finalized.
9	MR. ELTAWILA: That's correct.
10	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Don't forget to
11	change Comment 65.
12	(Laughter.)
13	DR. BESSETTE: I'll make a note.
14	MR. EricksonKIRK: Would you like self-
15	consistency?
16	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: How are we for time?
17	MEMBER POWERS: We're just about right on
18	it.
19	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We've been on time all
20	day.
21	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: This is
22	unbelievable. I'll turn it back to you, Mr. Chairman.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Thank you.
24	Are there any comments from the other
25	members of the committee? Now is your chance.

1	(No response.)
2	MR. EricksonKIRK: Are we I'm going to
3	ask my management a pointed question. What are we
4	asking of the committee at this time?
5	MR. ELTAWILA: I think we are asking for
6	a letter, that the staff has sufficient information to
7	support change to the rule, and whatever additional
8	comments the committee will want to make, that's their
9	prerogative, but we're asking for a letter right now.
10	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: Okay. So we are ahead
11	of time again. But this time, gentlemen, we don't
12	have something that we have to come back for on time.
13	We can come back early and do our work.
14	So thank you very much, Mark and Dave. I
15	think you did a good job under
16	MEMBER KRESS: Duress.
17	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: No, under appropriate
18	examination.
19	(Laughter.)
20	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: Just remember
21	Professor Wallis is always restrained when he has to
22	make his comments at the ACRS.
23	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: I have to be very
24	careful.
25	VICE CHAIRMAN SHACK: We'll bring the NEI

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1	guys in next time to give you a hard time.
2	(Laughter.)
3	CHAIRMAN WALLIS: We will then take a
4	break until five o'clock, and then we'll go to work.
5	Thank you.
6	(Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the committee
7	meeting was concluded.)
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