

**ENCLOSURE 2**  
**NRC STAFF RESPONSES TO PUBLIC COMMENTS ON WHITE PAPER**  
**DATED MAY 14, 2013**  
**ML13277A422**

## I. INTRODUCTION

This document presents the NRC staff's responses to written public comments received on a staff "White Paper," *NRC Staff Working Group Evaluation of Alternatives for the Disposition of Recommendation 1 of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Report*, dated May 14, 2013 (ADAMS Accession NO. ML13135A125). The staff posted the white paper on the regulations.gov website and on the NRC public website on May 15, 2013. Thereafter, the staff held a public meeting on June 5, 2013 to: (1) provide external stakeholders with the status of the NRC staff's progress on regulatory framework alternatives being evaluated to provide a recommended approach to the Commission regarding the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Report Recommendation 1; (2) afford external stakeholders an opportunity to ask the NRC staff clarifying and amplifying questions on the staff's current thinking on disposition of the NTTF Recommendation 1 effort; and (3) provide an opportunity for external stakeholders and the NRC staff to exchange information on regulatory framework subject matter to facilitate more accurate and complete understanding by all parties. The public comment period on the white paper was opened on May 16, 2013, and closed August 15, 2013.

Although the staff previously issued versions of the White Paper for public comments on two occasions in October 2012 and February 2013, this comment response document does not address comments received on earlier versions of the White Paper. This is because substantial changes were made to the NRC staff's approach to resolving NTTF Recommendation 1 as a result of its internal deliberations and the input from interested stakeholders. As a result, many of the earlier comments would no longer be applicable as some have been incorporated and others refer to preliminary staff proposals that are no longer being put forward. A list of commenters on earlier versions of the staff's White Paper is set forth in Enclosure 4, "NRC Staff Outreach on Disposition of NTTF Recommendation 1."

## II. OVERVIEW OF COMMENTERS AND COMMENTS ON MAY 14, 2013 WHITE PAPER

The staff received comment submissions from four commenters. One submission was received from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), one was received from STARS Alliance LLC (representing seven nuclear power plants), and submissions were received from two individuals. One of those individuals, Mr. Stephen Maloney, submitted a revision to his first comment submission with additional information and corrections to his first comment submission. The NRC staff did not find any comments in Mr. Maloney's earlier document which were not provided in his second submission, so this comment response document only addresses the second submission. Table 1 presents information on the commenters who submitted comments on the May 14, 2013 White Paper.

Table 1.

Commenter	Affiliation	ADAMS Accession No.
Prasad Kadambi	Individual	ML13233A025
Joseph Pollock	NEI	ML13234A022
Stephen Maloney	Individual	ML13233A024
Stephen Maloney	Individual	ML13239A438
Scott Bauer	STARS Alliance LLC	ML13252A064

### III. STAFF RESPONSES TO COMMENTS

Comments received by the NRC in the comment period which closed on August 15, 2013 fall into four general areas:

- General comments (e.g., scope, schedule, resources)
- Comments on Improvement Activity 1: creating a new category of events
- Comments on Improvement Activity 2: defining defense-in-depth
- Comments on Improvement Activity 3: voluntary industry initiatives

Accordingly, the comments and the staff's responses are organized into these four areas. In each area, comments that raise similar or identical matters are "binned" into a single comment summary, and an overall NRC response to the binned comments is provided.

#### A. General Comments

*Comment: The current regulatory framework maintains nuclear safety and use of this existing process provides an acceptable approach to regulation while precluding an increase in costs associated with new regulations. Thus, no regulatory action is needed with respect to Recommendation 1. However, a long-term strategic objective to better define the regulatory framework and allow NRC to provide a more structured and predictable response to future issues that may involve beyond design basis considerations may be desirable. (NEI)*

NRC staff response: No response necessary.

*Comment: A generic categorization approach for design-basis extension events and requirements without plant specific probabilistic risk assessments (PRA), as recommended by the staff, would be the most appropriate course of action if the NRC proceeds with implementing changes to the NRC policies and processes related to NTTF Recommendation 1. A regulatory requirement for a site-specific PRA for currently operating reactors, for the sole purpose of searching for as yet unrealized cost-beneficial risk-reduction activities, would not provide benefits commensurate with the substantial cost of developing such regulatory compliant models." (STARS)*

NRC staff response: No response necessary.

