Event Notification Report for April 17, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/16/2023 - 04/17/2023
Agreement State
Event Number: 56461
Rep Org: SC Dept of Health & Env Control
Licensee: Insight Health Corporation
Region: 1
City: West Columbia State: SC
County:
License #: 768
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Adam Gause
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Licensee: Insight Health Corporation
Region: 1
City: West Columbia State: SC
County:
License #: 768
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Adam Gause
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 04/10/2023
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2023
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE DOSE FOR AN EMBRYO/FETUS OF A DECLARED PREGNANT WOMAN
The following was received from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) via email:
"On 03/24/23, at 1446 [EDT], the Department was notified by the licensee of a dose more than the dose limit for an embryo/fetus of a declared pregnant woman. A written report was also submitted on 03/24/23. The employee is a Technical Assistant for mobile [positron emission tomography/computed tomography] (PET/CT) operations and is not directly involved with handling radioactive material. The estimated dose reported was 1145 mrem [deep dose equivalent] (DDE) for a one-month period, the cumulative dose was 1239 mrem DDE. The licensee's report indicated it is possible that the badge may have been in the PET/CT scanner room during patient scans, but the employee could not recall that this ever happened. The licensee also reported the chest and control badges showed no elevated readings; only the fetal badge. The licensee's corrective actions included discussing with the employee the importance of making sure the badge is never left in a radiation area, and while at work, the badge is always worn properly for the entire day. Proper storage of badges next to the control badge was also discussed. The Department performed an on-site investigation on 03/29/23, and the information obtained during the on-site investigation was consistent with the licensee's written report. This event is considered closed."
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control report no.: SC230008
The following was received from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) via email:
"On 03/24/23, at 1446 [EDT], the Department was notified by the licensee of a dose more than the dose limit for an embryo/fetus of a declared pregnant woman. A written report was also submitted on 03/24/23. The employee is a Technical Assistant for mobile [positron emission tomography/computed tomography] (PET/CT) operations and is not directly involved with handling radioactive material. The estimated dose reported was 1145 mrem [deep dose equivalent] (DDE) for a one-month period, the cumulative dose was 1239 mrem DDE. The licensee's report indicated it is possible that the badge may have been in the PET/CT scanner room during patient scans, but the employee could not recall that this ever happened. The licensee also reported the chest and control badges showed no elevated readings; only the fetal badge. The licensee's corrective actions included discussing with the employee the importance of making sure the badge is never left in a radiation area, and while at work, the badge is always worn properly for the entire day. Proper storage of badges next to the control badge was also discussed. The Department performed an on-site investigation on 03/29/23, and the information obtained during the on-site investigation was consistent with the licensee's written report. This event is considered closed."
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control report no.: SC230008
Agreement State
Event Number: 56462
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: PRECISION NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: Orla State: TX
County:
License #: L07054
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Karen Blanchard
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Licensee: PRECISION NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: Orla State: TX
County:
License #: L07054
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Karen Blanchard
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 04/10/2023
Notification Time: 18:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2023
Notification Time: 18:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Deese, Rick (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Deese, Rick (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE - DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY GUIDE TUBE PREVENTING RETRACTION OF SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:
"On April 10, 2023, the licensee reported to the Agency that on April 7, 2023, one of its QSA Delta 880 industrial radiography exposure devices (camera) had fallen approximately three feet onto the source guide tube at a job site in Orla, Texas. The camera severed the guide tube and the source pigtail was disconnected from the drive cable. The source was 72 curies of iridium-192. A boundary was set at 2 millirem by the radiographers and an individual authorized on their license was dispatched to the site and retrieved the source. The retriever's dosimeter indicated a whole-body dose of 2.6 rem. The licensee has reported initial calculations for the retriever's hand dose to be 385.9 millirem. The two radiographer's self-reading pocket dosimeters indicated doses of 180 and 150 millirem. All of the equipment is being sent to the manufacturer for evaluation. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-10007
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:
"On April 10, 2023, the licensee reported to the Agency that on April 7, 2023, one of its QSA Delta 880 industrial radiography exposure devices (camera) had fallen approximately three feet onto the source guide tube at a job site in Orla, Texas. The camera severed the guide tube and the source pigtail was disconnected from the drive cable. The source was 72 curies of iridium-192. A boundary was set at 2 millirem by the radiographers and an individual authorized on their license was dispatched to the site and retrieved the source. The retriever's dosimeter indicated a whole-body dose of 2.6 rem. The licensee has reported initial calculations for the retriever's hand dose to be 385.9 millirem. The two radiographer's self-reading pocket dosimeters indicated doses of 180 and 150 millirem. All of the equipment is being sent to the manufacturer for evaluation. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-10007
Part 21
Event Number: 56469
Rep Org: United Controls International
Licensee: United Controls International
Region: 1
City: Norcross State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Anu Kulkarni
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Licensee: United Controls International
Region: 1
City: Norcross State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Anu Kulkarni
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 04/14/2023
Notification Time: 07:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2023
Notification Time: 07:53 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Lilliendahl, Jon (R1DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
PART 21 - SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY HARD FAILURES
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On September 7, 2022, Dominion's Surry Power Station notified United Controls International (UCI) that three Schneider Electric PIN: ASP840-000 Modicon Primary/Secondary Power Supply units that were supplied by UCI in 2014 had failed after installation. Hard failures that shutdown the associated programmable logic controller were observed. The first unit was installed since June 6, 2017, and then failed in August of 2022. The second and third units failed approximately three days after installation. All units appeared to function properly at initial installation.
