Event Notification Report for October 2, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/01/2001 - 10/02/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38316 38333 38334 38335 38336 38337
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38316 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:28[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/25/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RITCHIE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 4-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "At 0930, uranium bearing material was observed in the interior spaces of a |
| block wall in the X-705 recovery area the openings leading to the interior |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA |
| 0705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential |
| collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) |
| amount of uranium bearing material that was spilled (at some time in the |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature one of |
| NCSA 0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system |
| piping this would represent a loss of the second leg as defined in NCSE |
| 0705_076.E03." |
| |
| "Measurements are being conducted and are ongoing to determine amount of |
| material, which may affect this report." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is |
| potentially high (at this time) because the exact amount of Uranium bearing |
| material that could have entered the opening in the block wall is unknown. |
| Measurements to quantify the material are in progress. The apparent block |
| wall construction (as evidenced by visual inspection of wall openings in the |
| other areas of Recovery) indicates the potential for the presence of |
| unfavorable geometry voids within and between the blocks compromising the |
| exterior building wall." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): If 1) a significant amount of uranium bearing |
| material entered the void spaces of the block wall, 2) the material has |
| collected in the multiple voids resulting in a single unfavorable geometry |
| configuration, 3) the material has a high enrichment and uranium |
| concentration, and 4) the material would become sufficiently moderated, then |
| a potentially critical configuration could result. Note that no spills or |
| leaks of uranium bearing material from present X-705 systems has occurred at |
| this time. The material in question has apparently been there for some |
| time." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| Double contingency for inadvertent containers relies upon the physical |
| integrity of X-705 piping to prevent a spill of an unsafe amount of |
| material. An unsafe amount is defined by the concentration and enrichment |
| of the material. Double contingency also relies upon administrative |
| controls limiting the presence of unfavorable geometry or unsafe volume |
| containers that could collect a spill or leak." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): Unknown at this time. Enrichment |
| could be greater than 90% based upon historical operations. The form is |
| most likely uranyl nitrate or UO2F2. Measurements for determination of mass |
| and assay are currently in progress." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The openings leading to the interior |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of |
| NCSA.705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential |
| collection area is unknown. This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03. The presence of an unknown (at this time) |
| amount of uranium bearing material that has spilled (at some time in the |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature 1 of |
| NCSA-0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system |
| piping. This would represent a loss of the second leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Samples of the material have been taken and DNA measurements will be taken |
| to determine amounts of material and assay." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be |
| notified. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM JIM McCLEERY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1942 ON 09/27/01 ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "Conservative NDA analysis of the area near column A-16 indicates a total |
| maximum mass of 225+/-113 grams 235U with an enrichment of 8.2% is present |
| (preliminary NDA analysis reported less conservative values), which is less |
| than the safe mass limit for uranium. Investigations to determine the |
| extent of condition have identified three additional areas of potential |
| concern in X-705 Recovery. These areas are: the wall near the A-loop |
| overflow column, the wall adjacent to the Calciner system, and the wall near |
| the top of the B-38 storage columns. Each of these areas has received |
| preliminary scans via NDA analysis to determine the potential for uranium |
| material holdup in the block walls. Preliminary results indicate that the |
| amount of material, if any, in the wall near the A-loop overflow and near |
| the Calciner are bounded by the amount quantified near column A-6. More |
| detailed [quantitative] NDA scans for these two locations (to differentiate |
| between surface contamination, uranium holdup, and background) are currently |
| in progress and will be reported when available. Preliminary results |
| indicate that no material is suspect in the wall near the B-38 storage |
| column (near background readings). Additional NDA scans are currently in |
| progress to locate any other potential areas of concern in the Recovery |
| Area. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is |
| now low because the amount of uranium bearing material that entered the |
| openings in the block wall is known to be less that 338 grams 235U which is |
| less than the safe mass limit for uranium." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips) and NMSS EO (Holahan). |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM MIKE RITCHIE TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1626 ON 10/01/01 ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "More detailed quantitative NDA scans for the wall near the A-loop overflow |
| column indicate a total maximum mass of 92+/-46 grams 235U with an |
| enrichment of 86% is present (less than a safe mass). Quantitative NDA |
| scans for the wall adjacent to the Calciner system indicate a total maximum |
| mass of 201+/-101 grams 235U with an enrichment of 5.3% (also less than a |
| safe mass). It should be noted that these results incorporate conservative |
| assumptions about the distribution of uranium bearing material in the wall |
| matrix, and total amount of uranium present may be found to be much less |
| upon final disposition." |
| |
| "Preliminary results indicate that no material is suspected in the wall near |
| the B-38 storage column (near background readings): therefore, |
| quantification was not performed in this area." |
| |
| "Safe mass at 100% enrichment is 350 grams 235U, and safe mass at 10% |
| enrichment is 600 grams 235U." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Brown). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38333 |
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| FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
| UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:41[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/28/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HERRIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |VERN HODGE NRR |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PART 21 INVOLVING UNACCEPTABLE INSPECTION SERVICES |
| |
| On August 24, 2001, FPC personnel performed a water test on spare |
| safety-related Decay Heat Raw Water System pump RWP-3A to determine whether |
| the lip seal was installed correctly. This test was not part of an FPC |
| receipt inspection. No bearing flush/lubricating water flow was observed |
| coming from the pump. Upon disassembly of the pump bowl, FPC personnel |
| confirmed that the lip seal was installed incorrectly. |
| |
| In 1999, spare RWP-3A pump was rebuilt by Tampa Armature Works under |
