Event Notification Report for November 11, 2024
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/10/2024 - 11/11/2024
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57420
Facility: Beaver Valley
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Shawn Keener
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Shawn Keener
HQ OPS Officer: Robert A. Thompson
Notification Date: 11/12/2024
Notification Time: 01:21 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2024
Event Time: 17:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2024
Notification Time: 01:21 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2024
Event Time: 17:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - Plant S/D Reqd By TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - Plant S/D Reqd By TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Schroeder, Dan (R1DO)
Schroeder, Dan (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/31/2024
EN Revision Text: MSIV FAILED TO CLOSE DURING SURVEILLANCE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 2250 EST on November 11, 2024, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2. The following technical specification limiting conditions of operation (LCOs) were entered at 1939 EST on November 11, 2024:
"LCO 3.6.3, containment isolation valves, condition C, one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable; required action C.1, isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.
"LCO 3.7.2, main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), condition C, one or more MSIVs inoperable in mode 2 or 3; required action C.1, close MSIV within 8 hours.
"These technical specification required actions will not be completed within the completion time; therefore, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"With one main steam isolation valve inoperable, this condition is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The failure occurred during planned surveillance testing in preparation for reactor startup.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/30/2024 AT 1025 EST FROM JAMIE SMITH TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On 11/12/2024 an 8-hour notification was made describing the failure of one main steam isolation valve (MSIV) to close during testing while the plant was in MODE 3. This notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Further engineering evaluation has determined that this condition was not reasonably expected to prevent the fulfillment of a safety function based on a review of the accident analyses and the redundant equipment which is known to have been capable of performing the safety functions. Therefore, this does not result in a reportable condition under this criterion.
"At the same time, a 4-hour notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as an initiation of a shutdown required by plant technical specification due to initiating a transition to MODE 4 to exit TS applicability. The plant was in hot standby (MODE 3) at the time of the event and negative reactivity was not added in order to move to MODE 4, therefore, this event is not reportable under this criterion.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl)
EN Revision Text: MSIV FAILED TO CLOSE DURING SURVEILLANCE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At 2250 EST on November 11, 2024, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2. The following technical specification limiting conditions of operation (LCOs) were entered at 1939 EST on November 11, 2024:
"LCO 3.6.3, containment isolation valves, condition C, one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable; required action C.1, isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.
"LCO 3.7.2, main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), condition C, one or more MSIVs inoperable in mode 2 or 3; required action C.1, close MSIV within 8 hours.
"These technical specification required actions will not be completed within the completion time; therefore, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"With one main steam isolation valve inoperable, this condition is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The failure occurred during planned surveillance testing in preparation for reactor startup.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/30/2024 AT 1025 EST FROM JAMIE SMITH TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On 11/12/2024 an 8-hour notification was made describing the failure of one main steam isolation valve (MSIV) to close during testing while the plant was in MODE 3. This notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Further engineering evaluation has determined that this condition was not reasonably expected to prevent the fulfillment of a safety function based on a review of the accident analyses and the redundant equipment which is known to have been capable of performing the safety functions. Therefore, this does not result in a reportable condition under this criterion.
"At the same time, a 4-hour notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as an initiation of a shutdown required by plant technical specification due to initiating a transition to MODE 4 to exit TS applicability. The plant was in hot standby (MODE 3) at the time of the event and negative reactivity was not added in order to move to MODE 4, therefore, this event is not reportable under this criterion.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57419
Facility: Pilgrim
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: David Noyes
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: David Noyes
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 11/11/2024
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2024
Event Time: 15:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2024
Notification Time: 16:49 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2024
Event Time: 15:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - Offsite Notification
Person (Organization):
Schroeder, Dan (R1DO)
Schroeder, Dan (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The following is summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On November 11, 2024, at 1510 EST, site personnel identified what appeared to be water bubbling up from the pavement adjacent to the sanitary lift station 'C' outside of the facility industrial area. Less than 100 gallons of non-radiological sanitary water ran to a catch basin connected to permitted outfall number 007. Visual inspection did not identify any odor or indication of flow at outfall number 007 discharge. By 1530, the lift station pumps had been secured, sources of influent to the lift station were removed from service, and efforts were underway to pump the tank.
At 1611, an offsite notification was made to the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division in accordance with Section B of the station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. 0003557. The event was associated with leakage from underground sewage system piping from a non-radiological underground tank and lift station.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The following is summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On November 11, 2024, at 1510 EST, site personnel identified what appeared to be water bubbling up from the pavement adjacent to the sanitary lift station 'C' outside of the facility industrial area. Less than 100 gallons of non-radiological sanitary water ran to a catch basin connected to permitted outfall number 007. Visual inspection did not identify any odor or indication of flow at outfall number 007 discharge. By 1530, the lift station pumps had been secured, sources of influent to the lift station were removed from service, and efforts were underway to pump the tank.
At 1611, an offsite notification was made to the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division in accordance with Section B of the station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. 0003557. The event was associated with leakage from underground sewage system piping from a non-radiological underground tank and lift station.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.