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Reliability and PRA Subcommittee

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

(ACRS)

+ + + + +

RELIABILITY AND PRA SUBCOMMITTEE

+ + + + +

THURSDAY

AUGUST 24, 2017

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ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

+ + + + +

The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., John W. Stetkar, Chairman, presiding.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

JOHN W. STETKAR, Chairman

RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member

DENNIS C. BLEY, Member

CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member

WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member

JOSE MARCH-LEUBA, Member

DANA A. POWERS, Member

JOY REMPE, Member

PETER RICCARDELLA, Member*

GORDON R. SKILLMAN, Member

MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member

DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:

QUYNH NGUYEN

ALSO PRESENT:

MICHAEL CHEOK, RES

MARY DROUIN, RES

JOSEPH GIITTER, NRR

DONNIE HARRISON, NMSS

GREG KRIEGER, NEI

JOHN NAKOSKI, RES

HOUMAN RASOULI, RES

MARK THAGGARD, RES

ANDREA D. VEIL, Executive Director, ACRS

*Present via telephone

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Τ	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(8:32 a.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The meeting will come
4	to order.
5	This is a continuation of the
6	Reliability and PRA Subcommittee of the Advisory
7	Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
8	I am John Stetkar, Chairman of the
9	subcommittee meeting.
10	ACRS members in attendance are Ron
11	Ballinger, Matt Sunseri, Dick Skillman, Dana Powers,
12	Dennis Bley, Jose March-Leuba, Walt Kirchner, and
13	Joy Rempe. I believe that we also have Pete
14	Riccardella on the phone line, and I'm not sure
15	whether we'll be joined by Mike Corradini. They are
16	joining us by phone.
17	Quynh Nguyen of the ACRS staff is the
18	designated federal official for this meeting.
19	The subcommittee will hear the staff's
20	presentation on the planned update to Regulatory
21	Guide 1.174. The subcommittee will gather
22	information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and
23	formulate proposed positions and actions, as
24	appropriate, for deliberation by the full committee.

The ACRS was established by state and is

governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act. This means that the committee can only speak through its published letter reports. We hold meetings to gather information to support our deliberations. Interested parties who wish to provide comments can contact our offices requesting time after the meeting announcement is published in the Federal Register.

That said, we also set aside some time for spur-of-the-moment comments from members of the public attending or listening to our meetings.

Written comments are also welcome.

The ACRS section of the U.S. NRC public website provides charter, bylaws, our reports, and full transcripts of all full committee subcommittee meetings, including slides and the meetings. The rules for presented at participation in today's meeting were previously announced in the Federal Register. We have received no written comments or requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's meeting.

We have a bridge line established for interested members of the public to listen in. To preclude interruption of the meeting, the phone

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bridge line will be replaced -- I was trying to do two things at once here, and it just doesn't work. To preclude interruption of the meeting, the phone bridge line will be placed in a listen-in mode during the presentations the committee and We will unmute the bridge line at the discussions. of the meeting to afford the public end an opportunity to make a statement provide orto comments.

At this time, I request that the meeting attendees and participants silence your cell phones and any other electronic devices that may make little sounds and disturb us.

A transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be made available as stated in the Federal Register Notice. Therefore, we request that participants in this meeting use the microphones located throughout the meeting room when addressing the subcommittee. The participants should first identify themselves, and speak with sufficient clarity and volume, so that they may be readily heard.

Make sure that the green light on the microphone is on when you're speaking up front there, and please turn it off when you're not

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1 speaking because the extraneous noise makes it difficult for both our transcript and also folks on 2 the bridge line. 3 We will now call -- proceed with the 4 5 meeting, and I call upon Mike Cheok. Mike, do you want to make some introductory statements? 6 Well, 7 MR. CHEOK: good morning, thank you for the opportunity to come brief you all 8 9 on the staff progress in revising Reg Guide 1.174. I am Mike Cheok, and I'm the director 10 for the Division of Risk Analysis in the Office of 11 12 Research. Our presenters today will be Mary Drouin 13 from Research and Donnie Harrison from NMSS. 14 Joe Giitter, my counterpart from NRR, is sitting 15 16 right beside me, and Marty Stutzke from NRO 17 somewhere in the audience. 18 The presence of all the staff from all 19 of these offices reflects that the task to revise Reg Guide 1.174 is indeed an interoffice effort. 20 21 I will spend a couple of minutes to 22 provide some context for our discussions today. 23 First, the scope for the revision of -- for Revision 24 3 to Reg Guide 1.174 is focused on revising the

defense-in-depth guidance, so that it is implemented

consistently. This is in accordance to Commission guidance which initiated this effort to begin with.

We have been sensitive to any expansion to the scope of the reg guide. However, based on public and ACRS comments, we have made some clarifications to the quidance on items not related to defense-in-depth. For example, we revised the acceptance quidance figures, and we added language on risk aggregation and uncertainties and dealing uncertainties. Т will note with t.hat. these clarifications and additions were on issues that do not involve changes to the NRC policy or positions.

Second, in 2016, we had a deferring professional opinion, or DPO, on the use terms that describe PRA acceptability. The documented the inconsistent use of terms such as PRA technical adequacy, PRA quality, PRA and applicability. This DPO was resolved in October resolution, 2016, and consistent with the will Guide 1.174 to Reg use the term PRA acceptability rather than a term such as PRA quality and technical adequately.

We are developing a regulatory information summary, or RIS, to communicate to NRC staff and to the public the meaning and intent of

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the terminology changes. We plan to make this RIS available for public comment in the near future.

Third, as I mentioned, we had an interoffice working group formed for this effort. In 2016 alone, the working group held multiple public interactions, including three public meetings, two briefings of this subcommittee, and two public meetings of the risk-informed steering committee.

We then published Revision 3, the draft of Revision 3, for Reg Guide 1.174 for public comment earlier this year. We have incorporated the majority of stakeholder comments into the revised reg guide. However, not all comments were implemented. In some cases, we determined that the suggested change was outside the intended scope of the reg guide.

In a few cases, we thought that the comments were not inconsistent with the agency's position. In some of the cases, although we supported the intent of the comment, we did not implement the comment into the reg guide. For example, there was a suggestion to revise Branch Technical Position 8-8, so that it is consistent with Reg Guide 1.174.

NRC agrees with the comment that the BTP 8-8 needs clarity, and we are in the process of revising the BTP. However, we do not believe that the reg guide itself needs to contain the prescriptive language recommended by the commenter.

Mary and Donnie will discuss the resolution of comments in more detail during the presentation, but first I will turn the mic over to Joe Giitter.

MR. GIITTER: Thank you, Mike. As one of the customers of the revised reg guide, I would like to first express my appreciation for the work that has been done by the staff, as well as the thoughtful comments that we received from industry. In NRR, we are on the cusp of meaningful change in how we use risk insights on a day-to-day basis. As you will hear from Mary and Donnie, this reg guide has a number of improvements that will help the guide -- that will help guide the industry and the staff as they attempt to apply risk insights on a regular basis.

For example, the draft guide places greater emphasis on how risk insights can be used to better understand how the defense-in-depth philosophy may be considered. Defense-in-depth is

one of the issues at the forefront of the decision to allow the Palo Verde plant to operate for an extended period of time with one emergency diesel generator unavailable.

The NRC Branch Technical Position 8-8 states that an alternate AC source can be brought in as a defense-in-depth measure to extend the allowed outage time up to 14 days with some compensatory measures.

Palo Verde pre-states three flux diesels that were capable of handling the loads associated the dominant accident sequences, blackout, purely as defense-in-depth station а while these diesels measure. So may effective for design base of a loss of coolant accident coincident with the loss of offsite power, they could provide protection against accidents that were much more likely to occur. The balancing of risk insights with the defense-in-depth philosophy facilitated this decision-making process.

So, with that, I'm going to ask Mary and Donnie to go ahead and start with their presentation.

MEMBER SKILLMAN: Joe, before we do that, may I ask you a question, please?

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1	MR. GIITTER: Yes.
2	MEMBER SKILLMAN: I'm Dick Skillman.
3	MR. GIITTER: Yes.
4	MEMBER SKILLMAN: You said NRR is on the
5	cusp. That suggests to me a change
6	MR. GIITTER: Yes.
7	MEMBER SKILLMAN: that something is
8	laying just ahead where there is going to be either
9	a change in cadence, a change in thinking, a change
10	in rulemaking, a change in enforcement. What is it
11	that you referred to when you say, "We're on the
12	cusp of change of change "?
13	MR. GIITTER: I would like and maybe
14	I'm optimistic on that but I would like to say
15	that we're on the cusp of change in terms of our
16	thinking and risk-informed decision-making. And,
17	you know, maybe at some future point in time we can
18	come and talk to the subcommittee about some of the
19	things that we're working on.
20	But we're starting to to just give
21	you an example, in our licensing reviews that are
22	risk-informed, or have any risk whatsoever, we are -
23	- instead of in the past we would have individual
24	technical members of the different divisions work on

their input, send it over to the Division of

1 Operating Reactors, and then the project manager 2 would have to integrate that. We're not doing that 3 anymore. 4 We're working on in team 5 environments, so that the PRA practitioners working alongside with the electrical engineers or 6 system engineers, so that when the safety evaluation 7 8 report is complete it's one product that goes to -and it -- you have the benefit of learning on both 9 And we believe that that is essential for 10 sides. 11 the risk-informed thinking to migrate from -- from 12 particular organization across the one 13 organization. 14 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you, Joe. 15 you. 16 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Anything more for 17 Mike or Joe? If not, Mary, it's yours. 18 MS. DROUIN: Okay. As you can see, I'm 19 not Anders Gilbertson. He is the chair of the 20 working group and could not be here today. 21 off looking at the solar eclipse where I'm sure a 22 lot of us would have loved to have seen. 23 But before we get started, I certainly 24 would like to acknowledge, you know, the members of 25 the working group because they're all here. You

know, there's myself and Donnie, and we've got Matty, Don, Marty, and CJ, and the whole working group, as you know, it has been a very concerted effort, very congenial group, and everybody has worked hard, and so I wanted to make sure they got acknowledgement for it.

Okay. So for today, we are going to not spend a whole lot of time, but just, you know, the background and the process that we used in modifying the reg guide, what our recent accomplishments have been, the actual modifications we have made to the reg guide, and go through two sets of public comments, because we had a set of public comments back in 2012, and then the recent set of comments that we got several months ago, and then what our path forward is from all of that.

So, on Slide 3, you know, we had an SRM that came out in 2011 that did ask us to revise the defense-in-depth part of the reg guide. And if you remember, if you go back to Rev. 2, you know, it tells you that you want to maintain the principle of defense-in-depth, and it just lists seven bullets, and that's all there is.

And so not that that has been a major impediment to Reg Guide 1.174, but it did cause some

1	confusion and different interpretations of what we
2	meant by each one of these bullets. So we did have
3	a draft that was published in 2012, but at that same
4	time we had NTTF occurred, and we had RMRF, and
5	both of those two efforts were dealing also with
6	defense-in-depth.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Mary, just for the
8	benefit of because it's a public transcript,
9	could you define those acronyms?
10	MS. DROUIN: Oh, sorry. Near-Term Task
11	Force for NTTF. Sometimes you get so used to
12	acronyms you forget what they stand for.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's right. And
14	RMTF?
15	MS. DROUIN: And RMTF is Risk Management
16	Task Force.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you.
18	MS. DROUIN: So those were NTTF had a
19	bunch of recommendations, and they dealt with not
20	all of them, but it did deal with defense-in-depth;
21	and RMRF, that was one of the biggest
22	recommendations was what to do with defense-in-
23	depth.
24	So we felt that it was important to wait
25	and hear what the Commission was going to tell us to

do in response to those efforts on defense-in-depth and then that would help us on Reg Guide 1.174. We thought if we moved forward we would be putting the cart before the horse. So, you know, it was delayed, and so at that point in time we did not respond to the public comments that we received in 2012.

Then we had the SECY that went up, and we got the SRM back in 2016, which told us to very expeditiously move forward with Reg Guide 1.174, and they were very explicit that we were just to keep our focus and the scope of this effort on defense-in-depth, which is, you know, what we attempted to do.

So, and moving forward, now I'm on Slide 4, you know, an interoffice working group was formed from RES, NRR, NRO, and OGC. Clark Sheldon was our person on the working group from OGC, so I apologize I forgot to give him recognition.

