Event Notification Report for March 14, 2024
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/13/2024 - 03/14/2024
Agreement State
Event Number: 56587
Rep Org: SC Dept of Health & Env Control
Licensee: DAK Americas, LLC
Region: 1
City: Columbia State: SC
County:
License #: 189
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Korina Koci
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Licensee: DAK Americas, LLC
Region: 1
City: Columbia State: SC
County:
License #: 189
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Korina Koci
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 06/22/2023
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2023
Event Time: 16:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2024
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2023
Event Time: 16:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Eve, Elise (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Eve, Elise (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/14/2024
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE
The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control [the Department] via email:
"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified via telephone at 1515 EDT on 06/22/23, that during the commissioning of a new device [at their Gaston S.C. facility] the strip source of the fixed gauging device was stuck between the source housing and dip-tube. The licensee is reporting that the fixed gauge is a Berthold Technologies USA, LLC., LB 300 IRL Type III Series gauging device, housing a Cs-137 Berthold Technologies USA, LLC., sealed source Model BT-MPLM. The licensee is reporting that no immediate health and safety concerns have been identified. The licensee is reporting that a consultant has been contacted to perform the repair. A department inspector will be dispatched to the facility to conduct an on-site investigation. This event is still under investigation by the Department."
* * * UPDATE ON 7/21/2023 at 1058 EDT FROM KORINA KOCI TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *
"A Department inspector was dispatched to the facility on June 23, 2023. The licensee submitted their 30-day written report on July 14, 2023. The licensee is reporting that the serial number of the Berthold Technologies USA, LLC., LB 300 IRL Type III Series gauging device is 40876-01-10009. The licensee also reports that the serial number of the sealed source containing 0.74 GBq (20 mCi) of Cs-137, (Model BT-MPLM) is G0990_22. The device was removed from service by a licensed contractor and will remain in the site's radiation storage room until the licensee and manufacturer determine the best option moving forward. The licensee reports that no regulatory exposure limits were exceeded as a result of this event, and that the sealed source remained housed for the duration of this incident. This event is still under investigation by the Department."
Notified R1DO (Carfang) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/13/24 AT 1530 EDT FROM KORINA KOCI TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"The licensee disposed/transferred the model BT-MPLM sealed source (serial number G0990_22) on 12/13/23. The Berthold Technologies USA, LLC., LB 300 IRL Type III Series source holder (serial number 40876-01-10009) was also disposed. This event is considered closed."
Notified R1DO (Jackson) and NMSS Events (email)
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE
The following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control [the Department] via email:
"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified via telephone at 1515 EDT on 06/22/23, that during the commissioning of a new device [at their Gaston S.C. facility] the strip source of the fixed gauging device was stuck between the source housing and dip-tube. The licensee is reporting that the fixed gauge is a Berthold Technologies USA, LLC., LB 300 IRL Type III Series gauging device, housing a Cs-137 Berthold Technologies USA, LLC., sealed source Model BT-MPLM. The licensee is reporting that no immediate health and safety concerns have been identified. The licensee is reporting that a consultant has been contacted to perform the repair. A department inspector will be dispatched to the facility to conduct an on-site investigation. This event is still under investigation by the Department."
* * * UPDATE ON 7/21/2023 at 1058 EDT FROM KORINA KOCI TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *
"A Department inspector was dispatched to the facility on June 23, 2023. The licensee submitted their 30-day written report on July 14, 2023. The licensee is reporting that the serial number of the Berthold Technologies USA, LLC., LB 300 IRL Type III Series gauging device is 40876-01-10009. The licensee also reports that the serial number of the sealed source containing 0.74 GBq (20 mCi) of Cs-137, (Model BT-MPLM) is G0990_22. The device was removed from service by a licensed contractor and will remain in the site's radiation storage room until the licensee and manufacturer determine the best option moving forward. The licensee reports that no regulatory exposure limits were exceeded as a result of this event, and that the sealed source remained housed for the duration of this incident. This event is still under investigation by the Department."
Notified R1DO (Carfang) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/13/24 AT 1530 EDT FROM KORINA KOCI TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"The licensee disposed/transferred the model BT-MPLM sealed source (serial number G0990_22) on 12/13/23. The Berthold Technologies USA, LLC., LB 300 IRL Type III Series source holder (serial number 40876-01-10009) was also disposed. This event is considered closed."
