Event Notification Report for May 05, 2021
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/04/2021 - 05/05/2021
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 55216
Facility: Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: Uranium Fuel Fabrication
Comments: Leu Conversion (Uf6 To Uo2)
Leu Fabrication
Lwr Commerical Fuel
NRC Notified By: Philip Ollis
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: Uranium Fuel Fabrication
Comments: Leu Conversion (Uf6 To Uo2)
Leu Fabrication
Lwr Commerical Fuel
NRC Notified By: Philip Ollis
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 04/27/2021
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2021
Event Time: 18:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2021
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2021
Event Time: 18:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - Offsite Notification/News Rel
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - Offsite Notification/News Rel
Person (Organization):
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
MILLER, MARK (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
MILLER, MARK (R2DO)
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/5/2021
EN Revision Text: OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
"At approximately 1822 EDT on April 26th, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshal was notified that the outer fire doors on the first and third floor of the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) elevator shaft malfunctioned and were left in the open position to allow for the elevator repair contractor to observe the issue. The DCP elevator is located on the South wall of DCP which is a credited fire barrier. A fire watch was initiated and maintained until the elevator doors were restored to service at approximately 1330 EDT on April 27th. The New Hanover County Fire Marshal was notified at 1410 EDT that the doors were returned to operational status and that the fire watch had been terminated. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c)."
NRC Region 2 and the North Carolina Radiation Protection Office will be notified of this event.
EN Revision Text: OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
"At approximately 1822 EDT on April 26th, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshal was notified that the outer fire doors on the first and third floor of the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) elevator shaft malfunctioned and were left in the open position to allow for the elevator repair contractor to observe the issue. The DCP elevator is located on the South wall of DCP which is a credited fire barrier. A fire watch was initiated and maintained until the elevator doors were restored to service at approximately 1330 EDT on April 27th. The New Hanover County Fire Marshal was notified at 1410 EDT that the doors were returned to operational status and that the fire watch had been terminated. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c)."
NRC Region 2 and the North Carolina Radiation Protection Office will be notified of this event.
Agreement State
Event Number: 55217
Rep Org: ARIZONA DEPT OF HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: Ninyo & Moore
Region: 4
City: Phoenix State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-460
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Licensee: Ninyo & Moore
Region: 4
City: Phoenix State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-460
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 04/27/2021
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2021
Event Time: 00:00 []
Last Update Date: 04/27/2021
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2021
Event Time: 00:00 []
Last Update Date: 04/27/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
PROULX, DAVID (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
CNSNS (MEXICO), - (EMAIL)
PROULX, DAVID (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
CNSNS (MEXICO), - (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/5/2021
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE
The following information was received from the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"The Department received notification from the licensee that a portable gauge was stolen. A technician locked a portable gauge in the back of a truck and the truck was locked inside the users garage at their home overnight. When the gauge user came out to go to work the next day, the chain had been cut and the gauge and the gauge transport box were missing. The gauge is a Troxler 3430, Serial Number 34160, containing approximately 8 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Americium-241:Beryllium. A police report has been filed. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event."
Arizona Incident No.: 21-004
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE
The following information was received from the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"The Department received notification from the licensee that a portable gauge was stolen. A technician locked a portable gauge in the back of a truck and the truck was locked inside the users garage at their home overnight. When the gauge user came out to go to work the next day, the chain had been cut and the gauge and the gauge transport box were missing. The gauge is a Troxler 3430, Serial Number 34160, containing approximately 8 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Americium-241:Beryllium. A police report has been filed. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event."
Arizona Incident No.: 21-004
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 55218
Facility: Nuclear Fuel Services Inc.