"The subject items were returned to UCI on October 19, 2022, for evaluation. Items were received at UCI with substantial shipping damage noted. One item was received with a loose transformer inside the unit. All items were received with bent or cracked cases. These issues are attributed to poor shipping practices as items were not supplied in such conditions and these issues would have been noted at receipt by the utility. Due to the complexity of the items and unavailability of design documentation for these obsolete items, further evaluation of item failures required manufacturer (Schneider Electric) evaluation. UCI returned all three items to the manufacturer for evaluation of failed components. The manufacturer was able to repair one item by replacing several capacitors, transistors, integrated circuits, and resistors; however, a specific cause of the failure could not be identified. The remaining two items were determined to be unrepairable, and cause of failure could not be identified.
"UCI is not capable of providing any further evaluation as to the root cause of the subject module failures. The item manufacturer Schneider Electric was also unable to provide a determination as to the cause of failure. Since the root cause of failure cannot be determined or inspected for, UCI will no longer be supplying these modules which are now obsolete."
North Anna and Surry Power Station are the plants affected.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On September 7, 2022, Dominion's Surry Power Station notified United Controls International (UCI) that three Schneider Electric PIN: ASP840-000 Modicon Primary/Secondary Power Supply units that were supplied by UCI in 2014 had failed after installation. Hard failures that shutdown the associated programmable logic controller were observed. The first unit was installed since June 6, 2017, and then failed in August of 2022. The second and third units failed approximately three days after installation. All units appeared to function properly at initial installation.
"The subject items were returned to UCI on October 19, 2022, for evaluation. Items were received at UCI with substantial shipping damage noted. One item was received with a loose transformer inside the unit. All items were received with bent or cracked cases. These issues are attributed to poor shipping practices as items were not supplied in such conditions and these issues would have been noted at receipt by the utility. Due to the complexity of the items and unavailability of design documentation for these obsolete items, further evaluation of item failures required manufacturer (Schneider Electric) evaluation. UCI returned all three items to the manufacturer for evaluation of failed components. The manufacturer was able to repair one item by replacing several capacitors, transistors, integrated circuits, and resistors; however, a specific cause of the failure could not be identified. The remaining two items were determined to be unrepairable, and cause of failure could not be identified.
"UCI is not capable of providing any further evaluation as to the root cause of the subject module failures. The item manufacturer Schneider Electric was also unable to provide a determination as to the cause of failure. Since the root cause of failure cannot be determined or inspected for, UCI will no longer be supplying these modules which are now obsolete."
North Anna and Surry Power Station are the plants affected.