And then we had people from NMSS and NSIR who came to observe, because even though this was really reactor focused, you know, if -- you know, we wanted to make sure that what we're doing, particularly in defense-in-depth, you know, wasn't going to create a ripple -- negative ripple effect

across the agency.

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We were overseen by an interoffice division level steering committee that was Mike Cheok and Joe Giitter and John Moninger, and we met with them quite frequently and got a lot of very good guidance from them.

Wе also had frequent public very meetings. We tried to do this effort in a very open, transparent manner, so we were very frequently having public meetings. We have had several public -- we have had several meetings with the ACRS, and we have also -- there is the risk-informed steering committee, which is the committee comprised of deputy office directors, and we have briefed them quite frequently. And we have had, I don't know, one or two Commission TA briefings.

So on April 7th of this year, we issued the reg guide for public review and comment. We sent it out for a 45-day public review and comment, and I believe we extended it or we accepted people after that date. We briefed the Commission on May 11th on this, and then in July we completed our revision based on the public review and comment period, which -- and that closed, I believe, at the end of June.

So, you know, we very quickly, you know, got -- started going through very diligently all the public comments. And we also addressed the ones from 2012.

Okay. So what were the modifications we Well, one of the things that is -- we went did? through, and when we had issued 1285 back in 2012, we had reordered those seven considerations. You they were called factors, but we're now calling them considerations because "factors" gave the wrong -- people were misinterpreting the word "factor." So call them we now "considerations."

But, anyway, we had reorganized them and put them in this kind of what we thought was a hierarchical structure. Well, that was one of the biggest public comments that we got. They didn't like the hierarchical structure that we did.

So we just went back to the seven things, and we provided guidance. Well, we did two things. We went through and tried to describe what each one of those factors meant, and then we tried to write guidance that if you followed this you had a very good chance of making sure that you had met that principle.

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One of the things we did is we removed the defense-in-depth examples. We had created examples in the original DG, but that was another significant comment we got from the public is they hated the examples. And they wanted more of a checklist, and they wanted more of an in integrated example. What I mean by that is we had examples for each factor individually, and we had very distinct specific language in there that said these examples, you know, you cannot -- you know, if you follow this precisely, it doesn't mean, you know, it will be acceptable. These examples are to illustrate only.

But they really wanted more of an example that kind of stood back and went across all seven factors, and we understood that and NEI did offer to come up with examples for us to consider in the DG.

The other thing was on risk aggregation. At this same timeframe, we had published NUREG-1855, and we got very good feedback on 1855 from the public. They particularly liked our discussion on risk aggregation. So they were asking for a closer tie in Reg Guide 1.174 that, if they used the guidance in 1855, that was an acceptable way to deal

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with uncertainties. So we did that.

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The other thing was on the guideline boundaries, if you go back to the very first publication of Reg Guide 1.174 and looked at the figure, believe it or not, it was the graphics capability that prevented us from showing some of those lines more as a transition, whereas the figure showed it as a bright line. And that really was a graphic problem.

Well, we've gone way past that, so we fixed that, and I believe we did add some language to make that even clearer. Then, also, one of the public -- I believe this came from the public comment -- is that they liked some of the language on particularly defense-in-depth that showed up in the standard review plan. So we went back and looked at the standard review plan, and where we thought that was appropriate, we moved it over to the reg guide.

know, These last two, you briefed you on these before, so I won't go into any kind of details. This came out of some FSRMs. Ι don't know if, Donnie, you want to add anything to these, on developing the language to transition from the conditional large release frequency and

containment to the large early release frequency and the language on containment performance expectations.

MR. HARRISON: Yeah. I'11 just add that, again, these were -- just like the other scope issues, these were driven by SRMs, and so we felt like this would be the time to implement and capture those SRM requirements. So you see in the slides there the two -- the three references to That's revisions related what drove some specifically for new reactors on containment performance. That's it.

MS. DROUIN: Okay. Then the last one on modifications, and Mike talked about this a little bit, was the use of the terms PRA acceptability, PRA technical adequacy, and quality. We were -- we have been aware that these terms are used interchangeably. We were in the midst of trying to fix this in a more slow manner. mean, as documents, you know, would come up revision, we would fix it.

But now, because of the DPO, we're going to be much more proactive on fixing this language.

And it is just -- it doesn't change anything in terms of what we mean by policy, anything we mean

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1	technically. It is just a tech edit change, and I
2	really want to communicate that. And so the term,
3	you know, we will be using is PRA acceptability.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I don't want to
5	dwell on this. You know, we had a separate meeting
6	last September, I believe
7	MS. DROUIN: Right.
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: on this particular
9	issue. I personally think you did a really good job
10	of weaving that in here. I think it's I thought
11	it was clear before, but I think it's really clear
12	now. I hope you do continue that because in
13	September I think we did highlight a couple of other
14	guidance documents that I know I had stumbled across
15	that did have ambiguity in terms of expectation.
16	So as you do future updates to the reg
17	guides, just
18	MS. DROUIN: Right. We
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: don't forget this.
20	It's not just a 1.174 issue.
21	MS. DROUIN: No, no, no. We are
22	MR. HARRISON: It's
23	MS. DROUIN: already starting to
24	start the wheels on updating Reg Guide 1.200. So
25	we'll be making, you know, conforming changes in

1	that document to be consistent here.
2	MEMBER REMPE: So I had a question,
3	though, just a curiosity question, because I can
4	remember the last meeting we had on this topic and
5	how I was thought I heard, I think actually from
6	you, Mary, that industry had supported the use of
7	the word PRA acceptability. And then I saw the
8	comments that
9	MS. DROUIN: No.
10	MEMBER REMPE: seemed like that they
11	well, I thought you had said the standards folks
12	liked the approach
13	MS. DROUIN: No.
14	MEMBER REMPE: that you took.
15	MS. DROUIN: No. No, no, no. I never
16	would have said that.
17	MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
18	MS. DROUIN: The industry has always
19	liked the term PRA technical adequacy. That's the
20	term that they would prefer.
21	MEMBER REMPE: Okay. So I guess I
22	misunderstood, but then I saw in your last slide
23	that there was a comment about later today about
24	reversing. And so it sounded to me like reversing
25	the terminology changes the public oh, so you're

1 just trying to say that they wanted you to reverse But I -- yeah, I thought -- I actually 2 it back. checked even the transcript, and I thought I had 3 4 heard differently. But anyway, the bottom line is 5 is that --If I said it, then I did 6 MS. DROUIN: 7 not mean that because I have always known the public 8 does not like -- they have always, always, always 9 loved the term technical adequacy. 10 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. So that clarifies 11 it in my mind. Thank you. Okay. 12 MS. DROUIN: You're welcome. And we are 13 -- we do have a draft RIS that is getting ready to 14 go into concurrence that explains all of this, that 15 Mike, you know, talked about that will go out for 16 public comment. 17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I think, you know, 18 you get hung up on these -- this terminology. 19 think that the reg guide, as it's written, does a 20 really good job. It highlights the four elements 21 that you're looking for -- the scope, level of 22 detail, now I've forgotten the other -- conformance 23 to the standard, and plant representation. you. And it's clear. It says that's, you know --24

and you could call it Joe. Sorry, Joe. You could

1	call it Ralph.
2	MS. DROUIN: I think what happened is
3	that when we cleaned up and I use that term
4	loosely the first version of 1285, and we have to
5	take, you know, responsibility we did not do a
6	thorough checking of the terms. So we cleaned up
7	this one little part, and then other parts we had,
8	you know, used the wrong term. So we were using two
9	different terms to say the same thing, and but,
10	anyway, it's behind us. We're moving forward. We
11	already also, when you look at 1855, we were able
12	to catch that right before it went to the printer,
13	and
14	(Laughter.)
15	MS. DROUIN: not before
16	(Laughter.)
17	MS. DROUIN: So, yeah, we cleaned it up
18	in 1855, and we have now cleaned it up in 1.174.
19	And as, you know, we'll start cleaning up in the
20	other documents.
21	Okay. Donnie is going to walk us
22	through the public comments.
23	MR. HARRISON: Didn't mean to cut you
24	off early.
25	MS. DROUIN: No, that's okay.

1 MR. HARRISON: Okay. I'm trying to shut 2 her down. So --We've been trying to 3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 4 do that for longer than I've been on the committee. 5 It hasn't worked so --6 (Laughter.) Be nice. 7 MS. DROUIN: Be nice, because 8 Dana will beat you up if you're not nice to me. 9 (Laughter.) 10 MR. HARRISON: All right. So I've got a 11 few slides here that just summarize kind of the 12 scope of the public comments and the areas where we 13 implemented changes and the areas where we didn't 14 implement changes. Some of this is going to be 15 repetitive. 16 received a number from the 2017 17 public period -- review period. Numerous editorial 18 changes, so, as appropriate, we implemented those. 19 There were a number of places where there 20 language that we got public comments about needing 21 to clarify certain aspects of what we did. And this 22 is just a list of kind of five bullets of examples. 23 There were small impacts. The question was raised, 24 if small impacts individual have and you

considerations, what does that mean? Can you have,

if you will, almost like a synergistic effect that makes the defense-in-depth weaken sufficiently to be a problem? So that would be a significant impact, even though individual factors or considerations were only affected slightly. So we clarified that guidance.

There was the issue of -- there was a mentioning of compensatory measures, and there was a couple sentences that talked about the need to model those, and it depends on the context. And so we clarified the couple of paragraphs that talked about compensatory measures and under what conditions you need to model those versus just having them as extra things.

Much like the Palo Verde where they had the FLEX equipment, does it need to be modeled, yes And the question is, is it or no? significant to the decision? If it's telling you that it passes or fails based upon this thing, you'd want a little more precision in knowing, well, what is the credit you get from this, as opposed to just, hey, you know, we're going to install something; and trust us, it makes things better. So we clarified that language to make it --

MEMBER SKILLMAN: Donnie?

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MR. HARRISON: -- a bit more explicit.

Yes.

MEMBER SKILLMAN: Just on that specific issue, let me ask this question. I put myself in the position of the decision-maker at Palo Verde, and I realize I'm out of -- either I'm out of tech specs or I'm going to be. I know I've got a timeclock, and I know the clock is going to shut me down.

so I come to the region and I ask for enforcement discretion. My experience is that interaction is accompanied by two major issues. The corporate risk people have already done a fairly thorough sort of what that decision might mean in terms of risk. And at least my experience in Region I was we would have engaged the Region I risk specialist for our plant, and that individual would have been fully up to speed, so that the regional administrator was not surprised by the request. At least that is the world that I lived in for a long time.

What is changing here with the change in -- the proposed change in 1.174? I can imagine a requirement to include the FLEX equipment because to not do that would not give a clear reflection of

1 what the incremental risk would be for the use of 2 that equipment. So could you walk us through --MR. HARRISON: In that context, within a 3 4 NOED structure, this guidance isn't changing that 5 This is getting you more into if interaction. someone comes in with a license amendment and says, 6 7 " I extend this outage or extend want to 8 period," even if it is a diesel and you're going 9 from a three-day completion time to, say, a 14-day 10 completion time, if -- oftentimes you will hear a 11 licensee say, "We will reduce the initiating 12 frequency by doing maintenance in the not 13 switchvard. We'll establish a fire watch." 14 And those are good things to do. The 15 question becomes, if I'm -- the risk is high enough 16 such that I'm making a decision that's right on the 17 line of acceptable or not acceptable, or very close, 18 I need more precision to understand what, really, 19 benefit am I getting from that equipment that you're 20 So it's only in those kind of situations 21 where this becomes important. 22 MEMBER SKILLMAN: So it is or is not in 23 the NOED? 24 It's not in the NOED MR. HARRISON: 25 structure.

1 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Not in NOED. 2 MR. HARRISON: And I'll look at Joe to 3 make sure I don't overstep that. 4 MR. GIITTER: Yeah. I think the point 5 here is that they submitted two emergency license And I'm not going to get into all of 6 7 the details, but you have somebody here; if 8 want, we can talk about it. But I think what Donnie is saying is that the guidance we have now tells you 9 -- because in the case of Palo Verde, they weren't 10 11 crediting the FLEX diesels numerically in their PRA 12 They were relying on those as defense-in-13 depth measures. So I think what Donnie is saying is, in 14 case, we know because those diesels were 15 this 16 capable of providing the emergency power for the 17 dominant accident sequences that you were getting 18 substantial safety benefit from them. 19 But I think the point is, if you have 20 another example where you're 21 compensatory measures, how do those actually reduce 22 the risk? And that's what -- I believe that's what 23 Donnie is saying. 24 Yeah. And, again, it's MR. HARRISON: 25 if you're orders of magnitude from the all

acceptance guideline, it becomes less of an issue. It's when you're trying to make a decision and it's close to a decision-making line. And so there is fuzziness in that line, and so the question becomes, how much confidence do I have that this will actually move me away from that fuzzy line, right? So -- and, again, it's in the license application, license amendment process.