*Comment: There is little safety benefit to be derived from the comprehensive changes recommended by the NTTF and in the staff's white paper. (NEI)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees that safety is not the main focus of the three improvement activities. The primary goals of the staff's proposed improvement activities are to enhance the logical, systematic and coherent character of the existing regulatory framework for nuclear power reactors – as recommended by the NTTF in Recommendation 1. The staff believes that the benefits of the three proposed improvement activities are primarily in the areas of regulatory efficiency and predictability, which may lead to increased public confidence in the NRC's regulatory activities for nuclear power reactors. The staff believes that there will be safety benefits in the future from consistent application of Improvement Activities 1 and 2, but these potential safety increases are not the staff's primary bases for recommending the three improvement activities. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: Consistent and rigorous application of the NRC Regulatory Analysis Guidelines is the preferred solution to any perceived concerns with lack of transparency or objectivity in the NRC's current regulatory framework for power reactors. The existing NRC regulatory analysis guidelines provide appropriate and thorough considerations relative to criteria for beyond design basis regulatory thresholds. (NEI)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees with the comment to the extent that NRC's regulatory actions must reflect consistent and rigorous application of the NRC Regulatory Analysis Guidelines, NUREG/BR-0058 (currently, Revision 4). However, the staff disagrees with the comment's implicit argument that there are no other cost-effective improvements which the NRC could adopt to address perceived concerns with lack of transparency or objectivity in the NRC's current regulatory framework for power reactors. Based upon the plain words of Recommendation 1 as well as the discussion in the NTTF Report, one major aspect of the NTTF's concern was with the lack of a coherent, internally consistent, and readily explainable regulatory framework for nuclear power reactors.

After careful consideration, the staff believes that the three proposed improvement activities address NTTF Recommendation 1 in a cost-effective manner which minimizes undue diversion of NRC and licensee resources from more safety-significant activities. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: The NRC should consider better integrating the NTTF Recommendation 1 effort with the work being done regarding NUREG-2150 and the Risk Management Regulatory Framework. (NEI)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees with the underlying premise of the comment, viz., that there should be a clear understanding within the NRC regarding the relationship between the staff's proposed disposition of NTTF Recommendation 1, and the staff's consideration of the recommendations in the Risk Management Task Force (RMTF) Report, NUREG-2150. The staff also has determined, as a result of the comment, that a clearer explanation of the relationship between Recommendation 1 disposition and the RMTF effort is needed.

Accordingly, the SECY paper and its enclosures describe the consideration of the RMTF Report as part of the disposition of NTTF Recommendation 1, and the relationship between the staff's proposed disposition of NTTF Recommendation 1, and the staff's consideration of NUREG-2150's recommended Risk Management Regulatory Framework (RMTF). That discussion makes clear that the staff considered the RMTF recommendations applicable to power reactors

in developing the three improvement activities addressing NTTF Recommendation 1. The enclosures to SECY-2013-xxx provide tables showing the extent to which each portion of NTTF Recommendation 1 and each power reactor recommendation from the RMTF Report is addressed by the proposed regulatory framework improvement activities. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: Recommendation 1 must also be evaluated in the context of the cumulative impacts of regulation. There exists a more immediate need to address regulatory considerations for post-Fukushima orders, rulemakings, and related guidance development. (NEI)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees, and has significantly changed its recommended improvement activities from what was set forth in the white paper, such that the implementation and ongoing costs are significantly lower than some of the options originally considered. The scope of the recommended improvement activities was reduced, in part, because the ongoing post-Fukushima efforts have and will result in safety improvements for nuclear power reactors. The staff has considered such actions and is making recommendations in an integrated manner with due consideration of cumulative impacts and the interrelationship among the various activities. Revised resource estimates are provided in the SECY for the final staff recommended improvements.

