Event Notification Report for January 04, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/03/2022 - 01/04/2022
EVENT NUMBERS
55756
55756
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55756
Facility: Brunswick
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Richard Barrett
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Richard Barrett
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 02/24/2022
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2022
Event Time: 13:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2022
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2022
Event Time: 13:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
Miller, Mark (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/24/2022
EN Revision Text: 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER [Licensee Event Report] submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 1316 Eastern Standard Time [EST] on January 4, 2022, during performance of isolation logic periodic testing associated with Primary Containment Isolation System Groups 2 and 6, an invalid actuation of Group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Containment Atmospheric Control/Monitoring (CAC/CAM) and Post Accident Sampling (PASS) isolation valves) occurred. This resulted in a Division I CAC isolation signal, a full CAM isolation, and a full PASS isolation. Reactor Building Ventilation isolated and Standby Gas Treatment started per design. No manipulations associated with the isolation or reset logic were ongoing at the time.
"Troubleshooting determined that the Group 6 isolation signal resulted from a high resistance contact on a relay associated with the main stack radiation high-high isolation logic. This condition interrupted electrical continuity and prevented the Group 6 logic from resetting. Following cleaning of the relay contacts, the isolation logic remained in the reset state.
"The main stack radiation monitor is a shared component that sends isolation signals to Unit 1 and Unit 2. It was verified that the radiation monitor was not in trip electrically and there were no Unit 2 actuations. Therefore, the actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. As a result, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
EN Revision Text: 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER [Licensee Event Report] submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 1316 Eastern Standard Time [EST] on January 4, 2022, during performance of isolation logic periodic testing associated with Primary Containment Isolation System Groups 2 and 6, an invalid actuation of Group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Containment Atmospheric Control/Monitoring (CAC/CAM) and Post Accident Sampling (PASS) isolation valves) occurred. This resulted in a Division I CAC isolation signal, a full CAM isolation, and a full PASS isolation. Reactor Building Ventilation isolated and Standby Gas Treatment started per design. No manipulations associated with the isolation or reset logic were ongoing at the time.
"Troubleshooting determined that the Group 6 isolation signal resulted from a high resistance contact on a relay associated with the main stack radiation high-high isolation logic. This condition interrupted electrical continuity and prevented the Group 6 logic from resetting. Following cleaning of the relay contacts, the isolation logic remained in the reset state.
"The main stack radiation monitor is a shared component that sends isolation signals to Unit 1 and Unit 2. It was verified that the radiation monitor was not in trip electrically and there were no Unit 2 actuations. Therefore, the actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. As a result, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.