MEMBER SKILLMAN: Okay. Thank you. That was helpful. Thank you.

MR. HARRISON: One of the other comments that we implemented changes on had to do with submission of the peer review facts and observations. So the industry, when analysis of PRA is completed, gets a peer review by the industry. They end up getting findings; facts and observations is what they call those.

Licensees then can go through a process of addressing those findings and want to close them out. In the past, there has been a process where you have to basically have a focused scope peer review to close out those findings, to actually get them off the books. The industry has worked on an initiative to provide another means of being able to close out findings that doesn't invoke a full scope

or a focused scope peer review.

So we got a comment that asked us to put that in. That's still in kind of a piloting process. So we added some language in a footnote that recognizes this process is going on.

MS. DROUIN: We are past the pilots, and we have -- I think we have been in here and briefed you all on this. And so the pilots and a letter approving the process was issued back in April or May timeframe. We will be ultimately, as we update Reg Guide 1.200, we will be endorsing this -- this process is an appendix to the three peer review guidance documents that NEI has issued. And under this process, if they close an F&O, they do not have to submit that F&O as part of their submittal.

So that was kind of the key to this, and we did some pilots. And we're past the pilots; we've approved the process. So I don't know if you want to add anything, Joe, to that.

MR. GIITTER: No. I think what you said is accurate. In addition, to ensure that we have confidence in this process, we are continuing to do some observations. We have had a recent observation a couple of weeks ago, and we have somebody onsite right now at Grand Gulf doing an observation.

In addition, as these are used as part of licensing actions, we plan to do audits on a sampling basis to make sure that the process is being carried out appropriately.

MR. HARRISON: And I will just add, the footnote that we added referenced the letter that accepted this process, so -- for use.

The fourth bullet there, sub-bullet, is the risk insights can be used to help inform defense-in-depth. We got a number of comments that said, "Can't you get insights from the risk analysis to help you determine if you actually are consistent with addressing common cause failure or human reliability within the defense-in-depth considerations?" And so we have added language that brings that concept in.

Really, the human errors -- again, defenses against -- we had some clarifications that were requested to address defenses against human errors. We have incorporated some language to address that as well.

Things we didn't change -- and at this point, I want to say, when we got to an issue where we didn't change something, sometimes it was because, like the first one here, which is related

to the PRA acceptability language, we had a DPO. It got resolved. We implemented the resolution. That's fairly clear-cut.

So when we got a comment saying, "We want you to go back to PRA technical adequacy," the answer is going to be, "No, we're not doing that.

We're going to move forward, not backwards."

There are other ones here where we got a comment, would say, you know, we propose this. And even though we may even agree with the comment, it's not as simple as just change one sentence. So it was going to take more work. It may affect other reg guides. We need to step back and think about that. So we created a parking lot, and we've started collecting these things in the parking lot.

So the next time we revise Reg Guide 1.174, and as we go through the other reg guides, that becomes a bigger issue, to make sure we consistently address all of these issues.

MS. DROUIN: There were, however, some where we just didn't agree with them, you know, and that second one kind of is one of the ones where we didn't agree. And if you remember, of the seven bullets, the seven considerations, you know, the last one is that you maintain the intent of the

1 plant design criteria. 2 And the public comment was essentially 3 they wanted us to completely remove that from the 4 reg guide. They felt that it was already addressed 5 under one of the principles of your risk-informed decision-making process, and we disagreed with that 6 7 one. MEMBER BLEY: Did that just come from 8 9 one place? I don't remember. 10 MR. HARRISON: That may have had a 11 couple comments. In the public meetings we had, it 12 came from more than one source. 13 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 14 MR. HARRISON: So it is a topic that 15 came up, and then it was a discussion topic as well 16 within the comments. 17 MEMBER REMPE: So before you leave this 18 slide, even in the DPO case, I can quote a statement 19 from the panel report that says, "There is a clear 20 preference in the industry to discontinue the use of 21 the term PRA quality in this context." And so when 22 I read the way the comments were dispositioned, they 23 said, "Well, the decision was made." 24 And the industry brought this up again

and said, "We'd like to go back to quality."

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The

disposition was, "Well, the decision was made that,
based on this report, how the DPO case was settled,
we're not going to use quality." So did industry
change their mind, was what I wanted to ask earlier,
or and that's when I saw that reversing, it
sounded like, oh, did industry change their mind?
Someone at some point at the staff
believed industry didn't want to use the word
"quality," and they made a decision based on that
information. And that's what I was trying to get
to.
MS. DROUIN: All I can tell you is that
I have a lot of discussions through my standards
work with a lot of people in industry. And I will
have to say, I have never heard anyone say, "We'd
like to use PRA quality." All I personally have
ever heard is that, "We want to stay with PRA
technical adequacy."
MEMBER REMPE: Okay. So if that is
true, then didn't I see some comments come in from
industry that said, "We'd like to go back and use
quality in this last time and"
MR. HARRISON: I think they were saying
they wanted to go back to technical adequacy.
MEMBER REMPE: Okay. Okay.

1	MR. HARRISON: And I think our comment
2	disposition maybe was confusing because the comment
3	disposition then referred to quality technical
4	adequacy in everything.
5	MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
6	MR. HARRISON: But, yeah, the industry
7	has surely been consistent against quality not
8	against quality. They are consistent against using
9	the term PRA technical adequacy.
10	MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
11	MS. DROUIN: Well, I don't know if Greg
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13	MR. HARRISON: Or quality
14	MS. DROUIN: wants to, you know, say
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16	MEMBER REMPE: I think I got what you
17	meant. Okay.
18	MR. KRIEGER: Hi. Greg is this on?
19	Greg Krieger. Yeah. With regard to technical
20	adequacy, as Mary characterized it, that is correct.
21	Everybody within the standards community, within the
22	utility community, is really focused on technical
23	adequacy. The real issue with acceptability is,
24	technical adequacy talks to the model or the you
25	know, the object, where acceptability is really

something that is personal. It takes away from the model and says, "Is it acceptable to somebody?"

So that really was the issue here. know, in the end, we all mean the same thing. the PRA good, such that it can be used for decision-So in the end, you're talking semantics, change is why people little but that were resistant, is that you're really taking away from that model something that feels to little different.

MEMBER REMPE: Okay. Thank you.

MR. HARRISON: And I'll just close with that. So at meetings with you all, don't be surprised if people say quality, technical adequacy. They are still going to use those. And the key I always have started using is, what's the context of why you're using that phrase?

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: When I did my homework for last September's meeting, I went back through. There actually are old ACRS letters that address this issue. I mean, old ACRS letters about what you should -- what should you call it, and what are the implications of each word, and all that kind of stuff. It's not going to end. As long as -- but as long as the guidance is consistent, and you call,

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you know, the thing what it is, then going forward that's what it is. You know, it's well defined.

MS. DROUIN: I will tell you, you know, just side note, at the May 11th Commission briefing, all three words were used. All three Some people used the word PRA quality, some said technical adequacy, people and some said acceptability. So, you know, it's not going to go away in terms of when people start talking.

MR. HARRISON: And so on this slide, just to close, the last item here is an example of something that went into the parking lot. We had a paragraph that talked about considering past changes and what you'd need to do if you wanted to credit past changes, and if they were in the model already related to risk-informed applications.

When we got the comment, we thought that that might have tentacles elsewhere within the reg guide, or it could influence how we write things. So we took that as a parking lot issue to address in a greater scope. So it's related to just one paragraph. You weren't sure what the unintended consequences of revising that paragraph would be.

So going back to 2012, these are a number of items we have already kind of touched on,

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this hierarchical framework that was created in the draft guide back in 2011. The comments came in. That created, actually, I think more confusion because then the question was, am I addressing just the two high-level requirements, or am I addressing all seven? Do I only do the five? If I do the five, does that meet the two?

And so that framework, we got a lot of comments that said, you know, this creates confusion. And, again, the working group decided the easier solution was to revert back to the seven considerations and just address them.

We also get a number of comments trying to nail down what we mean when we use terms like significant, reasonable. We have tried to be more consistent I think in the reg guide by using consistent terms. But when you get into defense-indepth, and you're not trying to define the term, but you're trying to give insights into what the term means, these qualitative kinds of terms will always kind of show up. And so that's one where we've tried to clarify the terms to be consistent, but they are still there. There are still some -- "significant" is a phrase that shows up.

MS. DROUIN: But I do think, you know,

we did add additional text to try and communicate what we meant by those terms. So, you know, we do use the terms consistently, but we did add text to try and explain what we meant by those terms.

MR. HARRISON: The types of licensing basis changes was a thing that came up within the comments back in 2012, what does this apply to? So we've tried to clarify that.

Again, this is comment а Mary already addressed where we got a number of comments that said that there was language within the standard review plan that addressed defense-in-depth that was -- the industry liked that terminology and the discussion, but it wasn't in the reg guide, so we've changed it to bring some of that guidance over into the req quide.

And then the removal of the examples. They raised more questions than they solved, and they were non-committal. So, again, it's the -- if you follow the example, didn't mean that that on an application would always be acceptable. So, in that sense, it didn't help. It may have helped define the individual consideration, but it didn't help you have a path to understand, if you would actually do that, would you get approved? So that was more

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confusing.

Some things we didn't change as a result of those comments. There was this discussion — and, again, I think this is another parking lot item of, how do the five principles of risk-informed decision-making — how do they relate to each other? I've seen this actually in applications where there is — you rely on performance monitoring to help confirm some of the analysis you're doing, and how do those all interact with each other. That's a thing that we need to spend some time on, to think about how we would address that.

MS. DROUIN: Also, it's our understanding that industry is underway in terms of developing guidance for this. So, you know, we're more I think in a wait-and-see mode and see what comes out of the industry guidance, and that's why this is in -- I mean, it was in a parking lot because it was out of scope, but also industry is doing something in this area.

MR. HARRISON: And then the last bullet here on this slide is just we had a couple of comments that talked about needing to describe the limitations on the considerations of defense-indepth. Are there places where you don't need to

consider defense-in-depth effectively? And so that's an item where we actually disagreed, and I don't think that's in a parking lot. I think that's a direct disagreement by the staff, that we believe you need to address these considerations for all risk-informed applications.

And then I will turn it back to Mary.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And before we do that, because the next slide is the path forward, but I want to interject here. I've been quiet.

We had a meeting a year ago that focused entirely on what is now Section 2.1 of the guidance, the defense-in-depth stuff, and I see how that has evolved into the current version of the guidance.

To prepare for this meeting, I decided to look through the draft Rev. 3 in its entirety, beginning to end. And whenever you read something in its entirety, or at least whenever I read something in its entirety, things catch my attention that maybe should, maybe shouldn't. And I have several of those that I'd like to discuss here.

So I'll just start marching through them, if you'll allow me to do that. And to orient you, I'll give you kind of page numbers or paragraph numbers, so you can pull up the guidance in front of

you to see what I'm babbling about.

The first one is on page 10, or it's just before the paragraph that talks about the first element of the process. It's in Section C, the last paragraph in the introduction. And it's a long paragraph. It says, basically, the expectation is that for plants licensed under 10 CFR Part 52, the deterministic containment performance metric should also be maintained.

And it goes on to cite all types of things, but basically containment maintains its role as a reliable, leak-tight barrier for approximately 24 hours following the onset of core damage under the more likely severe accident challenges. And following this 24-hour period, the containment should continue to provide a barrier against the uncontrolled release of fission products.