Notified R1DO (Jackson) and NMSS Events (email)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56957
Facility: Peach Bottom
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Bill Linell
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Bill Linell
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 02/09/2024
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2024
Event Time: 13:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2024
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2024
Event Time: 13:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition
Person (Organization):
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/14/2024
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION - INADEQUATE FUSES FOR FUEL POOL COOLING
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 2/9/24 at 1322 EST, it was determined that the unit was in an unanalyzed condition. A review of DC feeder circuit protection schemes identified a circuit for the fuel pool cooling system is uncoordinated due to inadequate fuse sizing. This results in a concern that postulated fire damage in one area could cause a short circuit without adequate protection, leading to the unavailability of equipment credited for in 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Fire Safe Shutdown. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The postulated event affects the following fire zones: fire areas 6S and 6N (within the Unit 2 reactor building). Compensatory actions for affected fire areas have been implemented. An extent of condition review is being performed.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Fire watches have been established in the affected areas. These will be maintained until the protection scheme is revised.
* * * UPDATE ON 03/08/24 FROM PAUL BOKUS TO TOM HERRITY * * *
The following updated information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call:
"On 03/08/24 at 1418, extent of condition reviews identified circuit(s) in the Units 2 and 3 Reactor Protection Systems (RPS) which are also uncoordinated due to improper fuse sizing. These circuits are not bounded by existing design and licensing documents for 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdown and, therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This event poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The postulated event affects the following fire areas: 32, 33, 38 and 39 (Units 2 and 3 Switchgear Rooms). In accordance with procedural requirements, compensatory actions for the affected fire areas have been implemented and will remain until the condition is resolved.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Arner)
* * * UPDATE ON 3/13/2024 AT 1538 FROM TROY RALSTON TO SAM COLVARD * * *
"On March 13, 2024, at 1350 EDT, extent of condition reviews identified a circuit in the Unit 2 reactor protection system (RPS) which is also uncoordinated due to improper fuse sizing. This circuit is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Fire Safe Shutdown, therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This event poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The postulated event affects fire area 57 (Switchgear Corridor, common to Units 2 and 3). In accordance with procedural requirements, compensatory actions for the affected fire areas have been implemented and will remain until the condition is resolved.
"Additionally, it was previously reported that fire area 6N contained a circuit which was not bounded by the Fire Safe Shutdown analysis; however, after further review it has been determined that compliance is maintained in this fire area and is therefore retracted from the scope of this report.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Jackson)
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION - INADEQUATE FUSES FOR FUEL POOL COOLING
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 2/9/24 at 1322 EST, it was determined that the unit was in an unanalyzed condition. A review of DC feeder circuit protection schemes identified a circuit for the fuel pool cooling system is uncoordinated due to inadequate fuse sizing. This results in a concern that postulated fire damage in one area could cause a short circuit without adequate protection, leading to the unavailability of equipment credited for in 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Fire Safe Shutdown. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The postulated event affects the following fire zones: fire areas 6S and 6N (within the Unit 2 reactor building). Compensatory actions for affected fire areas have been implemented. An extent of condition review is being performed.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Fire watches have been established in the affected areas. These will be maintained until the protection scheme is revised.
* * * UPDATE ON 03/08/24 FROM PAUL BOKUS TO TOM HERRITY * * *
The following updated information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call:
"On 03/08/24 at 1418, extent of condition reviews identified circuit(s) in the Units 2 and 3 Reactor Protection Systems (RPS) which are also uncoordinated due to improper fuse sizing. These circuits are not bounded by existing design and licensing documents for 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdown and, therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This event poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The postulated event affects the following fire areas: 32, 33, 38 and 39 (Units 2 and 3 Switchgear Rooms). In accordance with procedural requirements, compensatory actions for the affected fire areas have been implemented and will remain until the condition is resolved.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Arner)
* * * UPDATE ON 3/13/2024 AT 1538 FROM TROY RALSTON TO SAM COLVARD * * *
"On March 13, 2024, at 1350 EDT, extent of condition reviews identified a circuit in the Unit 2 reactor protection system (RPS) which is also uncoordinated due to improper fuse sizing. This circuit is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Fire Safe Shutdown, therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This event poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The postulated event affects fire area 57 (Switchgear Corridor, common to Units 2 and 3). In accordance with procedural requirements, compensatory actions for the affected fire areas have been implemented and will remain until the condition is resolved.