*Comment: Improvement Activities 1 and 2 are interrelated and should be viewed in the context of a specified risk tolerance and risk management processes. Improvement Activities 1 and 2 would also benefit from exploring the correlated failure issue, measuring the relationship between as-built and as-designed, and instituting a policy to employ the "high confidence limit" throughout all design processes. (Maloney)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees that there are aspects of these two improvement activities, creating a new category of events and defining defense-in-depth, that are interrelated and that there may be synergies to be realized by considering them together. As noted above, the NRC is recommending these actions to the Commission. If the Commission approves both of these improvement activities, the NRC staff will consider how to best integrate them. As for the specific recommendations regarding correlated failures, as-built versus as-designed, and the high confidence limit, the NRC staff intends to fully engage interested stakeholders in the development of any improvement activities approved by the Commission, so that recommendations from interested stakeholders may be appropriately considered.

*Comment: Improvement Activity 2 should be completed before embarking on Improvement Activity 1. NUREG-2150 offers the decision making structure and describes for each area of NRC's regulatory activity the description of how the structure could be implemented. The Appendices to NUREG-2150 go into considerable detail in describing state-of-the-art methods and tools. Hence, the NRC staff's immediate task should be to conceptualize, with appropriate input from stakeholders, the structure that accomplishes the above goals and objectives. This would go a long way toward accomplishing the NRC staffs stated goal in NRC-2012-0173-0017 for Improvement Activity 2. If resources are spent on Improvement Activity 1 prior to gaining agreement on a defense-in-depth framework, it is inevitable that inefficiencies, duplication and internal conflicts will arise. (Kadambi)*

NRC staff response: The staff disagrees with the comment. The staff does not believe that there is any need to complete Activity 2 before beginning Activity 1, and the reasons presented by the comment do not appear to be valid. The development of a new category of plant events and accidents would not appear to be influenced by defense-in-depth considerations. It is true that defense-in-depth may play a role in selecting new events to populate the design-basis extension category. It might also be argued that the level of defense-in-depth that should be provided in addressing events in the new category should be included when the staff develops guidance on treatment requirements. The NRC staff notes that existing guidance regarding defense-in-depth will serve until such time as enhanced guidance results from Improvement Activity 2, at which time the guidance regarding defense-in-depth would be enhanced. More importantly, the concept of the new category does not depend, in any significant way, upon the characterization and development of decision criteria for defense-in-depth. The comment did not explain how defense-in-depth would constitute a fundamental part of the conceptualization for the new "design- basis extension" category. For these reasons, the staff does not believe that there is any particular sequence for accomplishing Activities 1 and 2 which provides distinct advantages, from either a resource expenditure (efficiency) or a conceptualization standpoint.

*Comment: A PRA cannot adequately address (1) cascading failures arising from single point vulnerabilities that may or may not be known; (2) the prospect of serially correlated failures; or, (3) defects in design or construction. The NRC Staff's suggestions under Improvement Activity 2 are unlikely to be practical or achieve measurable benefits because the above, involving DID, cannot be addressed through a PRA, but can only be handled via advanced statistical methods. PRA models have limitations: (1) PRAs are not tested for accuracy or reliability; (2) PRAs do not routinely operate or present results at the high confidence limit; (3) PRAs are inferential engines that merely model the "as-designed" plant for an enumerated set of circumstances. "Top down" modeling methods would be more effective than PRA models. (Maloney)*

NRC staff response: The staff believes that a plant-specific PRA need not be required in order to effectively address NTTF Recommendation 1. However, the staff believes that risk information from PRAs and other sources would be useful in informing the improvement activities to define a design basis extension category, to clarify the use of defense-in-depth in the regulatory process, and to determine which voluntary industry initiatives should be subject to NRC oversight. Should the Commission approve any or all of the recommended improvement activities, the NRC staff will work with interested stakeholders to ensure that information from PRA models is used with appropriate consideration of their limitations. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

#### B. Comments on Improvement Activity 1: creating a new category of events

*Comment: The Staff's estimate that there will be no additional costs to the industry for the approach described above is incorrect. While the new regulatory framework may address the so-called "patchwork" approach of regulations, there would likely be significant licensing changes, FSAR updates, program additions and changes, procedures, equipment requirements, change processes (beyond 10 CFR 50.59), training, etc. that would be associated with a new regulation [establishing a design basis extension category and treatment requirements]. (STARS)*