As I read this in the context of this guidance, this tells me that I cannot use risk information to make any changes to that. This seems to be telling me, no, no, the guidance says that you must maintain that. So what am I reading wrong? Or if I'm reading that, why, in this guidance about using risk information in a regulatory decision-making process, am I specifying very, very distinct,

1	precise numerical criteria for one class of
2	containments? I don't understand why that paragraph
3	is in here. So can you explain to me why that
4	paragraph is in here?
5	MR. HARRISON: Do you want me to start,
6	Mary, or
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I understand that
8	it's in the conditions for licensees under who
9	get their license under Part 52. But once I got my
10	license, it would seem that if I wanted to address
11	this issue in a risk-informed basis, the guidance in
12	1.174 should give me the framework to do that. This
13	seems to exclude me from doing that.
14	MR. HARRISON: Yes.
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, why are we
16	doing it?
17	MR. HARRISON: This is the section
18	that you referred to I believe was actually in Rev.
19	2 in a different
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, it wasn't.
21	MR. HARRISON: in a different place.
22	In a different place, and we ended up moving it here
23	when we added the paragraph I think I remember
24	a discussion about containment performance in the
25	prior revision that was added

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'm not sure about
2	that.
3	MR. HARRISON: for new reactors.
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I think I looked for
5	that. I don't have it in my note, but I did check
6	Rev. 2 to this. I checked what went out for public
7	comments to the it was in what went out for
8	public comments in a different position.
9	MR. HARRISON: Okay. Then maybe I'm
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I don't think it was
11	in Rev. 2.
12	MR. HARRISON: Okay. I'll go back and -
13	_
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Only because Rev. 2
15	was issued before a lot of the Part 52 licensing
16	stuff came out.
17	MS. DROUIN: I think at this point we're
18	just going to have to take your comments under
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's
20	MS. DROUIN: you know, and look and
21	see
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: What I basically,
23	you know, we had an informal meeting last week, and
24	what I wanted to do is to bring up these comments
25	that I have, see if any of the other members had any

reflection on them, see if you had any reaction to them, and then we can figure out, you know, what we're going to do going forward.

MEMBER BLEY: Is this something you are not prepared to talk about, you know, why it's here?

MR. HARRISON: I can give you the context of part of this is, again, it dates back to those SECYs and SRMs from the 1990s. And this was considered the deterministic containment performance requirement.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Donnie, I get that, and in each of the design certifications and combined license applications that we have looked at, this issue is addressed in there as part of the licensing basis or the certification. And that's fine; the same as the -- I hate to call it -- deterministic licensing basis for any currently operating plant.

This guidance, my interpretation of this regulatory guide, provides a framework for using risk information to make changes to the licensing basis for any licensed facility. And it seems to me excluding one, if you want to call it, deterministic containment performance requirement for a specific class of plants, if that's the intent -- and that's

certainly the way I read it in here -- seems contrary to the basic principles of what we're trying to do under Reg Guide 1.174.

MEMBER BLEY: I agree with John pretty strongly on this one. And also, it is already codified as part of Part 52. Doesn't need to be in here unless this guidance, in particular, wants to exclude Part 52 containments from risk-informed consideration. And that seems wholly inconsistent and illogical to me.

MS. DROUIN: I think, you know, you all have raised a very good point. You know, I think we just have to go back and look at it. I think we need to go back and look -- this was a result of an SRM, so I think we just have to go back and revisit this. I don't think we have an answer for you today.

MEMBER BLEY: Okay. And, well, some of us anyway, would be pretty strong on this. It seems like everything else. It's in the regulation, you've got to meet that, unless you have a reason to get around it, and you argue it and you win. And to exclude that possibility in the guidance just seems inappropriate.

MS. DROUIN: Fair comment.

1	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I don't want to dwell
3	on them too much. As I said, the whole reason that
4	I wanted to have this discussion is to see if other
5	members had comments and to see, you know, if you
6	had any immediate feedback, like this is really
7	stupid, and, no, we're not going to consider it.
8	MS. DROUIN: But I might still think
9	that is
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, no, that's fine.
11	And you can say that.
12	MS. DROUIN: No. We will look at this.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The next one that I
14	had is in and you'll have to excuse me as I page
15	down through things here. It's in 2.1.1.2.
16	MS. DROUIN: Do you have a page number?
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah. I'm
18	MR. HARRISON: Page 14.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Page 14. But, in
20	particular yeah, it's page well, no, let me
21	get to the exact point because I've got to find
22	this. It's on a transition from page 15 to page 16
23	where there's bullets on what's called common cause
24	coupling factors.
25	MEMBER BLEY: The inadequate design

1 bullet, and so on? 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right. So it's right at the bottom of -- depending on which -- we've got 3 4 a PDF version. 5 MEMBER BLEY: It's under Number 4, the first bullet. 6 It's under Number 4. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 8 And in a PDF version, it's on page 16. I was 9 looking at a Word file. So are you where we are? 10 MS. DROUIN: We're there. Yes. 11 Okay. CHAIRMAN STETKAR: When I read 12 this, I thought that the -- at least -- well, let me 13 cut to the chase here. I'm really hung up on these 14 coupling factors, because it wasn't clear to me why 15 they are discussed here. The previous version of 16 the quidance had -- when I say "previous," Rev. 2 17 had a fairly succinct, simple paragraph that just 18 says, "You need to ensure defense-in-depth against 19 common cause failures." And I won't quote it. 20 that previous seemed to me that 21 paragraph was adequate to raise the issue without 22 being as specific as these bullets. And what got me 23 even further confused is, as you page down in the 24 same section, there is -- at the bottom of page 16,

or in the middle of the paragraph that follows those

1 bullets. it talks about defenses against 2 coupling factors, and it says an example of this type of defense might be fire or flood barriers that 3 4 limit component failures. Those are not defenses against these 5 types of common cause failures. 6 In fact, they are defenses against physical hazards. So I got really 7 8 confused about why we're being so specific on these 9 coupling factors here. 10 Now, later in 2.1.1.3, when we discuss 11 this consideration, there may be -- when you talk 12 about how people may address common cause failures, you know, the guidance on how you might address it, 13 information 14 highlighting this there might appropriate, but it is highlighted there but less 15 16 specific than what's up front. 17 So I'm curious about why the need for 18 specificity here, and especially when the example 19 that is provided is not consistent with what we're 20 talking about. 21 MS. DROUIN: Okay. First, I have a 22 You said that in the earlier version we question. 23 had a more simple paragraph. Are you talking about 24 the earlier version of 1285? 25 It's the July --CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No.

1 veah. Well, all I highlighted here is July 2016 2 version, which is what we reviewed a year ago. it was the draft of the defense-in-depth principles. 3 4 MS. DROUIN: Okay. I just want to go 5 back and look at what --CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I can read on the 6 7 record, if the you want, paragraph that Ι 8 highlighted from that which says, "An 9 aspect of ensuring defense-in-depth is to 10 against common cause failure. Failure of several 11 devices or components to function may occur as a 12 result of a single specific event or cause. failures may simultaneously affect several different 13 14 items important to risk. The event or cause may be a design deficiency, a manufacturing deficiency, an 15 16 operating maintenance error, or а natural 17 phenomenon, a human-induced event, or an unintended 18 cascading effect from any other operation or failure 19 within the plant." 20 That, to me, kind of captured the notion 21 of what we're talking about without elaborating on 22 specific --23 MEMBER BLEY: I kind of read through 24 this without noticing that, but thinking about it,

there is a level of methodological precision here

that isn't anywhere else in 1.174. It just seems kind of unique.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And here, if you read the other considerations, it's also different from the other considerations. Even in the current version of 1.174, it's got, especially up front here, in this particular section where I view this part of the guidance as identifying the issues that need to be addressed, there is later guidance on how they might be addressed.

Now, how they might be addressed might say, well, you need to address coupling factors.

And, indeed, the guidance later does say that, but even then, without this level of bullet, bullet, bullet specificity.

MS. DROUIN: You know, without going back and relooking at our history within the working group, you know, because there is a lot of versions, of course, you didn't see, you know, it's hard for me to answer this question. And we could have just been maybe on this one a little bit overeager, because I know we did -- we did have a mind-set of erring on trying to provide more information than less.

MEMBER BLEY: It almost reads like

1	somebody came up with this layout and was kind of
2	proud of it, wanted to get it all in there.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, no, what
4	MS. DROUIN: I can't say that that
5	didn't happen, because when we write, our writings
6	are our children.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I tell you, other
8	than the fact that it seemed out of place, because
9	when I got to this, my God, this is it reads
10	differently in terms of, if I can call it the
11	philosophical flow of this part of the front part
12	of the guidance, if I can call it that.
13	And the concern that I have is, since
14	there are four distinct, crisp bullets, it might
15	very well be interpreted as a prescriptive type of
16	issue, that I have to address this, and only this,
17	four bullets. And if I check off those boxes,
18	somehow I have adequately addressed the intent of
19	the guidance, and it's maybe
20	MS. DROUIN: And that certainly isn't
21	our intention, so
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And if that's not
23	your intention, I'll tell you, people will read it
24	that way.
25	MS. DROUIN: Okay.

1	MR. HARRISON: And in the next in
2	that last paragraph, it's like
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oh, yeah.
4	MR. HARRISON: we had a list of six
5	bullets
б	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I know
7	MR. HARRISON: four bullets, and we
8	didn't catch that.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right. And you took
10	those out because somebody recognized that the two
11	you took out you deleted were not consistent with
12	the intent of what you're calling common cause
13	failures.
14	MR. HARRISON: So that's a lingering
15	issue.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So we read that in
17	the context of the flow
18	MS. DROUIN: Good comment.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: and if you want to
20	elaborate on it more and I'm not personally,
21	I'm not proposing to do that in the how you might
22	address it, that consideration guidance, may be
23	okay. But when I read the later section on how you
24	might address it, that also seemed as it's
25	written currently, seemed to be adequate in terms of

a balance between specificity and things in general you might consider.

MS. DROUIN: Yes. Okay.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. What is the next one? Now, Donnie brought this up, and I struggled with this. Where are we now? We're down on page -- my problem is I take things out of context, and then I have to go find them again. Bear with me for a moment. I have to do a word search here.

I'm on the top of page 18, and it's the first paragraph under 2.1.1.3, kind of the end of that paragraph where we're talking about -- now it's something Donnie raised in his discussion of the public comments. I'll read what I highlighted.

It says, "Although quidance is presented separately for each consideration, the evaluation of proposed licensing basis change should the performed in an integrated fashion. The proposed licensing basis change is considered to maintain consistency with the defense-in-depth philosophy if integrated the assessment demonstrates no significant impact on a single consideration, i.e., the intent of each defense-in-depth consideration is significant there is impact met, or not а

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1 collectively across all seven considerations." 2 If I go down now to C.2.1.1.4 --3 MS. DROUIN: And I would --4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So hold that thought, 5 because I want to see whether I'm interpreting 6 things correctly. C.2.1.1.4 now, and I'm on page 7 24, the main paragraph there says, "The licensee 8 should be able to conclude whether the change 9 maintains consistency of the plant design with the 10 defense-in-depth philosophy by showing that 11 intent of each consideration is still met following 12 the implementation of the proposed licensing basis 13 change." 14 Now what I'm hung up on is implementing Do I need to individually meet the 15 this thing. 16 intent of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, 17 individually, or can I fail to meet the intent of, 18 let's say, number three completely, provided that 19 the integrated defense-in-depth is still considered 20 adequate? 21 MS. DROUIN: Okay. My interpretation of 22 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 23 the first thing that I read was that, that I could 24 have an adverse impact on one of the defense-in-25 depth considerations, provided that the proposed

1 change does not have а significant adverse collective impact on plant-level defense-in-depth. 2 3 MS. DROUIN: Okay. 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Against whatever 5 That was my reading of the first one. The issue. second one doesn't tell me that. 6 The interesting thing about the second one is that section is called 7 8 Integrated Evaluation. 9 (Laughter.) 10 MS. DROUIN: Okay. I think what has happened here is that what you read under 2.1.1.3, 11 12 that one particular sentence was changed as a result 13 a public comment. So when we changed the 14 sentence here, we unfortunately did not look at 15 1.1.4 to make a comparable change. So we --16 MEMBER BLEY: Your intent would be to 17 make them like 1.1.3. 18 MS. DROUIN: Yes. 19 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So the intent -- I 20 just want to make sure because the words are --21 obviously can be interpreted differently, but the 22 intent is what I wanted to get to. The intent is 23 that I can have an adverse effect on one or more, 24 I'll call it that way, of the individual

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1	collectively I still maintain an adequate level of
2	defense-in-depth at the plant level.
3	MR. HARRISON: If I can caveat, the
4	adverse effect is not significant.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah, yeah. Okay.
6	Yes. I mean, it's up to me to
7	MR. HARRISON: Argue why it's not
8	significant.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: reach agreement on
LO	how much significant and how much adverse, but
L1	indeed the intent is
L2	MR. HARRISON: Small hits on a number of
L3	the defense-in-depth might be okay, if you can show
L4	overall you still have defense-in-depth.
L5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right. Or,
L6	principle, relatively large hit on one provided that
L7	you might have improvements in other areas to
L8	mitigate. I don't know. I'm not trying to get
L9	specific in it.
20	MR. HARRISON: A licensee would have to
21	give
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: A licensee has to
23	come in with a proposed application and present a
24	convincing argument. Obviously, if they can
25	demonstrate that there is either no effect or

1	perhaps an improvement, you know, on each of the
2	seven, so be it. But if they can't, I just wanted
3	to make sure I I wanted to understand that point.
4	MS. DROUIN: But that is I mean, I
5	know that we specifically changed this in 2.2.1.3 as
6	a result of a public comment.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. I didn't know
8	that
9	MS. DROUIN: And we didn't even think
10	about 2.1.1.4.
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
12	MS. DROUIN: So good catch.
13	MEMBER BLEY: Despite I'm glad you're
14	changing it. But just based on irony, 2.1.1.4
15	wouldn't have a reason to exist because it's about
16	integrated, and there is not a hit of integrated in
17	the words that are there.
18	MR. HARRISON: Right. If we fix it, it
19	would give you the concept of integrated.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Let me just make a
21	note here, because I'm a slow writer and my memory
22	is I don't remember what I did this morning.
23	The next one is under 2.1.1.3,
24	consideration 6. And Donnie also mentioned it.
25	It's page 22. This is I don't know whether it's

negotiated language or what. The first sentence there under 6 says, and I believe this was, by the way, carried over from Rev. 2, "Proposed licensing basis change should not significantly increase the potential for or create new human errors that might adversely impact one or more layers of defense-indepth." And I quoted the wrong one.