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: Uranium Fuel Fabrication
Comments: Heu Conversion & Scrap Recovery
Naval Reactor Fuel Cycle
Leu Scrap Recovery
NRC Notified By: Nick Brown
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: Uranium Fuel Fabrication
Comments: Heu Conversion & Scrap Recovery
Naval Reactor Fuel Cycle
Leu Scrap Recovery
NRC Notified By: Nick Brown
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 04/27/2021
Notification Time: 19:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2021
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2021
Notification Time: 19:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2021
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - Offsite Notification/News Rel
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - Offsite Notification/News Rel
Person (Organization):
MILLER, MARK (R2DO)
PROULX, DAVID (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
FUELS GROUP, - (EMAIL)
MILLER, MARK (R2DO)
PROULX, DAVID (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
FUELS GROUP, - (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/5/2021
EN Revision Text: CONCURRENT REPORT - IMMEDIATE REPORT TO THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
"Low level waste shipment bound for WCS [(Waste Control Specialists)], Andrews, Texas was involved in a minor traffic accident. The trailer sustained light damage to the rear of the trailer. No damage to the shipment contents was identified during visual inspection. Driver was released by the officer working the accident. Accident occurred near Dallas, Texas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
EN Revision Text: CONCURRENT REPORT - IMMEDIATE REPORT TO THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
"Low level waste shipment bound for WCS [(Waste Control Specialists)], Andrews, Texas was involved in a minor traffic accident. The trailer sustained light damage to the rear of the trailer. No damage to the shipment contents was identified during visual inspection. Driver was released by the officer working the accident. Accident occurred near Dallas, Texas. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55231
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jeff Myers
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jeff Myers
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 05/03/2021
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2021
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2021
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2021
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition
Person (Organization):
ORLIKOWSKI, ROBERT (R3)
ORLIKOWSKI, ROBERT (R3)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/5/2021
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION
"At 0930 EDT on 5/3/2021, it was determined that during entries into the Fermi 2 Reactor Building Steam Tunnel (RBST) on 4/17/2021, 4/18/2021, and 4/21/2021 that the door was not controlled according to site procedures. The RBST door is credited as a hazard barrier for various high-energy line break (HELB) scenarios. On the identified dates, the RBST door was left open for brief periods during maintenance related activities in the RBST. This condition is not bounded by existing analyses as the door is assumed to be closed throughout a HELB event. The time period that the door was open was less than one hour in each case, as stay times in the room are inherently limited by industrial and radiological conditions. Individuals remained in the area to close the door if needed, but existing analyses do not address the ability to perform those actions under all HELB scenarios.
"There is no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel as the door is currently closed and latched and access into the area has been restricted to normal ingress and egress per site procedures, which ensures consistency with existing analyses. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Investigation into the cause is ongoing. Preliminary review of the extent of this condition identified entries into the RBST on other occasions during the past three years where the conditions may also have not been bounded by existing analyses. The additional occasions where the door may have been held open were on 9/22/2018 (MODE 3), 10/26/2018 (MODE 1 ), 11/2/2018 (MODE 1), and 3/21/2020 (MODE 3). Each of these instances was also less than one hour with the exception of the occurrence beginning on 10/26/2018 which lasted approximately 10 hours to support packing leak repairs on a HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Outboard Isolation Valve."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION
"At 0930 EDT on 5/3/2021, it was determined that during entries into the Fermi 2 Reactor Building Steam Tunnel (RBST) on 4/17/2021, 4/18/2021, and 4/21/2021 that the door was not controlled according to site procedures. The RBST door is credited as a hazard barrier for various high-energy line break (HELB) scenarios. On the identified dates, the RBST door was left open for brief periods during maintenance related activities in the RBST. This condition is not bounded by existing analyses as the door is assumed to be closed throughout a HELB event. The time period that the door was open was less than one hour in each case, as stay times in the room are inherently limited by industrial and radiological conditions. Individuals remained in the area to close the door if needed, but existing analyses do not address the ability to perform those actions under all HELB scenarios.