NRC staff response: The staff disagrees with the comment. All of the changes proposed by the staff in Improvement Activity 1 are internal to the NRC; their implementation is not contingent

upon any specific action by any external stakeholders. The staff believes that the comment may be referring to the costs to applicants and licensees necessary for compliance with new (future) design enhancement rulemakings. The staff recognizes that those costs exist, but the compliance costs of these rulemakings would be considered in the regulatory analysis and any necessary backfitting and Part 52 issue finality consideration associated with such rulemakings. The staff does not foresee a substantial additional increment in costs of compliance with such new (future) design-basis extension rulemakings that would be attributable solely to Improvement Activity 1. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: In establishing a design-basis extension category, the NRC should address 6 elements:*

- 1. require all licensees to comply with contemporary safety requirements without regard to past SERs;*
- 2. employ statistical sampling in inspection programs to assess alignment of as-built to as-designed specifications;*
- 3. reexamine the issues considered under USI A-45 (Decay Heat Removal) with a special focus on sites sharing Fukushima risk factors;*
- 4. employ high confidence limits for external event frequency and severity, and internal event frequency and failure rates;*
- 5. notwithstanding the use of high confidence estimates, assume a minimal 2% dependent failure rate for systems considered to be "independent"; and*
- 6. prioritize according to loss distribution effects relate to the protection of the public health and safety (mortality and morbidity) and economic consequences (third party damages).*

*(Maloney)*

NRC staff response: If the Commission approves Improvement Activity 1, then the NRC will seek stakeholder input in its development of a new category of plant events and accidents, and the associated decision criteria. The comment's proposal will be considered during that development process. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: The NRC should define a set of key principles in order to guide future beyond design basis regulatory actions. An example set of key principles is presented in an attachment to one commenters' submission, and is supported by another commenter. The key principles in the commenter's Attachment are based on lessons learned from past and on-going beyond design basis regulatory activities, and includes a summary description of key principles addressing requirements for design, human performance, quality, programmatic controls, regulatory oversight, and processes for considering new information. (NEI, STARS)*

NRC staff response: If the Commission approves Improvement Activity 1, then the NRC will seek stakeholder input in its development of a new category of plant events and accidents, and the associated decision criteria. The comment's proposal will be considered during that development process. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of these comments.

#### C. Comments on Improvement Activity 2: defining defense-in-depth

*Comment: Developing defense-in-depth concepts for design is neither practical nor necessary. Defense-in-depth needs to be considered in measurable terms within the context of risk tolerance. The significance of "defense-in-depth" depends on site-specific risk relative to NRC's risk tolerance. The Commission should adopt a simpler approach to "defense-in-depth" that requires the potential for correlated failures impacting redundant safety systems to be shown on a statistical basis as less than 2% to 99% confidence, and to increase nonlinearly as an accident progresses. The Commission should impose conservatism in design while being receptive to licensee analysis demonstrating functional equivalence in a manner that can be measured. (Maloney)*

NRC staff response: The staff does not agree with the comment's position that developing defense-in-depth concepts for design is neither practical nor necessary. The staff believes there would be value to more formally defining defense-in-depth and developing, at a high level, decision criteria for assessing its adequacy. A formal definition of the defense-in-depth concept for nuclear power reactors would provide greater clarity and predictability. The staff believes there is a reasonable likelihood of success in developing a formal definition, given the staff's determination that conceptual discussions of defense-in-depth seem to use the same language and concepts over many decades.