Hospital
Event Number: 56463
Rep Org: Community Health Network, North Hospital
Licensee: Community Health Network, North Hospital
Region: 3
City: Indianapolis State: IN
County:
License #: 13-06009-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Erin Bell
HQ OPS Officer: Donald Norwood
Licensee: Community Health Network, North Hospital
Region: 3
City: Indianapolis State: IN
County:
License #: 13-06009-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Erin Bell
HQ OPS Officer: Donald Norwood
Notification Date: 04/11/2023
Notification Time: 08:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2023
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2023
Notification Time: 08:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2023
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - Dose <> Prescribed Dosage
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - Dose <> Prescribed Dosage
Person (Organization):
Orth, Steve (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Orth, Steve (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
MEDICAL EVENT - DOSE RECEIVED GREATER THAN PRESCRIBED
The following information is a synopsis of information provided by the licensee:
This event occurred at Community Health Network, North Hospital on 4/10/2023 and the error was discovered at approximately 12:00 p.m. [EDT].
This procedure involved a split dose, so the patient received two separate doses in two separate locations in the liver. Hospital personnel use a spreadsheet to help with calculations while drawing the dose and to determine the administered activity after the procedure. Hospital personnel had two spreadsheets due to the split dose. When the radiation safety officer (RSO) was completing the worksheets after the procedure, she noticed that the Grays (Gy) delivered on one of the doses was much higher than anticipated. When the RSO reviewed the worksheet, she realized that she had a typo in the prescribed activity in the worksheet and did not catch it prior to administration. Typically, the physician will fill out the written directive with giga-becquerel (GBq) and the RSO would enter millicuries (mCi) in parentheses, since the dose calibrator reads in mCi. Although the worksheet converts dose, this helps as a double check when completing the written directive. In this case, the RSO had not entered mCi, only GBq and did not catch that the second dose was much higher than the prescribed activity. If the RSO had entered the mCi on the written directive (WD) as per usual, she would have caught that this dose was higher than prescribed.
Initial corrective action will be to enter both GBq and mCi on the WD and give both versions of activity when doing the patient identification at the beginning of the procedure with the physician.
The physician was notified immediately and she was notifying the patient. At this time there is not expected to be any detrimental effects to the patient.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The prescribed first dose was 43.2 mCi of Y-90 SIR-Spheres, 63.2 mCi was delivered. The prescribed second dose was 18.9 mCi and 20.8 mCi was delivered.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following information is a synopsis of information provided by the licensee:
This event occurred at Community Health Network, North Hospital on 4/10/2023 and the error was discovered at approximately 12:00 p.m. [EDT].
This procedure involved a split dose, so the patient received two separate doses in two separate locations in the liver. Hospital personnel use a spreadsheet to help with calculations while drawing the dose and to determine the administered activity after the procedure. Hospital personnel had two spreadsheets due to the split dose. When the radiation safety officer (RSO) was completing the worksheets after the procedure, she noticed that the Grays (Gy) delivered on one of the doses was much higher than anticipated. When the RSO reviewed the worksheet, she realized that she had a typo in the prescribed activity in the worksheet and did not catch it prior to administration. Typically, the physician will fill out the written directive with giga-becquerel (GBq) and the RSO would enter millicuries (mCi) in parentheses, since the dose calibrator reads in mCi. Although the worksheet converts dose, this helps as a double check when completing the written directive. In this case, the RSO had not entered mCi, only GBq and did not catch that the second dose was much higher than the prescribed activity. If the RSO had entered the mCi on the written directive (WD) as per usual, she would have caught that this dose was higher than prescribed.
Initial corrective action will be to enter both GBq and mCi on the WD and give both versions of activity when doing the patient identification at the beginning of the procedure with the physician.
The physician was notified immediately and she was notifying the patient. At this time there is not expected to be any detrimental effects to the patient.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The prescribed first dose was 43.2 mCi of Y-90 SIR-Spheres, 63.2 mCi was delivered. The prescribed second dose was 18.9 mCi and 20.8 mCi was delivered.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56471
Facility: LaSalle
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Erik Thompson
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Erik Thompson
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 04/17/2023
Notification Time: 09:37 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2023
Event Time: 02:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2023
Notification Time: 09:37 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2023
Event Time: 02:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Orth, Steve (R3DO)
Orth, Steve (R3DO)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SINGLE TRAIN OF LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0246 CDT on April 17, 2023, it was discovered that the single train low pressure core spray system was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). All other emergency core cooling systems remained operable during this time period.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
LaSalle Unit 1 is in a 7 day limiting condition for operation.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0246 CDT on April 17, 2023, it was discovered that the single train low pressure core spray system was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). All other emergency core cooling systems remained operable during this time period.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
LaSalle Unit 1 is in a 7 day limiting condition for operation.