| Purchase Order No. F742538K. FPC contracted Raytheon (Contract Number |
| NO1067AD) to oversee the RWP-3A rebuilding activities and ensure, through |
| inspection, that the work was performed in accordance with the Raytheon 10 |
| CFR Part 50, Appendix B, QA Program. The shop traveler provided to Tampa |
| Armature Works by FPC included a detailed sketch and specific guidance with |
| respect to the orientation of the pump lip seal. In February 2000, Tampa |
| Armature Works signed off on and Raytheon Inspector 21 stamped Shop Traveler |
| Line Item #30A attesting to the correct orientation of the lip seal even |
| though the lip seal was not installed correctly. The rebuilt pump was |
| subsequently delivered to FPC. |
| |
| FPC considers the above condition to be reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 |
| as a defect associated with a substantial safety hazard. |
| |
| 10 CFR 21.3 states, in part, that a defect means a deviation in a basic |
| component delivered to a purchaser for use in a facility or activity subject |
| to 10 CFR Part 21 if, on the basis of an evaluation, the deviation could |
| create a substantial safety hazard. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the vendor were notified. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38334 |
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| REP ORG: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
|LICENSEE: TASK LABORATORIES INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:07[EDT]|
| CITY: MIAMI REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 09/28/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 11:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 0752-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER R2 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ADAMS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
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| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| TROXLER GAUGE WAS STOLEN FROM STATE OF FLORIDA LICENSEE |
| |
| A truck with a Troxler gauge (8mCi Cs-137 and 40mCi Be:Am-241) in a |
| transport case chained to the bed was left unattended in the parking lot. |
| When an employee returned at 11:30 a.m., the gauge was missing. The padlock |
| on the transport case had been cut and the gauge was gone. The transport |
| case and the keys were not taken. Law enforcement and the Florida Bureau of |
| Radiation Control are investigating. NRC Region II has been notified. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38335 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:59[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/01/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 02:00[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TONY HUDSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| ACTIVATION OF THE HIGH VOLTAGE UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM DUE TO A UF6 |
| LEAK TO ATMOSPHERE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah |
| personnel: |
| |
| "At 0200 CDT, on 10-01-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of an |
| activation of the High Voltage UF6 Release Detection System at the C-315 |
| Tails Withdrawal Building. Two UF6 detector heads had alarmed due to a UF6 |
| leak to atmosphere from the rupture disc assembly for the 'B' UF6 |
| accumulator. Operations isolated and pulled down the affected system. The |
| Plant Emergency Squad responded and closed the rupture disc isolation |
| valves. High volume air samples were taken with negative results. Health |
| Physics surveyed the area in C-315 and determined that contamination was |
| limited to the housing near the accumulator. The C-315 building was then |
| released to operations with controls on the area of contamination." |
| |
| "This event is reportable to the NRC per the Safety Analysis Report, section |
| 6.9, table 1, criteria J.2, safety system actuation due to a valid signal as |
| a 24-hour event notification." |
| |
| "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." |
| |
| "PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-01-5077; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2001-040; |
| Event Worksheet: [38335] |
| Responsible Division; Operation." |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 2105 EDT ON 10/01/01 |
| ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah |
| personnel: |
| |
| "Further investigation determined that the UF6 was released from a tube that |
| connected the rupture disc assembly to a calibration buggy. The connection |
| tube had come in contact with a heater that melted a section of the tube |
| allowing the UF6 release." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (David Hills) and NMSS EO (Patricia Holahan). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38336 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:14[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 10/01/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT AYER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING OUTFALL STRUCTURE SAMPLES IN EXCESS OF |
| RELEASE LIMITS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee. |
| |
| "Injection of [a] microbiological agent commenced at 1140 hours to treat the |
| station raw water systems for Zebra Mussel infestation. [The] agent used |
| was Spectrus CT-1300 (Clamtrol). Injection was being made at the station |
| intake structure, and [a] detoxification agent was being added at the |
| outfall structure prior to returning to Lake Erie. At 1600 hours, it was |
| discovered that samples taken at the outfall structure indicated |
| concentration of this chemical of 0.35 ppm which is in excess of the release |
| limit of 0.04 ppm contained in the Chemical Permit. This event requires |
| notification of the US EPA. [The] feed rate of the Clamtrol was decreased, |
| and [the] feed rate of the detoxification agent was increased. Injection of |
| the chemical was terminated at approximately 1740 hours. Sampling is |
| continuing to determine when compliance with the Chemical Permit is |
| reestablished." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the US |
| EPA. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38337 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:14[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 10/01/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT AYER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/01/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL VIOLATION |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee. |
| |
| "This report is being made in accordance with Perry Nuclear Power Plant |
| (PNPP) Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.F, as a potential violation of |
| the Maximum Power Level of 3758 [MWth] as described in License Condition |
| 2.C(1)." |
| |
| "General Electric (GE) report titled, 'Impact of Steam Carryover Fraction on |
| Process Computer Heat Balance Calculations, September 2001,' documents a |
| non-conservative assumption for moisture (carryover) used in the calculation |
| of core thermal power. The assumed carryover fraction of 0.1% was |
| discovered to be closer to 0.0% (non-conservative) in later model GE BWRs." |
| |
| "Following initial review by PNPP staff, moisture carryover has not been |
| tested at Perry since the initial startup test program, and the plant was |
| potentially affected by the non-conservative core thermal power calculation |
| results presented by GE. The plant is unable to perform carryover testing |
| at this time to provide a more accurate MWth bias; therefore, until testing |
| can be accomplished a conservative 3 MWth bias is suspected. Additionally, |
| the plant staff continues to investigate the overall effect of the moisture |
| carryover term within the Heat Balance equation." |
| |
| "PNPP Unit 1 has an administrative 8-hour average power limit of 3754 MWth |
| (reactor power reduction of 4 MWth) that was conservatively implemented on |
| 09/20/01 when the plant initially identified the potential concern in the |
| corrective action program." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| (Refer to event #38330 for a similar event at Fermi.) |
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