"Additionally, it was previously reported that fire area 6N contained a circuit which was not bounded by the Fire Safe Shutdown analysis; however, after further review it has been determined that compliance is maintained in this fire area and is therefore retracted from the scope of this report.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Jackson)
Agreement State
Event Number: 57011
Rep Org: Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm
Licensee: Piedmont Hospital
Region: 1
City: Atlanta State: GA
County:
License #: GA 292-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John Hays
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Licensee: Piedmont Hospital
Region: 1
City: Atlanta State: GA
County:
License #: GA 292-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John Hays
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 03/06/2024
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2024
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Arner, Frank (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Arner, Frank (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISADMINISTRATION
The following information was received from the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email:
"The licensee reported on 3/5/24 about an incident at Piedmont Hospital with Y-90. They underdosed a patient when the catheter was put in the artery. There were vein convulsions which caused only about 30 percent of it to be administered. The licensee stated it did not cause stasis. A follow up with a report will be submitted to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division within 15 days."
Georgia Incident Number: 79
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following information was received from the Georgia Radioactive Materials Program via email:
"The licensee reported on 3/5/24 about an incident at Piedmont Hospital with Y-90. They underdosed a patient when the catheter was put in the artery. There were vein convulsions which caused only about 30 percent of it to be administered. The licensee stated it did not cause stasis. A follow up with a report will be submitted to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division within 15 days."
Georgia Incident Number: 79
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 57012
Rep Org: Curium US LLC
Licensee: Curium US LLC
Region: 3
City: Maryland Heights State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Dan Szatkowski
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Licensee: Curium US LLC
Region: 3
City: Maryland Heights State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Dan Szatkowski
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 03/06/2024
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2024
Event Time: 06:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2024
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2024
Event Time: 06:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(2) - Excessive Release 1xALI 30.50(b)(1) - Unplanned Contamination
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(2) - Excessive Release 1xALI 30.50(b)(1) - Unplanned Contamination
Person (Organization):
Ruiz, Robert (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Ruiz, Robert (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
CONTAMINATION IN RESTRICTED AREA
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone:
On March 6, 2024, around 0600 CST, a technician found loose molybdenum (Mo-99) / technetium (Tc-99m) contamination inside a restricted area. Prior to the discovery, a production hot cell inside the restricted area had been deep cleaned as part of the regular maintenance program.
A thorough investigation of the area was conducted which revealed additional loose contamination on the lab floor. Surveys of surrounding areas did not reveal any spread of contamination outside of the restricted lab area.
Due to (1) the existing access controls, (2) personal protective equipment requirements for lab access, and (3) the absence of contamination identified by body scans of personnel exiting the lab; the licensee does not suspect any spread of contamination outside of the restricted area or personnel intake. Biological samples will be collected to confirm that no intake occurred.
The highest contamination level identified was 260 mrem/hr on contact and 2.3 mrem/hr at 1 foot. The contamination has been remediated to below licensee action levels. Overall, 2.4 mCi of Mo-99 was identified outside of the production hot cell. The 10 CFR 20 Appendix B limit for Mo-99 is 1 mCi. The licensee is investigating the root cause of this event.
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone:
On March 6, 2024, around 0600 CST, a technician found loose molybdenum (Mo-99) / technetium (Tc-99m) contamination inside a restricted area. Prior to the discovery, a production hot cell inside the restricted area had been deep cleaned as part of the regular maintenance program.
A thorough investigation of the area was conducted which revealed additional loose contamination on the lab floor. Surveys of surrounding areas did not reveal any spread of contamination outside of the restricted lab area.
Due to (1) the existing access controls, (2) personal protective equipment requirements for lab access, and (3) the absence of contamination identified by body scans of personnel exiting the lab; the licensee does not suspect any spread of contamination outside of the restricted area or personnel intake. Biological samples will be collected to confirm that no intake occurred.