The next sentence is actually the one.

"The evaluation of the proposed licensing basis change should demonstrate that the change does not adversely affect the ability of the plant staff to perform actions." Does not adversely affect the ability of the plant staff.

So does that mean, if I do a human reliability analysis as part of my risk-informed licensing submittal, and I find out that increased the human probability for error particular action by a factor of two, will it not be considered? Because it obviously adversely affects the performance of those personnel. But that factor of two might not have any impact whatsoever on the risk-informed decision.

If I read this literally in terms of an attorney, it says I cannot have an adverse impact on any action. That sounds really prescriptive.

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1	MR. HARRISON: Yeah. I think it's
2	MS. DROUIN: That's not meant to say
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
4	MR. HARRISON: Yeah. I think we're
5	missing the concept of significant impact.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Either significant or
7	maybe another sentence
8	MR. HARRISON: Because when you get down
9	to the bullet, it
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: See, the first one
11	that I read, I read it intentionally. It says,
12	"Does not significantly increase the potential for
13	or create new human errors that might adversely
14	impact one or more layers of defense." Okay. I
15	kind of got that. I don't know why the second
16	sentence is there.
17	MEMBER BLEY: We don't write for you.
18	But if you didn't have that second sentence, the
19	meaning would be more clear.
20	MS. DROUIN: I'll tell you why that
21	second sentence is there, is that if you look across
22	all of the seven factors, you know, the first
23	sentence tends to say, you know, at high level, and
24	then every single one of these has a comparable
25	second sentence that says should demonstrate.

1	MEMBER BLEY: Oh, okay. I didn't catch
2	that.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yeah. The second one
4	was
5	MEMBER BLEY: Okay. That I didn't
6	catch.
7	MR. HARRISON: Yeah. The first intro
8	line is always the what it should do. The second
9	one is what it should or vice versa.
10	MS. DROUIN: What you need to
11	demonstrate.
12	MEMBER BLEY: So that you have the
13	"significant" in that one, too.
14	MS. DROUIN: yes.
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That might help, just
16	the word "significant" then. And as Dennis said, we
17	don't we wouldn't
18	MEMBER BLEY: I read the word
19	"significant" into it as I read it, so I should know
20	you're right.
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Which is probably why
22	I have a hard time reading what you write, because
23	what you write probably has 12 times as many words
24	in it as what you actually put on paper. Sorry.
25	MEMBER BLEY: And you never leave one

1	out.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I would never leave a
3	word out, because I'd put six words in rather than
4	one.
5	MEMBER SUNSERI: Maybe this will be like
6	an ACRS letter-writing, and the closer we get to
7	noon, the faster things will move.
8	(Laughter.)
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: They will, and we're
LO	not going to get to noon.
L1	I have two more, and this is I'll
L2	skip one. Oh. Well, the one, as I'm going here
L3	because I think this might be an editorial change.
L4	Section C.2(3) on well, it's 2.3. On it's page
L5	26, it's the next-to-last paragraph. This is a
L6	carryover from Rev. 2. It says, "Reg Guide 1.200
L7	endorses ASME/ASN standard," and so forth. Other
L8	standards for low power and shutdown modes of
L9	operation in Level 2 PRAs, for example, are under
20	development.
21	Do we need that "under development"
22	anymore? I know that
23	MS. DROUIN: Unfortunately, we're out of
24	time sync because the low power shutdown in the

Level 2, they are out for trial use.

1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: They are. 2 MS. DROUIN: But they won't be issued as an ANSI standard for probably at least another year 3 4 to maybe two years. 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So you think it's 6 appropriate to leave in there now, given --7 MS. DROUIN: Because this is going to be 8 out within, you know, early 2018. We aren't going to see these standards probably until 2019. 9 10 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Okay. I just 11 wanted to make sure that we're not getting too far 12 out of sync in terms of timing. 13 MS. DROUIN: Yeah. 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But I'm okay with that, actually. 2.3.2, the last paragraph -- and 15 16 this was also mentioned previously. It's on the 17 This was added. It's the discussion next page, 27. 18 -- "It should be noted ASME and ANS Joint Committee 19 on Nuclear Risk Management has successfully balloted 20 capability category 3 remove and 21 capability Categories 1 and 2 in the next addition of the ASME/ANS PRA standard." 22 23 Why do we need that in a regulatory 24 guide? To me it sounds speculative. It also could 25 be interpreted by some applicants or reviewers that

1	say, "Well, I can completely ignore capability
2	category 3 guidance in the current version of the
3	standard," that the standards committee might decide
4	to fold in or impart or in total into capability
5	category 2 in the future.
6	And to me, this is I don't know why
7	we need that statement in a regulatory guide that
8	may live now for who knows how many years.
9	MS. DROUIN: I think, again, we were
10	trying to acknowledge is that the new edition of the
11	standard is due out in 2018, the latter part of
12	2018, and capability category 3 will not be in it.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It won't, but do we
14	know and I certainly don't do we know whether
15	some elements of what is currently capability
16	category 3 will be rolled into what is currently
17	capability
18	MS. DROUIN: Probably I would say 99
19	percent of the time the answer to that is no.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay.
21	MS. DROUIN: I wouldn't say equivocally,
22	across the board, that there might be some aspects.
23	But capability category 3 was always a capability
24	category that no one ever expected anyone to ever
25	have their PRA meet that.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I understand that. But my whole -- what I'm hanging up here is not so much on which column is going to disappear or which column -- which parts of column 3 are going to be rolled into column 2; is this paragraph basically sets the expectation to look at Req Guide 1.200 and refers you back to the ASME/ANS Standard. That's good. It also says that capability category 1 may be sufficient for some requirements, whereas for other applications it may be necessary to achieve capability category 3 for specific requirements. That's also, you know, in terms of a philosophy of -- to me, a good philosophy. Why can't we just stop And if the standard later comes out without a capability category 3 --MEMBER BLEY: I'm not sure even that far is appropriate here. You will have Reg Guide 1.200, and that tells people how to use the standard. don't see why you need this other stuff in here because it will end up with things not matching up in a couple of years. MR. HARRISON: I think in --MEMBER BLEY: And maybe for many years. Yeah. I think for a MR. HARRISON:

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prior version we stated that for most applications capability category 2 is sufficient. However -- and that's why you get this "however" statement. However, there are a handful of risk-informed inservice inspection, if you follow the ASME Code -- well, you can use 1 for something, but there is a couple of capability category 3 items you need to meet -- that is part of piping segmentation -- within that standard, if you're using your internal flooding --

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: One would hope that whatever those are they get rolled into what is now called probability category 2, or that Reg Guide 1.200 will take an exception if it's not -- you know, it's -- I just don't know why -- anyway, I made the comment.

MR. HARRISON: Yes.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Now, here is, actually, the one of all of the stuff that bothered me the most, and we're now on Section 2.5. And it is on the second paragraph in 2.5 on page 32. Okay?

This is a new paragraph, and I'll read it. "However, licensees are not granted the same discretion when incorporating these guidelines by reference into other programs." And there is a list

of them.

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"In this context, the licensee needs to treat the guidelines as hard criteria and is not allowed to consider the acceptance guidelines as met when the values are even slightly exceeded." That, to me, that paragraph is completely contrary, orthogonal to the whole concept of Reg Guide 1.174.

It says here in written guidance that for some applications, those gray lines that Mary originally a problem because said was the capabilities aren't graphics gray. They are precisely black lines, so that if I have something that is 9.9975 times 10^{-6} , I pass; and if it's 1.0025times 10^{-5} , I fail. Why is that paragraph in Reg Guide 1.174, in particular when we are talking about how to interpret those figures.

MR. HARRISON: And the reason that paragraph got added was there -- in some of the more recent risk-informed applications, the fire PRA of NFPA-805 and 50.69 were granting what I'll call self-approval. So once they get through the license amendment process, they can make changes at the plant on their own, and they can use the guidance to help inform that.

So when you get towards those fuzzy

lines, a licensee can make an argument to the staff in a license amendment, and we can judge if that's acceptable or not, and we can ask questions. The concern was, do we want to turn that discretion of determining something may come out numerically above a line, but we know that there's enough support that would say it's really considered below the line, you want to give that discretion to the licensee to make on their own without any regulatory review.

So that's, fundamentally, where this paragraph is coming into, is there is a handful of applications that turns over decision-making to the licensee after we have approved the application.

MEMBER BLEY: It strikes me that if that's the concern, it would be better to say it that way. And I'd even go further to say, if you're close, then you shouldn't have discretion and you ought to come talk to the staff. What you're kind of encouraging is for people to -- in those areas to fudge a little bit and game the system.

I mean, if it's that close and it's one of these things where you think you ought to be involved, say so. But putting it this way just doesn't -- I agree with John. It's not appropriate for 1.174, but it also isn't effective.

1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Let me try something, 2 though. I think it's completely inappropriate for 1.174 even to try to mention this notion of a hard 3 4 pass-fail criterion. 5 MEMBER BLEY: I'm agreeing with No. 6 that. 7 MEMBER REMPE: Did you say inappropriate 8 or appropriate? 9 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Inappropriate. 10 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. 11 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Not appropriate. 12 Bad. thought was if there there Μy 13 regulatory guides out there for particular riskinformed applications -- 1.175, 1.177, 1.178, 1.201, 14 1.205 is NFPA-805. 15 16 So if the intent for particular risk-17 applications, particular informed risk-informed 18 applications, that give -- as part of the licensing 19 decision that give a licensee the latitude to make changes without making a submittal, if the staff has 20 21 desire to highlight a bright line pass-fail 22 criterion within the context of those particular 23 applications, why and I'm not saying 24 necessarily agree with that, but it would seem more

appropriate to put that refinement of the guidance

in only those particular -- the guidance for those particular applications, rather than placing it here in what is generally interpreted by both the NRC and the industry as an umbrella document for how to think about making risk-informed decisions, and how to think about it is -- there's gray.

MR. HARRISON: I do want to clarify that if a licensee is making a change and it goes above a threshold, it doesn't say they can't do it. What it says is they need to come back with a license amendment to the staff to evaluate that.

