Event Notification Report for July 12, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/11/2002 - 07/12/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39046 39049 39051 39053
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39046 |
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| REP ORG: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/08/2002|
|LICENSEE: PERKIT FOLDING BOX CORP |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:27[EDT]|
| CITY: BOSTON REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 06/19/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: MA |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/08/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BRIAN MCDERMOTT R1 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KENATH TRAEDGE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| MISSING THICKNESS MEASURING GAUGE |
| |
| On 07/08/02 Mayo Construction company notified the Massachusetts Radiation |
| Control Program that a 50 millicurie Sr-90 thickness paper measuring gauge |
| has been missing since April/May of this year. It is believed that it was |
| sent out as scrap metal to the Prolerized New England scrapyard which is |
| located in Everett, MA. Mayo Construction company recently acquired Perkit |
| Folding Box Corp, which had the general license for the missing gauge and |
| they were unaware of the thickness measuring gauge. The gauge manufacturer |
| is Fife\DMC\Radiometry of Gaithersburg, Md. The source was manufactured by |
| Amersham. The source was installed in a C-ARM type gauge in 1991 by |
| TechControl of Mountain City, Georgia. The gauge is contained in a black |
| box measuring 4"x11"x11" and it is labeled on the outside as containing |
| radioactive material. The serial number on the gauge is 2412BC. Radiation |
| levels on the outside of the gauge with its shutter closed is 40 to 50 |
| milliRad/hr. Prolerized New England scrapyard has been notified and the |
| licensee is still searching for the missing gauge. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39049 |
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| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/10/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:26[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/09/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:04[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KOTTENSTETTE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 94 Power Operation |94 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE DILUTION NITROGEN INVENTORY NOT MEETING TS
|
| REQUIREMENTS |
| |
| During routine daily instrument checks on July 9, 2002, the control room |
| operator found the Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) Nitrogen inventory |
| just above the Technical Specification required inventory line of 67,000 scf |
| (2150 psig and 90�F). The previous day instrument check had the CAD |
| nitrogen inventory at 2250 psig and 94�F (approximately 69,000 scf). |
| |
| An operator was dispatched to the CAD compressor building to raise nitrogen |
| pressure by operating the CAD compressor. As the in-plant operator was |
| starting the CAD compressor, the control room operator again checked the |
| pressure and temperature of the CAD storage bottles and found that it fell |
| just below the require 67,000 scf line (2110 psig and 84�F). The startup of |
| the CAD compressor requires the draining of the suction receiver and opening |
| of the suction and discharge valves. This process consumed enough nitrogen |
| inventory to go below the Technical Specification value of 67,000 scf. |
| |
| At 2304, the CAD system was declared inoperable per Technical Specification |
| 3.6.3.1. A and a seven day LCO entered. The CAD compressor was operated to |
| restore CAD nitrogen volume and the CAD LCO was exited at 2330 when CAD |
| inventory was greater than the required Technical Specification of 67,000 |
| scf. |
| |
| During subsequent investigation, it had been determined that surveillance NS |
| 730301, Functional Check and Calibration of Containment Atmosphere Dilution |
| System had been performed during the dayshift on July 9, 2002. During this |
| surveillance, it performs a functional check of the CAD system by performing |
| a flow of nitrogen from the CAD bottles through a test rig thus using a |
| portion of the CAD nitrogen inventory. At the completion of the |
| surveillance, the check of the CAD nitrogen inventory was just above the |
| Technical Specification line. The surveillance was completed at 1404 and at |
| that time no action was undertaken to restore margin to the CAD nitrogen |
| inventory Technical Specification requirement. |
| |
| The NRC resident Inspector was notified |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39051 |
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| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:00[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 07/11/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:41[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MACLENNAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 82 Power Operation |80 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| INITIATION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM 82% AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.0.3 |
| |
| It was determined that reasonable assurance of continued operability of |
| Safety System Components associated with Unit 2 steam lines could not be |
| supported. They had noticed perturbations since the beginning of June |
| indicating a problem with their steam separators. They have since had an |
| operability and loose parts evaluation for this and recently experienced |
| another perturbation that's calling into question the loose parts |
| evaluations. Therefore, the licensee is assuming that there may be a loose |
| parts problem, so they have commenced plant shutdown at 0241 and are to be |
| in hot shutdown in 12 hrs and cold shutdown in 36 hrs. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39053 |
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| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/11/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:02[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 07/11/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PHILIP J. NORTH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANNE BOLAND R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| DISCOVERY THAT THE ALTERNATE POST-LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA)
BORATION |
| DILUTION FLOW PATH FOR ALL UNITS IS OPENED IF THE PRIMARY PATH FAILS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Event: At 1800 hours on 7/11/02, a review of the small break LOCA |
| mitigation section of the [emergency operating procedure (EOP)] determined |
| that the alternate post-LOCA boron dilution flow path for all units is |
| opened if the primary path fails. This alternate flow path was designed to |
| be opened during a large break LOCA. Current analyses do not exist to |
| support opening the flow path under elevated [reactor coolant system] |
| pressures. With this being the case, execution of the EOP during a [small |
| break LOCA] could open the alternate flow path under conditions that may |
| potentially degrade portions of the [low pressure injection (LPI)] system |
| (e.g. [reactor building emergency sump] screen, LPI pump). Since analyses |
| do not exist to support operation of the flow path under elevated pressures, |
| this condition is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)v." |
| |
| "Initial Safety Significance: The potential safety significance of this |
| issue is that opening the alternate boron dilution flow path under elevated |
| pressures could adversely impact the reactor building emergency sump. This |
| flow path would only be opened following a single failure of the primary |
| path. Oconee is conservatively reporting this condition. Analyses are |
| being performed to determine whether the EOP guidance related to opening |
| this flow path could have impaired sump recirculation." |
| |
| "Corrective Action(s): Guidance has been provided to the operating shifts |
| to not open the alternate flow path. An EOP change will be expeditiously |
| made to resolve this procedural issue." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021