Event Notification Report for December 7, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/06/1999 - 12/07/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36438 36489 36490 36491
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36438 |
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| FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/15/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:32[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 11/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARTY MCADORY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/06/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BILL JONES R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| DIVISION 1 AND 2 DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE. |
| |
| Approximately 20 hours after restoring the Division 1 Diesel Generator (DG) |
| to service and removing the Division 2 DG from service for outage work, the |
| Division 1 Load Shedding and Sequencing (LSS) failed. This resulted in the |
| Division 1 DG being declared inoperable because of its inability to meet the |
| required surveillance tests. The Division 1 DG is capable of operating and |
| supplying the ESF bus manually. |
| |
| The Division 2 DG has test equipment installed to allow ECCS testing. The |
| Division 2 DG is considered functional but not operable with the test |
| equipment installed. The licensee is reviewing Division 2 equipment status |
| to determine if Division 2 was fully operable, and if so, this notification |
| will be retracted. |
| |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| *************** UPDATE AT 2256 EST ON 12/06/99 FROM BOB CARROLL TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE *************** |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this notification. The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "After further investigation, we are retracting the 4-hour call-in, which |
| was made on 11/15/99 regarding the loss of [the Division] I Load Shedding |
| and Sequencing (LSS) power supply. The initial evaluation conservatively |
| considered [the Division] Il Diesel Generator (DG) [inoperable] due to the |
| installation of test equipment in preparation for [Division] II surveillance |
| testing. It has now been concluded, that even with the surveillance test |
| equipment installed, [the Division] II DG was still capable of timely and |
| correct automatic operation, [it] was [also] capable of performing its |
| safety function for the duration required, and there was no reason to expect |
| that [the Division] II DG would not have fulfilled its safety function if |
| the need had arisen. We have determined that all other redundant trains |
| needed to perform the required safety functions as discussed in NUREG-1022, |
| Rev. 1, were operable and available. Therefore, we conclude that loss of |
| the [Division] I LSS power supply did not meet the notification requirements |
| of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)." |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R4DO (Andrews). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36489 |
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| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/06/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:07[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK ABRAMSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/06/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| STEAM LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM DOES NOT MEET LICENSING BASIS. |
| |
| "The JAF [James A. Fitzpatrick] Licensing Basis states the steam leak |
| detection system will be able to detect a 7-gpm steam leak for areas outside |
| containment. The basis for the 7-gpm criteria is to detect and isolate a |
| leak before the [pipe] crack propagates to a critical point beyond which the |
| pipe is assumed to fail. These values are established for a |
| (representative) 3-inch diameter pipe. |
| |
| "Preliminary engineering analysis has concluded the JAF steam leak detection |
| system cannot meet this 7-gpm criterion. Preliminary engineering analysis |
| was also performed using 25 gpm as a criterion. 25 gpm is a criterion |
| established by the NSSS vendor for detecting and isolating a leak before the |
| [pipe] crack propagates to a critical point on other BWR designs and which, |
| it is believed, can be technically applied to JAF. The 25-gpm value is also |
| established for a (representative) 3-inch diameter pipe. |
| |
| "The JAF steam leak detection system is capable of detecting the 25-gpm leak |
| in most areas. For those areas which the system cannot detect a 25-gpm |
| leak, the system is considered operable because in some cases, the actual |
| pipe diameter is greater than 3 inches. It is believed that leakage rate, |
| crack size, and critical crack size are directly proportional. In other |
| cases, the combination of conservative assumptions (initial temperature |
| condition and margin beyond instrument uncertainty) provides a basis for |
| operability." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36490 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| REP ORG: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/06/1999|
|LICENSEE: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:05[EST]|
| CITY: UNVERSITY PARK REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 11/09/1999|
| COUNTY: CENTRE STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: 37-00185-04 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/06/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1 |
| |JOSEPHINE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC BOELDT |LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH NRR |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE |MARVIN MENDONCA PM |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OR THEFT OF SIX TO EIGHT SELF-LUMINESCENT EXIT SIGNS (POTENTIALLY |
| TRITIUM FILLED) FROM THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY NEW KENSINGTON CAMPUS |
| IN 1997 |
| |
| On November 9, 1999, a maintenance foreman at the Pennsylvania State |
| University New Kensington Campus (located approximately 40 miles north of |
| Pittsburgh) notified Nuclear Radiation Development (located in University |
| Park, Centre County) of the disappearance of approximately six to eight |
| self-luminescent exit signs from a New Kensington facility. The signs were |
| first noticed to be missing some time in 1997, and the individual who |
| initially discovered the loss thought that students from an apartment |
| complex may have taken them because the signs were ripped down from the |
| walls at night or over a weekend. This individual wanted to conduct a |
| search of the apartments but was told to drop the issue by another |
| individual at the New Kensington Campus. |
| |
| The licensee stated that six new signs were purchased during May of 1998, |
| and six additional signs were recently installed. (Only six or eight are |
| missing, and extra signs have been installed.) The need to notify Nuclear |
| Radiation Development was identified when the new signs were recently |
| installed. |
| |
| The missing exit signs were initially installed during new construction in |
| July of 1989. They were manufactured by Perm-Ex (Series P-160, Model |
| T-4001, self-luminous type containing nuclear material). It is currently |
| believed that the exit signs were tritium filled. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC region 1 office (Jim Dwyer and Sattar Lodhi) |
| and plans to submit a 30-day written report to the regional office. (Call |
| the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.) |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36491 |
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| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/06/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:48[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:33[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM MORRIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/06/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS ANDREWS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR REPORT REGARDING A VIOLATION OF A LICENSE CONDITION - UNIT 1, TRAIN |
| 'B,' FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR GREATER THAN 7 |
| DAYS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Carbon samples obtained from the fuel handling building exhaust air system |
| train 'B' failed laboratory tests. The Technical Specification Surveillance |
| Requirement 4.7.8.b.2 and 4.9.12.b.2 limit of 1% for methyl iodide |
| penetration was exceeded. The as-found methyl iodide penetration results |
| were 2.91%. This results in the train 'B' fuel handling building exhaust |
| air system being inoperable since the time that the carbon samples were |
| obtained on November 22, 1999, at 0930 hours [CST]. Thus, the train was |
| inoperable for greater than 7 days, which is a violation of Technical |
| Specification 3.7.8. The sample results were received on December 6, |
| 1999." |
| |
| "This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, |
| Condition 2.G, for operation or condition prohibited by technical |
| specifications." |
| |
| The licensee stated that there was nothing unusual or not understood and |
| that all systems functioned as required. The licensee also stated that a |
| 7-day technical specification limiting condition for operation was entered |
| at 1233 CST today as a result of this issue. The licensee plans to replace |
| the charcoal. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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