So it's not a bright line as you can't make the change; it's just that you need to go through a license amendment. But I take your point. It may be more appropriate for this to go over into the guidance associated with those applications that provide that flexibility.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 1.201, 1.205, whatever. And there, you know, one can argue back and forth in the context of that. At least it's extracted from 1.174 where -- I hate to use the term "philosophy," but I'll use it. The philosophy, as it's displayed in those figures, and well described in this guidance, about why there are not bright,

1	hard and fast lines, why there is gray, why you
2	consider uncertainty, why you have an integrated
3	decision-making process that considers multi-
4	attributes of a decision, not just, you know, a
5	numerical pass-fail criterion
6	MS. DROUIN: Well, I think you've brought
7	up a really good point. I think we also need to go
8	back and see, why did we add this in here, because
9	this is an issue that's out of the defense-in-depth
LO	part.
L1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Is it?
L2	MS. DROUIN: So there had to have been
L3	some
L4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, I have no idea.
L5	MS. DROUIN: So I can't answer, I've got
L6	to go back and look at our previous versions and
L7	everything and why did we do this.
L8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: As I said, it wasn't in
L9	Rev 2, obviously. Well, I mean maybe not obviously,
20	but I'll tell you it wasn't in Rev 2.
21	MS. DROUIN: And I just looked at Rev 2,
22	it's not in Rev 2.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No. No. And it
24	appeared in Rev 3. Now, when it appeared, it was in
25	the version of Rev 3 that went out for public

1	comments. But anyway, go back and, you've heard our
2	comments.
3	MEMBER REMPE: So I'm curious as to the
4	process, and this is for my education. If you've
5	got a thing where you're saying you can't do
6	something, is the Reg Guide where that should be?
7	I mean, it's guidance and so how could
8	you, this isn't enforceable, so how would that keep
9	someone from doing something?
10	MR. HARRISON: The idea, and again, the
11	applications themselves have license conditions
12	MEMBER REMPE: So there would be a
13	condition, right.
14	MR. HARRISON: Right. And so this was, I
15	think, trying to be, we've had all discussion about
16	the fuzzy lines and stuff and it was just trying,
17	maybe naively, provide this point that there are
18	some applications where licensees are doing things
19	on their own, they can't use this fuzzy argument.
20	MEMBER REMPE: Yes.
21	MR. HARRISON: But, it's a worthwhile
22	point that that would be better captured in other
23	places that apply to those applications, but not
24	here.
25	MEMBER REMPE: Right.

1	MR. HARRISON: So we should take that
2	back, that's a sure thing.
3	MS. DROUIN: Now, you brought
4	MR. CHEOK: Hey, Donnie, I think I agree
5	with that comment. So, you know, something like
6	this probably should not be in the reg guide. And
7	you make a very good point, it should be probably in
8	the license condition or something when we issue
9	those
10	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Or in the guidance for
11	those, as Donnie said, for particular applications.
12	If the Staff wants to elaborate on how to consider
13	the greyness, but
14	MR. CHEOK: But then we still go back to
15	the point that this is a guidance document
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
17	MR. CHEOK: and I'm not sure that we
18	can specify requirements in the guidance document.
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oh, you can't. You
20	can't.
21	MR. CHEOK: Yes.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I mean, but one could
23	anyway.
24	MR. HARRISON: And the way we did that in
25	Reg Guide 1.201, and in another area, is we stated

in the Reg Guide that there was an expectation, a 1 license condition would be established to control, 2 dah-dah, dah-dah. 3 4 So, you would write this the same way. A 5 license condition on this topic. And that's what we've done on the fire applications. 6 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. I had two or three comments, as long as we're talking about, I 8 9 don't have a lot more, so don't worry too much about 10 time. 11 Concept of uncertainty. And a lot of this 12 stuff I think is editorial, but we've had, we've 13 learned -- let me start over again. We collectively, I think, have become, at 14 15 the NRC, much more mature in our understanding of 16 how to treat uncertainty Reg Guide, or NUREG-1855, It's a very mature, very well presented way 17 1855. 18 to think about uncertainty and address uncertainty. 19 And Reg Guide 1.174 refers, now 20 appropriately, to 1855. Does it very well. 21 There were a few places that I stumbled 22 over though that may benefit from reconsideration. 23 And they're primarily holdovers from Rev 2. just throw them out for consideration, 24 I'11 if 25 you're making editorial changes.

And the first one is, in 2.5.1, it's Page 33, the first paragraph. Where you're talking about aleatory and epistemic uncertainty, just setting the case for what those things are.

Things I hang-up on. In other words, they've recently been termed aleatory, well recently, more than a decade ago, that's just a word.

More of a philosophical aspect though, is later in the paragraph, when we talk about aleatory uncertainty as being a measure of the random or stochastic measure, it then says, it is this aspect of uncertainty that gives PRA the probabilistic part of its name. Well, I take issue with that.

PRA is probabilistic and it ought to account for both aleatory and epistemic. This infers that PRA is PRA simply because it accounts for aleatory uncertainty. But I don't know why we need to say that anymore.

Reg guide, I always call it reg guide, NUREG-1855, I'm sorry. NUREG-1855 certainly doesn't say that. And it also, right at the end of that paragraph it says, this section discusses epistemic uncertainty, the aleatory uncertainty is built into the structure of the PRA model itself.

1	Well, yes, kind of. But many PRA models
2	also build in elements of epistemic uncertainty. In
3	particular, Level 2 models.
4	And people have even addressed things like
5	reactor coolant pump seal modeling, which is, has an
6	element of epistemic uncertainty in terms of
7	probabilistic treatment of seal LOCA flow rates.
8	So look at that paragraph again. It's
9	editorial, but it's
10	MS. DROUIN: Yes. And you're looking at a
11	paragraph that's been there approximately
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, yes.
13	MS. DROUIN: from Rev 0.
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's true, but this
15	Rev 3 in 2017.
16	MS. DROUIN: No, no, I understand.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And as I said, this has
18	been my first opportunity to read the whole thing
19	again, end to end, and think about, what changes are
20	we making from what was before to what is now.
21	MS. DROUIN: Now I will tell you, in 1855,
22	we had a lot of discussion on the term aleatory and
23	epistemic.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oh yes.
25	MS. DROUIN: And the decision we came to,

1	we weren't going to use either one of those terms.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
3	MS. DROUIN: And
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, I mean there were
5	discussions at one time about the fact that you
6	could call it aleatory, you could call it epistemic,
7	but there is some things that have elements of both
8	in it and trying to pigeonhole it into one of those
9	boxes doesn't make a heck of a lot of sense.
10	MS. DROUIN: Exactly. And we just though
11	going down that slippery slope, and so we just, yes.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. And this whole
13	notion of, the way you run your two loops to
14	quantify
15	MS. DROUIN: Exactly.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: aleatory versus
17	epistemic is, anyway, think about that paragraph if
18	you would. It's editorial, but it will start to
19	reinforce this notion of how we think about
20	uncertainty these days.
21	Now, when we talk about, again, Section
22	2.6, when we talk about integrated decision making,
23	and this is not a real specific comment, as I read
24	through this thing I made a note to myself that huh,
25	the word uncertainty does not appear in this

1 discussion of integrated decision making. Through 2 the word search it doesn't appear. To me that's somewhat remarkable. 3 the end of this section there are a list of bullets 4 5 in terms of the expectation of the information that 6 should be provided to support that 7 decision making. None of those says that I need to 8 tell you what my uncertainty is. So, should we address the notion of an 9 10 expectation, that the submittal ought to address 11 uncertainty? 12 There is a good discussion of the fact 13 that it should be treated in the analyses that you So this is kind of a grey area. But this sort 14 do. 15 of rolls everything together. And it's just notable 16 to me that it doesn't even mention uncertainty. 17 Think about it. 18 And along the same lines with that, 19 6.3.1, this was kind of a follow on from my previous 20 comment so I won't whine as much, but it lists, 21 again, the expectation of what information should be 22 submitted. And there's a list of bullets there, 23 event trees, fault trees, operator actions. It doesn't say that, it says description 24

documentation,

the

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assessment

risk

1 methods, it doesn't say anything about, it says key 2 modeling assumptions that are necessary, but doesn't say anything about, saying that I should 3 4 submit uncertainty. 5 Again, that's a little less, it does, down below say, the last bullet in that section says, 6 results of sensitivity analyses. Again, think about 7 8 That's primarily editorial in nature. 9 MS. DROUIN: Well, let me ask you a 10 philosophical question. When you use this term 11 uncertainty and it doesn't talk about submitting 12 anything, I mean, Reg Guide 1.174 goes on 13 premise that you deal with it, I mean, if we're 14 talking now, more your parameter uncertainties, you 15 deal with it by supplying the mean values. 16 we don't look at the uncertainty 17 intervals, we don't look at the 95th or the 5th, 18 everything is done around the mean. 19 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. Well, see, 20 point is, if I'm making a decision, I'd kind of like 21 to know if I'm fairly close to the mean, reasonably 22 close to that grey fuzzy area. 23 It would be useful, for me as a decision 24 other decision maker, and makers might think

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know

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1 probability that I might exceed it or is there a two 2 percent probability that I might exceed it or a essentially infinitesimal probability that I might 3 exceed it. That might affect my decision. 4 5 So I use that uncertainty as a measure of 6 confidence in mу margin. And without 7 information I'm only left with that mean value. 8 MEMBER BLEY: The earlier part of the 9 document talks about uncertainty a lot. 10 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It does. 11 MEMBER BLEY: Those people to integrate it 12 into what they're doing. So I kind of looked at it, 13 I read modeling assumptions as including it, now 14 Mary makes it kind of clear that they weren't 15 thinking you needed to show that in the final 16 result. 17 And of course, you're doing it, and that 18 lets you get the right mean. But with her decision 19 making, having an idea of how likely you are to be 20 beyond that grey area, is the thing that defines the 21 grey area. 22 MS. DROUIN: And that concept was, is 23 introduced in 1855. We've got the four regimes and 24 you look at which regime you are and how the

uncertainty falls in that regime. So it does --

1 MEMBER BLEY: And here you refer to 1855 2 quite a bit. It's just leaving it out right at the 3 end, isn't it? 4 MS. DROUIN: So, I mean this, in my mind, 5 if we're going to bring that in, it would be a major 6 scope change to here. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: See, I don't see why 8 you think it's a major scope change. I need to, as 9 Dennis said, if I follow the quidance in here in 10 need to quantify uncertainty, I need to address 11 uncertainty that I can quantify and I need to 12 somehow address uncertainties that I can't quantify. Either through a sensitivity analysis or by some 13 14 sort of qualitative assessment. 15 As long as I'm quantifying 16 uncertainty, why isn't there a clear expectation, by the NRC, for me to report that uncertainty as part 17 18 of my submittal, such that when a decision maker is 19 presented this information, part of which is 20 qualitative, part of which is quantitative, 21 decision maker can say, ah, from a quantitative 22 perspective, at least, here's what the uncertainty 23 is telling me.

the guidance, but low and behold, the uncertainty is

On a mean value basis, I might even exceed

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1 broad that the mean value is like the 90th 2 percentile of my uncertainty. There's a 90 percent 3 probability that I'm better. MS. DROUIN: I understand. 4 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And that to me, decision maker, gives me a heck of a lot 6 7 confidence than saying, the mean value is ten 8 percent higher than the quidance, and I addressed 9 uncertainty somewhere. 10 MR. HARRISON: The --11 (Simultaneously speaking) 12 MR. CHEOK: -- quickly, I think, we are trying to provide some guidance, both for the staff 13 and for the licensees. And I think the licensees 14 would like to have some clarity as to what the Staff 15 16 look at. 17 So, when we talked about uncertainties, we 18 talked about the parameter of the model and the 19 completeness uncertainties. I believe that the 20 submittal, in the submittal, we expect the licensees 21 to address model uncertainties by, you know, in the 22 is qualitative sense, this why we think it's 23 adequate enough. Completeness the same way. 24 Why the scope of the PRA is not, it's not 25 all inclusive, think it's

but we

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because. And so that should be addressed.

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But in terms of parameter uncertainty, we, I think the quidelines would imply that you are now submitting the mean values. But if you are now people address asking to the uncertainty by submitting the distribution, you may be introducing some variable in there where you are saying, what the staff expect, how we would make our now decisions based on the distribution, which is based on a mean value that we can look at in comparison to the quidelines.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: All right, I'll come back to my example. If you're a decision maker, you're faced with making a decision on a submittal.

And I need to be careful here because you're supposed to be making your decision on the totality of information that you have available to you. Qualitative and quantitative.

The quantitative part of that information says that, well, I did an analysis and my mean value comes out to be ten percent higher than this fuzzy line. And again, I won't make it a hard line because I don't want to make it a hard line.