The staff believes that certain aspects of the defense-in-depth concept described in the comment might be incorporated into an acceptable approach for implementing defense-in-depth for nuclear power reactors. However, Improvement Activity 2 does not constitute a recommendation to adopt a specific defense-in-depth approach. Rather, if the Commission approves Improvement Activity 2, then the NRC will seek stakeholder input in its development of a definition of defense-in-depth and associated decision criteria. The comment's proposal will be considered during that development process. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: The NRC's discussion under Improvement Activity 2 should be revised to reflect that defense-in-depth is a philosophy rather than a strategy, because it may cause confusion given past historical practice of basing defense-in-depth on a number of approaches rather than a single strategy and should reflect the principle that defense-in-depth should be commensurate with the importance to safety. (STARS)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees that different approaches and "importance to safety" need to be considered when addressing defense-in-depth. However, the staff does not believe that the discussion of Activity 2 needs to be changed or augmented as suggested by the comment. If Improvement Activity 2 is approved by the Commission, then the NRC will seek stakeholder input in its development of a definition of defense-in-depth and associated decision criteria. The comment's proposals will be considered during that development process, which is the appropriate time for detailed consideration of concepts and language. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: Defense-in-depth should not involve a new layer of DID expectations that would be imposed on top of the existing regulatory framework. Defense-in-depth should be a structured process informed by risk considerations. The staff's proposed approach for DID could undermine the viability of PRA and risk-informed approaches and could induce instability and*



*unpredictability of outcomes due to the many layers of considerations, some with subjective inputs. (NEI)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees that DID should not involve a new layer of DID expectations and agrees that it should be a structured process informed by risk considerations. The staff does not agree that its proposed Improvement Activity 2 undermines the viability of PRA and risk-informed approaches. The Commission's current risk informed approach considers DID, risk, and safety margins in an integrated fashion and the improvement activity would not change that. The development of proposed DID decision criteria will increase predictability. If Improvement Activity 2 is approved by the Commission, then the NRC will seek stakeholder input in its development of a definition of defense-in-depth and associated decision criteria. The comment's proposal will be considered during that development process. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: Defense-in-depth should not be applied in a manner which overlaps or supersedes NRC's existing regulations and GDC. While defense-in-depth may be applied in conjunction with risk-informed considerations, it should continue to be a subjective process in cases where PRAs do not exist. Improvement Activity 2 should be implemented on a forward-looking basis, because the lack of a site-specific PRA for certain scenarios (including external hazards) would prevent licensee implementation on a retrospective basis, and the cost of a PRA performed solely to support a defense-in-depth decision, would not provide benefits commensurate with the cost of developing such PRA models. (STARS)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees that defense-in-depth should not be applied in a manner which overlaps or supersedes NRC's existing regulations and GDC as they exist today. However, under the staff's proposal to implement DID in a forward-looking manner, should existing regulations be amended in the future for reasons unrelated to DID, the NRC would employ DID decision criteria to re-evaluate any DID considerations implicit in those regulations. The staff notes that Improvement Activity 2 does not require the use of a plant-specific PRA nor does the staff recommend that a PRA be required, in part for the reason noted in the comment, viz., that the cost of a PRA performed solely to support a defense-in-depth decision, would not provide benefits commensurate with the cost of developing such PRA models.

In any event, if Improvement Activity 2 is approved by the Commission, then the NRC will seek stakeholder input in its development of a definition of defense-in-depth and associated decision criteria, and the comment's proposal will be considered during that development process. No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

#### D. Comments on Improvement Activity 3: voluntary industry initiatives

*Comment: There is no need for any NRC initiative regarding voluntary initiatives. The NRC has not identified any systematic, industry-wide problem that would suggest that the industry as a whole is not following through on its commitments to implement these voluntary safety enhancements. "Regulatory footprints" have generally been established for industry initiatives within the current framework, and a regulatory footprint on industry initiatives is not appropriate or necessary for items where there is no regulatory concern. Finally, the incentive for licensees to voluntarily pursue and implement safety enhancements would be significantly reduced or eliminated if the NRC were to impose a regulatory footprint on these activities. (NEI, STARS)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees with the principle, which seems to be reflected in the comment, that if the NRC determines that a matter is not *within the NRC's regulatory jurisdiction*, then an NRC "regulatory footprint" on an industry initiative addressing that matter is neither necessary nor appropriate. However, this type of industry initiative, which is what the NRC characterizes as a "Type 3" initiative, is *not* the focus of Improvement Activity 3.