The highest contamination level identified was 260 mrem/hr on contact and 2.3 mrem/hr at 1 foot. The contamination has been remediated to below licensee action levels. Overall, 2.4 mCi of Mo-99 was identified outside of the production hot cell. The 10 CFR 20 Appendix B limit for Mo-99 is 1 mCi. The licensee is investigating the root cause of this event.
Agreement State
Event Number: 57015
Rep Org: Alabama Radiation Control
Licensee: World Testing, Inc.
Region: 1
City: Russellville State: AL
County:
License #: AL RML 1573
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Cason Coan
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Licensee: World Testing, Inc.
Region: 1
City: Russellville State: AL
County:
License #: AL RML 1573
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Cason Coan
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 03/07/2024
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2024
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/06/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Arner, Frank (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Arner, Frank (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following is a synopsis of information received via email from the Alabama Department of Public Health, Office of Radiation Control:
On the evening of March 6, 2024, the licensee experienced a source disconnect at a job site in Russellville, Alabama. The source connector appeared to have not been connected properly, and the source apparently disconnected from the drive cable while outside the exposure device (camera). The source was retrieved and secured in a 650L model source changer about 45 minutes later when a source retrieval team arrived on site. The two source retrieval personnel received 45 milliroentgens and 15 milliroentgens of exposure respectively. The radiography crew dosimetry had not yet been retrieved for emergency processing at the time of the report.
The camera and source information is as follows: Sentinel 880D, D1120, about 78.9 curies of iridium-192 in a model A424-9 source.
Alabama Incident Number: TBD
The following is a synopsis of information received via email from the Alabama Department of Public Health, Office of Radiation Control:
On the evening of March 6, 2024, the licensee experienced a source disconnect at a job site in Russellville, Alabama. The source connector appeared to have not been connected properly, and the source apparently disconnected from the drive cable while outside the exposure device (camera). The source was retrieved and secured in a 650L model source changer about 45 minutes later when a source retrieval team arrived on site. The two source retrieval personnel received 45 milliroentgens and 15 milliroentgens of exposure respectively. The radiography crew dosimetry had not yet been retrieved for emergency processing at the time of the report.
The camera and source information is as follows: Sentinel 880D, D1120, about 78.9 curies of iridium-192 in a model A424-9 source.
Alabama Incident Number: TBD
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57024
Facility: Comanche Peak
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Casey Davies
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Casey Davies
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 03/12/2024
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2024
Event Time: 08:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2024
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2024
Event Time: 08:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Werner, Greg (R4DO)
Werner, Greg (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/13/2024
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On March 12, 2024, at 0816 CDT, Comanche Peak Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped on lo-lo level in the 2-03 steam generator (SG). Prior to the trip, main feedwater pump (MFP) 2A speed reduced and a manual runback to 700 MW (60 percent) was in progress. Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump started due to lo-lo level in all SGs.
"Concurrent with the loss of speed on MFP 2A, a servo filter swap was in progress on MFP 2A.
"Unit 2 is being maintained in hot standby (Mode 3) in accordance with integrated plant operating procedure IPO-007A. The emergency response guideline network has been exited. Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser via the steam dump valves."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The cause of the loss of the MFP is under investigation. Unit 1 was unaffected.
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On March 12, 2024, at 0816 CDT, Comanche Peak Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped on lo-lo level in the 2-03 steam generator (SG). Prior to the trip, main feedwater pump (MFP) 2A speed reduced and a manual runback to 700 MW (60 percent) was in progress. Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump started due to lo-lo level in all SGs.
"Concurrent with the loss of speed on MFP 2A, a servo filter swap was in progress on MFP 2A.
"Unit 2 is being maintained in hot standby (Mode 3) in accordance with integrated plant operating procedure IPO-007A. The emergency response guideline network has been exited. Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser via the steam dump valves."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The cause of the loss of the MFP is under investigation. Unit 1 was unaffected.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57026
Facility: Catawba
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Joshua Gower
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Joshua Gower
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 03/13/2024
Notification Time: 02:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2024
Event Time: 21:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2024
Notification Time: 02:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2024
Event Time: 21:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF POWER TO CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORS
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On March 12, 2024, at 2111 EDT, a valid containment ventilation isolation train 'A' and 'B' signal was received due to a spurious loss of power to 1EMF-38 (containment particulate radiation monitor) and 1EMF-39 (containment gas radiation monitor). The power to 1EMF-38 and 1EMF-39 was restored.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified"
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
There were no plant evolutions ongoing at the time of the event and the cause of the loss of power is under investigation. There was no impact to Unit 2.