But it's ten percent and I did a mean value, the mean value is the result of my

1	uncertainty analysis. I present that to you and you
2	say, oh gee, the quantitative analysis says that
3	your kind of in, a little bit over but in the not so
4	good side of that grey line.
5	If I then tell you that there is a 48
6	percent chance that I will be even higher than that,
7	you think about, I would anyway, think about it one
8	way.
9	If I tell you there's only a three percent
10	chance that I'm higher than that, you might think
11	about it differently.
12	Now, without that uncertainty
13	distribution, you don't know whether there's a 48
14	percent chance or a three percent chance or a seven
15	percent chance or a whatever chance that I'm above
16	it, and you don't know how much above it you might
17	be. Or conversely, if I'm looking on the good side,
18	how much below it you might be.
19	MR. CHEOK: And
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: There might be an 80
21	percent chance that you're an order of magnitude
22	below it.
23	MR. CHEOK: And so these are actually all
24	good points, but when we looked at the acceptance
25	criteria, the fuzzy line, we are actually thinking

Τ	about your comparing two ruzzy rines. Four re
2	looking at the uncertainty. You are basically, the
3	distribution for the answer you're submitting, which
4	is the fuzziness of the acceptance guideline.
5	So if you're talking about 40 percent over
6	a bright line, then I think it also could be, they
7	can do a count. But if they are talking about 40
8	percent over which part of the fuzzy guideline, I
9	think that it gets a little bit complicated.
10	I think we can be a little simpler by
11	saying that the fuzzy acceptance criteria should
12	take into account the mean values that is being
13	calculated for us. I think it's all in the sake of
14	being more simple or more understandable.
15	MR. HARRISON: I think we have the comment
16	and so we need to take it back.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'm not going to say
18	anymore.
19	MR. HARRISON: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: This is
21	MR. HARRISON: We'll take it back and
22	discuss it internally.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. The last one that
24	I have, and this is the last one, is it comes back
25	to the, Donnie mentioned it, the peer review. And

it's in Section 6.3.

And it's the footnote on Page 44 that discusses that letter that you were talking about. This is another example of something that I think is extraneous and is speculative about what might happen in the future.

If there are going to be changes made to Reg Guide 1.200, to incorporate this, the guidance here already says that you should use 1.200. I don't know why we need that footnote.

MS. DROUIN: Well again, it's because 1.200, we're not seeing a change to that. I mean, we're starting it by, but by the time we get out the next revision of 1.200, we'll be in 2019. So right now, Reg Guide 1.200 does not talk about the resolution of these F&Os. It will in the next version.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Let me try something.

Because I don't know in, again, we don't propose writing, but given the fact that I'm not going to propose writing, I'm looking for the paragraph.

Yes, it's the paragraph right there at the end.

The footnote comes out of a paragraph that says, the licensee's resolution of the findings of the peer review should also be submitted, for

1 example, yada-yada, yada-yada, and you come to the 2 footnote. To me it's not clear to me why that first 3 4 sentence was ever in Reg Guide 1.174. Discussing 5 the need, in a risk informed application, to provide the resolution of peer review findings. 6 It was in Rev 2, I know it was in Rev 2. 7 8 That sentence is a carryover for Rev 2. 9 Given the fact that sentence is in there, 10 then prompts the need for the footnote saying, well 11 yes, but there's going to be a different way to 12 treat the resolution. Do we need at all to address that issue in 1.174, obviating perhaps the need for 13 footnote and throwing it over into whatever 14 comes out of 1.200 and whenever it comes out? 15 16 MR. HARRISON: The sentence is there 17 because, again, this is kind of on the submittal 18 information of, you're doing a peer review, the 19 purpose of the industry peer review. So this is 20 bringing in, that's the technical --21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But we've already --22 MR. HARRISON: -- piece of it. 23 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But we've already established, well I think, throughout this guidance, 24 25 the technical acceptability of the PRA. One element

of that is meeting 1.200. However it's met. 1.200 says you ought to have a peer review.

MR. HARRISON: And the question is, is for some applications, you don't necessarily have to meet a supporting requirement and you're still okay. So there's that flexibility of, on an application, not conforming to all the elements of a standard and yet still being okay.

In other cases that wouldn't be acceptable for some other applications. So this is --

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But that's an application specific. It still doesn't tell me anything about why I, I had a peer review, the peer review said I'm perfect in all of the elements that I need to support my application. Or it may have said, during the initial peer review said, no, I had a deficiency under one of those elements and I went back and I fixed it. Or I negotiated a partial fix.

I don't know why I have to submit that whole peer review resolution, as part of the guidance in 1.174. I might have to submit that to convince you, for my application, that I adequately satisfied technical acceptability for the elements that I need to meet, for my application. Whether it's a tech spec change or whatever.

1	You follow my rationale that
2	MS. DROUIN: I think personally we might -
3	_
4	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I don't know why it's
5	in 1.174. Because that sentence is in 1.174 has
6	prompted this footnote and I think we're rolling
7	down a slope that we might not need to have started
8	to roll down in the beginning.
9	Especially now that we have better clarity
10	on the expectations for technical acceptability.
11	We'll call it that.
12	MS. DROUIN: In the past, when they submit
13	their application, they submit the results of the
14	peer review.
15	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And there has been some
16	push back on the desire to do that.
17	MS. DROUIN: There has been push back.
18	And where the push back, and Joe, please correct me
19	if I'm going to say this incorrectly, the push back
20	is that on one application they answer the question
21	on some of these F&Os and then they have to re-
22	answer them again on other applications.
23	So this F&O closure process does two
24	things. It allows them, we as an agency, don't have
25	to look at how they were dispositioned for those

1	that were dispositioned properly. And they don't
2	have to submit them.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's basically a once
4	and done process.
5	MS. DROUIN: Right. So now they still
6	have to submit the open F&Os.
7	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's right.
8	MS. DROUIN: So this is talking, Reg Guide
9	1.174, is talking across all your applications.
LO	Because your peer review is not done per a specific
L1	application, it's done to the base PRA. And here
L2	are the findings.
L3	And so now they've come in and done this
L4	F&O and have corrected some of those deficiencies.
L5	We've approved that process, so we don't need to
L6	look at it. We just want to look at those
L7	deficiencies that have not been resolved.
L8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But, and I get that.
L9	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: To me that sentence
21	doesn't say that though. It says the resolution to
22	the findings in the peer review. That says
23	everything that is open, closed, halfway in between
24	there.
25	MS. DROUIN: Well

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's the way I read
2	that. And that's why I think the industry
3	MS. DROUIN: And again, maybe we weren't,
4	we didn't do the best job, we just fixed the problem
5	by adding a footnote.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, yes.
7	MS. DROUIN: Where
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But my problem is that
9	
10	MS. DROUIN: maybe in hindsight we
11	should have rewritten maybe, maybe tweaked the
12	paragraph a little bit more.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And it's a comment,
14	yes.
15	MS. DROUIN: But we were trying to keep
16	our changes to a minimum. So good comment, we can
17	go look at the paragraph and see how we want to
18	perhaps revise it.
19	MR. HARRISON: Yes, we can, elsewhere we
20	refer to Reg Guide 1.200, so if that's where this
21	guidance went, I don't think you'd be having a
22	comment on Reg Guide 1.200 if we said that.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, no. No.
24	MR. HARRISON: So the question becomes,
25	what's the appropriate words to have here or

1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I have no problem with 2 this pointing to 1.200 if 1.200 is the place where this all gets worked out. 3 4 MR. HARRISON: Yes. And the question is, 5 do you need a footnote or some kind of linkage that 6 says, currently, this is not in Reg Guide 1.200. 7 Right? 8 Because it's right now, you know, a means 9 of addressing it through this process. 10 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, but, Donnie, part 11 of my problem is that I don't know when, the reason 12 I intercepted this before this slide is, I don't know when Rev 4 of Reg Guide 1.174 is planned. 13 this document might be out here ten years from now, 14 with this footnote still sitting here. 15 And some 16 final decision might be to create some other 17 document. You know, I don't --18 MS. DROUIN: I understand your problem. 19 The problem is, is that we've got two documents that 20 work together and they're out of sync. 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: 22 MEMBER BLEY: And this kind of will 23 perpetuate that. What we've seen other people do is 24 either have a branch technical position, or an ISG, 25 that lives until you fix one of these and then it

1	goes away. Although some of those have lasted for
2	20 years or longer.
3	MR. HARRISON: Yes. It's a good comment,
4	I think we should take it back and look at it and
5	see if we can simplify that.
6	MS. DROUIN: Dually noted. And we will
7	have internal discussion on this one also.
8	We're going to have discussions on all
9	your comments, John.
LO	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'm sure you will.
L1	(Laughter)
L2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Now, before we get to
L3	path forward, any of the other Members have any
L4	comments on the Rev 3? The text. The philosophical
L5	editorial.
L6	MEMBER REMPE: I had a curiosity question.
L7	How often do you get submittals? Historically. Is
L8	it one year, two year, one every four years?
L9	MS. DROUIN: Joe, do you want to answer
20	that?
21	MR. GIITTER: Yes. Yes, it's a lot more
22	than that. We're actually seeing a pretty
23	significant increase in submittals that rely on Reg
24	Guide 1.174.
25	I would say at the baseline we had 40 per

1	year, but we're expecting to get 5069 applications
2	from every operating reactor. In fact, it's one of
3	the NEI bulletins under the, delivering the nuclear
4	promise.
5	We've got a bunch of 4b applications a
6	house. We've approved 5b for about three quarters
7	of the plants, we've approved risk informed ISI for
8	pretty much all the plants, I think, except for
9	Oyster creek, risk informed ILRTs. So we see a lot
10	of these.
11	MEMBER REMPE: Okay, thank you.
12	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Has that included a
13	power uprate?
14	MR. HARRISON: Power uprates are not
15	risked informed applications, per say. But we do
16	look at them.
17	MEMBER SKILLMAN: Joe, if I could ask,
18	please. Are those applications, and the interaction
19	between the staff and the licensee, contentious or
20	are those generally fairly smooth?
21	MR. HARRISON: That's a great question.
22	So we had, with NFPA 805, the history there was, I
23	would characterize it as more on the contentious
24	side. But I think there were a number of factors
25	that contributed to that. Both on the part of the

staff and on the part of the industry.

In fact, I mean, I can talk about that forever. I gave a presentation down at the utility working conference on some of the lessons learned from NFPA 805.

But there were a number of factors that went into it. I think the bottom line is, as an industry we were quite ready for it, in a number of ways.

We are working hard to prevent those type of contentious applications in the future. We had experienced some differences on the risk informed tech spec 4b and we worked through those. It was a difficult process.

I think we now have a process moving forward where those, where the staff and industry are in agreement on how to do that. Still some remaining issues, one remaining issue in particular, but I think getting the Vogtle safety evaluation issued I think was a major accomplishment.

And I think with 5069 we reviewed the pilot within a reasonable time frame. I think the guidance is in place. It's not perfect, but it's good. And I think we're in pretty good shape for the 5069 reviews.

1	MEMBER SKILLMAN: Okay, thank you, Joe.
2	Thank you.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I know Pete Riccardella
4	was, at one time, on the bridge line. I have no
5	idea whether Pete's still there. Pete, are you
6	there? All righty then.
7	Quynh, do we know whether we ever got Pete
8	back?
9	MR. NGUYEN: I don't think we got him
10	back.
11	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We didn't get him back.
12	Pete, if you're listening in, you've been
13	disenfranchised.
14	(Laughter)
15	MEMBER BLEY: Send an email.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, if you have a
17	burning concern or question or comment, please send
18	it to Quynh, now. Or Joy. Joy has email up.
19	Now, Mary, path forward.
20	MS. DROUIN: Okay. Well, we were
21	scheduled to come in September, so I do believe
22	we're now scheduled to come in October.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We have you, right now,
24	preliminarily slotted for October.
25	MS. DROUIN: Okay. And we've committed to

Τ	send you the document three weeks prior to that,
2	which we will do.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Given what you heard
4	this morning, is that a feasible path forward?
5	The reason that we need, I'd like a little
6	bit of clarity, and I don't want to put you on the
7	spot to make decisions, Mike or Mary or anybody
8	today, but I think we'd really like to know by
9	middle of next week whether that October briefing
10	seems to make sense or should we push it to
11	November?
12	We have scheduling problems for the Full-
13	committee.
14	MEMBER BLEY: We're okay in October
15	though?
16	MR. CHEOK: Mary said, and Donnie said the
17	same thing, we will look at all the comments that we
18	got today and we will determine how much changes we
19	will have to make, as a result of the comments, and
20	we will come back to you by next week
21	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, okay.
22	MR. CHEOK: to tell you if we need more
23	time to make those changes.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We just need to know a

1	months.
2	MR. CHEOK: And so I think the sensitivity
3	we have is that we, at this point, have a commitment
4	to the Commissioners that we will have the final
5	product out by March. So if we back things up, in
6	October Full-committee meeting would be doable,
7	November kind of pushes the limits
8	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
9	MR. CHEOK: but we'll take everything
LO	into consideration.
L1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Take it into
L2	consideration and see if you can get back to us.
L3	Would it, let me just ask you, I don't know how many
L4	Donnie and Mary
L5	MS. DROUIN: I took quite extensive notes.
L6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Do you need an
L7	expedited transcript or do you think you have enough
L8	notes?
L9	MS. DROUIN: I mean, that always helps.
20	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. We'll see if we
21	can get an expedited transcript. That though means
22	sort of middle of next week anyways, so.
23	MS. DROUIN: Well, I don't think we're
24	going to wait until the middle of next week.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, no. Okay.