"There is no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel as the door is currently closed and latched and access into the area has been restricted to normal ingress and egress per site procedures, which ensures consistency with existing analyses. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Investigation into the cause is ongoing. Preliminary review of the extent of this condition identified entries into the RBST on other occasions during the past three years where the conditions may also have not been bounded by existing analyses. The additional occasions where the door may have been held open were on 9/22/2018 (MODE 3), 10/26/2018 (MODE 1 ), 11/2/2018 (MODE 1), and 3/21/2020 (MODE 3). Each of these instances was also less than one hour with the exception of the occurrence beginning on 10/26/2018 which lasted approximately 10 hours to support packing leak repairs on a HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Outboard Isolation Valve."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 55219
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: Centura Health-Saint Francis Health Services
Region: 4
City: Colorado Springs State: CO
County:
License #: GL001964
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kathryn Mote
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Licensee: Centura Health-Saint Francis Health Services
Region: 4
City: Colorado Springs State: CO
County:
License #: GL001964
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kathryn Mote
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 04/28/2021
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2021
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
PROULX, DAVID (R4DO)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
PROULX, DAVID (R4DO)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/6/2021
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN
The State of Colorado reported that a Tritium exit sign at the Centura Health-Saint Francis Health Services, which was not able to be located during a change of ownership in June 2020, has been declared lost. The sign contains 10 Ci of Tritium.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN
The State of Colorado reported that a Tritium exit sign at the Centura Health-Saint Francis Health Services, which was not able to be located during a change of ownership in June 2020, has been declared lost. The sign contains 10 Ci of Tritium.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Agreement State
Event Number: 55221
Rep Org: RI DEPT OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH
Licensee: Electric Boat Corporation
Region: 1
City: North Kingstown State: RI
County:
License #: 3D-005-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Alexander Hamm
HQ OPS Officer: Joanna Bridge
Licensee: Electric Boat Corporation
Region: 1
City: North Kingstown State: RI
County:
License #: 3D-005-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Alexander Hamm
HQ OPS Officer: Joanna Bridge
Notification Date: 04/29/2021
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2021
Event Time: 01:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2021
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2021
Event Time: 01:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
SCHROEDER, DAN (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
SCHROEDER, DAN (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/6/2021
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE UNABLE TO RETRACT
The following was received via e-mail from the Rhode Island Dept. of Health, Radiation Control Agency:
"A licensee, Electric Boat Corporation, reported the inability to retract a 1.62 TBq (43.8 Ci) Co-60 source (QSA Global, Inc. Model A424-14, S/N 81346G) into the radiography exposure device (QSA Global, Inc. Model Sentry 330, S/N P30106) on March 7, 2021, at Electric Boat's Quonset Point Facility. At approximately 0120 [EDT], the [source] was [extended] without any issue.
"At the completion of the exposure, the radiographer attempted to retract the source into the exposure device, and attempted to re-expose the source to verify that the auto-locking mechanism on the Sentry 330 exposure device had engaged. At this time, the radiographer noted that the auto-lock did not engage and that dose rates indicated by his ND-2000A survey instrument at the reel (remote control) remained at approximately 10 mrem/hr. The radiographer then attempted to expose and retract the source to engage the locking mechanism 2 additional times without success.
"At approximately 0156 [EDT], the RSO [(Radiation Safety Officer)] was notified of the inability to retract a Cobalt-60 source into its exposure device. The RSO was able to observe the set up with an inspection mirror from the opposite side of the large part being inspected and determined that the guide tube had become disconnected from the collimator, exposing 10-12 feet of drive cable on the deck, and the source pigtail had become stuck in the collimator.
"After creating and briefing retrieval and contingency plans, source retrieval evolution began at 0640 [EDT]. The RSO Delegate secured the source pigtail in the collimator with a 6 ft long remote handling tool to prevent the source from leaving the collimator prematurely while the RSO stepped out from behind the lead shield with another 6 ft long remote handling tool to move the guide tube from the deck back up to the collimator. While the RSO was straightening out the guide tube and drive cable, a radiography supervisor was slowly retracting the drive cable at the reel to remove the 10-12 ft of drive cable slack on the deck while the RSO communicated via radio. Once the drive cable slack was removed and the RSO guided the guide tube back up to the collimator and tension on the source pigtail was released, the RSO Delegate released control of the source and it was immediately retracted by the radiography supervisor into the exposure device. The source was confirmed to be secured in its device by survey, and the evolution was declared secure at 0649 [EDT].
"RI Radiation Control Agency has investigated the report by Electric Boat Corporation and has determined that this does not have generic implications for the security of sources in radiography equipment at Electric Boat Corporation. The incident is considered closed by RI Radiation Control Agency."