Activity 3 is focused on what the NRC characterizes as "Type 2" industry initiatives, where the matter does not involve adequate protection and is within the NRC's regulatory jurisdiction, but the NRC declines to develop a "regulatory footprint" because of the Type 2 industry initiative. In these circumstances, the Commission has articulated the general principle that it is acceptable to rely on industry initiatives, as long as: (1) the industry initiative has the capability of adequately addressing the NRC's safety and/or regulatory concerns; and (2) there is a high likelihood that the industry initiative will be effectively implemented and maintained over time. Improvement Activity 3, in essence, is intended to strengthen the NRC's bases for relying on Type 2 industry initiatives, consistent with the Commission direction on this matter.

Improvement Activity 3 is premised in part on the staff's view that there will be greater NRC consistency and transparency if the NRC were to use a better tool to convey to internal NRC staff as well as to external stakeholders the current Commission guidance. The staff notes that, where there is no regulatory concern, the initiative would be a "type 3" initiative, which is not the focus of this improvement activity. Nor should Activity 3 have any significant adverse impact on licensee incentives regarding voluntary industry initiatives, as it is not a change in overall Commission policy.

The NRC staff agrees that there may be no evidence of widespread, systematic problems with industry initiatives. However, the NTTF's observations and subsequent deliberations have led the NRC staff to the conclusion that reliance on voluntary industry initiatives without some confidence that they are implemented and maintained over time is not consistent with the principles of good regulation. Improvement activity 3 seeks to clarify the Commission's policy on voluntary industry initiatives, gather additional information on whether selected voluntary industry initiatives have been effectively maintained, and optionally provide a regulatory basis requirement for monitoring changes to industry initiatives.

No changes in the staff's recommendations were made as a result of consideration of these comments.

*Comment: Unless industry can regularly demonstrate in a measurable way that an industry initiative can be effective, the matters covered in the initiative should be the subject of NRC rules because rules are enforceable and allow for public interaction. The NRC should not rely upon industry initiatives until measures are in place to measure efficacy and reliability of a safety initiative. The NRC should accurately and reliably assess risk so as to conservatively measure the benefits in a repeatable way. If industry relies on a voluntary initiative, then information must be made publicly available by the industry or by the NRC. (Maloney)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees in part with the comment. It is the Commission's policy that actions necessary to provide a reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety may not rely on voluntary industry initiatives, and shall instead be issued as legally binding requirements. This would apply to the "Type 1" industry initiatives. At the other end of the spectrum from a safety standpoint are the "Type 3" industry initiatives, which do not

involve safety issues and do not require demonstration of effectiveness. The “Type 2” initiatives are those that NRC recommend be further evaluated in terms of the likelihood that they will be effectively implemented and maintained over time by the licensees. For the more safety-significant Type 2 industry initiatives, the NRC staff is recommending that appropriate monitoring be put in place. This proposal is consistent with the individual’s comment regarding demonstration of the effectiveness of such industry initiatives, although the staff’s proposal would not apply to all Type 2 industry initiatives as proposed by the commenter. The NRC staff’s recommendation that this apply to safety-significant industry initiatives is consistent with other comments by this same individual that NRC should employ a risk management approach to regulation. As for the public availability of information regarding voluntary industry initiatives, the NRC staff notes that it is the Agency’s practice to discuss and deliberate on such topics in public meetings whenever practicable. No changes in the staff’s recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.

*Comment: The NRC staff should make greater use of standards development organizations and consensus standards when voluntary industry initiatives are being considered to address a potential safety issue. (Kadambi)*

NRC staff response: The staff agrees in part with the comment. If a voluntary industry initiative includes use of a voluntary consensus standard developed by a standards development organization addressing the matter under consideration, then the NRC would consider that as a factor in favor of NRC reliance on the voluntary industry initiative, as opposed to developing an NRC regulatory requirement (e.g., a “government-unique standard” under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act with respect to an NRC regulation).

The general principles governing reliance upon voluntary consensus standards as an alternative to a government unique standard is already reflected in the NRC’s rulemaking policies and procedures, and no fundamental change to those documents is needed. However, the staff will consider whether additional clarification on the consideration of industry voluntary initiatives utilizing voluntary consensus standards would be prudent and may pursue this outside of Improvement Activity 3, as this matter is not directly related to NTTF Recommendation 1 or Improvement Activity 3. No changes in the staff’s recommendations were made as a result of consideration of this comment.