1	MR. CHEOK: I think we got a
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You think you have
3	MR. CHEOK: of the major comments that
4	we need to address.
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Okay. We'll try
6	to get an expedited transcript, just so it will
7	help. Make sure, Quynh, we make that happen.
8	MS. DROUIN: Okay then, resolve the
9	feedback that we've heard. We were not asking for a
10	letter, but my understanding is you all are going to
11	provide a letter.
12	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well we, yes. I can't
13	speak for the Committee, the Committee decides
14	MS. DROUIN: And I know we're talking
15	about
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: but given the fact
17	that Rev Guide 1.174, in my opinion, it's a very
18	visible, highly referenced regulatory guide. And I
19	think because of its visibility, I would expect that
20	the Committee will decide to write a letter on it.
21	But again, I can't
22	MEMBER BLEY: And we've been heavily
23	involved since its origin, so I can't imagine we
24	won't
25	MS. DROUIN: I'd like to ask you a

1	question.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Sure.
3	MS. DROUIN: Putting aside the comments
4	that you gave us
5	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes.
6	MS. DROUIN: then I would assume that
7	you pretty much like this rev guide and what we've
8	done.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I will tell you, this
10	is a Subcommittee meeting, so my personal opinion, I
11	think that the way that you've addressed defense-in-
12	depth in particular, and that's the big change
13	CO-CHAIR SUNSERI: Yes.
14	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: flows very well now.
15	I think the context is there. Again, I had a couple
16	of minor comments, but the, I think that should be
17	very, very helpful to users. Both applicants and
18	the Staff.
19	And I think that was, in my opinion, done
20	very, very well. And I would have, you know, I
21	would have whined about things in that area more if
22	I had any particular heartaches.
23	And not hearing any comments from the
24	other Subcommittee Members I'd presume that there is
25	a general agreement in that area.

1	MS. DROUIN: Okay.
2	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So the big chunk of the
3	change, Rev 2 to Rev 3
4	MS. DROUIN: And I didn't want to walk
5	away with that impression
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No, no.
7	MS. DROUIN: so I'm glad that you
8	verbalized that.
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I went back, I looked
10	at the draft of that section, what's now 2.1, that
11	we saw a year ago, the comments that we had on that,
12	that we had, Subcommittee comments on that draft, I
13	looked at the public comments, I looked at, pretty
14	well scrutinized the words in the final version that
15	we had and I think you did a really good job on
16	them. Really good job.
17	MS. DROUIN: I mean, you know, we ended up
18	writing a little bit more, I think, than we had
19	planned when we started this, but I think we ended
20	up going the route we went because of the numerous
21	public meetings we had and the feedback we were
22	getting from the public and the questions that we
23	were being asked, we really felt this kind of
24	additional text and the way we broke it up between

explaining what the factors and then here's the

1 guidance, was necessary. 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: In a big picture, 3 mentioned where I hung-up on that common cause one. 4 That was the only one --5 MS. DROUIN: Right. CHAIRMAN STETKAR: -- that sort of got me 6 a bit off kilter. I think the rest of the stuff 7 8 flows very well. The expectations, how you might be able to 9 address them, the philosophy of the fact that you do 10 11 not need to meet specific criteria, if you will, for 12 each of the seven. That reinforces this notion of integrated decision making and addressing an issue 13 as a whole. 14 It does make the point that you can use 15 16 insights from the risk assessment, the PRA, to help 17 bolster your arguments about maintaining, enhancing defense-in-depth or if you have a reduction, if you 18 19 will, in defense-in-depth providing a good argument that despite the fact that you might consider it a 20 21 reduction, it's not a significant reduction. 22 think all of that flows really, really, well. 23 And it's consistent with this notion of an 24 integrated decision making. It sort of tells you

that you need to consider defense-in-depth.

25

But it

1	is not a standalone requirement that you must met in
2	a clear pass/fail criterion, that it's part of the
3	process.
4	I, again, that's my opinion. The rest of
5	the Committee might think differently, but you have
6	a pretty cross-section of the Full-committee here
7	today.
8	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
9	MS. DROUIN: Right. So, bearing that no
10	one is saying anything, that pretty much people
11	liked what we did, so that's good to know.
12	So once we come to you guys we're going to
13	then start our final review and go into the
14	concurrence. And we're looking to meet our March
15	2018 publication date.
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Anything else?
17	If not, are there any members of the public in the
18	room who would like to make a comment? If so, come
19	up to the microphone and do so. Oh?
20	MEMBER REMPE: While you're waiting for
21	that, I did hear from Pete and he said he doesn't
22	have any comments.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oh, good.
24	MEMBER REMPE: He left the discussion
25	about 9:30.

1	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oh, okay. That's more
2	stamina then I credited him for.
3	(Laughter)
4	MEMBER REMPE: Oh, actually he's back
5	though, I guess, on the line.
6	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Sorry, Peter.
7	MEMBER REMPE: He couldn't get in at 9:30
8	so anyway
9	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I got to stay away from
10	Pete next time. Are there any members of the public
11	on the bridge line who would like to make a comment?
12	If there are, please speak up, state your name and
13	make your comment.
14	MEMBER RICCARDELLA: This is Pete, can you
15	hear me now?
16	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, Pete, hi. Sorry.
17	MEMBER RICCARDELLA: I was on the regular
18	bridge line. Yes, I've been on since about 9:30
19	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Oh, okay.
20	MEMBER RICCARDELLA: but I wasn't able
21	to talk the last time you asked. But I'm interested
22	and I think that I concur with what you just stated.
23	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Thank you very
24	much. Are there any members of the public on the
25	bridge line who would like to make a comment? If

1	not Pete? Mute your phone, Pete.
2	MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Okay.
3	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Hearing no public
4	comments, as we always do in a Subcommittee meeting,
5	I like to go around the table and see if there are
6	any final comments that any of the Members would
7	like to make. Ron.
8	MEMBER BALLINGER: Yes. I mean, it's
9	obvious I'm not up on the nuances of what you've
10	been discussing, but when I read it I thought it was
11	damn good. Compared to the, really. I mean, very
12	good. Thank you.
13	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you. Matt.
14	MEMBER SUNSERI: I concur. There's a lot
15	of hard work been done on this and we look forward
16	to the final revision. Thanks.
17	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dick.
18	MEMBER SKILLMAN: Yes. Mary and Donnie,
19	thank you very much. I appreciate the collaboration
20	between NRR and RES. So, Michael and Joe, thank
21	you. Thank you.
22	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dana.
23	MEMBER POWERS: No.
24	CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you. Dennis.
25	MEMBER BLEY: Since you ask, I was a

1 little uncomfortable the last time we looked at 2 this. I think you've come along way, it's really good. 3 The one piece, and John had brought it up, 4 5 that makes me nervous are having things that aren't risk informed in a few places, tacked in here, and I 6 7 hope you get rid of that. 8 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Jose. 9 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I like the quide and 10 I like the defense-in-depth section of the guide and 11 I like the fact that the defense-in-depth section is 12 there. 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Walt. 14 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I concur with some of the other comments. I would strike the Latin lesson 15 16 in the beginning. 17 agree, although the containment I 18 requirements are nice, they probably don't belong in 19 this document. I would strike the CCF examples 20 because you were striking some of them and not all 21 of them, and you don't do examples for defense-in-22 depth, which I like, why do it for CCF. Because 23 you're getting in the weeds. And I think it looks 24 pretty good. Thank you.

Joy.

CHAIRMAN STETKAR:

25

1 MEMBER REMPE: I don't have any additional comments, but 2 thank you for your efforts and 3 presentations. 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you. And I don't 5 have any more. Again, you what heard what I said I think with the exception of the nits, 6 some of them not maybe so nits, but you can figure 7 8 that out. But I mentioned earlier, I think that the 9 major effort, you did a heck of a lot of good work 10 11 to fold the defense-in-depth considerations in. 12 I know that you had a lot of discussions with the 13 public on this. More than, probably more than I would have 14 expected, and I think on balance you have made a 15 16 real fine improvement from the previous version of 17 And we certainly look forward to the quidance. having the final version available for the Full-18 19 committee, whenever we decide to do that. 20 And, Mike and Joe, appreciate you being 21 And with that, we are adjourned. 22 MS. DROUIN: Thank you. 23 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 24 off the record at 10:46 a.m.)



Regulatory Guide 1.174, Revision 3 Status Briefing for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Subcommittee on Reliability and PRA

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Overview

- Background
- Process
- Recent accomplishments
- Modifications to Regulatory Guide (RG)
- Public comments
- Path forward



Background

- SRM-SECY-11-0014 (2011): Revise defense-indepth (DID) guidance in RG 1.174
- Proposed draft of RG 1.174, Revision 3, was published in 2012 as DG–1285 for public review and comment
 - RG 1.174, Revision 3, was delayed due to ongoing work on DID
 - Public comments were received but not dispositioned
- SRM-SECY-15-0168 (2016): Expeditiously complete the revision to RG 1.174



Process

- Inter-Office Working Group formed (RES, NRR, NRO, and OGC; NMSS, NSIR observing)
- Effort overseen by Inter-Office Division-Level Steering Committee (RES/DRA, NRR/DRA, and NRO/DSRA)
- Frequent public meetings, including briefings for the ACRS and both the internal/external Risk-Informed Steering Committees



Recent Accomplishments

- April 7, 2017: Revised DG–1285 issued for public comment
- May 11, 2017: Briefed the Commission on status of changes to RG 1.174
- July 2017: Completed revision of DG-1285 to address public comments (including comments from 2012)

RG 1.174, Rev. 3 – Modifications

- Described each of the seven DID considerations (formerly known as factors) and reverted to original structure of DID guidance
- Removed DID examples
- Provided guidance on how to address each DID consideration
- Included guidance on risk aggregation with a stronger tie to NUREG-1855, "Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decisionmaking"
- Emphasized that the acceptance guidelines' boundaries are gradual transitions
- Adopted relevant and useful language from other NRC guidance documents (e.g., the Standard Review Plan)



RG 1.174, Rev. 3 – Modifications (cont')

- Developed language on transitioning from large release frequency and conditional containment failure probability to large early release frequency for new reactors (SRM– SECY–10–0121; SRM–SECY–12–0081 Option 2C)
- Developed language on containment performance expectations for new reactors (SRM-SECY-12-0081 Option 2C)



RG 1.174, Rev. 3 – Modifications (cont')

- Changed language related to the terms PRA acceptability, technical adequacy, quality etc.
 - DPO–2016–001 raised issues on inconsistent language usage
 - EDO supported RES OD decision that the staff should adopt the term "PRA acceptability" rather than "PRA quality" or "technical adequacy"
 - RIS under development to communicate staff's plan to implement EDO resolution across the agency's guidance to licensees



Public Comments from 2017

- Public comments resulting in changes
 - Numerous editorial changes
 - Examples of where language was clarified:
 - Small impacts to all DID considerations can result in an overall significant impact on DID
 - Modeling of compensatory measures
 - Regarding submission of closed peer review Facts and Observations
 - Risk insights can be used to help inform the DID evaluation
 - Clarification related to defense against human errors



Public Comments from 2017 (cont')

- Pubic comments not resulting in changes
 - Reversing terminology changes related to "PRA acceptability"
 - Removing the DID consideration on maintaining the intent of the plant's design criteria
 - Related to submittal of past plant changes



Public Comments from 2012

- Public comments resulting in changes
 - Confusion over hierarchical framework of DID considerations
 - Additional clarification on relative terms (e.g., reasonable, significant)
 - Types of licensing basis changes
 - Inclusion of relevant language from SRP
 - Removal of examples



Public Comments from 2012 (cont')

- Pubic comments not resulting in changes
 - Relationships between risk-informed decisionmaking principles
 - Limitations on when DID should be addressed

RG 1.174, Rev. 3 – Path Forward

- Upcoming ACRS Full Committee Meeting
- Staff resolves ACRS feedback
- Final Reviews/Concurrence
- March 2018: Final publication