* * * RETRACTION ON 3/13/2024 AT 1436 EDT FROM JASON MOORE TO SAM COLVARD * * *
"After further review of the event, it was determined the actuation of the associated containment ventilation isolation train 'A' and 'B' was not valid. This is due to the loss of power being associated with the control room modules for 1EMF-38 and 1EMF-39, and not a result of an actual sensed parameter or plant condition. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Miller)
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On March 12, 2024, at 2111 EDT, a valid containment ventilation isolation train 'A' and 'B' signal was received due to a spurious loss of power to 1EMF-38 (containment particulate radiation monitor) and 1EMF-39 (containment gas radiation monitor). The power to 1EMF-38 and 1EMF-39 was restored.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified"
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
There were no plant evolutions ongoing at the time of the event and the cause of the loss of power is under investigation. There was no impact to Unit 2.
* * * RETRACTION ON 3/13/2024 AT 1436 EDT FROM JASON MOORE TO SAM COLVARD * * *
"After further review of the event, it was determined the actuation of the associated containment ventilation isolation train 'A' and 'B' was not valid. This is due to the loss of power being associated with the control room modules for 1EMF-38 and 1EMF-39, and not a result of an actual sensed parameter or plant condition. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Miller)
Agreement State
Event Number: 57016
Rep Org: Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency
Licensee: Alton Steel
Region: 3
City: Alton State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01738-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Whitney Cox
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Licensee: Alton Steel
Region: 3
City: Alton State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01738-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Whitney Cox
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 03/08/2024
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2024
Notification Time: 13:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2024
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2024
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Ruiz, Robert (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Ruiz, Robert (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGES
The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"On March 7, 2024, the Agency was notified of equipment damage at Alton Steel in Alton, IL, that exposed two sealed radioactive sources. The licensee reported that molten steel flowed over Berthold Technologies source housings (source housing serial numbers 1197-10-21 and 601-05-12) and, despite trying to cool the steel, it damaged the source housings and exposed the sources. The Berthold Technologies sources are Co-60 and have an activity of 2.3 mCi each (source serial numbers 1200-10-21 and 600-05-12). The sources were removed from the housings by a licensed service provider and placed in secured storage. Leak tests are pending. The licensee determined there were no exposures to any personnel and that the incident does not pose a risk to any members of the public. Licensee surveys indicated no contamination, and radiation levels from these sources were comparable to those from an undamaged source. The Agency plans to conduct a reactionary inspection to verify the lack of contamination/exposure and accountability of licensed materials. This is a reportable event in accordance with 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(c)(2)."
Illinois Item No.: IL240008
* * * UPDATE ON 3/13/24 AT 1625 EDT FROM GARY FORSEE TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"[On 3/8/24], another email update was received in which Alton Steel's licensed contractor advised another portion of the source rod had been located and was actively being cut from the molten steel. A conference call was immediately scheduled and the following information noted: The incident had actually taken place on 2/22/24 with no notification to the Agency. It was stated that the licensee's authorized user removed the damaged sources using pliers and placed them in secured storage but did not follow their approved emergency procedures to cease work and rope off the area at 20 feet. The licensee contacted their consultant (R.M. Wester), and they were on-site the same day. R.M. Wester personnel surveyed the area and assumed there was no contamination because they were getting the expected radiation levels. At that time, the consultant recommended that the licensee contact the manufacturer (Berthold) to come out and further evaluate the sources and devices. The manufacturer was on-site on 3/7/24 and discovered that two source rods were damaged. The manufacturer's rep advised a call to the State was needed. He noted one source rod had been damaged to the point the internal Co-60/nickel wire was exposed. On the afternoon of 3/8/24, Alton Steel's licensed consultant surveyed the mold lid and found what they assumed to be the remaining portion of the source (exposure rate of 50 mR/hour). On 3/8/24, Alton Steel personnel used a torch to cut that portion of the source from the lid of the mold. This piece was also placed in secured storage. The lid was then surveyed by the consultant which he stated evidenced no further radioactive material. The two damaged sources, as well as the source rod fragment, are pending disposal. The Agency has requested that the lid and mold be held for surveys when Agency staff are on-site. Agency staff plan to be on-site 3/13/24 to further investigate. Leak tests from the consultant did not evidence removeable contamination in excess of 0.005 uCi. At this time, there is no indication of risk to workers or the public as all sources are in secured storage. The investigation is ongoing and updates will be provided as available.
