Event Notification Report for January 12, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           01/11/2000 - 01/12/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36579  36580  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36579       |
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| FACILITY: WNP-2                    REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:47[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-5                             |EVENT DATE:        01/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:50[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN SIMS                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JEFF SHACKELFORD     R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v)      OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 1-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING THE LOSS OF THE DEDICATED LAND LINES TO STATE/LOCAL  |
| AGENCIES FOR REASONS UNKNOWN.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "THE DEDICATED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION LINK TO STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES IS   |
| LOST.  NO PROJECTED TIME OF REPAIR."                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES AND WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT  |
| INSPECTOR.                                                                   |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36580       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:26[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        01/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:52[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE WHEELER                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JEFF SHACKELFORD     R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| POSTULATED CONDUCTOR-TO-CONDUCTOR SHORT IN FIRE PUMP CONTROL CIRCUITRY COULD |
| INHIBIT THE ABILITY OF THE PLANT TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN FOLLOWING A FIRE.       |
|                                                                              |
| "During preparation of the permanent plant modification to replace a         |
| Temporary Modification associated with LER 96-009-03, another configuration  |
| was found that could inhibit the ability of the plant to safely shutdown     |
| following a fire. For an Alternate Shutdown Fire (10 CFR 50 Appendix R       |
| Section III.L) in the Cable Spreading Room fire area, the Diesel Fire pump   |
| is relied upon to provide emergency backup gland seal water to the essential |
| service water pumps. A fire scenario in the cable spreading room assumes of  |
| a loss of offsite power (which disables the normal gland water supply) as    |
| well as concurrent hot shorts which disable the emergency gland seal water   |
| supply MOV's (because their control cables are routed through the Cable      |
| Spreading Room). A multi-conductor cable located in the Cable Spreading Room |
| carries 24 VDC start control circuits and 120 VAC annunciator power          |
| circuits. The postulated fire scenario requires the assumption that the fire |
| could cause a conductor to conductor short within this cable such that the   |
| 24 VDC circuits would be energized by the 120 VAC power. This would disable  |
| the automatic starting capability of the diesel fire pump (the currently     |
| credited emergency backup gland seat water).  A fire watch has been posted   |
| in the Cable Spreading Room as a compensatory measure. The Cable Spreading   |
| Room fire area is the only fire area affected by this configuration. The     |
| operator's ability to recognize and correct a loss of gland water to the     |
| Service Water pumps would not be impaired. Sufficient procedural guidance is |
| provided for the post-fire restoration of the essential service water pumps  |
| such that loss of gland seal water would have been detected prior to service |
| water pump damage. Fire fighting activities would have immediately indicated |
| loss of the fire pump. A modification to separate the starting circuits from |
| the power circuits is being pursued. CNS has conservatively concluded that   |
| this postulated scenario is reportable under 10CFR50. 72(b)(2)(iii)(A).      |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."                              |
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