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE UNABLE TO RETRACT
The following was received via e-mail from the Rhode Island Dept. of Health, Radiation Control Agency:
"A licensee, Electric Boat Corporation, reported the inability to retract a 1.62 TBq (43.8 Ci) Co-60 source (QSA Global, Inc. Model A424-14, S/N 81346G) into the radiography exposure device (QSA Global, Inc. Model Sentry 330, S/N P30106) on March 7, 2021, at Electric Boat's Quonset Point Facility. At approximately 0120 [EDT], the [source] was [extended] without any issue.
"At the completion of the exposure, the radiographer attempted to retract the source into the exposure device, and attempted to re-expose the source to verify that the auto-locking mechanism on the Sentry 330 exposure device had engaged. At this time, the radiographer noted that the auto-lock did not engage and that dose rates indicated by his ND-2000A survey instrument at the reel (remote control) remained at approximately 10 mrem/hr. The radiographer then attempted to expose and retract the source to engage the locking mechanism 2 additional times without success.
"At approximately 0156 [EDT], the RSO [(Radiation Safety Officer)] was notified of the inability to retract a Cobalt-60 source into its exposure device. The RSO was able to observe the set up with an inspection mirror from the opposite side of the large part being inspected and determined that the guide tube had become disconnected from the collimator, exposing 10-12 feet of drive cable on the deck, and the source pigtail had become stuck in the collimator.
"After creating and briefing retrieval and contingency plans, source retrieval evolution began at 0640 [EDT]. The RSO Delegate secured the source pigtail in the collimator with a 6 ft long remote handling tool to prevent the source from leaving the collimator prematurely while the RSO stepped out from behind the lead shield with another 6 ft long remote handling tool to move the guide tube from the deck back up to the collimator. While the RSO was straightening out the guide tube and drive cable, a radiography supervisor was slowly retracting the drive cable at the reel to remove the 10-12 ft of drive cable slack on the deck while the RSO communicated via radio. Once the drive cable slack was removed and the RSO guided the guide tube back up to the collimator and tension on the source pigtail was released, the RSO Delegate released control of the source and it was immediately retracted by the radiography supervisor into the exposure device. The source was confirmed to be secured in its device by survey, and the evolution was declared secure at 0649 [EDT].
"RI Radiation Control Agency has investigated the report by Electric Boat Corporation and has determined that this does not have generic implications for the security of sources in radiography equipment at Electric Boat Corporation. The incident is considered closed by RI Radiation Control Agency."
Agreement State
Event Number: 55222
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: The Methodist Hospital
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: L 00457
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Karen Blanchard
HQ OPS Officer: Joanna Bridge
Licensee: The Methodist Hospital
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: L 00457
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Karen Blanchard
HQ OPS Officer: Joanna Bridge
Notification Date: 04/29/2021
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2021
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
PROULX, DAVID (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
PROULX, DAVID (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 5/6/2021
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
The following was received via e-mail from the Texas Department of State Health Services:
"The licensee reported that on April 28, 2021, a medical event involving a High Dose Rate (HDR) afterloader gynocological treatment, using a Varian VariSource iX device, with an iridium-192 sealed source of 6.93 curies, at the time of treatment, had occurred at is facility. The wrong length transfer tube was used which resulted in a dose of 600 centigray, the intended dose fraction, to an area, mostly skin, approximately 12 centimeters from the intended treatment site. The authorized user does not expect any harm to the patient. The patient has been informed. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9843
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
The following was received via e-mail from the Texas Department of State Health Services:
"The licensee reported that on April 28, 2021, a medical event involving a High Dose Rate (HDR) afterloader gynocological treatment, using a Varian VariSource iX device, with an iridium-192 sealed source of 6.93 curies, at the time of treatment, had occurred at is facility. The wrong length transfer tube was used which resulted in a dose of 600 centigray, the intended dose fraction, to an area, mostly skin, approximately 12 centimeters from the intended treatment site. The authorized user does not expect any harm to the patient. The patient has been informed. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9843
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55235
Facility: Diablo Canyon
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Don Townsend
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Don Townsend
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Notification Date: 05/05/2021
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2021
Event Time: 21:39 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2021
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2021
Event Time: 21:39 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
DEESE, RICK (R4)
FFD GROUP, (EMAIL)
DEESE, RICK (R4)
FFD GROUP, (EMAIL)
Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.