"On Monday, 3/11/24, Agency staff conducted interviews with the Berthold service representative which conducted the service call. Information from that call indicated the licensee had cut through a source with a torch. At this point, Agency staff responded that morning to take surveys and interview Alton Steel staff. Survey readings were taken with a microR meter, which lacked the necessary sensitivity and were inconclusive due to [naturally occurring radioactive material] NORM and refractory material. Investigation findings indicate the licensee failed to follow emergency procedures, failed to follow operating procedures, failed to adhere to license conditions, received inadequate and incorrect training, improperly handled and manipulated sealed sources, failed to perform surveys, and failed to make timely notification to the Agency. The licensee's consultant also failed to notify the Agency, lacked sufficient knowledge of the sealed source and performed inadequate surveys. Additionally, it was discovered the licensee had used a 4 inch die grinder on one source, cut through another with an oxygen lance, had a practice of handling unshielded source assemblies and an inadequate radiation safety program.
"Agency staff arrived at the licensee's site again on 3/13/24 to perform additional surveys. Upon arrival, the licensee stated they had found yet another piece of the Co-60 rod source under the spray booth that washes down the cast billets. This was reportedly the area below where the source was first cut with a torch. The Agency confirmed the licensee was aware of the source when using the torch and did not perform surveys or alter operations. The second source which was found to be damaged had also been inadvertently withdrawn from its shielded housing when the molten steel overflowed atop the mold cap. However, the second source immediately fell into two pieces, apparently suffering damage within the housing. That source was reportedly burnt/melt and would not fit into the shield. A licensee gauge user then used a 4 inch angle grinder to smooth out the source so it would fit back into the shield. Agency staff investigated all areas accessible (some areas were inaccessible due to molten steel). A portable germanium spectrometer was employed to discern if elevated count rates were from NORM or Co-60 contamination. Preliminary findings indicate at least two areas adjacent to the vise (where grinding had occurred) had Co-60 contamination. Samples were collected for lab analysis and additional area surveys performed. The [Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Office of Homeland Security] IEMA-OHS lab reported on the afternoon of 3/13/24 that samples did evidence Co-60 contamination. The Agency covered the contaminated area and required it to be posted. Additional surveys will be taken once accessible, to include the wash-down water sedimentation areas. A full survey and remediation plan will be required by the end of the month. Decontamination efforts will be undertaken by a qualified contractor and the Agency will perform verification surveys to support release. Updates will be provided as they become available."
Notified R3DO (Hills), IR MOC (Crouch), NMSS (Williams), NMSS Events (email)
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"On March 7, 2024, the Agency was notified of equipment damage at Alton Steel in Alton, IL, that exposed two sealed radioactive sources. The licensee reported that molten steel flowed over Berthold Technologies source housings (source housing serial numbers 1197-10-21 and 601-05-12) and, despite trying to cool the steel, it damaged the source housings and exposed the sources. The Berthold Technologies sources are Co-60 and have an activity of 2.3 mCi each (source serial numbers 1200-10-21 and 600-05-12). The sources were removed from the housings by a licensed service provider and placed in secured storage. Leak tests are pending. The licensee determined there were no exposures to any personnel and that the incident does not pose a risk to any members of the public. Licensee surveys indicated no contamination, and radiation levels from these sources were comparable to those from an undamaged source. The Agency plans to conduct a reactionary inspection to verify the lack of contamination/exposure and accountability of licensed materials. This is a reportable event in accordance with 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(c)(2)."
Illinois Item No.: IL240008
* * * UPDATE ON 3/13/24 AT 1625 EDT FROM GARY FORSEE TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *
"[On 3/8/24], another email update was received in which Alton Steel's licensed contractor advised another portion of the source rod had been located and was actively being cut from the molten steel. A conference call was immediately scheduled and the following information noted: The incident had actually taken place on 2/22/24 with no notification to the Agency. It was stated that the licensee's authorized user removed the damaged sources using pliers and placed them in secured storage but did not follow their approved emergency procedures to cease work and rope off the area at 20 feet. The licensee contacted their consultant (R.M. Wester), and they were on-site the same day. R.M. Wester personnel surveyed the area and assumed there was no contamination because they were getting the expected radiation levels. At that time, the consultant recommended that the licensee contact the manufacturer (Berthold) to come out and further evaluate the sources and devices. The manufacturer was on-site on 3/7/24 and discovered that two source rods were damaged. The manufacturer's rep advised a call to the State was needed. He noted one source rod had been damaged to the point the internal Co-60/nickel wire was exposed. On the afternoon of 3/8/24, Alton Steel's licensed consultant surveyed the mold lid and found what they assumed to be the remaining portion of the source (exposure rate of 50 mR/hour). On 3/8/24, Alton Steel personnel used a torch to cut that portion of the source from the lid of the mold. This piece was also placed in secured storage. The lid was then surveyed by the consultant which he stated evidenced no further radioactive material. The two damaged sources, as well as the source rod fragment, are pending disposal. The Agency has requested that the lid and mold be held for surveys when Agency staff are on-site. Agency staff plan to be on-site 3/13/24 to further investigate. Leak tests from the consultant did not evidence removeable contamination in excess of 0.005 uCi. At this time, there is no indication of risk to workers or the public as all sources are in secured storage. The investigation is ongoing and updates will be provided as available.
"On Monday, 3/11/24, Agency staff conducted interviews with the Berthold service representative which conducted the service call. Information from that call indicated the licensee had cut through a source with a torch. At this point, Agency staff responded that morning to take surveys and interview Alton Steel staff. Survey readings were taken with a microR meter, which lacked the necessary sensitivity and were inconclusive due to [naturally occurring radioactive material] NORM and refractory material. Investigation findings indicate the licensee failed to follow emergency procedures, failed to follow operating procedures, failed to adhere to license conditions, received inadequate and incorrect training, improperly handled and manipulated sealed sources, failed to perform surveys, and failed to make timely notification to the Agency. The licensee's consultant also failed to notify the Agency, lacked sufficient knowledge of the sealed source and performed inadequate surveys. Additionally, it was discovered the licensee had used a 4 inch die grinder on one source, cut through another with an oxygen lance, had a practice of handling unshielded source assemblies and an inadequate radiation safety program.
"Agency staff arrived at the licensee's site again on 3/13/24 to perform additional surveys. Upon arrival, the licensee stated they had found yet another piece of the Co-60 rod source under the spray booth that washes down the cast billets. This was reportedly the area below where the source was first cut with a torch. The Agency confirmed the licensee was aware of the source when using the torch and did not perform surveys or alter operations. The second source which was found to be damaged had also been inadvertently withdrawn from its shielded housing when the molten steel overflowed atop the mold cap. However, the second source immediately fell into two pieces, apparently suffering damage within the housing. That source was reportedly burnt/melt and would not fit into the shield. A licensee gauge user then used a 4 inch angle grinder to smooth out the source so it would fit back into the shield. Agency staff investigated all areas accessible (some areas were inaccessible due to molten steel). A portable germanium spectrometer was employed to discern if elevated count rates were from NORM or Co-60 contamination. Preliminary findings indicate at least two areas adjacent to the vise (where grinding had occurred) had Co-60 contamination. Samples were collected for lab analysis and additional area surveys performed. The [Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Office of Homeland Security] IEMA-OHS lab reported on the afternoon of 3/13/24 that samples did evidence Co-60 contamination. The Agency covered the contaminated area and required it to be posted. Additional surveys will be taken once accessible, to include the wash-down water sedimentation areas. A full survey and remediation plan will be required by the end of the month. Decontamination efforts will be undertaken by a qualified contractor and the Agency will perform verification surveys to support release. Updates will be provided as they become available."
Notified R3DO (Hills), IR MOC (Crouch), NMSS (Williams), NMSS Events (email)
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf