# Official Transcript of Proceedings

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Digital I&C Subcommittee Meeting

Docket Number: (n/a)

Location: Rockville, Maryland

Date: Friday, November 16, 2012

Work Order No.: NRC-2019 Pages 1-292

NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433

	1
1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
3	+ + + +
4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
5	(ACRS)
6	+ + + +
7	DIGITAL I&C SUBCOMMITTEE
8	+ + + +
9	FRIDAY
10	NOVEMBER 16, 2012
11	+ + + +
12	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
13	+ + + +
14	The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear
15	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room T2B3,
16	11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Charles H. Brown,
17	Chairman, presiding.
18	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
19	CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Chairman
20	DENNIS C. BLEY, Member
21	JOHN D. SIEBER, Member
22	JOHN W. STETKAR, Member
23	
24	
25	
	NEAL R. GROSS

		2
1	NRC STAFF PRESENT:	
2	CHRISTINA ANTONESCU, Designated	Federal
3	Official	
4	SUSHIL BIRLA, RES/DE	
5	MILTON CONCEPCION, NRO/DE/ICE	
6	NORBERT CARTE, NRO/DE/ICE	
7	EUGENE EAGLE, NRO/DE/ICE2	
8	IAN JUNG, NRO/DE/ICE	
9	PETER KANG, NRR/EEB	
10	KHOI NGUYEN, NRO/DE/ICE2	
11	PAUL PIERINGER, NRO/DCIP	
12	DAN SANTOS, NRO/DE	
13	MOHAMMED SHUAIBI, NRO/DE	
14	JOELLE STAREFOS, NRO/DARR/SMR/LB1	
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
	NEAL D. CDOSS	

### ALSO PRESENT:

BRIAN ARNHOLDT, B&W
RUFINO AYALA, NuScale Power, LLC*
STEVE BLOMGREN, NuScale Power, LLC
DERICK BOTHA, NuScale Power, LLC*
GREGG CLARKSON, NuScale Power, LLC
JOHN CRAIG, NuScale Power, LLC*
PAREEZ GOLUB, EXCEL Services*
CHRIS GRAHAM, Safeware Engineering
PETER HASTINGS, B&W*
MARC HAYDEN, NuScale Power, LLC*
BOB HIRMANPOUR, Southern Nuclear*
GARY JONES, NuScale Power, LLC*
DON LEWIS, NuScale Power, LLC*
DENISE McNABB, NuScale Power, LLC*
STEVE MIRSKY, NuScale Power, LLC*
CHET POSLUSNY, B&W
DON STATILE, NuScale Power, LLC*

\*Present via telephone

**NEAL R. GROSS** 

### 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Opening Remarks ..... 5 DSRS Chapter 7 Introduction ...... 7 Overview and Summary of DSRS Chapter 7 ...... 10 Break 87 DSRS 7.0 Introduction and Overview of Review 8 Process 9 87 DSRS 7.1, Fundamental Design Principles ...... 95 10 11 DSRS 7.1, Fundamental Design Principles 12 13 (continued) 149 14 15 Appendix A, Evaluation of Hazard Analysis ...... 181 16 Break 206 17 18 Appendix B, I&C System Architecture ...... 206 19 20 DSRS 7.2, System Characteristics ...... 230 21 22 Closing Remarks ...... 288

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

23

24

1

2

6

/

8

9

1112

13

\_\_\_

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

#### PROCEEDINGS

(8:39 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN BROWN: The meeting will now come to order. This is a meeting of the Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems Subcommittee.

I'm Charles Brown, Chairman of the Subcommittee. Advisory Committee members in attendance are Dennis Bley, John Stetkar and Jack Sieber. Christina Antonescu of the staff, ACRS staff, is the Designated Federal Official for this meeting.

During this meeting the staff will discuss the Design-Specific Review Standard, Chapter 7, as part of a new Licensing Approach for Instrumentation and Control systems for Babcock and Wilcox mPower. I guess that's a small modular reactor design.

Also in preparation for the Digital I&C Subcommittee meeting, we provided some suggestions on the framework based on some earlier stuff five or six months ago.

In addition to that, we are hoping that we

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 will have some information presented relative to the following questions. In other words, an outline of the schedule and intent of the entire effort, an explanation of the mPower design information that the staff already has and how that influenced the Design-Specific Review Standard, what items from the present SRP NUREG-0800 were dropped and why, a description of the philosophy behind the development of this standard, a comparison of the level of detail in this standard relative to the SRP topic by topic, chapter by chapter, issue by issue, subject by subject, whatever the appropriate category is, and somewhat of a mapping of how the items listed in the Table 7.1 are addressed in Chapter 7.

The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts and formulate proposed positions and actions as appropriate for deliberation by the full Committee.

The rules for participation in today's meeting have been announced as part of the notice of this meeting previously published in the Federal Register in November of 2012.

We have received no written comments or requests for time to make oral comments/statements from members of the public regarding today's meeting.

Also, we have Bob Hirmanpour from Southern

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

Nuclear on - I believe these are on the phone bridge;
is that correct?

MS. ANTONESCU: Right.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Southern Nuclear; Chet Poslusny from B&W; Pareez Golub, EXCEL Services Corporation and others from NuScale, LLC. There's 11 folks. I'm not going to - and please excuse me. I'm not going to run through the entire list of 11. I don't know who the leader is, but the first name on the list is Don Lewis.

To preclude interruption of the meeting, the phone line will be placed in a listen-only mode during the discussions and presentations and Committee discussions.

A transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be made available as stated in the Federal Register Notice.

Therefore, we request that participants in this meeting use the microphones located throughout the meeting room when addressing the Subcommittee.

The participants should first identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they may be readily heard.

We will now proceed with the meeting and I will call upon Mr. Mohammed Shuaibi, Deputy Director

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

of the Division of Engineering in the Office of Nuclear Reactors to provide some introductory remarks.

Mo.

MR. SHUAIBI: Thank you, Mr. Brown, and good morning, everyone.

I'm the Deputy Director of Division of Engineering in Office of New Reactors. As you said, I am acting Director as I am normally here for Tom Bergman who is the Director of the Division. He is on rotation to NRR. Otherwise, he would have been here to introduce this topic. So, I just wanted to point that out.

I'm going to provide just a few short opening remarks and then turn it over to the team that worked hard to develop this Review Standard with Milton's lead at the table. I'm very proud of their work and their dedication to this project.

Let me start by saying that we appreciate the opportunity to brief you on this project. I know that Digital I&C has been, and continues to be, a very important topic for the Committee and it's also very important to us.

I have sat through several ACRS meetings on Digital I&C and I'm glad that we have the opportunity to brief you on this Review Standard prior to finalizing it and prior to using it for the review of the mPower

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

design.

We last briefed you on this initiative in February of this year, I believe. We have continued to follow that same path that we briefed you on back in February. So, I hope that you'll find what you hear today consistent with that briefing and your expectations from that briefing that we are here for.

We undertook this project to incorporate lessons learned from our past new reactor reviews and our interactions and feedback with the Committee.

We believe we have an opportunity here to significantly enhance future reviews, and this effort is intended to do that for the mPower design.

I will note that this Review Standard is specific to mPower design at this point. So, what we're reviewing here today is for the mPower design.

I do also want to note that cybersecurity is not within the scope of this effort. We know and understand that the Committee is very interested in the topic of cybersecurity, but this effort and this Review Standard were really not intended to cover that topic. So, I want to bring that up front and I want to make sure that we - I'll let you know what the scope of the presentation is today.

So, with that, I'll turn it over to Milton

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 Concepcion unless you have any questions. CHAIRMAN BROWN: I have one other comment. Since you brought up the cybersecurity issue, you can 3 be rest assured that we have been thinking about cybersecurity in terms of the development of the SRS standard -MR. SHUAIBI: Okay. 8 CHAIRMAN BROWN: - because the architecture 9 is so integrally a part of even having a structure that 10 can allow cybersecurity to be actively and accurately 11 and effectively countered and we've had that discussion before. 12 MR. SHUAIBI: We have. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm not going to discuss 15 it again now, but because you're not going to discuss 16 it doesn't mean it may not be considered. I just wanted 17 18 MR. SHUAIBI: I understand. CHAIRMAN BROWN: - to pass that tidbit on 19 as part of the discussion, okay? 20 MR. SHUAIBI: I understand. 21 22 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Thank you very much. 23 MR. SHUAIBI: Thank you. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Milt, if you would like to 24 25 go ahead?

MR. CONCEPCION: Sure. Good morning.

For those who don't know who I am, my name is Milton Concepcion. I'm a senior digital I&C in the Office of New Reactors, ICE Branch 2.

I'm really excited to be here and present the status of this initiative to provide new guidance for the review of instrumentation and controls and how we will apply to the mPower design.

A little bit about myself. I have a Bachelor's and Master's degree in electrical engineering. Been with the NRC for about 10 years now.

I'm a qualified technical reviewer and qualified vendor inspector. I have done many inspections of I&C systems here for the NRC and recently did some research and collaborated some research efforts in the digital I&C area.

I recently came back from, like I said, Research. Been with NRO since early this year and took the lead for this project, and I'm really excited to brief you on the status of it.

As stated on the slide, we'll provide an update on our early commitment on the development of the DSRS for Chapter 7. We've been working really hard collecting information, identifying areas for improvement and putting together the sections that end

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 up in this draft guidance that we're presenting today. With me on my right side is Ian Jung, the 3 Chief of I&C, Branch 2. Dan Santos, Senior Technical Advisor, NRO. And Dr. Sushil Birla from Senior 5 Technical Advisor in the Office of Research. If we go to the next slide, like I said, 7 we're going to present the status of Chapter 7 DSRS and 8 how we intend to implement it to the mPower design. 9 We're very much interested in collecting 10 feedback from the Subcommittee, and we're also here to 11 answer any questions that you might have. 12 And since I have Dan Santos and Ian Jung sitting around the table, I guess I can say being there's 13 14 an I&C briefing, we're triple redundant today. 15 MR. SANTOS: And diverse. 16 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. Next slide. 17 (Laughter.) 18 (Discussion off the record.) MR. CONCEPCION: So, as far as the agenda, 19 we have a full agenda for today. And if you will, the 20 21 topics are going to be broken down in two major areas. 22 The first couple of bullets will address 23 the background, the status and schedule of Chapter 7, 24 all the key activities that we did, provide some 25 philosophical background and approach to the

development of the DSRS.

And then the second half would get into the details of each section of the DSRS starting with 7.0 and going down through the fundamental design principles and those system characteristics that we identified from IEEE 603.

And then we get into the appendices that we developed to support the review of the fundamental design principles.

Now, I will turn it over to Joelle Starefos, which is on my left side. She will provide you an update on the overall DSRS schedule and how we fit - how Chapter 7 fits in the overall DSRS development.

Joelle.

MS. STAREFOS: Thank you, Milton.

Good morning. My name is Joelle Starefos.

I'm the Senior Project Manager in the Office of New Reactors.

I'm responsible for the mPower pre-application activities, including the DSRS development.

And I just wanted to take an opportunity to answer your first question, Mr. Brown, which was what kind of schedule do we have for this and how does it fit into the overall plan that we had?

As I'm sure you're aware, SECY-11024 was

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 a SECY that the Commission had asked us to address how we could improve efficiency and include risk information into the future reviews of the advanced reactors or small modular reactors when they came into - for application.

We addressed this with the full Committee back in March of 2011, and with the Subcommittee about a month earlier with what our plans were for that. And I think what we're going to share with you today is what the implementation has resulted in.

So, I have a timeline here. This is our approximate timeline for finalizing the mPower Design-Specific Review Standard. This is the first DSRS that we're issuing.

And in September 2012, we had put the draft together and had issued several topics or sections prior to that in draft manner for informal public comment.

Chapter 7 fell into one of those draft slide packages or draft presentation packages that the public had an opportunity to look at. So, we've actually had some comments and opportunities to interact with B&W and members of the public on this section.

In October, we were working through interim concurrence and OGC/NLO being obtained. We're now in November and we're still working through our concurrences and OGC/NLO. We have it on numerous

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 sections, but we're working on some of the stragglers. Just like with any project, you get to the 3 last month or so and you start to make sure that everything is coming together. 5 And right now we do have a few challenges that we're working through, but we anticipate that this 6 7 certainly will be issued no later than the end of the 8 year if we end up slipping our date. 9 CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's for public comment, 10 correct? 11 MS. STAREFOS: Yes. 12 CHAIRMAN BROWN: For official public 13 comment. 14 MS. STAREFOS: Exactly. 15 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. 16 MS. STAREFOS: That's what we're calling 17 "for interim use and comment." And that will be the 18 opportunity for the public to comment via the Federal Register Notice. 19 We had originally planned on 60 days. 20 21 because of the holidays and other considerations, we 22 decided it's beneficial to give the public a little bit 23 So, we're anticipating about a 90-day more time. 24 comment period. 25 This is a very voluminous document, a lot

of changes, and we don't want anybody to be rushed through their decisions on this.

So, our plan here is to issue it for public comment. And at the same time, send a memo to the ACRS inviting your thoughts and reviews. And if you'd like to meet, we look forward to that as well.

We'll also send our notice to OMB for the Congressional Review Act review. All of this should happen, as I said, by the end of the year.

We anticipated public comment being received by February. Again with the 90 days, that will push maybe to March time frame.

And we'll start resolving public comments and revising the document as appropriate with an eye on getting the final mPower DSRS document issued no later - well, sometime around the time when we're anticipating their application to come in.

The concern that we had about getting the first round issued and the comments resolved was to make sure that we meet the requirements for the applicant to review or consider the SRP, and address any differences that they have from what the standard SRP is. As you know, we have a rule that requires that in Part 52.

So, we've talked with our general counsel

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 and this will suffice, this DSRS will suffice as being their Specific Review Plan, or SRP, for the mPower design. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, you state that in the 5 document itself already. MS. STAREFOS: We will. 7 CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, I think you already 8 have. 9 MS. STAREFOS: Yes, and we will state that 10 in the preface to the document that goes out with how 11 to use this DSRS, what it applies to and the specific 12 application of these aspects to mPower alone at this 13 point. 14 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes. Well, that was one 15 of the reasons we asked for, you know, what was in, what 16 was left out. 17 MS. STAREFOS: Right. 18 CHAIRMAN BROWN: So that we know what - is there anything in what I would call - I don't want to 19 call it the collective opinion of importance that 20 21 reviewer guidance is not getting that they used to get. I'm not worried about the 22 IEEE 23 references and things like that. I'm talking about the more substantive -24

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

MS. STAREFOS: I understand.

1 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Using more substantive -MS. STAREFOS: And I hope what you'll find today is that they address that for I&C for you in this 3 presentation. We're certainly prepared to discuss that. As far as the other sections, we actually 7 have - just a little statistics for you. We have four 8 different categories of the Standard Review Plan that 9 we had considered. 10 We characterized them as either use as-is, 11 which meant that we were going to use the SRP as it is 12 to appropriate and applicable as it stands for the mPower 13 There's 87 sections that fall into that design. 14 category. 15 CHAIRMAN BROWN: 87 sections of the existing NUREG-0800 SRP. 16 17 MS. STAREFOS: Existing SRP, correct. 18 There's 82 sections that we're going to delete that includes all the original Chapter 7 19 So, that actually gained about 30 of them 20 sections. in there. 21 But a lot of those sections -22 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Hold it. Retrace that 23 24 again. You deleted - you're not using any of the Chapter 25 7 stuff? That's the way I -

1 MS. STAREFOS: That's correct. We have rewritten the entire Chapter 7 and now it is -3 CHAIRMAN **BROWN:** So, you eviscerated whatever previous - that's a nice word. MS. STAREFOS: Well, I wouldn't eviscerated. I would look at it more like incorporated 6 7 it in an efficient way in the future guidance. 8 How is that? 9 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, I tried to look at 10 the old SRP and track it over to some of the stuff and 11 it was virtually impossible. I threw the towel in. 12 MS. STAREFOS: I know our guys have spent a lot of time ensuring that all of those important and 13 14 required aspects are incorporated. And I hope that 15 you'll get that today in this presentation. 16 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Thank you. 17 MS. STAREFOS: We've also got modified we've modified 154 sections. And we have 13 new 18 sections, including the seven for the I&C. 19 20 Some of those are for new systems or new 21 ways that the systems functions have been or 22 characterized by the mPower design. So, we've done a lot of work and we're 23 24 hopefully headed towards a very solid and good product. 25 And we hope to share that with you in the future.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, thank you.

MEMBER STETKAR: Joelle, or this is a heads up to Milton, perhaps. As I read through this, it was not clear to me how this was specifically tailored to mPower.

So, if you could point out places where there is specific - this is a Design-Specific Review Guidance and I'd like to understand what features of the mPower design were considered in this guidance.

I understand digital I&C compared to other things in a very generic sense. But I'm thinking going forward if this is the mPower-specific review, what about, you know, the next one that comes down the line?

What differences, what changes might there be from this guidance, because this is tailored to something that is very specifically associated with this particular design?

 $\label{eq:And if there are those, I'd like to know } % \end{substitute}% \begin{substitute}{0.5\textwidth} \end{substitute}% \be$ 

MEMBER BLEY: And if I could just expand this just a tiny bit, it is, in fact, what John was just talking about, an mPower-specific one, or is this the first draft of what you see actually replacing the I&C material and the Chapter 7 material in the SRP for the future?

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

CHAIRMAN BROWN: You mean the general SRP.
MR. BLEY: Yes, I do.

MS. STAREFOS: Yes, actually I should have mentioned that in my preface, and I apologize. That's a great question because one of the challenges we had when we were doing the DSRS, we had amazing pre-application interaction with the mPower B&W organization. They have been very open and very - I guess they've given us a lot of pre-application information.

I would probably say having been working around new reactors for many, many years, probably more so than we've done to date.

With that, though, this particular I&C project was really an initiative. And I would say this was kind of our - this was probably our pilot chapter that you could argue based on even the information we did have from B&W, we wanted to try to make something that would give us a more efficient look, a more, I guess - well, probably "efficient" is a good way to put it for the pilot program.

A way to approach the I&C that did not cut out too many of our general criteria for our review until we actually had the application in. This is one of the challenges we have with many of the sections.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

Although B&W mPower has been so open with their pre-application work, their design is not yet complete. So, our reviewers face that challenge on every section whether they had sufficient information to make the decision to eliminate or change our Review Standard, because we knew something was not going to be there.

In some cases, it was very evident. The system didn't even exist. This was a passive plant and some of the information in the SRP could be a nonpassive boiling water reactor-related concept that wasn't applicable. So, it was easy to cut those out.

In other cases, it wasn't so easy. And so, some of these sections, and you'll even see this in the general DSRS, are more generic in nature. And we plan to try to bring those down to a more specific mPower focus when we have - if we have more additional information before the application is received.

But if not, the reviewers are in a position where they can make those determinations immediately upon receipt of the application and seeing what the presented material is.

So, we try to put the reviewers in a much stronger position. And I think the benefit we've seen out of it is that the issues that we normally would

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

identify in the first six months or year of a review are coming up in pre-application. So, we feel like this has been a very beneficial effort. MR. SHUAIBI: Very quickly, and I do want to turn it over to Milton. I think he'll probably try to address some of those as we go through this presentation. I did, you know, we both mentioned, and all of us will mention this is specific to mPower. We don't mean that this is specific to the specifics of the design that they're going to be proposing to us and Milton will address that. I wouldn't be surprised if we come here sometime in the future and we have another small modular design and say, well, with very minor tweaks, this is basically the same quidance we'll use. So, I don't want to mislead you to make you think that this is so specific to mPower that it only applies to the design that we're looking at for mPower. So, it is a pilot. And if this works well for us here, then don't be surprised if we use it again for other designs that come in the new reactors area. So, I'll just leave you with that. unless you have any other questions, I quess I'm sure

Milton can answer most of them as he goes through.

1

3

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's what I thought.

MR. CONCEPCION: Just to add a little bit to it, yes, I understand that the mPower DSRS is specific. But in the area of I&C, you will know - you will know in the presentation it will be capturing more than 90, 95 percent of the guidance that's today in the SRP.

So, and I'll get into it and I believe B&W is in the audience today. They can talk about some of their information that was shared with staff, but the majority of the information today in the SRP is contained in the DSRS.

It is modified in terms of structure, but all of the information is in the SRP and there is no loss of relevant guidance.

Okay. So, we set a couple of goals, a handful of goals for the DSRS development. And one of the main goals was to enhance the focus of the reviews and provide clear guidance to the reviewers on how they could resolve high-order issues such as redundancy, independence, single failure and determinism and some others.

And we also wanted to improve the efficiency of reviews by incorporating some of the lessons learned that have been discussed at length with this committee,

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

as well as internally in our I&C reviews.

We also see a benefit of us developing this guidance and putting it in the public domain and have the mPower and B&W applicant to understand the scope and intent and level of review that we expect them to - that they expect us to do in their design.

So, in general, what we expect is that they understand what kind of review we're going to be doing so they can provide the information we need to close all of our safety issues and have a comprehensive review that hopefully will enhance the efficiency compared with what we do today and using the existing SRP.

We'll move to the next slide to provide some background of where we are. We've gained significant review experience, as I said, review I&C designs and those lessons learned. We're doing our best to capture it in the DSRS development.

As you know, some of those reviews have been really challenging ranging from a lack of level of detail in some areas, to an applicant's difficulty in trying to - presenting a safety case and demonstrating safety given a particular I&C architecture.

So, as you know, this has had some significant impact in licensing certainty in terms of both schedules and resources, which is of concern to

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

our management as well as the industry in general.

So, we took all of the lessons learned and the material and developed a list of the lessons that we have learned and try to implement them in Chapter 7.

Some of those lessons learned were - have been discussed with the Subcommittee. And fundamental design principles comes to mind as one of the key lessons that we try to incorporate in the DSRS.

Continuing on the background, so we took all of that information and we reorganized it. We took the lessons learned and we put together the DSRS with - using information from the existing SRP, using the ISGs to the extent practical and developed this approach engineering principles using sound such as defense-in-depth, using simplicity as an attribute, using integrated hazards, and also enhancing structure and providing some clarity in the way the address the information reviewers will application.

So, this slide provides a representation of all of the - of the major lessons learned that we captured in the last several years of reviewing I&C.

You probably recall that these were discussed with you back in February of this year. And

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

each of those colored blocks and provide some examples of what we did to address each of those lessons learned 3 in the DSRS. And as I said before, a key point is that we took - we took the SRP and we took the ISGs to the 6 7 extent practical, and we manipulated the information 8 and we rearranged it and we made sure that no relevant 9 guidance was left behind with the exception of guidance 10 that clearly doesn't apply to the mPower design. 11 Yes, sir. 12 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Excuse me. There's two or three ISGs. I can't remember the numbers. The one on 13 14 data independence, I think it was ISG-2 or Three, Four? 15 MS. ANTONESCU: Four. 16 MR. CONCEPCION: Communication 17 independence. 18 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, and there was another - what was ISG-5? I'm trying to remember what that one 19 That's human factors. And then there was a third 20 was. 21 one. 22 MR. SANTOS: ISG-2, diversity. 23 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Two, diversity. 24 were specifically reviewed and we went through those. 25 You've been using them.

what I'm going to do today is I'm going to go through

1	Are all - has all of that now been put in?
2	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. ISG-2 was rolled
3	into BTP 7-19. And we took BTP 7-19 and incorporated
4	it into DSRS. So, that is captured.
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's interesting.
6	Because in reading the DSRS, there's not - the BTP 7-19
7	is, what, 40 pages long or something like that, and D3
8	in the DSRS is about four and there's never any mention
9	of BTP 7-19. It's not even referenced in the guidance
10	documents.
11	At least I didn't find it going through that
12	list of reference reg guides, IEEE standards, rules and
13	everything else.
14	So, the ability to take 40 pages of
15	information without ever mentioning it and then crank
16	it into four pages, that's a pretty good consolidation.
17	MR. CONCEPCION: Well -
18	CHAIRMAN BROWN: And it's a little bit that
19	blows my mind.
20	MR. CONCEPCION: We took what's in 7-19 and
21	we - if you're looking at the review guidance section
22	of D3, you will see those four elements that are in the
23	SRM to the SECY paper.
24	We captured the major elements that are in
25	7-19 and put them in the D3 section. So, we made sure

that the guidance - we moved repetitive information that isn't in BTP 7-19 in particular since we're talking about it, but the essence of the information is in the D3 section.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, but it's at this level where if you look at BTP 7-19, the guidance, there was some specific reviewer guidance that's in there that's not over there.

The high-level thought process is, yes, I agree they're stuck in there. But the details of giving the reviewer guidance as to what he should look for, it's like he's got to invent it again all by himself in terms of some of the details.

There was a lot of time spent on 7-19 from a D3 standpoint. So, I, you know, that's one of the questions that at least I was going to ask later. So, I'm asking it now instead. That seems to be a little bit sparse.

And on top of that, 7-19 is not mentioned anywhere even in the reference documents in the back, because it's no - I guess because it's no longer a technical position anymore other than -

MR. CONCEPCION: It is no longer applicable and we should have captured all of the important elements of BTP 7-19, as I said, and put it in D3.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, top-level elements I'm probably not going to argue with. But the positions and everything else that was in it or however they rephrased it did not seem to make it. I mean, how do you go from 30 or 40 pages to four or five and capture it adequately, I don't know. 6 And I didn't have the time to go through 7 8 and try to do a side-by-side comparison all the way through. 9 10 MR. CONCEPCION: We have a side-by-side 11 comparison of how we captured the information. We're 12 more than happy to share it with you. 13 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. MR. CONCEPCION: It is not in the DSRS. 14 15 have - I have my supplemental material with information 16 that shows how we took all of the information from all 17 of the BTPs and their relevant ISGs and how we captured 18 them in the DSRS. MEMBER BLEY: That would be really helpful 19 20 for us to see. 21 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, I could certainly -22 MEMBER BLEY: It's a little - well, you 23 probably did a lot of work on that and it's hard for 24 us in our review to really track that and be comfortable 25 with it.

That was one

MR. JUNG: Okay. Ian Jung, Chief of the I&C.

The intent of DSRS is to capture sufficient staff guidance to reach a safety finding on its own.

That's one of the reasons we are not referencing any of the existing BTPs.

We wanted to incorporate so that the reviewer would have sufficient information by itself to review and make a decision so that the staff wouldn't

have to refer to many other documents.

The intent is to make sure all the relevant guidance that is important to make decision on D3 is captured in diversity section.

So, we've done exercise, but it will - we'll continue to look for any feedback from the B&W and the public.

If we somehow missed it, then we will let you know. The reason that the BTP 7-19 was a lot bigger than DSRS is I remember ISG - the purpose of the BTP 7-19 was to incorporate ISG into the existing BTP 7-19 original version, but the ISG was not - incorporation of ISG was sort of addition of more information.

That particular effort did not go back and we evaluated what are the redundant information in the existing BTP.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

of the intent.

So, we went through that, we scrubbed it. Our staff did a clause-by-clause comparison of all of the BTP 7-19, Revision 6, and made a decision which ones are repeated, which ones are relevant and we made a decision. It turns out that, you know, the information we believe is just sufficient to do that. But if we dropped any of the criteria or relevant guidance, we'll let you know specifically. So, we'll look for - we'll continue to look

at it. And B&W and others are looking at it. So, we'll continue to look into that.

MR. SANTOS: Dan Santos here.

I just want to echo what Ian said and even the current SRP doesn't contain all the guidance for I&C.

There's many, many references. There's many, many standards out there and it's impossible. We have never incorporated all of that.

So, none of that is going away. None of the BTPs, none of the IEEE standards. They're always going to be available for the staff to do their review, but we felt that some of the items can only come up if they have a particular question that the design forces them to go into those other reference. Then, they can

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

2

3

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

go do that, pick up those reference.

But what we wanted to capture on the DSRS was the essence to answer the necessary safety question.

And if a particular complexity in the design forces the reviewer to other reference, they'll always be available. That's the case today with the current SRP.

Having said that, I would echo what Ian said. If there's any things that members feel, no, you cut too much, then that's a good feedback. And hopefully when we get to the particular section, we can discuss that and we're very open to get that type of feedback and we appreciate it.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. I just went and looked at BTP 7-19 again just to make sure I was accurate, you know. 20 pages down to five, five-and-a-half, and that just seems to be a lot of slicing and dicing in terms of - I didn't realize there was that much repetition in BTP 7-19 and redundant information.

It certainly didn't read that way when we did the review of that for the incorporation of ISG-2 - was that ISG-2 at the time?

MR. JUNG: Charlie, I'm little bit simplifying that. Not only the repetition, BTP 7-19 has a lot of background and explanation. It is not really directly relevant to the staff guidance.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

So, those documents will be available if someone wants to be trained on the background of, you know, current BTP 7-19 is an official Agency-broad guidance that's out there.

If somebody, one of my staff wants to review that background or history in the 1990s, it describes a lot of what happened.

We want the staff to really focus on what we are looking for, why diversity is there, you know, what kind of approach is acceptable to the staff. So, it's a lot of the discussions that are not relevant to the staff review.

We are not putting that DSRS as repetition to existing - the reference material that's in the BTP 7-19.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Well, just to beat this dead horse a little bit deader, okay? I understand your point. But, yet, when you look at - if you look at the existing thing in the DSRS, a basis, you know, a regulatory basis for why is not - is really not there in terms of the way it's discussed in BTP 7-19.

There's a more thorough discussion of, you know, the regulatory basis and the various - both the rules from the GDCs, as well as other guidance that's put out there. And there's a number of points made with

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 then clarifying discussion on those. In other words, I mean, the reviewer now if he hasn't, if he doesn't have the background that 3 you have or Dan has and the rest of your talented team, it's going to be difficult for them to try to invent some of this stuff on their own. 6 7 And maybe they won't even know they can go 8 to this since it's not even listed anywhere in the DSRS 9 relative as to a former basis - document that establishes 10 a regulatory basis for it. 11 So, anyway, that's -12 MR. CONCEPCION: We're taking the feedback, you know. We're taking it. We're going to go back and 13 14 look at D3. 15 MR. SHUAIBI: Let me add something here. 16 You said we're beating a dead horse. Maybe I'll beat 17 it a little more. 18 CHAIRMAN BROWN: You're going to make me talk 19 again. 20 MR. SHUAIBI: We've got statistics, I think, 21 that we can share with you on, you know, how many pages 22 was the old guidance versus how many pages are in this Review Standard. 23 24 And if we want to do that comparison, 25 actually the difference is pretty significant. We know

1	that we're coming in here with a much, much shorter
2	document than what we had before.
3	So, we believe we've captured what's
4	important. But, again, as Ian and Dan said if you
5	believe that there's something missing, I mean, that's
6	part of our interaction with you, that's part of our
7	interaction with the public and everybody else.
8	We'll take that back. We're happy to take
9	that back, think about it, discuss it further with you.
10	And, you know, if we need to put it in, we'll put it
11	in.
12	But if we're going to compare numbers of
13	pages, I think - I think what we're ready to share with
14	you right now, you know, what the reduction is in the
15	number of pages, that's not what our focus was -
16	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I don't disagree with that.
17	I'm not a page guy, okay? I'm interested in content.
18	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: And what I tried to look
20	at when I did that one basic comparison was what was
21	the content of 7-19 and relative to what the content
22	was.
23	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: And I agree that there's
25	some stuff that could be left out, but it just seemed

1 to be, you know, if I looked and said what's the reviewer - if you look at what - where's the reviewer guidance, it's not - there's not a whole lot in there. So, anyway, that's - well, I'll pass on 5 that. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. 7 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Do you have any other 8 comments, Dennis, John, Jack? 9 MR. SANTOS: We'll get to that specific 10 section later today. 11 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, we'll have a chance 12 to -MR. SANTOS: We'll present our logic, and 13 14 then we can take it from there. 15 MR. CONCEPCION: Absolutely. 16 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. 17 MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. So, moving on to the next slide. 18 So, in the process of reviewing the SRP and 19 the relevant guidance, we used our I&C reviewers who 20 21 have done some of these I&C reviews in the past and we 22 also reached out to other staff members in NRO, to reinforce those interactions and activities that we do 23 24 as part of our review of other systems that interact 25 with I&C. So, we attempted to strengthen those areas

where there's overlaps in our review guidance.

And there's a bunch of other regulatory requirements that show up in the existing SRP for I&C. So, we had lengthy discussions with staff to better coordinate those reviews and clearly establish review responsibilities and all of that.

As part of the feedback we received from NRR, NRO, we had people reviewing the DSRS internally. We had NRO provide some feedback. We had OGC providing feedback. And also, external stakeholders provided feedback.

So, let me touch briefly on what the status of the DSRS is today and what led us to be here with this second version of the DSRS.

Back in June we published 7.1, which is the fundamental design principles. And we published Appendix B, which is the I&C architecture, and Appendix C, simplicity, along with the references for initial review and comment to support a meeting with stakeholders on June 21st.

And the feedback we received - oh, and there was some feedback that we received from this committee as well.

So, we took that feedback and considered the feedback and put it in the second version of the

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

DSRS, which is what you have in front of you today. We published it again - I guess those three sections were published and that we expanded and covered hazard analysis and provided basically the full Chapter without the section on quality and software development. We published it back in September of this

year and that is the reason why we're here today.

We're still in the process of collecting public comments and still in the process of developing the guidance of quality and software development, which will take us some time to finish.

Hopefully by sometime next year we will be able to publish this section and then collect some additional feedback on that.

Okay. So, now I'm going to get into the specifics of how we incorporated the lessons learned. And I have two examples associated with reorganization of the review guidance and separating those fundamental design principles from other system characteristics.

So, if you go to the next slide, I'm on Slide 11. We wanted to focus the review quidance on how the applicant should address those fundamental design principles of independence, redundancy, determinism and all of the - in D3.

And we provided specific language

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

address some of those activities so the reviewer understands how to review those to assure that there is regulatory compliance.

And this is an example that I'm going to show here. In the case of independence, we centralized the discussion about independence in 7.1.2 of the DSRS.

And we repeated that same approach for each fundamental design principle that is in Section 7.1 of the DSRS.

So, in addition, we alluded to the level of detail that we expect to receive in the application that the reviewer - that the reviewer should use to review the application.

We're getting to asking for logic diagrams and architectural descriptions and signal directions and inputs and outputs and all of that information so that we get a complete picture of the I&C system and how it - how the components interrelate and get that perspective directly in the application so the reviewer understands.

This is another example of how we reorganized the information. Today, the SRP has a system-by-system approach. And on top of Section 7.2 through 7.9 of the SRP, you have the branch technical positions which provide a resolution of a particular technical issue.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

So, Section 7.2 contains all the regulatory requirements applicable to RTS and there is repetition of regulatory requirements as you go through each of those sections. So, inherently, that structure lends itself to be repetitive. So, what we did was we segregated whatever we considered important as part of the fundamental design principles, put them in 7.1, we took all the additional design and functional characteristics and put them in 7.2 of the DSRS, and then considered all of the BTPs and relevant ISGs and put them in those sections of the DSRS.

So, we made sure that - again, this came up already, but we tried to make sure that we didn't lose relevant guidance associated with those concepts. And I guess in the case of D3 we're going to go back, but this is the structure we came up with.

And, again, we expect the applicant to information and address those fundamental design principles and system characteristics in a single location rather than scattered in different sections of the application.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Before you go - back up one slide. I just wanted to make one point.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

CHAIRMAN BROWN: And I'm not speaking for the - I'm speaking for myself right now, not necessarily for the Subcommittee. Personally, I like the setup of bringing the various types from the independence standpoint, bringing them into one section as opposed to having them spread out through a number of different sections they have to evaluate. So, that's a good idea in terms of integrating it, putting it in one location.

However, to make a - just to make a point under the communications independence, the first sentence that leads off says that determination of independence communications is self-evident, self-evident, if one-way communication is used among redundant channels or divisions and between safety and nonsafety systems.

And I, I mean, I think my brain just about exploded when I read that. I'm using very soft words. Could have made it stronger.

One-way communications does not ensure independence. That is so far from the truth. It's what you send and the method of sending, the type of data, the information and everything else that gets put in with that.

So, if I was a reviewer and I was looking

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

for independence and a design came in and said, hey, we're one way, I stop. I mean, his job is done from a communications standpoint.

And that is so far from the truth that it's just difficult for me to really integrate that and understand that and even sign up to it.

And if you've participated in any of our other design center meetings, we've spent multiple meetings trying to make sure that point got across and that we had ways to compromise - not compromise, excuse me, accommodate or - I've forgotten what the right word is now - recognize or, you know, to make sure that if you were compromised on your independence, it didn't compromise safety. It didn't compromise your ability to trip a channel or to, you know, fail as-is or to execute a safeguards function.

So, I mean, that's, you know, that's, you know, you go through a whole bunch of other stuff after that which is relevant to the discussion which blatantly says, you know, the first statement is not true.

So, that's just a difficult - when you say we've addressed it in one location, you're right. But yet, you've made a blanket statement in terms of what constitutes satisfactory communication independence, which is really the lynchpin. It's one of the most

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 difficult areas of software-based I&C systems because of sending digital type signal data from one division to another division for voting purposes, or any other purpose. MR. SANTOS: We're taking the feedback - this is Dan Santos. Charlie, good comment. We can probably 6 7 come up with a better word. 8 (Laughter.) 9 MR. SANTOS: What I want to say is that as 10 you know, communication independence is not the full 11 story. That the real story is independence, okay? Well, that's one of 12 CHAIRMAN BROWN: 13 multiple -14 MR. SANTOS: Right. 15 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I agree with that. 16 MR. SANTOS: We have many attributes when 17 it comes to independence. I mean, it's the collection 18 and the systematic look at the system to ensure independence. 19 20 Includes functional, sharing of parameters 21 22 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I agree with you, Dan. 23 MR. SANTOS: - basic -24 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Stop for a minute. I 25 understand.

MR. SANTOS: Okay.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: The functional independence and electrical independence are fairly relatively - I'm saying it's relatively easier to grab your hands around.

Communication independence and software-based systems is very difficult to get your hands around, because it's invisible. Little bits and bytes running around on buses.

So, I mean, and how that communication is done, I mean, relative even if you look at the base diagram of the mPower design, all of their information flows out from -- like the PTL level, I actually looked at that gross top-level architecture out to a - everything goes through one set of buses. It's all conglomerated; ESF systems, control systems and reactor protection systems.

Well, what part of independence do I not understand when I look at that, okay? There's no - there's physical independence, but there's certainly not functional independence and there's certainly not communication independence, or at least not based on the level of detail in that particular diagram, which admittedly is very high-level.

My point being I agree with you. But the

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	communication setup in this stuff and the independence,
2	the whole issue we've been dealing with the last four
3	years, is to make sure this independence issue is not
4	compromised.
5	If you don't have it, you don't have a safe
6	system, period, whether it's reactor trip systems or
7	whether it's safeguard systems.
8	MR. CONCEPCION: We understand the feedback
9	and we're going to go back and look at the section one
0	more time.
_1	I believe we're getting into some -
_2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: It was an example.
_3	MR. CONCEPCION: - proprietary details
_4	that I just don't -
. 5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, I didn't see it say
6	proprietary and I didn't even say what it looked like.
- 7	I just said it's -
8 ـ	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I have to go back and look
20	at what those levels are.
21	MR. SHUAIBI: Good comments and we'll take
22	that one back. We'll relook at that section.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: This is a critical part of
2 4	this DSRS.
25	MR. CONCEPCION: We understand and we're

1 going to go back and look at this section. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, thank you. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. 3 MEMBER BLEY: I think what follows is pretty 5 good though. MR. CONCEPCION: Oh, yes. 6 MEMBER BLEY: This makes sense to me, the 7 8 last two slides you talked about. And it makes sense to me given we've had all these discussions the last 9 10 four years. 11 I know you've been really busy. Have you 12 had a chance to run this draft past some of your people who might be doing reviews in the future who aren't as 13 14 experienced, to see if this is - hangs together as well for them as it appears to hang together for me, anyway? 15 MR. CONCEPCION: Well, part of this effort 16 17 includes a training activity once we are done with 18 developing the chapter. So, we intend to go and train our staff on how to implement this DSRS. 19 And staff has been able to look at this draft 20 21 version today. So, this version is available. We shared it with staff, but we intend to have training 22 once we're done with it. 23 24 And once we get the application, we will 25 involve staff members to make sure they understand how

to implement.

MEMBER BLEY: How to use it.

MR. CONCEPCION: This is a clear change in the way we're doing reviews from the current SRP from these fundamental principles. And we're sensitive to that and we know that there is some training associated with it.

MR. JUNG: Mr. Bley, just to add from my branch who led this project, and our branch is assigned to review this particular design, advance reactors coming up, so development of DSRS is a branch-level activity.

I think most of them were involved starting from depending what kind of structure do we want? And we divided many of the efforts between the junior reviewers all the way up to senior reviewers.

So, in the audience, most of my staff, I see their faces. Some of the junior engineers who's been with NRC only a few years, all the way through, you know, decades of experience. They were all part of that. We've been addressing their suggestions and comments along the way.

They are part of the ownership right now. So, in a way, not to mention about the training, but they are already getting trained on what it looks like,

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	what's needed. So, they've been providing their own
2	_
3	MEMBER BLEY: I'm glad to hear that.
4	Sometimes these things that look so good on the
5	conceptual level, don't quite work when you actually
6	try to use them. And I was hoping you had those folks
7	involved.
8	MR. CONCEPCION: We should be able to collect
9	some additional lessons learned once we start
10	implementing it.
11	MS. STAREFOS: Can I also comment on that,
12	Mr. Bley? Joelle Starefos, Project Manager.
13	It was really remarkable the number in
14	variety of experience in the room for the people that
15	were developing this. It was very impressive.
16	And it was interesting to see that across
17	Ian's, I guess to say, almost whole branch had been
18	involved at one point or another here.
19	So, I think that those aspects had been
20	incorporated and thought about during this as well.
21	So, I just wanted to share that.
22	MEMBER BLEY: It will be interesting to see
23	what happens.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Another point relative to
25	this since you're using examples, was under the

1 redundancy part of the - I'm trying to find it now. Yes, redundancy. When you read through that, there is - the 3 only reference in terms of evaluating this from an acceptance criteria was listed as single failure criteria, which gives you to believe that that is the 7 sole basis for why we have redundancy. 8 And yet, if you look at that in a bigger 9 - on a bigger scale, the real point is there is other 10 operations that drive you to higher levels of 11 redundancy. I mean, for instance, if only single failure 12 was a criteria, all I'd need was three channels. 13 14 But yet, if I have to allow myself to operate 15 when I'm in maintenance bypass and I've got to channel 16 down, it drives me to four. 17 So, there's no discussion - I see somebody 18 shaking their head up and down over there. So, I don't know if you're all agreeing or disagreeing with me. 19 20 MR. CONCEPCION: Well, I agree with you. 21 CHAIRMAN BROWN: But the point being is that 22 that's, you know, when the reviewer has to address what 23 I'm looking for in terms of redundancy, what are the factors that he looked at? 24 25 Is it just single failure, or are there

other modes of operation that drive you to different levels of redundancy?

And it's not - and I don't know that's in the rest of the old SRP or not, but it's certainly not - it's certainly not listed or at least I didn't recognize it in here.

So, that's just - I'm just trying to use an example of something that appeared to be missing.

In other words, what does the reviewer use when he looks at the acceptance criteria and when he looks at the - what is it - the review procedures that he goes though?

So, all those factors that drive you in certain areas somehow - and I don't mean pages of this discussion, but what's the functional - what is the specific design thing you look for relative to other modes of operation whether they be maintenance or whether they be testing or whatever they happen to be.

MR. SANTOS: That's a good comment. And, actually, we have got a comment like that already and we're going through. So, I thank you for that and that's the type of feedback we're looking for to make sure we're complete.

So, again, we already had a comment very similar to that and we're going to be dispositioning. So, thank you.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay.

MR. JUNG: Yes, Charlie, generally the - our redundancy guidance as we pull together our fundamental design principles, redundancy was somewhat difficult.

The way the current guidance is structured, the current guidance somewhat focus on a lot of regulatory requirements and what to review.

So, redundancy was not specifically identified as a relatively good section -

CHAIRMAN BROWN: In the old -

MR. JUNG: The existing SRP.

So, I think we made an improvement overall from a redundancy. But maintenance bypass and operating bypass, those are 603 requirements specifically listed in 7.2 as well. There's even an argument what drives a redundancy as a single failure criterion or bypass. Those are very controversial kind of topic.

Generally, I think it is well understood that single failure criteria and 603 really drives fundamentally what redundancy is required and some of the bypass conditions are accepted, condition of the tech specs, for example, that allows two out of three instead of two out of four.

So, is that a redundancy or not? It could

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 be arguable, but regulation requires maintenance bypass, operating bypasses are designed in a safe way for all operating modes. So, we have another requirement to handle that.

Whether we want to put that into redundancy to have another redundant, a repetitive guidance, that's a different aspect.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let me phrase it another way. When I look in many of the sections you addressed and refer to either IEEE 603-specific clauses and here the only reference was to 379 -

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: - but yet that does not - to my knowledge, that does not go into that information. It's been a while since I looked at 379.

So, the point being is if there's relevant regulatory basis or rule basis for it, then I think you could make an - it's just what does the reviewer look at when he's - personally, I think the approach relative to fundamental high-level principles of design that you want to get across to people, a different approach to looking at this not be reg guide or, you know, bottom-up. You want to be top-down, and then you want these other pieces to feed in as to how do you deal with each of these fundamental principles.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

And so that, I don't have any - I personally don't have any disagreement with that. But yet, you still have to give the reviewer when he's thinking about the principles, what are the points that drive - or the regulatory basis that drive those whether it be from a reg guide, or whether it be GDC, or whether it be IEEE 603.

MR. CONCEPCION: Let me just add something

MR. CONCEPCION: Let me just add something real quick here.

Like I said before, we're manipulating the existing guidance in the SRP. And perhaps we might need additional information to the reviewer to address this particular aspect of redundancy.

Now, when you look at RTS in the existing SRP, it points you to IEEE 603, Section 5.1, which calls for IEEE 379. And that is endorsed in Reg Guide 1.53.

So, I understand the point, but we are using existing information to populate the sections that are in the DSRS today. And if we need additional guidance for the reviewer to perform a review and determine what is it that we need for them to establish that redundancy is, in fact, implemented in the design, we can go back and look and identify those and incorporate it in the DSRS, but we're using the existing information.

We did not reduce guidance particularly for

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 redundancy in the DSRS. We've extracted what's in the SRP and put it in there. And we're taking the comment - this is 3 something that NRR brought up already and we're going to address it, definitely. CHAIRMAN BROWN: All right. Well, I'm 6 7 repetitive in my comment then. I didn't know that. 8 MR. CONCEPCION: That's okay. That's okay. 9 Okay. 10 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I will continue to be 11 repetitive if I have to. 12 MR. CONCEPCION: That's okay. No, that's not a problem at all. We're addressing the comment as 13 14 we speak. 15 MR. SANTOS: Just to add real quick, sorry 16 to interrupt, you mentioned redundancy. But like we're 17 saying, we're taking a new approach with the four 18 fundamental principles and our current guidance wasn't structured like that. 19 20 So, to go from this top-down approach 21 there's this translation that's going on, but we're all 22 for being complete. So, that's all I want to say. 23 MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. I think I covered 24 Slide 12 already. So, moving on to Slide 13. This is 25 another lesson learned that we're trying to incorporate in the DSRS.

1

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And moving on to the next slide, this is the structure we came up with after we decided to incorporate the fundamental design principles.

So, you have the introduction in 7.0, you have directly addressing the fundamental design principles in the middle column of that slide, and then you have the system characteristics which are design and functional characteristics are contained in IEEE 603-1991.

And what's missing in this particular slide is the list of appendices that we expect to use in conjunction with 7.1 and 7.2, but this is pretty much the structure we're implementing in order to use that lesson learned related to the fundamental design principles and incorporate in the guidance.

That's the only point I'm trying to make here with this slide.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Plus the appendices.

MR. CONCEPCION: Plus the appendices, yes. Plus the appendices. There's a better slide later on that I will show everything in there.

Okay. So, I have two examples that show how we remove redundant and nonapplicable information.

There is one that comes across really obviously, which

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

is IEEE 279 if we go to Slide 16. And, by the way, there is a typo on that slide.

On the right-hand, the first bullet, it should read "pre-1999 licenses." That is the applicability of IEEE 279. I apologize for that.

So, like I said, we considered all the guidance and tried to improve the efficiency of it by modifying, incorporating information and removing the stuff that we didn't find necessary to the reviewer as we went through and identified what it was that we needed for the DSRS.

And in the end once we removed, for example, the 279 and the repetitive information and some other sections, we end up with this document that has around 150 pages from 500 plus pages. But that includes BTPs that we - that were applicable to I&C that we were able to roll into the DSRS and some other information that we didn't consider, because it was not applicable to this particular project.

And I have to emphasize that we did not lose relevant guidance. We took what we had and we put it in the DSRS.

Perhaps we can improve in some areas, but the net effect of the existing guidance and the rearrangement gave us this result and this particular

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	format.
2	MEMBER BLEY: In the past, we feel that we've
3	had a great number of unnecessary RAIs.
4	(Laughter.)
5	MR. CONCEPCION: You want to answer that?
6	MR. JUNG: Milton wasn't quite here. I have
7	to be careful what I say.
8	MR. CONCEPCION: I would think so.
9	MR. JUNG: I think there could have been
10	efficiency -
11	MEMBER BLEY: So, they were repetitive or
12	-
13	MR. JUNG: - that could have obtained.
14	Because in February meeting I mentioned to you about
15	repetitiveness in different systems and different
16	areas, right? Many of my folks are involved in one
17	design center to be able to accommodate the review.
18	So, each person looking at 7.2 reactor trip
19	system, it contains a lot of the redundant, repetitive
20	review areas, including independence, all of the, you
21	name it, digital systems. And somebody reviewing 7.9
22	on data communication system, you're looking at
23	communication type of things.
24	MEMBER BLEY: So, we're really talking about
25	repetitive RAIs that were asking the same issue, but

from slightly different point of view.

MR. JUNG: In some cases because it should be the nature of the information, the applicant also does make a mistake in providing some different information, different level of detail, different sections to address the same issue.

I remember there are cases that RAI could have been combined into one single, very clear RAI that you would have - it got repeated multiple times in some cases to make sure what it was really meant by the applicant, because it was not clear in two different sections.

But I think overall we worked it out okay.

I think, you know, eventually as we write the SER, we have to make a conclusion.

MEMBER BLEY: This side could get you in trouble somewhere.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, I would amplify your comment relative to - I don't think it's necessarily all driven by just having stuff in different places. Because if anything stood out to me in some of the earlier what I'd call design center reviews, was a lack of either understanding or agreement by the design agents relative to what NRC needed or wanted relative to clarity and detail in the functional designs that

they presented.

And, I mean, I remember specifically sitting in the first meeting I was in, in June or July of 2008 where we were just told, no, we don't have to give you the information.

It turned out that that didn't work out for a couple of years and we eventually got it, but the point being is that it's critical for the review standards to be very clear relative - and I don't think they were before from what I went and looked at when we were doing that in terms of what level of detail do you want and how do you specify how certain basic, for instance, independence or diversity or what have you are actually accomplished.

So, it's important to have enough detail that people understand what you're looking for and what is an acceptable approach to doing things.

So, I think that's what drove a lot of the RAIs in trying to get that level of information. And so, that's why we drive to try to have a little bit more information. This is what the reviewer is going to be looking for and that detail is there, and we go on from there.

MR. JUNG: Thank you, Charlie. We fully agree. I just want to add one aspect of it related to

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 complexity and simplistic design. In some cases, the solution was not about 3 more details. It was about demonstration of safety with, in some cases, a simpler design. 5 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Absolutely. I won't 6 disagree with that. 7 MR. JUNG: So, in those cases, simpler design 8 does not require more detail. It needs that decision 9 to be made up front. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, if you get a design 10 11 submitted to you in functional diagram language which 12 is extremely complex looking, that immediately sends the message that, you know, we're - that's going to be 13 14 a problem. 15 Whereas if it's emphasized - and that's why 16 it's important to emphasize the simplicity standpoint 17 even though it's not - there is no rulemaking relative 18 to simplicity. MEMBER BLEY: Could you back up one slide? 19 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sir. 20 21 MEMBER BLEY: I think you might have a good 22 story for this, but there's a thing that worries many 23 people, me in particular, when you go from the existing 24 SRP when you do it at higher levels with some licensing

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

issues, to a design-specific and you get this idea of

1 what we have to do is remove the irrelevant parts from the general guidance to our specific guidance. 3 Where do you cover looking very hard to make sure that you add things that are necessary due to the new design as well? CONCEPCION: Well, we added 6 MR. 7 quidance. We added the quidance on HA. We added the 8 guidance on I&C architectural description. We added 9 quidance on simplicity. And we had limited information and I don't 10 11 want to talk too much about this, because the information 12 we received is clearly proprietary and there are some - there's some information in the DSRS today that alludes 13 14 to it in a subtle way, but we had those pre-application 15 interactions with B&W and we captured the essence of 16 some of those early design decisions and we try to tailor the DSRS to capture those. 17 18 In the case of nonapplicable guidance where clearly 279 is not applicable to the mPower design, that 19 is one -20 21 MEMBER BLEY: No, nobody is going to argue 22 with you that -23 MR. CONCEPCION: Right. 24 MEMBER BLEY: - there's reason to remove 25 inapplicable things. It was the other side. And at

least for me, the thing that helps - well, there are two things that help. And the one is this focus on the fundamental design principles that cover things that maybe you weren't covering well before, and the elimination of the use of DAC also kind of helps with that as well.

So, I think you might have a story, but you can get a sense of what we did was take away the stuff

So, I think you might have a story, but you can get a sense of what we did was take away the stuff that didn't matter rather than we really looked to make sure we were being inclusive as well.

MR. CONCEPCION: The only major information that we did not consider for this was 279. Everything else was fair game and we considered it - we removed the repetition.

Now, this exercise is uncovering certain areas where we don't have strong guidance to the reviewer and that's reflected in some of the sections.

So, we're taking that feedback back and make sure that we provide what the reviewer needs to address those areas, because we understand that the structure provides a different approach that is - that will need additional information to the reviewer to make sure that all of the safety issues are resolved.

I guess Dan wants to - or Mo. I'm sorry.

MR. SHUAIBI: I'll just add one other comment

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

to that. A very relevant comment. And kind of it's where we are today and where they are today as an applicant.

So, let me just say that regardless of what you see here today if we learn something in design space in the future that we haven't considered, there is nothing to stop us from going out and developing either new guidance or new RAIs to deal with those issues.

So, they don't have a complete design right now that we could basically tailor our review standard very specific to that design. But as that gets closer and as we learn more about their design if anything comes up where we need new guidance, I'll be back sometime in the future, and you can quote me on this, we will address that design feature - those design features if they come up.

So, I guess what I'm saying is right now what you've got is based on the information that we have.

And the more information that we get, the more we'll be looking at it to see if we need more guidance or if something else needs to change.

MS. STAREFOS: I'd also like to add that our overall philosophy for the DSRS was to have more information rather than less, unless we were certain that removing it was appropriate.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

So, in some cases you might see things that are more generic than you would imagine the design would 3 be, but we didn't have the certainty in where the design was at that point to eliminate it as a review aspect. So, we tried to be conservative in that to allow the reviewer to make that 6 7 decision at application. 8 MR. SANTOS: I just want to offer that when 9 we get to the specific sections later today if there 10 is any particular area that you feel what happened to 11 this, we can explain to you our evaluation process that resulted in inclusion or elimination. 12 And we have to be careful with the examples 13 14 so we don't get into proprietary information, but we'll share that with you. 15 16 MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. I'm on Slide 17 now. 17 this is another example where we identified 18 an area where there repetitive was information in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 18 of the 19 application. 20 And we had the luxury of having someone from 22 the human factors group doing a rotation to our branch 23 in the time that we were identifying these overlaps. 24 And he was quick to identify there were some areas that 25 had clear overlap.

21

1 And what we did was we strengthened the coordination of human factors considerations which is an IEEE 603 requirement that we need to address in I&C systems. And what we did was the stuff that's on the left used to be in Chapter 7. What we did, we condensed 6 7 the information and put a direct pointer to Chapter 18 8 of the application, because that is an area where I&C 9 has to coordinate with human factors. 10 And this is something that we considered 11 an improvement, because we - this guidance was not -12 was in Chapter 7. We were not doing an active review. All right. So, where am I? 13 DAC, okay. 14 Going to the next slide. 15 MEMBER BLEY: Just for me and is this really 16 a change at all? How do you coordinate the human factors 17 and the I&C? I mean, they're very closely correlated. 18 Do you have each other on the review teams for each of those? 19 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, I need a lifeline, 20 21 Paul. 22 MR. PIERINGER: Hi, I'm Paul Pieringer, human factors technical reviewer. 23 24 The way we used to do it is pretty much we 25 would independently come to our conclusions and sometimes we would talk and make sure our conclusions were the same. Other times it would be caught in the review process where we might have disconnect.

The plan going forward is that these kind of references cause tech reviewers to come down and talk with each other and to review the results of each chapter before they become finalized.

There are certain areas we know that we have to have a team orientation. One of them is the D3 manual action review, because all that material comes to the Chapter 7. And Chapter 18 people wouldn't see it unless we go in and pull the Chapter 7 material. So, this rewrite specifically directs that interface.

And the other, I would say, even more important interface is around Reg Guide 1.97. And that only - not only requires an interface between Chapter 18 and Chapter 7 people, but in the last design center review we did, we actually had a team fielded with the Chapter 15 people, the systems people, TRA people, HFE and tech specs.

So, I can't give you a number, but it was probably on the order of 10 to 12 people. And with that interface, we were able to start from the design basis material and understand what that required and work it down through every step in the various system designs

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

and verify that the end product was that every control display alarm needed to support - managing design basis events had been properly characterized and cataloged within the 1.97 structure. We took that concept and we embedded it in this rewrite. And what it does, it's centered in Chapter 7. So, they've taken on the leadership responsibility for that and is in the direction for the reviewers of Chapter 7. It says, contact the following people as a minimum and it recommends establishing this team for Reg Guide 1.97. That's the basics. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. Thanks, Paul. MEMBER BLEY: Anything that drives us in this direction is good. (Laughter.) MR. CONCEPCION: Thanks. Okay. So, I'm back on Slide 19 and I'm trying to address the concept of DAC and I want to be clear here. We understand that DAC is policy and we understand that it can be used in DSRS, but we're looking for a level of detail that is sufficient for us to resolve all safety issues without reliance on DAC. Now, B&W is on board and they have been

They have been cooperative with the level

forthcoming.

1

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

of information - they say they will provide the information sufficient to address all safety issues. So, we don't expect any particular issue regarding DAC.

Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, question. Where does it say that in the DSRS?

MR. CONCEPCION: It does not mention it.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's my point.

MR. JUNG: Charlie, we don't discuss DAC -

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Hold on. There's no reason why you shouldn't state in the fundamental start-off of this thing that the level of information provided to evaluate the design should be sufficient to establish that whatever the overarching reactor safety, et cetera, et cetera, you don't have to even use the words DAC. I agree you don't - it would not be a good idea to kind of cross-play that and get into a food fight.

But the point being is the purpose of a good bit of the information that's provided in here is to ensure that we get that information. Not just the Advisory Committee. I mean, that's just so you all have the ability to provide us with the information that we can walk away knowing that on a licensing basis you now have - you don't have to wait for something to happen five years later.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	You don't have to say that, but you've got
2	to be able to establish the firm licensing basis as part
3	of your, you know, final design certification or
4	whatever.
5	So, you say that, but you don't talk about
6	DAC. So -
7	MR. JUNG: Thank you, Charlie.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - that will be - that will
9	probably be a comment. I just - I don't know whether
10	it will be a comment or not, because I've got 14 other
11	people to deal with.
12	From my viewpoint -
13	MR. JUNG: Thank you, Charlie. We accept
14	your comment and -
15	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm glad you accept it.
16	(Laughter.)
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Now, what are you going to
18	do with it?
19	MR. JUNG: We'll work with the applicant.
20	We are communicating what you're just saying with the
21	applicant and we'll see what we can do in the guidance
22	space.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, this is - remember,
24	this is the Design-Specific Review Standard. The
25	applicant shouldn't - well, maybe I shouldn't say that.

I'm very blunt.

MR. CONCEPCION: We're working with the applicant.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: This basis, I mean, quite frankly, again, my opinion, not the Committee's opinion, is that the higher level fundamentals plus this thing really should be a better format for overall generic design reviews or, you know, a Standard Review Plan for staff.

It's a far more functional level of looking at in terms of meeting basic safety goals. There are a lot of details, but you start from the top down.

And fundamentally from that top-down standpoint, you set the guidance for what is acceptable for processing and say, yes, we accept this design. You ought to just say it.

MR. CONCEPCION: We're taking steps to get there and give the reviewer the tools so that he or she understands what level of information is needed.

We're not mentioning DAC, but we're alluding a lot to certain aspects of the design description that should get us there without necessarily having an applicant saying, okay, I'm just going to use DAC.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, up in the -

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1	MR. CONCEPCION: Hopefully we're in the
2	right direction.
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - review of the review
4	process, all it takes is a small paragraph that says
5	that the purpose of this, you know, is to ensure during
6	the review that we have a satisfactory level of detailed,
7	functional instrumentation and control information to
8	establish that the licensing basis or safety basis is
9	met at this date and that we don't have to bet on - you
0	don't have to say - this is my extra words. You don't
. 1	have to say so we don't have to bet on something in the
2	future, but the point ought to be made up front without
_3	saying that.
4	You can't say they can't use DAC. You can't
. 5	do that, because that's established policy.
6	MR. CONCEPCION: Understand. I appreciate
7	the feedback.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay.
_ 9	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Moving on, this is
20	another example -
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Know where I come from,
22	that's all.
23	MR. JUNG: Charlie, we're not ignoring it.
24	We are taking that into -
25	MR. CONCEPCION: No, absolutely.
	WELL D. GDGG

1 Absolutely. MR. JUNG: Good feedback. MR. CONCEPCION: Moving on, this is another 3 area where we - that we identified as a lesson learned. We're introducing the concept of simplicity and hazard analysis in our guidance. And not mentioned 6 7 on this slide is also I&C architectural descriptions. 8 So, we have a User Need Request with the 9 Office of Research right now. And Dr. Sushil Birla is 10 here with us. 11 They are working on developing a technical basis for the review of hazard analysis. And what we 12 did a couple of months ago, we took a portion of that 13 14 research effort and we developed this Appendix A that is right now in the DSRS. 15 16 MEMBER STETKAR: Are you going to talk more 17 about this in detail later? 18 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, I will. Yes, there is a slide devoted to Appendix A and we can get into 19 the details of it. 20 21 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay, fine. 22 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. In addition, we took 23 existing guidance, the very limited guidance on 24 simplicity, and we tried to develop these items that 25 is in the DSRS. And this is a running joke. This was

not a simple task, because there is very little on simplicity.

And we looked at the common position from the multinational design evaluation program. We looked at the I&C safety guide from IAEA, as well as information from IEEE 7-432, and tried to come up with something that would make sense in the area of simplicity.

And we ended up bouncing it against the fundamental design principles so that we could at least give the reviewer some information that he would process this as he goes through the review of these systems and address how simplicity was factored in the design of these I&C systems.

I see you're nodding your - you're shaking your head.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, what did I say five years ago? Okay. It was redundancy, independence, determinism, D3 and an adjunct principle not rule-based of simplicity.

Those are the key factors in trying to determine that you've got, I mean, that's the only way nondetailed design people can look at the basic system like the Committee or other outside bodies and say, look, they've looked at this from the high-level standpoint and they've tried to make sure that the system is as

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	simple as possible because you've got less likelihood
2	of having things surprise you. Yet, you still have the
3	complexity necessary to meet the other requirements.
4	Not the nice stuff, but the nice, you know,
5	the necessary stuff only. And that seems to be personal
6	opinion again from looking at the other stuff we've seen
7	in the last four years on the new design.
8	There's a lot of, gee, we've got this big
9	computer that can do all kinds of stuff. So, we're going
10	to do all kinds of stuff whether it's needed or not.
11	And there's always a nice, oh boy, this is
12	nice because the operator can - but when it's really
13	useless, and I won't complete the rest of that phrase.
14	It's been heard before, and I'm -
15	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. And not shown on
16	this slide is the concept of I&C architectural
17	description that we also captured in Appendix B of the
18	DSRS.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You've got another slide
20	on that later?
21	MR. CONCEPCION: We have a slide that
22	addresses -
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: A, B and C are covered by
24	roughly starting at Slide 35 or so.
25	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, it's later in the

presentation. So, we can get into the details of it if you guys are interested in it, and I believe you are. (Laughter.) MEMBER STETKAR: That would be a good belief. MR. CONCEPCION: This is another lesson Again, we try to make sure that we covered all of the regulatory requirements in the guidance and the DSRS. And if you go to Slide 23, I'm showing a couple of regulatory requirements from 603 and GDC and the location of the DSRS. This is just an attempt to show an example of how we do it, but there is a table, Table 7.1 in Section 7.0, that pretty much maps Table 7.1-T of the SRP today. And I don't - I guess we can go maybe later during the presentation, because I have a slide devoted all on 7.0 alone and all the information on 7.0. I can show you how we mapped all of those regulatory requirements in the DSRS, how they're captured. And even we put review responsibilities and review scope for some areas where we have a clearer coordination with plant systems, with containment systems, electrical systems and all of those other areas

CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'd like to make one

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

that interface with I&C.

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

observation. I notice that throughout you did make observations that this other group is responsible for this, and this other group - you have the Chapter 15 guy and the Chapter 6 guy and the Chapter whatever folks are responsible for this.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

Was an I&C guy and responsible for all this stuff for 35 years in another - in the Naval nuclear program and I was never able to shuck responsibility, the key word, responsibility, for ensuring that my systems addressed all of the relevant requirements that everybody else, all the, you know, whether it be a fluid system, whether it be a trip system, whether it be a support system.

If I had to do that, I always looked at it - well, let me put it this way: Admiral Rickover never allowed me to not take responsibility or I would have my, you know, I'd be skinned alive if I had ever said, oh, no, that's somebody else's. I would depend on he would have shot me and said, that wasn't a good idea.

MR. CONCEPCION: But we're not -

CHAIRMAN BROWN: But, I mean, when you read this, just personal opinion again, it looks like, well, gee, we're just an adjunct. These other guys are responsible for making sure we meet - that we have

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 addressed their requirements. And I think it requires - personally, I 3 think you ought to have a little bit more stronger ownership, myself, because this is the digital I&C this is the reactor trip safeguard systems and for all the other support systems that feed in, auxiliary or 6 7 otherwise, that support that. 8 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, we're trying to make 9 sure that the coordination is there, number one, but 10 we're not delegating responsibility. 11 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I don't disagree. But if 12 the way it reads is they you read it, have responsibility. 13 14 MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. 15 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. It's really being 16 I&C should be responsible to make sure that they do their 17 job and feed into you and coordinate with you. 18 You should be - the I&C folks should be responsible for that. That's just kind of a generic 19 20 thought process I had when I was reading this. 21 MR. JUNG: Charlie, good comment. We will 22 take a look at that. 23 I just want to share one thought. One of 24 the lessons learned in some areas, I&C in some cases

have taken on someone else's - some other discipline's

79 work and spent a lot of time on as if we are the lead. And there's some inefficiencies in terms of the, you know, given the amount of time definitely we need to take care of these fundamental design principles and focus on what's really important, first. And then, also coordinate with other branches. This is a double-edged sword in terms of how much we cover someone else's - I think it's a mutual responsibility. We all have to have ownership, understand the design.

A lot of the pre-application report of the application interactions that's been going through, my staff is attending, at least have a presence in understanding the systems design and in fluid systems and other areas.

So, how does I&C play a role in those things? We are keeping on top of it. We understand your We'll take a look at that. comment.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. I'm not - I wasn't - I'm not trying to have you all take over the, you know, what they're supposed to be.

The point being is that somebody, you, I mean, if it comes up in the system as deficient later, where is somebody going to go?

It's your system, Ian. Why, you know, how

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

did you guys let that one - all that means is you don't
- sure, you have to have a fundamental understanding
of the other systems. It doesn't have to be a detailed,
down in the, you know, what's the stress analysis for
the pipe and the flow velocities in the elbows and all
that. That's not what I'm talking about.
The point being is if you've got fundamental
functions that have to be accomplished, you have to make
sure in that coordination that they do them and give
it to you in a timely manner and that you understand
what they're giving you.
That's all I'm saying. I'm not advocating
that you do their work for them. That doesn't -
MR. JUNG: I think we understood the
feedback.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: And I just think you ought
to tweak the words a little bit to make it clear of
ownership and the necessary coordination.
So, instead of having, you know, these guys
are responsible, hey, you know, this is what we do and
we will make sure that all this other stuff comes in.
It's just a ways of phrasing it, that's all.
MR. JUNG: Yes, absolutely. Yes,
understand.

MEMBER STETKAR: To give you a specific

1	example that I kind of stumbled over in this area, you
2	say that, for example, you're not going to look at
3	separation of cables because people doing Chapter 8 does
4	that. So, we're not going to look at that.
5	That's okay. Last time I checked,
6	electricity got transmitted on copper wires. This
7	stuff gets transmitted on fiberoptic cables.
8	Who looks at separation of fiberoptic
9	cables? If you're not going to look at that, the
10	electrical guys aren't going to look at that. So,
11	nobody is going to look at it.
12	Okay. That's a little bit of what Charlie
13	is talking about in terms of this distributed -
14	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, that's an obvious one
15	to -
16	MEMBER STETKAR: You and only you own
17	fiberoptic cables, but this says, no, we're not going
18	to look at the cable separation, because that's a Chapter
19	8 function.
20	Chapter 8 guys say, well, we looked at the
21	separation of our cables. We don't have to look at
22	those.
23	Okay. So, be careful about that.
24	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, I understand that.
25	Okay. So, this is - I guess this is a better

representation of DSRS Chapter 7 on the right-hand side.

And we're putting it side-by-side with the existing

SRP. And I just want to make a couple of points here.

The information - and this alludes to how we handle the information from the SRP and put it somewhere in the DSRS or a higher level.

So, when you look at 7.0 and 7.1 of the existing SRP, that information got transferred to Section 7.0 of the DSRS. That's where you will see the overall description of I&C, how we do the reviews, the review scope and coordination and all of that information that got transferred from those two sections in the SRP.

Then you get into Section 7.2 all the way down to the ISGs. That's how - we took all of that information and we segregated it in 7.1, 7.2 and Appendices A, B and C.

I just wanted to make those points and show how we at a higher level, how we took the information from the SRP and put it in the DSRS. And I guess we will have a chance to get into the specific sections right now with Section 7.0, which, like I said, talks about the introduction and overview of the review process.

MR. JUNG: Mr. Brown, I think it might be

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	a good time to take a break.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, I was just getting
3	flagged here. I was going to ask where -
4	MR. CONCEPCION: I was supposed to finish
5	this section and then get into the break, but we're -
6	it is 10:15 right now and I will not - I don't know if
7	I'm going to cover it in 15 minutes -
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes.
9	MR. CONCEPCION: - if you guys want to get
10	into the table.
11	CHAIRMAN BROWN: On the schedule, where are
12	we here?
13	MR. CONCEPCION: We are under Item Number
14	4 right now.
15	CHAIRMAN BROWN: We're just about to start
16	that?
17	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sir.
18	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, so we're a half an hour
19	behind? I thought we were ahead.
20	MEMBER BLEY: I did, too.
21	(Laughter.)
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Blowing me away.
23	Did you think we were ahead?
24	PARTICIPANT: You're never behind as long
25	as there are 24 hours in a day.
	NEAL D. CDOSS

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, we've gone through
2	24 slides out of 43. So, I mean, you know, I figured
3	we're halfway done.
4	PARTICIPANT: Charlie, stop talking.
5	MR. CONCEPCION: We're going to spend a lot
6	of time on those slides.
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I agree.
8	MR. CONCEPCION: I don't have a lot, but
9	there's a lot of discussion.
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's excellent. I like
11	the suggestion. I'm glad everybody is pounding on me,
12	but I've got the hammer.
13	(Laughter.)
14	CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, we will take a break
15	and we will - what's the appropriate terminology here?
16	We pause the meeting?
17	MEMBER STETKAR: Recess.
18	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Recess, thank you. We will
19	recess the meeting for 15 minutes until 10:30.
20	(Whereupon, the proceedings went off the
21	record at 10:15 a.m. for a brief recess and went back
22	on the record at 10:44 a.m.)
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: The meeting is now back in
24	session. Milt, fire away.
25	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Yes, okay.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 So, we made it to Section 7.0 of the DSRS. This is we established - like I said before the break, we established the differences between the SRP and the DSRS, including the level of scope, objectives, review interfaces and the review process for I&C. And one of the items that was mentioned at 7 the beginning of the meeting was to provide a mapping 8 of how those regulatory requirements in Table 7.1-T of 9 the SRP are addressed in the DSRS. 10 We developed DSRS Table 7-1 that provides such a mapping. I have Section 7.0 here. I have the 11 12 If there is interest by any of the members to table. go into the details of the table, we can answer questions 13 14 related to that. If not, I can continue to move on and 15 get into 7.1. 16 MEMBER STETKAR: Two questions. 17 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sir. 18 MEMBER STETKAR: Are you going to pull up the whole table or -19 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, I can. 20 MEMBER STETKAR: Go to - it's not - I don't 21 22 know where you have page numbers. It's 5034F219. 23 It's the next up from the bottom on that slide. 24 MR. CONCEPCION: Displays and monitoring. 25 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. You talk a lot about,

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

well, the EQ folks are going to take care of environmental qualifications, instrumentation and the digital I&C platforms and cabinets and all that kind of stuff.

And that's good, except for the fact that these instruments are supposed to apparently function following core damage, which is far beyond the environmental conditions that those folks look at.

So, who's going to look at the environmental conditions for these instruments that have to function in beyond design basis events?

MR. CONCEPCION: I don't know if I have an answer to your question specifically, but we are - we're trying to coordinate the reviews of Chapter 3 and environmental qualification with our reviews in Chapter 7.

Specifically for Reg Guide 1.209 where the process calls for the use of IEEE 323 for mild environmental qualification of I&C equipment, we're trying to strengthen that coordination with Chapter 3 folks.

And we can get into the details of your question regarding how to address those components that will have to perform beyond, I guess, after core damage beyond design basis. We can get answers to that. I

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	don't have an answer to -
2	MEMBER STETKAR: You're telling me, wait
3	until we get to Chapter 3. So, I'll make a note.
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, it's not in Chapter
5	7.
6	MR. CONCEPCION: It's not in Chapter 7.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Well, but this is another
8	issue if it's not in Chapter 7 and the Chapter 3 folks
9	know that they don't know that they need to worry about
10	beyond design basis environmental conditions, then it's
11	going to be no one.
12	MR. SHUAIBI: I don't want to get into a place
13	where we're telling you, see them, and they're tell you,
14	see us.
15	So, do you want us to take that question
16	back and try to get you back an answer -
17	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.
18	MR. SHUAIBI: I would rather satisfy you
19	rather than -
20	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, that would help.
21	MR. SHUAIBI: I remember those interactions,
22	and I don't think you appreciated that.
23	MEMBER BLEY: That's right.
24	(Discussion off the record.)
25	MR. CONCEPCION: We're definitely taking the
	NEAL R. GROSS

feedback back and then we'll give you a response.

MEMBER STETKAR: And if you drop down just to - yes, that's the last one on this page. Failure modes and effects analysis of the integrated control system.

I went to 7.2.15, and I could not find a - I could find the need to do a failure mode and effects analysis of the integrated control system in the introduction to that guidance, but I couldn't find any other mention of reviews or what it might entail or - and what I'm curious about is this smells like a post-TMI issue.

And a specific function of the B&W plants is they had something called an integrated control system.

Now, we don't want to discuss details of the mPower design or what they might call different bits and pieces of their design, but is this specifically focused on what the old B&W designs used to call the integrated control system, or is this supposed to be a failure modes and effects analysis of an integrated protection and control system, which the mPower design has one of?

MR. CONCEPCION: Right now the regulation is very specific to B&W plants. And I -  $\,$ 

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	MEMBER STETKAR: Old B&W plants.
2	MR. CONCEPCION: And I was going to say old
3	B&W plants. And we have not received any modification
4	from the applicant stating they will take exception to
5	this particular rule.
6	MEMBER STETKAR: My question -
7	MR. CONCEPCION: And I guess that is not your
8	question. Your question is whether the failure modes
9	and effects analysis needs to be applied to the
10	integrated control system.
11	MEMBER STETKAR: To the - I'll call it "Joe."
12	Joe being something that does protection and control
13	functions and exists in this particular design.
14	So, does a failure modes and effects
15	analysis need to be performed for Joe, to avoid specific
16	terminology?
17	And if so, where is the review of - guidance
18	for the review of that FMEA included in the SPRS?
19	MR. CONCEPCION: DSRS.
20	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, whatever it is.
21	MR. CONCEPCION: First of all, GDC-23
22	addresses failure modes for - addresses failure modes
23	for - what is the terminology? Protection systems, yes.
24	Protection systems. I drew a blank for a second.
25	MEMBER STETKAR: No, Joe minus. It's a

subset of this thing.

MR. CONCEPCION: So, GDC-23 still applies.

Now, we've developed Appendix A which provides the overall system hazard analysis that we expect the applicant to address using whatever technique hazards associated with the system and hopefully come up with measures to prevent those hazards.

MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Maybe we'll talk a little bit more about that when we get to Appendix A.

I just want to make sure that the - my basic concern is that because of the way things may or may not be parsed, that people understand one part as being a failure modes and effects analysis perhaps with only the protection functions and they don't need to worry about control functions.

This tends to point toward control functions if I go away from the TMI era of B&W plant design integrated control system. But they could say, well, we don't have something that looks like that. So, we don't need to do some FMEA of the control function.

As long as the hazard analysis scope in Appendix A includes both protection and control functions, anything that's tied together within that - the scope of the Digital I&C system, then I'm happy.

Then people can take exception to this --

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	MR. SANTOS: This is Daniel
2	MEMBER STETKAR: - all they want. But I'll
3	tell you if you want the guidance even with the
4	constraint of the what's called an integrated control
5	system here, if you want the guidance for your reviewers
6	to address that, it doesn't seem to - it just simply
7	mentions it as something that's thrown into that 7.2.15.
8	Everything else in 7.2.15 talks about other issues.
9	MR. CONCEPCION: We'll look into - it seems
10	to be an inaccurate point or two that the -
11	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.
12	MR. CONCEPCION: But we'll look into that,
13	yes.
L 4	MEMBER STETKAR: It is mentioned in the
15	introduction to 7.2.15, but that's as far as it goes.
16	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Dan, do you want to
17	add something else, or Sushil?
18	MR. SANTOS: No, we'll wait for the Appendix
19	A discussion. It really covers everything.
20	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Anything else
21	regarding this section or the table 7-1?
22	MEMBER STETKAR: This is the only slide on
23	_
24	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, this is the only slide
25	that addresses that particular section.

1	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: This is actually out of the
3	DSRS. You called up the document, didn't you, to get
4	_
5	MR. CONCEPCION: Oh, I'm sorry. This is the
6	DSRS. This is DSRS Section 7.0.
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: But this was not in your
8	slide or backup slides. This was in as part of the DSRS.
9	This is the table you just called up, right?
10	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, that is correct.
11	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I have too many pieces of
12	paper here, as you can see. I don't have the one on
13	7.0. Do you want to hold on a second?
14	(Pause in the proceedings.)
15	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You can go on.
16	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. So, I'm going to
17	switch the view here. Going to get back on the slide.
18	Okay. So, now we get into 7.1, which this
19	is the section on fundamental design principles. And
20	we're going to go into each of these subsections in more
21	detail.
22	So, we're going to talk about system design
23	basis. This is a direct regulatory requirement in
24	Section 4 of 603-1991. We're going to cover as part
25	of the review, the identification of safety functions

and corresponding protective actions, monitored variables, minimum number and location of sensors, range of transient and steady-state conditions. And, again, these elements are part of Section 4 of IEEE 603. And We're going to have coordination with Chapter 15 as soon as we get those functions from the accident analysis. So, that is pretty much the essence of 7.1.1

and I don't have any more information. I can go and pull 7.1 if we have to get into the specifics of it, but this is pretty much in a nutshell what we're going to be covering for 7.1.1, which is the safety system design basis.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: This is kind of an adjunct to a question that I had earlier, a statement I made earlier.

You walk through all of the Section 4 items and you do - there's a little paragraph or session in each one of these.

The guidance is kind of general and I can't cross this to the existing SRP. I don't know if there just wasn't enough time to go and try to cross this over to equivalent sections. I tried to find one or two and it was very difficult for me to find those.

It says that reviewer should verify.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 picked one. Section 4.4, identification of variables or monitor, et cetera, et cetera. He should confirm adequate margin exists. 3 Well, what does that mean? I mean, how does he come up with that type of a determination? I don't object to the, I mean, I'm not 7 objecting to the general statement, because I think you 8 highlighted and you provided clarification of what the 9 Section 4 items mean. But what is the - if I looked around, there's not, quote, a set of acceptance 10 11 criteria. I mean, that's earlier and that's a very 12 general statement. 13 says there are no specific DSRS 14 acceptance criteria in this section. 15 MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let me finish, okay? 16 17 MR. CONCEPCION: I'm sorry. 18 CHAIRMAN BROWN: And it just seems like there ought to be some level of guidance to the reviewer of 19 20 what is meant by acceptable. 21 And I'm not saying it's got to be the words 22 "acceptable," but what are the things you look for? 23 What are the little metrics or what have you? 24 And that seemed to be kind of the story 25 throughout a bunch of the Section 7.1. And it's not

1 just - this was one of them, but there's a number of So, there are no - whatever the words were. CONCEPCION: No DSRS-specific acceptance criteria. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Exactly. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BROWN: And this one is - this is 8 pretty comprehensive relative to formulating in the reviewer's mind what's the overall system design basis 9 that I have to think about and here's the metrics. What 10 does he look for, for each of these? 11 12 MR. CONCEPCION: Let me try to explain a little bit in terms of the structure and what we adopted 13 14 as the structure of DSRS. 15 When you get into any particular section, 16 you have your errors of review and then you - I talk 17 about review interfaces and then you get into the acceptance criteria. 18 The acceptance criteria is broken down in 19 20 two major elements. One of them is the regulatory 21 criteria or those requirements that are codified in our 22 regulations. 23 And then we get - we get this DSRS acceptance 24 criteria and that's where we identified NUREGs, 25 regulatory guides, generic communications, anything

that is - anything that surrounds the issue where we have explicit information to capture an acceptable method of satisfying those regulatory requirements.

In the case of system design basis in Section 4 of IEEE 603, we don't have a reg guide to address those elements. We clearly go back to the standard and say, the applicant has to provide information to address those 11 or 12 elements that are in Section 4 of the standard.

So, the criteria for review is actually contained in those 12 elements in Section 4. That is what we have and that is reflected in the DSRS today.

I hear your comment that we can add additional information to guide the reviewer in addressing those 12 elements and we can certainly take that back as feedback.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. I'll just pick another one. Minimum number and location of sensors for variables identified in Section 4.4, the one above, should confirm that the application to analysis demonstrates that the number and location of sensors are adequate.

What does "adequate" mean? I mean, I just
- I don't disagree with that particular part of it.
But when you're a relatively - as you move through and

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 you move from a very senior level set of reviewers that you've had in the past to bringing on - there's a lot of built-in what is adequate and what's not that new 3 people that don't have. And I don't know what's in the existing SRP relative to this. It may be just as blank. 6 7 MR. CONCEPCION: It's the same information. 8 It is the same information. We did not modify with 9 the exception of some of these elements that were not 10 directly captured in the SRP, that we did add them in 11 this section. The information is a direct extraction 12 from the existing SRP into the DSRS. CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, if I mucked around 13 14 enough in the existing SRP, I would find this section 15 on -16 MR. CONCEPCION: I show you right now. 17 CHAIRMAN BROWN: - Section 4.4, Item 4, that that paragraph would be a direct extraction from 18 the existing SRP. 19 20 MR. CONCEPCION: I can show you any one 21 example. I can show you right now. And, actually, we 22 have tables that show exactly where that information 23 is in the SRP and how we captured it. 24 I can show you any one example.

MR. SANTOS: I think it's good to know one,

1	Charlie.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, I want to see one just
3	to see what it looks like or - I'd like to see one, if
4	you don't mind.
5	MR. CONCEPCION: Oh, yes. I have one here.
6	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'd just like to see what
7	that means.
8	MR. SANTOS: Charlie, because we run into
9	this. We stumble a lot, you know, looking at a current
0	guidance and some of the issues with a current guidance.
_1	MR. CONCEPCION: I wish I could project this
. 2	on the screen. I have the DSRS. I don't have the SRP
. 3	with me. And I have a single file with the entire SRP
_4	electronically and I do - it didn't occur to me that
. 5	we were going to do this.
- 6	But on Page 7.1-C-4 of the existing SRP,
- 7	there's a section called System Safety Designation.
8 ـ	And it is what - it contains information. These two
9	pages contain pretty much the review guidance for -
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: NUREG -
21	MR. CONCEPCION: This is 0800, Chapter 7.
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: What part of Chapter 7?
23	I happen to have the NUREG.
24	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay, 7.1-C.
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's in the introduction.

1	7.1, is that an appendix?
2	MR. CONCEPCION: It is an appendix, yes.
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: All right.
4	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, I'm sorry.
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Maybe you'll find something
6	else.
7	MR. CONCEPCION: Appendix 7.1-C.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, I've got it.
9	MR. CONCEPCION: In compliance with 603.
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, there's 17 pages.
11	MR. CONCEPCION: So, page Number 4.
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Page 4. C-4, right?
13	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. And I'm going to pull
14	the DSRS here so that we can make a direct comparison.
15	(Pause in the proceedings.)
16	(Discussion off the record.)
17	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Do you have it on your
18	screen?
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, I happen to be looking
20	at part of it.
21	MR. CONCEPCION: Well, I have it here. I
22	can circulate these two pages if any member is
23	interested.
24	So, what you see on the screen is the
25	equivalent of these two pages in the SRP today. So,
	NEAL D. CDOSS

1	we have the areas of review and pretty much this section
2	is - the format of 7.1-C is a little different, but -
3	MR. SHUAIBI: Could you give them the tables?
4	I think somebody may want to see the tables.
5	MR. CONCEPCION: They can pass them around
6	if you guys are interested in seeing it, yes.
7	MEMBER BLEY: I can look over Charlie's
8	shoulder.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm looking at the Section
10	4 - I see what you're talking about. It looks like,
11	I mean, I'm not working every word for word. You
12	obviously had to change a couple of the words -
13	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
14	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - to be compatible with
15	the new document. But the final part says the reviewer
16	should confirm are adequate to ensure completion. And
17	where's the other part? Review adequate margin exists
18	between analytical limits and setpoints. And you've
19	added that it should include adequate margin.
20	So, that looks like that's an added part,
21	which is roughly you extracted and went. So, we're
22	good.
23	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I see what you did from that
25	standpoint and I'll take your word that you did that

1 on the rest of them. MR. CONCEPCION: Thank you so much. 3 reflected in some of our documents that we put together. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Member Stetkar, you had a comment? 6 MEMBER STETKAR: Charlie, are you -8 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm done. Stick a fork in 9 me. 10 MEMBER STETKAR: I had kind of a - well, don't 11 tempt me. I had a broader -12 CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's fine. 13 14 MEMBER STETKAR: - question. In the 15 introduction to 7.1, there's a statement that says 16 because the current state-of-the-art and available data 17 are insufficient to support risk-informed digital I&C 18 licensing actions at this time, for the digital I&C guidance developed herein the staff will use a 19 traditional deterministic base review of the mPower IPWR 20 21 design. 22 And at one level, I understand that. 23 certainly if I'm looking at the internal structure 24 components, functions internally how the digital I&C

system, however that's defined, works, I unfortunately

have to kind of agree with you.

However, and the reason I wanted you to keep this page up on the screen, if you look at GDC-4 - I'm sorry - GDC-16 and GDC-20, I see words that say, containment design conditions important to safety. And I see words that say, initiate the operation of systems and components important to safety. Doesn't say safety-related. It says important to safety.

Now, if this indeed will be a risk-informed licensing submittal, and indeed there's already some guidance being floated around about determination of the SSCs that are important to safety using a risk-informed process, then the interfaces between the digital I&C system, both functional and signal interfaces, are informed by the scope of that, perhaps, not safety-related, but important to safety systems.

So, therefore, I'm a bit confused when I'm a reviewer. How do I assure myself that indeed the scope of the functions and signals and interfaces from the digital I&C systems are appropriate for the whole scope of those SSCs that are defined as important to safety within the context of this particular licensing submittal?

Are you following what I'm saying?
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, I do.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1	MEMBER STETKAR: So that, you know, within
2	a little box that you can draw around something that's
3	got signals floating around in there and some software,
4	I understand why you have to look at that part of the
5	entire system from a deterministic review standpoint,
6	but I want to make sure that indeed the reviewers of
7	the I&C system are sensitive to the fact that the scope
8	of that system and its functions within the plant of
9	necessity will have some risk-informed basis.
10	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. And let me try to
11	answer -
12	MEMBER STETKAR: And I didn't see that sense
13	anywhere.
14	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, and let me try to
15	answer the question.
16	We're looking at essentially
17	safety-related systems and nonsafety-related systems.
18	So, from the Chapter 15 analysis that gets done and
19	those functions are identified and classified, we
20	receive those in Chapter 7 for review.
21	So, the safety-related aspects of this
22	platform will get reviewed against the guidance that
23	we have in 7.1 and 7.2 in the appendices.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Let me -
25	MR. CONCEPCION: Independent of whether

104 those are - and I shouldn't say "independent." We're looking at Chapter 7 using a deterministic approach, but those functions, the allocation of those functions, the classifications are contained in a different chapter of, in this case, the DSRS. MEMBER STETKAR: Let me ask you - let me try this a different way. You're using the terms safety-related and

nonsafety-related. I'm using the terms safety-related important to safety, safety-related not important to safety, nonsafety-related important to safety, and nonsafety-related not important to safety. I'm using those four terms.

I'm particularly concerned about things that you're calling nonsafety-related, and I'm calling them nonsafety-related important to safety.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but -

MR. CONCEPCION: Okay.

MEMBER STETKAR: - it was my understanding that the risk-informed review guidance for mPower and the small modular reactors in general, was going to adopt basic notion of perhaps something isn't safety-related, but it is important to safety. therefore, it perhaps would require more intense review than a nonsafety-related not important to safety system,

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

SSC.

1

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I believe that is the way I remember the general review guidance being structured.

MR. CONCEPCION: But Chapter 7 -

MEMBER STETKAR: Not Chapter 7. I'm talking

about -

MR. CONCEPCION: Okay.

MEMBER STETKAR: - the entire review of the

design.

MR. CONCEPCION: Okay.

MEMBER STETKAR: Don't knock me into the hole. I'm going to try to keep you out of the hole.

MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Understand.

MEMBER STETKAR: So, my question is, if, for example, and instead of using Joe again, I'll use Mary, if, indeed, the risk-informed process determines that there is a co-called nonsafety-related system called "Mary" out there that is important to safety, and that it's important that Mary gets actuated for control or isolated or whatever to perform its important-to-safety function, how does that relate to your review of the signals that tell Mary to start or stop or isolate? Because this says, initiate the operation of systems and components important to safety.

Doesn't say safety-related. It doesn't

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 say the things that are only analyzed in the particular deterministic design basis accidents in Chapter 15. 3 It says, important to safety. MR. JUNG: Let me answer. There are two 5 parts I see. One, overall risk-informed approach that was mentioned in this introduction, I don't want to go 6 7 into that particular approach because Chapter 7 - many 8 of the design aspects of our review, a particular 9 approach is not necessarily applicable. In Chapter 7, we are making clear for that. 10 11 Now, John, I think, Mr. Stetkar, your 12 comments is more about how about the containment system? 13 Looking at it, they found some aspects of it that are 14 traditionally nonsafety-related, but maybe 15 important to safety. 16 I'm going to answer in two parts. One is 17 because the importance to safety - nonsafety-related, but important to safety, has been a very important topic 18 19 to us. 20 So, currently from a Chapter 7 perspective, 21 there are, in fact, areas that are nonsafety-related, 22 important to safety. We are looking at that. 23 The backup system is one of them, and 24 annunciators, and there are other aspects. And in

addition, the current - as you know, the Chapter 19 PRA

requirements are there. So, actually, we worked with the Chapter 19. I'm not sure you've seen Chapter 19.0. It's been updated. It has extensive, actually, discussion of coordination with the I&C, digital I&C with some - understanding the basis and how Chapter 7 reviews are done along with the risk assessment and quality of digital I&C systems extensively discussed. I have a copy of it here.

But in terms of the other systems that are being reviewed by other disciplines that — and those situations has come up, I think it's a coordination issue. We can take that back as something that we are to highlight potentially.

Because right now there are - many, many systems are out there. Especially nonsafety systems are a lot more extensive. Especially for mPower designs we expect that.

So, those systems that are being identified as part of risk-informed approach that are being discussed as part of the SECY response, those systems that are being - I didn't apply those important to safety, but other systems will have to coordinate with them and need to somehow communicate with those branches.

MEMBER STETKAR: Ian, that's exactly - I'm

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

concern, because I didn't see in the DSRS anywhere that particular focus on coordination. You know, whether it's in the table in 7.0 5 or in, you know, test guidance somewhere, that need for looking at things that are perhaps outside the 7 traditional scope of the Chapter 15 analyses - there are a lot of references to the Chapter 15 analyses and 8 the cross-talk there, but not the direction that we've 9 10 just been discussing in terms of -11 MR. JUNG: Mr. Stetkar, I would go even 12 further. Those aspects that we are talking about, it may not just be in the I&C. It could be other aspects. 13 14 So, it's a generic -15 MEMBER STETKAR: Absolutely. 16 MR. JUNG: Right. MEMBER STETKAR: That's one of the reasons 17 why I wanted to kind of back it out from just -18 MR. JUNG: I understand. 19 MEMBER STETKAR: - the box of Chapter 7. 20 21 Because I'll agree with you that within however you 22 draw the lines around that box, you have no feasible 23 way of doing a risk-informed review of, you know, a 24 particular containment protection signal, how it's 25 processed within the digital I&C versus a, you know,

glad you restated it that way. That's exactly my

1 an injection actuation signal or something like that. There's not enough basis for that within the system itself. 3 MR. JUNG: Thank you for the comment. We'll 5 work with Joelle's group and see how it can improve as a whole package. 6 7 I'm sorry, go ahead, CHAIRMAN BROWN: 8 Dennis. 9 MEMBER BLEY: I was just from where Mr. 10 Stetkar started out, was there an intent? And I think 11 this is what you said, and I think it's what I remember, 12 that these - this guidance you are preparing would actually incorporate the ideas of 50.69 and without 13 14 having to refer to those externally. That's kind of 15 where you started. MEMBER STETKAR: I believe at least on what 16 we've seen on the guidance for reviews of systems, that 17 that's the intent of the design-specific review. 18 MEMBER BLEY: And if that is the intent, this 19 idea Ian talked through of having - at least getting 20 21 the idea of the coordination across really important. 22 That's the only way it could work. 23 MEMBER STETKAR: That's right. I mean, I 24 think, I believe, I lose track of the guidance that we've 25 seen and what discussions we've had, but I seem to recall

110 that they were saying, well, from a risk-informed review basis, a good starting point is to look at the hierarchy of systems and organize the resources that will be applied to the system on that risk-informed basis, you know, without saying 50.69, basically. But if you're going to do that, then it ought to filter into the rest of the review. MS. STAREFOS: Yes, I - thank you. Joelle Starefos. I would be hesitant to apply that 50.69.

We would try to weave that throughout this. In fact, that's a big sensitivity we've had with some of our stakeholders on whether or not that was the appearance.

Because as we talk about things, there's only so many ways you can bin safety and nonsafety and risk and nonrisk when you start breaking it down and it looks a lot like 50.69, but it wasn't exactly -

MEMBER STETKAR: If it's not, then what do these words mean right here?

MS. STAREFOS: Well, I think important to safety - the important to safety, those are the GDC Those have been part of our GDC for a long time, and that has been something that's been a particular challenge for us because of the interpretation of the GDC -

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

MEMBER BLEY: The interpretation of that has kind of evolved -MS. STAREFOS: Yes. MEMBER BLEY: And the most recent evolution I kind of thought was 50.69 - no. MS. STAREFOS: No, I don't think that's exactly how we would interpret it. MR. SHUAIBI: I think 50.69 defined its own terms for how to bin things. Important to safety, safety-related, nonsafety-related, those have been in the books for a long, long time. In fact, maybe what we could do is find you memos that try to clarify to staff and the industry in terms of what important to safety means, but you're right. I don't think there's a definition in the books that says here's what important to safety means, but those have been there long before 50.69 MEMBER STETKAR: And you're going to have to help me here. Isn't it true that within the whole scope of the mPower review guidance, guidance, I think, is being developed at least in the systems area to say that you'll allocate resources, you know, the level of detail and the depth of review that you perform will be informed by - I don't know whether the words important

to safety or risk significance or what particular words

1

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

are used, but the notion is that there will be some type of hierarchy.

MS. STAREFOS: Yes, that is correct.

MEMBER STETKAR: And I, for the lack of knowing what those particular words are, let's call it a hierarchy right now. And at some point, the reviews will have less effort applied to them.

I don't want to imply that no, you know, certainly the systems will be reviewed, but they'll receive kind of a traditional nonsafety-related systems review.

My only point is if that's indeed the structure that's going to be used for the systems reviews however that hierarchy is defined, if something falls in the upper tier of that hierarchy for whatever reason, then if that's important enough to merit a more detailed review on that basis, it would seem that those systems, those functions would be important enough to also merit careful attention on how they interface with digital I&C, electric power and, you know, you're right. It's an overarching type of issue for the whole review, not just within the context of individual systems.

MS. STAREFOS: I think these are some - and don't let me overstep my I&C guys, but these are some of the issues that I anticipated we would - we would

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

evolve as we started our first implementation of this.

In the sense of it being a pilot, these are the important aspects that we're going to have to kind of figure out depending upon what the answer is that we get with the application. And the appropriate level of review certainly if it's safety-related, it gets the thorough level.

And I've always been under the understanding that our I&C folks wrote this to a level that all of our safety stuff is going to get this thorough look.

Important to safety with the GDC, I would imagine some of those pieces would slide up into that safety and get that equivalent safety review.

And in very, you know, very rare cases, we might find that the risk assessment of a system is nonsafety. Maybe the risk significance of it didn't rise to the level where we would give it that thorough safety review. And that would be a one-by-one evaluation done at that level and the decision would be made in a case-by-case basis.

So, I think some of us will see, and I don't want to push this forward and imply that, yes, we'll have all the answers when we're doing the review, but I think some of this will be more apparent at that point.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

And I think what I understood from my I&C counterparts were - was that the intent here is to focus on safety and do it all at this thorough level and bump those pieces up into it as opposed to losing them and doing a lesser review in this case.

Now, please, Ian, Milton, if I've overstepped -

MR. JUNG: No, that's correct.

MS. STAREFOS: Okay.

MEMBER STETKAR: I think something that Ian said sort of hit it, is I don't think we have all of the answers and I think you're right that we need to work through this process to really understand how it's going to work.

My only concern, I think, that if this guidance included those hooks, those references to other disciplines that define that hierarchy, I'll call it that, to alert the folks doing the digital I&C review that they need to go out and look for those other things that are perhaps in the gray area between the deterministic Chapter 15 analysis strict safety-related and the nonsafety stuff, would at least satisfy it at this level.

Because as it stands right now, it says safety-related, we're going to look at it very

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 carefully. Safety-related is determined by the Chapter 15 analyses. And we have to make sure that all of this is separated from all of that nasty nonsafety-related stuff. MS. STAREFOS: Right. MEMBER STETKAR: And we don't look at the 7 nonsafety-related stuff in here. 8 MS. STAREFOS: There is another piece that 9 10 MEMBER STETKAR: Except for those interface 11 - except for the interfaces. 12 MS. STAREFOS: Yes, there is another piece unfortunately hasn't been made public 13 14 consumption at this stage, but the introduction to the Standard Review Plan was rewritten with the intent of 15 16 incorporating the SECY-11-024 guidance. 17 And we've been doing a lot of work to try to figure out what that looks like in incorporating these 18 four pieces. And that's one of the reasons I said I'm 19 hesitate to call it 50.69, because we've kind of written 20 21 this other guidance. 22 Certainly, that's something that you're 23 going to have an opportunity to take a look at and it 24 really makes this picture complete. Because it tells

the reviewer at the very beginning, you have two choices

1 here - or, well, not you have two choices, but there are a couple of choices. Part 1 of the introduction is a traditional 3 SRP review. Part 2 is this approach that we've taken to develop the DSRSes and how that incorporation of risk is going to be done fundamentally. 7 And those reviewers have been trying to 8 consider that as that guidance evolves while they're developing these DSRSes. 9 10 The guidance generally talks about those 11 four categories that we've discussed, but it also gives 12 them a process path on how to move through and determine whether or not something needs certain levels of review. 13 14 For example, programmatic types of items 15 review would be different and we wouldn't t.he 16 necessarily apply that risk information. still want the thorough review from the program level 17 of the entire program. 18 So, that piece is unfortunately not on the 19 20 table for you to see. And I'm hoping that that will 21 clarify both this discussion, as well as some of our 22 external stakeholders' concerns lack of or 23 understanding of that aspect of it. 24 Right now - I'm sorry.

MEMBER BLEY: We saw a draft about a year

1	or so ago, I think.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Chapter 1?
3	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
4	MS. STAREFOS: Right.
5	MEMBER BLEY: So, it's evolved quite a bit
6	since then.
7	MS. STAREFOS: I think it's evolved a little
8	bit more than that.
9	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
10	MS. STAREFOS: And, in fact, I think it's
11	with our -
12	MEMBER BLEY: That would help.
13	MS. STAREFOS: I think it's with our counsel.
1 4	We anticipated having it out later this year.
15	So, I'm not sure what schedule that's on.
16	That's not within the scope of what I'm working on,
17	but it's my understanding that they've been working very
18	hard and diligently to get that out especially because
19	we are, we would say, imminent on getting the DSRS out
20	for mPower.
21	It's a critical piece for that
22	understanding and evaluation.
23	(Discussion off the record.)
2 4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Should we go on? Okay,
25	Milton.
- 1	1

1 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Slide 28? you finished with 27? 3 MR. CONCEPCION: Let me get back to the 5 slides, because I don't know where I'm at. CHAIRMAN BROWN: 27. 7 MR. CONCEPCION: Okay, yes. 8 So, any additional questions or feedback 9 regarding design basis at this point? If not, I'm going to move on to 7.1.2, which is independence. 10 11 I'm on Slide 28 right now. So, this is Section 5.6 of IEEE 603. The review will cover four 12 13 Namely, physical major independence, areas. 14 electrical independence, communications independence 15 and functional independence. 16 There was an earlier comment by Member 17 Stetkar regarding the review of physical and electrical 18 independence and the coordination with Chapter 8. We 19 captured that. 20 So, we are - this is Slide 29, Okav. 21 communication independence. This is where we have that statement of one-way communication should be used among 22 redundant channels. We're going to look into that 23 24 sentence and see a way to reword it.

NEAL R. GROSS

This is where we also discussed data flows

between redundant portions of the safety system. discussed whether the safety division should not depend on information or resources originating from other divisions to accomplish safety function. Divisions should have their own sensors, are dedicated to the division and that kind of quidance. There is another slide that talks about functional independence. On Slide 30, this is where we verify isolation of a safety system function from other safety systems, and verify that there's no unwanted behavior from other system influencing, basically, inner system interference. So, any questions regarding 7.1.2? CHAIRMAN BROWN: Just one observation. can do with this what you want. You walked about repetitiveness and stuff you're trying to eliminate. And if you walk through almost everything after Section 7.0 when you talk about DSRS acceptance criteria, there's a caveat statement in every one of them; 7.1.1, .2, .3, .4, .5, 7.2.1, on and on and on. MS. STAREFOS: Yes, sir. CHAIRMAN BROWN: That one caveat would have fit very well, which says you don't have to follow any of the regulations or guidelines as long as you can

justify doing something that we don't like.

1

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 So, it would fit very well one time on Page 7.0-6 under DSRS Chapter 7, Acceptance Criteria and 3 Review Process. So, do with that what you want to. 5 MS. STAREFOS: Yes, sir. CHAIRMAN BROWN: It's just taking up space 6 7 and the rest of -8 MEMBER BLEY: It's annoying after a while. 9 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, very annoying to read through that every time. 10 11 MR. CONCEPCION: This is the section on DSRS 12 acceptance criteria. That paragraph, right? That's what you're talking about? 13 14 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, it's the paragraph 15 right on Page 7.0-6. It covers - and that little 16 statement of exceptions and the fact that you don't have 17 to follow anything we say would fit - I have to say it that way very pejoratively. 18 MS. STAREFOS: You know, I would venture to 19 20 say you're absolutely right. And the guys have been 21 on me for a long time about this. 22 The intent of the repetitive nature was to 23 ensure that if a reviewer picked up one section and was 24 assigned one subsection to do, they wouldn't need to

necessarily go back and try to find those kinds of

1 directions and pieces throughout. And so, we've done this throughout the whole 3 DSRS and it's - trust me if I tell you just keeping that coordinated in the right version and every place is a lot of work for us. The intent is to ensure that the reviewers 6 7 have everything they need in that one place if that's 8 all they're assigned to. So, I understand for someone 9 looking at it, it's very repetitive. 10 We can rethink that. But, again, it -11 CHAIRMAN BROWN: 7.0, your introduction and 12 overview of review process, it's very pointed as to what that is. 13 14 MS. STAREFOS: Yes, sir. 15 CHAIRMAN BROWN: And if somebody is good at 16 doing something else and haven't read that, then you 17 probably shouldn't have them reviewing the other 18 section. That's the point I'm talking about. MS. STAREFOS: Thank you for the comment. 19 CHAIRMAN BROWN: It's just an observation. 20 21 MS. STAREFOS: No, it's a good comment. 22 Thank you. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Excuse me for that small 23 24 departure. 25 (Discussion off the record.)

1	MEMBER STETKAR: Milton, can you just pull
2	up the section of the DSRS?
3	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
4	MEMBER STETKAR: And scroll down to, I guess,
5	what's Page 10. Keep going. There's a long list of
6	things under -
7	MR. CONCEPCION: Which section? 7.1.2?
8	MEMBER STETKAR: 7.1.2 under communications
9	independence.
10	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sir, here we are.
11	MEMBER STETKAR: There you go. Number 4.
12	Functions that are not necessary for safety even if
13	they enhance reliability, should be executed outside
14	the safety system.
15	What does that mean and what are you - what
16	is the notion of reliability in this particular context?
17	MR. CONCEPCION: What is the relationship
18	with reliability?
19	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. I mean, this says -
20	I'm trying to understand what this means in practice.
21	MR. CONCEPCION: In practice, what it means
22	is that we're trying to have the divisions perform their
23	own safety functions without influence from any other
24	division.
25	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.

1 MR. CONCEPCION: That is, in essence, what we are trying to do with this particular element in this section. MEMBER STETKAR: I understand that basic 5 notion. What I'm not understanding is that something if it's not necessary for safety, but it enhances 6 7 reliability, enhances reliability of what? Enhances 8 reliability of performing the safety function? 9 Enhances reliability of what? 10 MR. CONCEPCION: In this context - I'm going 11 to take a shot at it. In this context, it should enhance 12 the reliability of the system. MEMBER STETKAR: Well, but if something 13 14 enhances the reliability of the system -15 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. MEMBER STETKAR: - which because I'm a 16 17 numbers kind of guy, makes it 0.999 reliable instead of 0.99, why isn't that a good thing to have and why 18 shouldn't it be within the context of my safety system? 19 MR. SANTOS: Dan Santos. We're not going 20 21 to argue with that reliability. It's not a good thing 22 to have. The issue is that this is very subjective 23 24 area when it comes especially to software and digital 25 communication systems.

124 We feel that the tradeoff between increased reliability versus the protection against unknown errors and for variations of those errors, we want to make the point towards the conservative part of simplicity, okay. Because to date, no applicant has been able to make a sound reliability improvement case. It's tradeoff the of the claim reliability versus the ability to protect against unknown -MEMBER STETKAR: So, if I had a system that

had a knife switch that was operated by somebody who didn't have any hands in one channel, and a - let's see. Something else. Some other type of I don't know. thing that's operated by an automatic system that has a failure rate of 0.5. Because they are diverse and they are completely separated, that is an adequate design even though it's almost guaranteed to fail a fifth of the time.

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, about a quarter of the time.

MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, that's what I hear. It's ludicrous, but that's what I hear you saying is that you've ignored the concepts of reliability because you need something that by definition, something that is completely separated is adequate even though it's

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

not very reliable.

MR. JUNG: Mr. Stetkar, let's - I'll bring up the safety system when design basis analysis and it's performed to demonstrate what safety functions are required to be performed and those SSCs that are relied upon to perform those functions, many of the regulations, because it's in the regulations, including GDC-21 and some aspects that talks about reliability, reliability of those systems that are relied upon has to be, you know, highest quality, it is a very safety-critical aspect.

So, safety system already are required to demonstrate high-quality systems, right? So, what we are - using the example we are talking about is, goes in some experience have shown that certain vendors would introduce a nonsafety system functionality that beyond what's required for safety function are introduced with the claim that it increases the reliability.

Because this feature would allow early detection of something, the parameter changing because the nonsafety system has other functionalities using the data that's been coming from safety analyze and all that.

In some cases, their basis for that argument, that benefit of reliability versus the

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

potential hazards that are introduced by having the connection from nonsafety/safety, that couldn't be - the basis wasn't sufficient enough in most of the cases because of the complex nature of the digital systems. So, we are generally discouraging that argument to be used in those regards. MR. SANTOS: This is a direct reflection from the experience of reviews. But if it will avoid confusion, we could delete even if they enhance reliability and maintain the essence of the sentence, which is functions that are not necessary for safety should be executed. MEMBER STETKAR: That would held me a lot. MR. SANTOS: I understand. MEMBER STETKAR: Because my fallback, I think I know, you know, from experience, I know what you're talking about ludicrous examples aside. But I was also in terms of reliability, also think in terms of reliability of the operators. So, for example, information that might be transmitted from the safety-related system to the operators could also be part of the context of this sort of generic sense of enhanced reliability. MR. SANTOS: I understand.

int. Dintiod. I didelibedia

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 MEMBER STETKAR: It's just that little phrase left me very confused. MR. SANTOS: Yes, we can delete that phrase without losing what we really want. It was just an explanation of the type of -MR. JUNG: Experience we were having. 7 MEMBER BLEY: I think your point is you were 8 getting claims of reliability that you didn't believe 9 either because of uncertainty or because of unintended consequences of this thing. And if you could somehow 10 11 get that sense in here, it would be good. 12 The language goes too far the other way to 13 ignore reliability, which of course you don't want to 14 do. 15 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, that's true. That is 16 correct. 17 MR. JUNG: Thanks for comment. Only just 18 observation this particular criteria is exact quote from the ISG-4. So, we just have to work with NRR to make 19 sure it is consistent. 20 (Discussion off the record.) 21 22 MR. CONCEPCION: I guess we have another comment from staff. 23 24 MR. NGYUEN: This is Khoi Nguyen, I&C 2 25 branch.

1	I would like to share with you an example
2	on that particular sentence that in the past we have
3	seen some of the design that claim to enhance the
4	reliability for the data communication system.
5	They introduced the diagnostic test from
6	the nonsafety system. That's what we want to make a
7	point here. We don't want any design that claim to
8	enhance the reliability that interface with the safety
9	system from the nonsafety side.
10	That's what the point that we wanted to
11	make. That's all I -
12	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, I know. I understand
13	that basic concept, certainly.
14	MR. CONCEPCION: I guess he took it through
15	a different level used with the word "enhanced
16	reliability." And that was never the intent of staff,
17	yes.
18	MEMBER STETKAR: Can we in the interest of
19	time, thanks, scroll up to Number 8?
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Don't worry. I'm going to
21	finish after you finish.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: I figured as long as I can
23	get my ranting in before you start, I'll do -
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Keep going before I start.
25	Thank you.

1 MEMBER STETKAR: I choose words my carefully, actually. 3 says, safety commands should have highest priority and should override all other commands. "All" is a big word. Is the intent of this that safety commands 7 should override equipment protection signals? 8 MR. CONCEPCION: No. 9 MEMBER STETKAR: Ah. 10 MR. CONCEPCION: In the use of priority 11 modules, the intent is to make sure that those priority 12 modules prioritize those safety functions that need to take place, and not focus on those other functions that 13 14 are not necessarily safety-related. MEMBER STETKAR: That, I understand. 15 But 16 should override all other commands implies -MR. SANTOS: I think a better word would be 17 18 MEMBER STETKAR: For example, if I'm an 19 inexperienced reviewer without the benefit of the last 20 21 30 seconds and I see a design that comes in and it says, 22 oh, a pump trip signal because it has no cooling, will 23 block the pump from starting and that is not an 24 acceptable design because it doesn't meet this, I'm 25 going to ask a question about that.

1	MR. SANTOS: Better than safety commands
2	safe-state is what we're really looking for.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: It's just "all" is a big
4	word.
5	MR. SANTOS: Yes.
6	MR. CONCEPCION: No, we're going to look into
7	that. Appreciate it. Thank you.
8	MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks. Because I found
9	it in two or three other places also that has this notion
10	that -
11	MR. CONCEPCION: We're going to look into
12	that.
13	MEMBER STETKAR: I can start something to
14	discussion.
15	MR. CONCEPCION: We can use better words to
16	describe what we intent with that.
17	MEMBER STETKAR: Just trying to think about
18	it the way a reviewer might interpret this without the
19	benefit of the knowledge of -
20	MR. SANTOS: And we'll have to also
21	coordinate it with ISG-04, because a lot of this language
22	is already current guidance. So, comment taken.
23	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay, thanks. I'm done.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Go back to Page 11.
25	Right there. Now, scroll up. Nope, scroll down. I'm
- 1	

sorry. Stop. Let me see where this is.

Okay. The sentence that starts right at the second paragraph, the reviewer shall also confirm - this is data communications - conforms to the guidance, to the separation and isolation of data processing functions of interconnected contained in IEEE standard 7-4.3.2. Clause 5.6 as endorsed by Reg Guide 1.52. Consider the following.

The problem that I - I guess I don't understand this. Annex E is not endorsed in - at least it was not at the time we did the revision to Reg Guide 1.152. Only Annex A was endorsed at that time. B through F were not.

Annex E is used for - it defines - if you go read 7-4, it shows here's what defines communication independence, which is just a travesty. It's the worst definition.

I mean, there are little pictures which are barely comprehensible and are meaningless relative to data communication. That's my own personal opinion.

Just meaningless. That's point one.

So, the statement that we've got to go back and meet this thing as endorsed, I think that's - somehow that's got to be fixed. That is incorrect right now.

MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. We will -

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm not quite finished. Let me finish the last point, and then you can blow me up - no, excuse me. You can tell me why I'm wrong in a more, you know, polite manner than I use normally. It also talks about barriers in 5.6. MR. CONCEPCION: 5.6 of? 7 CHAIRMAN BROWN: 7-4.3.2. 8 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, okay. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Barrier requirements shall 9 10 be identified to provide adequate confidence that the 11 nonsafety functions cannot interfere with t.he 12 performance of safety functions. The barrier shall be designed in accordance 13 14 with requirements of the standard, but nonsafety system hardware is not required to meet the nonsafety system 15 - nonsafety software is not required to meet these 16 requirements. 17 18 And then it says, if barriers between safety software and nonsafety software are not implemented, 19 the nonsafety software shall be developed in accordance 20 21 with requirements of this standard. 22 It's circular. I couldn't figure out where 23 you were going with this stuff. 24 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. 25 CHAIRMAN BROWN: And then it goes on to say

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	guidance for established communication independence
2	provided in Annex E, which is not endorsed.
3	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. Okay, I'll let you
4	finish.
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm finished.
6	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. So, when you look
7	at that sentence, the sentence points you to 5.6 of
8	7-4.3.2, right?
9	So, the section on the standard has to be
10	used in accordance with the information in the Reg Guide
11	which endorse the standard.
12	So, off the bat, Appendix E does not apply.
13	CHAIRMAN BROWN: It does not -
14	MR. CONCEPCION: Let me finish.
15	When we look at the Reg Guide, the Reg Guide
16	says, Appendix E does not apply or it was not considered
17	for endorsement. Let me just say it that way.
18	CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, it's a downstream
19	disavowal -
20	MEMBER BLEY: As endorsed by -
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, okay. I got that.
22	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Are you finished telling
24	me -
25	MR. CONCEPCION: Well, the information -
	NEAL R. GROSS

maybe I'm going to repeat myself, but what the sentence
says is basically 5.6 will be used. And you use the
Reg Guide to bound the information, because it is an
endorsed standard. So, Appendix E is not in the scope
of review.
There are elements associated with
communication independence in 5.6 that do apply and we
use those elements.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Now, I will address that
comment.
In addition to the requirements of IEEE
Standard 603-1998, data communications between safety
channels or between safety and nonsafety shall not
inhibit the performance of the safety function.
That is a grandiose statement. I have no
doubt that is a very high-level and it provides
absolutely no enlightenment at all of what it means to
not inhibit the performance.
I just - I have not liked - if you haven't
gotten it yet, I haven't liked 7-4.3.2 since it was first
published in 1993.
MR. SANTOS: And that's why we expand it on
the DSRS.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, I agree with that, but
it says you should consider the following, okay. And

it's -

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  CONCEPCION: That is our guidance. That is what we tell -

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, I'll go with that.

I'm just aggravated with looking at this thing, that's all.

I'll make one other point, and then we can go on. When you get down into Section 2.2, the safety division shall not be dependent, if you'll scroll up a little bit.

MR. CONCEPCION: Number 2?

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, just scroll up so the whole - A and B and C are shown. I don't have any problem with this, except it addresses what appears to be reactor trip-type functions.

Like in B it says, "and a reactor trip shall result if everything locks up. An alarm should be - an alarm should be initiated," which is fine.

But engineered safeguard systems also are subject to the same problem of lockup. And there, you fail as-is. If they lock up, they don't perform a function. They don't do anything.

And yet, there's no - there's nothing that clearly says that those functions, that particular safety function should at least alert, provide an alarm.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	And maybe I've misread it somewhere in here. It just
2	was - it didn't stand out to me that all those would
3	be communicated.
4	Only A led this and the emphasis on reactor
5	trip. For some reason to me, you ought to have
6	safeguards and functions at least highlighted somehow
7	in this discussion as to what happens since they are
8	fail as-is-type functions as opposed to trip functions.
9	That's the only point.
10	MR. CONCEPCION: It was to cover both, but
11	we're going to add additional language to make sure that
12	it is clearly reflected in that section.
13	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's all. I mean, that's
14	just trying to make it clear.
15	MR. CONCEPCION: By the way, this is direct
16	feedback from this committee where we collected input.
17	You provided this feedback and we incorporated it into
18	this.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, no, I know you all -
20	I provided this information to you. You did quite well.
21	It's just that I'm not saying that I caught everything
22	at that time.
23	MR. CONCEPCION: Anything else you want to
24	add?
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Until I saw what you wrote,
	WEAL D. GDOOD

1	it wasn't clear that, I mean, how you did it.
2	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, we were trying to -
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You did a good job of taking
4	my thoughts and cranking them in. I'm not objecting
5	to that.
6	MR. SANTOS: We agree with that comment.
7	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, absolutely. Okay.
8	Any additional comments or thoughts regarding
9	independence?
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I can go on and on, but I
11	won't.
12	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay, moving on.
13	Redundancy, okay. This is Section 5.1 of
14	IEEE 603. We talk about single failure, we talk about
15	removal from service of components or channels and how
16	that should not result in a loss of required minimum
17	redundancy.
18	We have guidance for reviewing channel
19	assignments to address redundancy and diversity
20	requirements. And it is all based on Reg Guide 1.53,
21	which endorses IEEE 379.
22	This section is a true reflection of what's
23	in the SRP today.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I think I made an earlier
25	comment on that relative to single failure being the
	NEW D 0000

1 only ones. I'm not going to be repetitive with that. MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. CHAIRMAN BROWN: I just think we need to 3 provide a little bit more flesh on that one. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay? 6 7 MR. CONCEPCION: We've got that, yes. 8 Okay, determinism. I think this is the 9 only slide on determinism. We talk about system timing. 10 We talk about confirm deterministic performance of data 11 communications. And we intend to use Appendix B to 12 support the review of determinism. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Two observations on this. 13 14 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sir. 15 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I've made the one about 16 there's no acceptance criteria. And you explained how since there is not - you can only quote the rules. 17 18 MR. CONCEPCION: For determinism? 19 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, yes. It says right 20 here there are no specific DSRS acceptance criteria in this section. 21 22 MR. CONCEPCION: Correct. Yes, correct. 23 There is no regulatory guidance or NUREGs or any other 24 surrounding document to support the review 25 determinism aside from BTP 7-21, which was rolled into

139 1 this section as well. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes. Again, you address 3 some of the stuff that should be considered as acceptance criteria in Items 1 through 10 on the next page - on the next two pages. I guess my only point on this one because 6 7 there is not a, quote, regulatory basis or real-base 8 basis, however you phrase it, I probably didn't say that 9 right again, that almost makes it sound like these are

And I don't know that I'm phrasing that right or not. I mean, maybe if somebody wants to tell me that I'm just so -

just - well, you ought to think about these, but they're

really not necessary to be complete.

MR. CONCEPCION: This is the acceptance criteria for determinism today. So, we have the regulatory requirements in 603. We have this section, Section 4.10, which talks about -

CHAIRMAN BROWN: I got that.

MR. CONCEPCION: - deterministic approach. And then we get into the GDCs. So, this is an area that is a regulatory requirement.

What we do not have is a, like I said, a NUREG or a reg guide or an ISG. We do have the BTP 7-21 and we factored that into the guidance. We stayed with

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 the regulatory requirements. We put the guidance in. CHAIRMAN BROWN: I guess what I was expecting 3 to see because of that and what I was thinking of after I read A, I mean, it very clearly says you got to go 5 to completion, that's all going to completion. says once you've established that you need to trip, it's 7 got to finish the action. 8 Ιt just says realtime must ensure 9 completion of protection action within the critical 10 points of time. And then in 4.10 it identifies your 11 critical points of time, and I recognize that. 12 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. CHAIRMAN BROWN: It just seems if I had been 13 14 writing this myself, I would have said there are no 15 specific requirements, design acceptance requirements. 16 However, you know, Guidance 4 establishing appropriate 17 periods, et cetera, et cetera, are, you know, are used 18 in the next - just to highlight, hey, look, we're really paying attention to what you're looking for. 19 20 MR. CONCEPCION: I see what you're saying, 21 okay. 22 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Between independence and 23 determinism of the processing, the sample times and 24 whether it's FPGAs or whether it's microprocessors even 25 though they're different technologies, they still have

their own little nuances within them.

For instance, interrupt-driven software is not prohibited in terms of their review, because you can't prohibit it.

MR. CONCEPCION: We're trying not to encourage it either.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, I wouldn't say you haven't - you haven't really discouraged it as much as it ought to be either.

Were you going to say something, Dan?

MR. SANTOS: I think we have the basis and we run this through OGC. And I think we are - we're on good grounds here to expect some of this to be provided as part of the application.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. I just don't want it to get lost. I mean, I sat through one design where, you know, fighting about the interrupt-driven microprocessor-base system was like sucking blood out of rocks to get the information needed to try to make sure it was okay and it just makes the whole design difference and just trying to not lose opportunities to make sure that the design agents that come forward really know you mean business when it comes to, you know, independence and deterministic behavior.

Everybody pays attention to diversity.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 Beat the bejeebers out of them on that. I mean, they've got diverse stuff and defense-in-depth coming out their But yet, this always seems - independence and 3 this seem to get short - I don't want to say short shrift, 5 but just it's harder to work your way through them. MR. JUNG: Charlie, we - to that subject, 6 7 we are interfacing with the applicant in several 8 meetings there. They fully understand the - they 9 already are looking at the previous ACRS transcription. 10 (Laughter.) 11 MR. JUNG: We are also emphasizing through 12 this guidance what we are looking for. Applicant wanted licensing, they certainly know which area has been 13 14 challenging. Determinism is one of them and they fully 15 understand. 16 I think we are very competent that -17 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. So, I can never retire. Is that what you're telling me? 18 19 (Laughter.) 20 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Not going to work. 21 MR. JUNG: I just briefly, Charlie, you 22 mentioned that the - about, you know, there's no specific 23 regulatory basis or regulatory requirement speaking about determinism. It is much broader than that. 24 25 The current regulation in Chapter 7 -

1 related to Chapter 7 never talks about software and some other things. 3 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, I know. 4 MR. JUNG: It's an evolving technology, you 5 know, from, you know, we are going decades back to now that - but the fundamental hazards and the way the safety 6 7 questions came up, certain regulations still dictates 8 that it has to be - all the safety concerns and hazard 9 has to be addressed. 10 So, I think we don't want to overly 11 highlight this does not have regulatory basis 12 requirements. We want to -CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, no, I understand your 13 14 point. 15 MR. JUNG: Yes, we want to just go over what 16 the current regulatory basis. In the future, we'll see 17 if there is a better way to establish better - clear 18 regulatory basis addressing digital technology. That's something we've been thinking about. 19 CHAIRMAN BROWN: That digital, it's either 20 21 FPGA, combinational logic-type thought processes where 22 it's hard-wired type stuff or its software-based. MR. JUNG: All of those -23 24 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Are you going to 25 something with our other discussion relative to sensor

1	input to safety actuation that we talked about in Item
2	9?
3	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, we will.
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay.
5	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, we will.
6	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. We can move on then
7	if Dennis and John don't have anything else, or Jack.
8	Okay. I just like to rub it in for a little bit.
9	Next slide.
10	MR. CONCEPCION: I guess at this point it
11	is almost noon and we're supposed to have a break. We
12	either start the section on Diversity, which I have two
13	slides, or we can just break for lunch and then come
14	back and address it.
15	This is the last section of the DSRS before
16	we get into Appendix A.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You said you had something.
18	MEMBER BLEY: We're going over to training.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: At noon precisely?
20	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You want to go ahead and
22	break now and finish this up when we get back, or -
23	MEMBER BLEY: Be simpler.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Why don't we -
25	PARTICIPANT: Are you going to lose
	NEAL R. GROSS

somebody?

CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, they have a commitment to the members at noon for some training so we can do one of the other reviews.

So, if we can go ahead and break here for lunch, and we'll restart on Slide 33, and we will recess until one o'clock.

(Whereupon, the proceedings went off the record at 11:59 a.m. for a lunch recess and went back on the record at 1:07 p.m.)

# AFTERNOON SESSION

.

1:07 p.m.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: The meeting will come back to order. And, Milt, I'll turn it back over to you to start where we left off.

MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. So, we are on Slide 33 on diversity and defense-in-depth. We briefly touched about this section earlier this morning when we talked about a level of detail and the comparisons of BTP 7-19 and what ended up in Section 7.1.5 of the DSRS.

I'm going to go back and restate what we put together under this section. We're using the SRM to SECY-93-087. We're also referring to the guidance in NUREG-6303 which is - has comprehensive information on diversity and defense-in-depth.

And we also rolled BTP 7-19 into this section to the extent that we found appropriate removing the repetitions and all of that.

This section as mentioned earlier, has coordination with human factors engineering to evaluate the assessment that is done in accordance with D3. And also touches on 50.62, the ATWS rule.

Now, on Slide 34 we get into the details of what that assessment is about. And again, it's

In summary, what we do is we identify - or the applicant has to identify vulnerabilities and analyze the events in Chapter 15, provide automatic or manual actions as diverse means, and displays and controls, and prioritization between safety-related and diverse actuation signals.

Again, this is all consistent with the BTP and the SECY paper. I guess Ian has a comment.

MR. JUNG: Charlie, a couple of comments.

In terms of relationship, interface with other disciplines, D3 analysis itself involves Chapter 15 folks as part of it. They actually have to analyze the acceptability of the D3 analysis which allows the use of the best estimate or realistic assumptions used in analysis. So, we enhance the interface for Chapter 15.

Also, a little clarification, Charlie. Earlier you mentioned about the current DSRS and the number of pages for diversity. It's actually ten pages right now.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: You all really beat me up on that earlier. You had to bring it up in the transcript, right?

(Laughter.)

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	MR. JUNG: If you subtract the references
2	out of BTP 7-19, which is about two, three pages -
3	actually, it's a two-to-one relationship, not the
4	five-to-one as you mentioned. I just want to clarify
5	that.
6	(Laughter.)
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Can I take my glasses off
8	so you can poke me in the eye?
9	I did have one other - now that you did that,
10	you're going to pay.
11	(Laughter.)
12	MR. JUNG: I expected it.
13	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Let me make sure I get this
14	right.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Milton, while he's looking
16	_
17	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sir.
18	MEMBER STETKAR: - why don't you just pull
19	up that section of the DSRS.
20	MR. CONCEPCION: Absolutely.
21	MEMBER STETKAR: Because I'm going to have
22	some comments or questions.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Can I go ahead?
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Mine's a small one. I
	NEAL R. GROSS

think on Page 7.1-26 under the Diverse System

Characteristics, there was an item - two items there.

It said that in the context, the diverse means should

be initiated from the control room.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

me in this case. I thought I remembered a couple of circumstances where somebody had to leave - that we reviewing, they actually had to leave the main control room and go to a room somewhere else. Not far, but it was like through a hall and into a door or something like that.

I can't remember where that was or where that was presented. And I didn't know whether that - somebody has got to help me, because I very distinctly remember that comment that it was not located in the main control room itself. It was exterior.

MEMBER STETKAR: That's right. There was one design I recall that was in a room adjacent to the main control room.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: And it had some access controls on it as well, but it was something else I thought I remembered. But I - it's fuzzy.

MR. CONCEPCION: You want to answer that, Paul?

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	MEMBER STETKAR: I think they did that for
2	control room habitability issues and things like that.
3	MR. PIERINGER: One applicant proposed
4	manual actions to isolate main steam.
5	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, that was it.
6	MR. PIERINGER: And it was out of the control
7	room. And we submitted an RAI asking them to quantify
8	all the time delays that would entail.
9	And they decided that there were too many
10	time delays and they put in automatic isolation from
11	the - well, I won't say - from the -
12	MEMBER STETKAR: From the other panel.
13	MR. PIERINGER: - gas panel in the control
14	room.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay, okay.
16	CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, they doubled up on the
17	automatic feature as opposed to -
18	MR. PIERINGER: We didn't put in an automatic
19	_
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You just said automatic.
21	MR. PIERINGER: Sorry. That was incorrect
22	then.
23	They put in a switch on the gas panel in
24	the control room so the operators could shut the main
25	steam isolation valves.
	1

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Manually from -
2	MEMBER STETKAR: And you're right, Paul.
3	That was the function that I was recalling.
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: All right. I don't
5	disagree with what you've said. It's just that I -
6	that's fine. That answers that one.
7	I can't remember - I've got another question
8	here. Go ahead and do yours, John, and let me -
9	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - come back after I figure
11	out what I was - what I wrote.
12	MEMBER STETKAR: Can you scroll down, I don't
13	know, three pages or so from where you are? Page 29.
14	One more. Number 2. There we go.
15	Talking about software common cause failure
16	under Number 2. And the words, credible postulated
17	spurious actuations or credible spurious actuations are
18	used under here. What's a credible spurious actuation
19	as opposed to an incredible spurious actuation?
20	The reason I bring this up is that people
21	have used that term in traditional analyses to say, well,
22	this is not considered credible. Therefore, we will
23	not evaluate it. And whenever asked what that means
24	in a quantitative sense, they fell open.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

So, I'm curious what a credible event is

within this context.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, you want to tackle that, Ian? Yes, we're getting into the details of D3 and BTP 7-19.

MR. JUNG: Okay. Let me tackle that.

The current SRP in 7.1, as well as, I think, in this BTP 7-19, the word "credible" shows up. The way the conversation took place with the industry is not the interpretation we had in a quantitative argument, because that's the one that we talked about earlier, digital system PRA. Quantification of digital system in PRA has been proven to be very challenging and nobody so far that I know other than UK, some folks I was told they took 10, 15 years to use quantitative PRA in digital systems in the practical sense at the site as well.

The credible - there was the term used.

It was - of course the burden is on the applicant to say whether it is credible or not, but typically it was about the basis. The staff went after the what do you mean by credible? Can this happen, or not? Is there any proof of data that shows that it hasn't happened or it happened?

But most of the - many of the cases, those arguments are made either to take credit for - as part

of the, you know, design basis prevention or mitigation.

It was very difficult to demonstrate that and come up with failure in general when complex system is used in protection systems.

The incredibility of the - the possibility of common cause failure nobody was able to demonstrate is not credible. That's one.

In terms of spurious actuation, we are getting to an area of, again, judgments that, you know, in those cases where there is spurious actuation needs to be evaluated, staff has been asking the question of the credible nature of it.

And on a case-by-case, we are evaluating what everyone needs.

MEMBER STETKAR: I guess I hear what you're saying, but I'm not sure that I understand how it's going to play out in practice, because I always say that the way I would like to die is to be flying in an airplane that's hit by a meteorite. It's very fast, and I think just the irony would just be too much.

To me, that's a credible event. It can happen. I can actually calculate the frequency of that happening. There might be uncertainty about it, but it is a - it is not an impossible event. And to me, credibility is something that I can actually put my hands

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

on.

Is it something that I worry about every time I climb on an airplane? Absolutely not. I don't.

But if you leave it at this area, what I hear you saying is that I, as an applicant, will come in and say I've evaluated X, Y and Z because I believe they are credible, and I have not evaluated A, B and C, because I believe that they're not credible.

And you say, well, I believe that A, B and C are credible. So, now all you're doing is arguing about belief systems.

Is there not a better way to provide some guidance about what your intent is here?

MR. JUNG: If you look at -

MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, if you mean all possible spurious actuations, that's pretty broad. All possible common cause failures. That's pretty comprehensive. It's not clear anybody could do that, but it's pretty comprehensive.

If you mean something else, I'm not sure what credible means.

MR. JUNG: To some degree that's the reality of it, because there's going to be some line drawn. Because when you start talking about multiple spurious actuation, which always - it's a possible.

So, while we are - the guidance which was improved through the ISG-2 and incorporation of ISG-2 through the input from ACRS is to clarify the language in such a way that possibility of spurious actuation is evaluated to show. It is bounded by what's already required by the Plan Safety Analysis which already evaluates the spurious actuation. It's different types of spurious actuation if you are using the software that the burden has to be still in the applicant. We have to look at it. It's a difficult area. And the degree of concern to the staff on this area has been - it's very - it is hard to determine exactly what it is. had a lot more data, we could provide a better guidance. Right now it's from, oh, I've never seen that to, oh, yes, it's possible. And some of the consequences that could come - in some cases, gets down to actually coding of software themselves. How you code it, the quality of software, they are all intertwined. It's a simple digital system, you know, logics that are being employed in some of the newer designs and may be possible to better demonstrate that. So, in some cases, some applicant has demonstrated actual analysis of potential for multiple

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

2

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

spurious actuation, but it's one of those areas how far the guidance would go on, you know, if you go down to application-specific software development if you start putting in quality and all of that, it could be somewhat challenging.

MEMBER STETKAR: See, what I'm concerned about here, quite honestly, is that the staff reviewers will use this guidance for their review.

And if you have a staff reviewer like me who believes that a meteorite hitting an airplane is a credible event, I, as a reviewer, am going to be pressing the applicant to provide me confidence down to that level of detail, because my belief system is that that's a credible event.

"credible." And perhaps Charlie is a different reviewer who might have a different belief system about what he believes is a credible event. And, therefore, you don't have necessarily consistency in the review in terms of demands, RAIs and so forth on an applicant to demonstrate assurance to your reviewers of adequate coverage of credibility.

MR. CONCEPCION: I think we understand what the concern is and we will look into it and we'll get back to you, because this is coming from the existing

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

guidance, the BTP 7-19.

1

3

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So, we want to make sure that we have expanded information in NUREG 6303 to cover this. Or if we don't, we probably have to enhance this particular section.

MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks.

MR. CONCEPCION: Anything else on -

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes. Go ahead, Dennis.

MEMBER BLEY: Yes, I had a couple. Back about two pages higher up where you had the list of things for manual actions - that's it.

On several of these, two of them are minor.

In the first one - oh, I'm sorry. Where it had the numbered list up at the top of the page. Must have been the page before.

I saw it up there when I looked at - there you go. Whoa. You just passed it. There you are, yes. Yes, and we'll have to go a couple lines lower.

MR. CONCEPCION: That's okay.

MEMBER BLEY: The first one, if the assessment indicates its safety-related manual initiation would be subject to the same potential common cause, we'll probably never be able to show it would be. We can show it could be, perhaps. Since we don't know quite what the common cause failures are inside

1 these systems, that's really minor. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. MEMBER BLEY: The next one is less minor in 3 Number 2. MR. CONCEPCION: I need to make sure that we capture this elsewhere, but, yes. MEMBER BLEY: Number 2 kind of bothers me 7 8 especially looking at your picture. Ιf the safety-related system or division required - it's 9 10 sufficiently diverse, the second manual means would not 11 be necessary. 12 Well, you still have that common cause thing laying in your picture. What's "sufficiently diverse" 13 14 mean? How do you get around - does sufficiently diverse 15 mean that it really can't have the same common cause? I don't know what that means. 16 17 Is that what it means? Is that what it meant to you guys? If it's sufficiently diverse such 18 19 that no common cause exists between the two, then I kind of buy into it. 20 21 But, you know, sufficiently diverse as a 22 reviewer, to me, might mean this looks different from this one without digging into what underlies all that. 23 MR. JUNG: I think that's the current intent. 24 25 Sometimes we don't want to - I'm still hesitating to

1 some degree where is the absolute. Even for hardware systems there is certain nature of common cause failures possibility, for example, environmental conditions. MEMBER BLEY: Exactly, which can be there. MR. JUNG: So -MEMBER BLEY: That's a real tough one to buy 6 7 into unless we know a little more what sufficiently 8 diverse means. 9 MR. JUNG: The NUREG-6303 has extensive 10 guidelines on different types of diversity. 11 probably remember Mike Motorman's wheel chart and all 12 that. 13 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. 14 MR. JUNG: Which generated the NUREG-7007. 15 There are set of guidance that's out there to allow 16 the staff to make some judgment on it, but -17 MEMBER BLEY: Well, since this is self-contained, do we refer to that guidance? 18 MR. CONCEPTION: We don't have NUREG-7007 19 referenced in this particular version of the DSRS, but 20 we have 6303. 21 22 Doesn't mean that 7007 don't apply -MEMBER BLEY: Well, think on it. If you're 23 24 convinced this takes care of it, then we're probably 25 all right.

The next one I've commented on back on both of the ISGs that deal with this one here. Number 4 still bothers me.

Difference between time available and time required for operator action is a measure of safety margin. Yes, it is.

The next sentence is the one that bothers me. As the difference decreases, uncertainty should be appropriately considered.

Uncertainty should be appropriately considered, period. I don't care if you've got 30 minutes if the time available is pretty close to the time required, or if there are complexities in the situation where you'd be doing it that increase the uncertainties. Things that sound like you got a lot of room, don't have so much room.

So, if you don't always think about that uncertainty - now, how carefully do you do the uncertainty analysis, that can of course vary. But there's no easy cut here that says, gee, you have to be done within ten minutes of each other or two minutes of each other before uncertainty matters. It's just not true.

Think about some of the scenarios on a boiler where you got to open a vent. Now, we're not

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

161 1 talking about a boiler with a vent, because you're design-specific, but there's probably something in here that gets you into a spot where the complexity or the 3 operational considerations involved in carrying out an action gives you enough uncertainty that even if there is - looks like substantial time, it matters. 7 So, there's no easy way around this other 8 than saying you should consider the uncertainty as 9 necessary for the case at hand or something like that. That's all. 10 11 MR. JUNG: And just to - I appreciate the 12 comment. This particular paragraph, ACRS letter on ISG-2 and conversion into Revision 6 of BTP 7-19 came. 13 14 had couple of reiterations. 15 MEMBER BLEY: It's getting closer to what

I like, but I still am not happy.

(Laughter.)

MR. CONCEPCION: It's a good sign we're getting there.

MR. JUNG: We worked with the reactor systems and the human factors and it was excruciating efforts to get to this language. And these particular elements are - even though it's here, it is being referred - this particular one is also being referred by, you know, Chapter 18.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	MEMBER BLEY: I know, and ISG-5 covers it
2	as well, but it's a concept that's not quite right and
3	it still bothers me. So, I'll keep telling you that
4	it still bothers me.
5	(Discussion off the record.)
6	MR. CONCEPCION: A staff member is coming
7	up to the podium.
8	MEMBER BLEY: Oh, okay, from the hinterlands
9	of the room.
10	MR. EAGLE: Gene Eagle, I&C.
11	I just want to point out an additional word
12	that it went through a very complex review, all these
13	different groups and everything. And I'd just like to
14	point out right there in the last sentence where it says
15	this is for complex situations and for the actions with
16	limited margin.
17	In other words, you mentioned that the
18	complex situation -
19	MEMBER BLEY: I did, and limited margins.
20	MR. EAGLE: That got added. I thought you
21	might be interested in that.
22	MEMBER BLEY: But you had to throw in the
23	lousy 30-minute thing.
24	(Laughter.)
25	MEMBER BLEY: If you had left that out, I
	NEAL D. CDOSS

1	would have been happier.
2	MR. EAGLE: Well, we want to keep that
3	specifically, because that carries over from -
4	MEMBER BLEY: I know it carries over, but
5	it's a concept that's not quite right.
6	MR. EAGLE: Well, we just said, you know,
7	if it falls below 30 minutes, that particularly you're
8	going to pay a lot of attention to it.
9	There are not many manual actions that would
10	require more than 30 minutes -
11	MEMBER BLEY: It's true.
12	MR. EAGLE: - that are going to be - and,
13	remember, we are replacing and, remember, these cases
14	-
15	MEMBER BLEY: It's getting better.
16	MR. EAGLE: We are replacing automatic
17	functions.
18	MEMBER BLEY: That's true.
19	MR. EAGLE: That's one of the key things.
20	MR. CONCEPCION: Good. Thanks, Gene. I
21	appreciate it.
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay - oh, I'm sorry. Go
23	ahead.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Let me follow up a little
25	bit on Dennis. If you go down to testability on Page

30 or so - are you done?

MEMBER BLEY: Yes, I'm sorry.

MEMBER STETKAR: Bottom of Page 30, top of Page 31. It says - and if you can bring up all of - just scroll up a little bit more so we can see that paragraph on the bottom of - first paragraph on 31 also. There you go.

This says - again, I'm trying to think of this as a reviewer. It says, if a system is sufficiently simple such that every possible combination of inputs and every possible sequence of device states are tested and all outputs are verified for every case, then CCF within the system can be considered to be appropriately addressed without further action. If a portion of a component or a component of a system can be fully tested, then it can be considered to have no - not to have a potential for software-based CCF.

What's the basis for that assertion? I test pumps all the time - or I think I test pumps. I have test procedures and I test the pumps. And I have documented tests that I've tested these pumps for years.

Then a common cause failure happens and I find that, oh, gee, I wasn't really testing for that particular failure mode. I didn't really design my test to test for that. And lo and behold I'll test for that

in the future, because I had one.

So, why now do I have confidence that what you're calling a hundred percent testability says that common cause failures are impossible?

Because, again, I'm a reviewer. Somebody comes and says, okay, I have 100 percent testability. You say, fine. I don't need to think about common cause failure. You are now given a free card. You don't need to consider that in any of your assessments.

That's the way I understand this.

MR. CONCEPCION: Gene, are you going to tackle that?

MR. EAGLE: Yes. This definition when you use the exact definition that came out of ISG-04 and this is out of the key ideas, if you got this, we're dealing of course with software, particularly digital, and we look at the idea of being able to describe and you have a digital input that has a component that has a certain number of inputs, certain number of outputs and perhaps some states inside.

And if you can go through every possible combination in there of inputs and every possible combination and you look at the outputs, then that's pretty thorough testing. That's a hundred percent testing of all states.

1	This is the basic definition that came
2	directly out of ISG-04 that was developed with a suitable
3	amount of stakeholders and everything trying to describe
4	it.
5	MEMBER STETKAR: It does that if it's every
6	possible combination.
7	MEMBER BLEY: Well, but it doesn't look at
8	the environment, it doesn't look at failures internal
9	to the chips that aren't just software. I mean, it's
0 _	software running on hardware, on firmware on hardware.
.1	You can't test all of that.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'll give you an example.
_3	And you're a hundred percent right. I totally agree.
4	How about that?
. 5	But, I mean, I've actually experienced a
. 6	circumstance where -
- 7	MEMBER BLEY: I'm going to go home and die,
8 _	Charlie.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - there was a generator,
20	a turbine generator overspeed trip system required to
21	have, you know, separation, independence, all kinds of
22	good stuff between the controls function and the
23	overspeed trip function.
2 4	Had separate sensors. Had separate wires.
25	They were electrically isolated. They had optics.

1 It was an analog system on top of that. No software. And in the process of operating the plant, 3 the crew found, gee, they were always - seemed like TG set was always trying to move off of its nominal value. 5 And the - they started troubleshooting, as 6 you would imagine. They went through all their normal 7 checks. Checked all the operational parts. It seemed 8 to come out okay. 9 Then they decided, okay, well, let's go 10 remove the power supply. Turns out both of those 11 functions were supplied by the same two auctioneered 12 power supplies. 13 Well, they pulled out the wrong power 14 supply. They pulled out the one that turned out to be 15 the problem. And as soon as they did that, they pulled 16 out the good one. 17 The TG set immediately tried to overspeed. 18 They caught it at 149 percent overspeed manually. That's how fast it went. 19 an unloaded TG 20 Now, this was set. 21 Obviously, they weren't troubleshooting. The problem 22 as it turned out to be was noise coming out of that, 23 that told the control system to increase speed. Told 24 the overspeed trip system, don't pay any attention to 25 it simultaneously.

It can

Now, that's not a testable situation you would ever think of doing. And, I mean, to say that you can test all possible, as you say, combination of inputs and outputs, your environmental question or other functioning question is an issue. It's an interesting thought process that you can test everything, but there are a lot of other circumstances that can interfere. That can happen software-wise. happen analog-wise. And that's the only reason I bring up an analog version of that. I'd just be cautious with the use of a hundred percent testability. MEMBER STETKAR: Part of this, by the way, I know Dan wants to say something, but part of this actually dovetails back into my previous comment about what is a credible common cause failure. Certainly if you can test every possible combination of inputs and assure that every possible combination of outputs still remains within your operating constraints, that gives you some confidence about the range of possible common cause failures that

It doesn't ensure that no common cause failures can occur, but it gives you higher confidence

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

could occur.

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

that indeed you have a system that is at least less resistant to common cause failures than a system where you could not do at least that level of testing. But just to say that if it's a hundred percent testable, it's not prone to common cause failure is - that bothers me. MR. SANTOS: I just want to say I agree with the comment and maybe there's something there we can improve. We never implied to cover all common cause failures here. Clearly, you can have requirements adverse testing, you test the requirements most of the time.

So, even the example that Charlie was saying that you may have some environmental conditions that put you outside your design space, there's many ways you can get to common cause failures. So, we were trying to just simply address one small aspect through testing of existing requirements due to software.

Maybe there's a better way that we can take a look back to make that point more clear that we are not implying that we are taking care of all common cause failure even if we use the words over it, you know. I brought more clear quidance to the staff on that.

MEMBER BLEY: Maybe the way you've said it

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 is literally true, because you did say software-based common cause failure. 3 MR. SANTOS: Right. MEMBER BLEY: But the software, like I said, 5 firmware and on hardware. MR. SANTOS: Yes. 6 7 MEMBER BLEY: And I think you're right. 8 Software doesn't break like a bearing can break or something. So, if you've tested all those and the 9 10 software is okay until something is running on - makes 11 it not work the way -MR. SANTOS: Correct. That's what we meant, 12 but clearly it still creates confusion. So, we'll take 13 14 it back to see if we can add more clarification. 15 DR. BIRLA: Even for software, I would not 16 accept that premise. 17 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, you're probably right. Thank you, Sushil. I agree with you. 18 One other observation. There was two parts 19 to that of which I did not state the second part. 20 21 You'll note that I said they were completely 22 independent, and then I went on to say there were two 23 power supplies that fed both. 24 In other words, independently, they were 25 really independent. not They were not really

1 independent. And that issue actually came up working on another project and I had told people, look, 3 independence means independence. If you wonder why I'm hard over 5 independence, you know, for the reactor trips and all the safeguard systems, that's an example of what 7 independence really means independence. 8 It doesn't mean, wow, I've got two power 9 supplies that both feed and go someplace. And it's, 10 you know, prove to us, show us a circumstance when I 11 told them, hey, you really ought to have a separate pair 12 of power supplies for each of - it's on a new project - for each of those functions. 13 14 Said, no, no, no, they're not independent 15 if you don't. Oh, no. Tell us this is not a problem. 16 We never ever had that problem occur before. 17 Sure enough about six months later is when 18 this occurred and all of a sudden now there's a multimillion dollar redesign. 19 MEMBER BLEY: You've even seen some where 20 21 if the hot side is independent, they're running on a 22 common ground, that suddenly they get -23 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Exactly right. 24 MEMBER BLEY: Something happens and the 25 ground is not as good and suddenly you have different

.

3

1

5

7

9

8

10

1112

13

14

1516

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's happened because the ground wires that they had common between a bunch of things were too small and you end up building common mode voltages across the system that tore everything up once you got an imbalance.

MEMBER BLEY: And those have happened.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: I just, you know, independence is independence. And if you want safety, you better be independent everywhere. I had to say that.

Now, I'll go on and I'll ask my one other  $\label{eq:power_power} \mbox{question - two other questions on D&D.}$ 

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: On Page 26, and again this is a suggestion, this is not - I'm not trying to point out - right where it says - right above Use of Automation as a Diverse Means where it says that when a diverse means is needed to be available, on and on and on. And the last sentence says, the preferred diverse means is normally an automated system.

The last, absolutely last word in all the discussion of characteristics, the preferred system is automated. And that's the - you wait until the end.

You really ought to have that paragraph at

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 the beginning of the diverse system characteristics before you go into things that could cause problems. 3 In other words, it could be manual, it could be automatic, but we prefer automatic and then go into 5 the rest of the - just a suggestion, okay, in a matter of setting the tone so people know what's considered 6 7 to be important. That's number one. 8 The second one, and we may have dealt with 9 this earlier, but on Page 29, Item 1(b) and - first, 10 1(b). 11 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, we discussed it when 12 we talked about priority modules, I believe. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Well, let me go -13 14 safety-related commands - we did - that direct a 15 component to a safe state should always have the highest 16 priority and must override all other commands. 17 So, if I have a reactor trip system that 18 locks up, it should lock up in a safe state and override all - I'm not sure between that and the engineered 19 safeguards system which - that just gets confusing. 20 21 I just think it's a little bit ambiguous from the thought 22 process. I'm not proposing a solution. Just pointing 23 it out. 24 And then the one in C where it says, commands 25 that can be - let's see how did they - commands that

174 originate in a safety-related channel, but only cancel or enable cancellation, should have a lower priority and my be overridden by the - that tends, to me, you're right on the margins about what should the safety-related channel commands mean and what should they not mean. You've automatically assigned a priority based on two specific circumstances; cancellation, or enabling cancellation of something, as opposed to a more thoughtful process. That's the only point. It's just confusing to me when I read it. And how would that be evaluated? And that could be

subject to a lot of different reviewers' thoughts.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, we're going to look into that.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: The last one, and you're glad to hear this probably from me, anyway, Page 7-31 7.1-31, and it's on conformance with 10 CFR 50.62. And I'm like Dennis on this one. I have gone over this time and again.

The last sentence in that paragraph, not the A, B or C, is you can put every function within one controller.

Come on, guys. Just submit it to me and I'll evaluate all this stuff and hope it comes true.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 I mean, having all your safety functions in one single controller or CPU, you're just kind of inviting it. 3 That's one of my - raises the fur on the back of my neck. It's just instead of saying we really don't 5 like this, but if you really insist, we'll give it an evaluation just to set the tone. 6 7 I don't know how you - the preferred thing 8 is to - you ought to at least say the preferred way to 9 do this, have separate things. But if you really 10 insist, then we'll beat you to death on there other 11 points. 12 MEMBER BLEY: Maybe another reason to have that general disclaimer up front once and for all that 13 14 if you do something that's not here, we'll look at it. 15 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes. Anyway, I just - I'm 16 just giving you a heads up. 17 SANTOS: We accept your comments, 18 Charlie, and the clarifications. And, again, we've said it many times that some of these were direct -19 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, this is right out -20 this is out of 1.152, I believe. 21 22 MR. SANTOS: Yes, direct copy of -CHAIRMAN BROWN: We had the discussion on 23 1.15. I didn't like it then. It's clear that I don't 24 25 like it now because of the context.

	MR. CONCEPCION: And It is today in Bir 7-19.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: It probably is.
3	MR. CONCEPCION: I'm pretty sure it is.
4	MR. SANTOS: We'll capture an action item
5	to see how we -
6	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, absolutely. We'll
7	look into it. We'll look into it.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: This is again one of those
9	ones where the preferred means should be multiple
10	controllers for multiple safety functions. And then
11	you should have the however, if you really want to resort
12	to his, we'll tear your throat out with the rest of these
13	reviews.
14	I like those words, to put it bluntly.
15	MR. CONCEPCION: No, we got it. We got it.
16	We understand.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, I'm done. Thank you.
18	For this section.
19	MR. CONCEPCION: Diversity and
20	defense-in-depth.
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Where are we now?
22	MR. CONCEPCION: If there are no more
23	comments, we're getting into Appendix A, Hazard
24	Analysis.
25	So, this is the guidance that provides an
	WEAL D. 00000

1 approach to review hazards analysis. The focus of this is on evaluating whether the identified and evaluated each loss of impairment or of and safety function developed the necessary compensatory measures in the form of architectural constraints in the system. 7 This section provides a set of evaluation 8 topics that the reviewer will go through to make sure of 9 all the hazards were identified 10 compensatory measures were incorporated in the design. 11 And also, there are two examples on a 12 section related to ITAAC for implementation activities, because we believe that - or we consider HA to be an 13 14 iterative process that will be executed in every phase 15 of the system life cycle. 16 One point I want to mention is that Appendix 17 A does not provide guidance to do an HA. It provides 18 review quidance to assess whether hazard have been identified and corrected in the system. 19 20 MEMBER STETKAR: Milton. 21 MR. CONCEPTION: Yes, sir. MEMBER STETKAR: Does the staff or does 22 23 anybody have an example of what a hazard analysis might be? 24

# MR. CONCEPCION: Dan or Sushil.

# NEAL R. GROSS

from

DR. BIRLA: This is Sushil Birla Research, senior technical advisor here in support of NRO to answer questions pertaining to the technical basis that Research has provided them. I presume your question is in the context of I&C systems, or in general? If it was in general, you know that the NRC has a seismic hazard analysis report that is world renown. MEMBER STETKAR: That's a seismic hazard analysis. DR. BIRLA: Right. MEMBER STETKAR: I'm trying to think of what does - I'd like to see - let me not talk about seismic events then, because this is I&C. What do we really mean by hazard analysis in the context of a digital I&C system? The reason I'm asking that is there is a statement in the DSRS that says, current hazard analysis technique such as fault tree analysis and failure modes and effects analysis by themselves, do not assure discovery of or the absence of system internal hazards rooted in system development activities.

By implication, whatever this thing is does assure completeness of that. So, I'm really curious about what this is, because I'd like to learn what it

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 is. Because I've never used one of these things and I'd like to learn how people do use it. Because if this 3 is complete, that's great. read MEMBER BLEY: Ι that statement 5 differently, but I'm more interested in the answer. (Discussion off the record.) 7 MEMBER STETKAR: This is apparently a new 8 method. 9 DR. BIRLA: So, this is not advocating a 10 particular method, but it is recognizing that people 11 who have used the traditional methods of FTA, ETA, FMEA 12 resulting in thousands of pages of analysis reports, have heated systems that eventually failed and you could 13 14 not trace the failure to any revelation from those 15 analyses. 16 MEMBER STETKAR: Is that because of the fault 17 trees, FMEAs and event trees, or is that because the 18 people using those little tools didn't really think carefully enough? 19 DR. BIRLA: Well, when it comes to the root 20 21 cause being rooted somewhere in the engineering process 22 that meets an engineering effect, the system has been 23 so complex that the space is so large that you cannot 24 possibly do an exhaustive FMEA on components of that 25 sort. This is what it's amounting to.

1 MEMBER STETKAR: That's fine. DR. BIRLA: Individual software unit-wise 3 if it's small enough, perhaps you could, but scale it up to a representative system of today, nobody is able to. MEMBER STETKAR: That's fine. 7 DR. BIRLA: Secondly, what do you do the FMEA 8 You do it on some design given to you. or FTA on? 9 Unfortunately, the propagation paths are 10 not reflected in the design the way they are in an 11 electrical circuit and we haven't overcome the problem. 12 We don't have explicit, verifiable, architectural design constraints that assure us that 13 14 these four properties perhaps will not exist. 15 MEMBER BLEY: The design might not give you 16 those, but the analyst might be - must understand them 17 to be able to be able to do hazard analysis. 18 DR. BIRLA: What information does the analyst analyze? All the analyst can analyze is the 19 design given to the analyst. 20 21 Now, we can suspect that the design isn't 22 showing you everything and what do you do with that 23 suspicion? 24 So, you seek evidence in some other way. 25 That's what this is getting at.

1 MEMBER BLEY: Which is the way you ought to do fault tree analysis and event tree analysis anyway. 3 You ought to look at the history of failure and understand that and apply that to your model. But the way I read this wasn't that they were saying they have a new hazard analysis, but that 6 7 the tools of hazard analysis don't quarantee it will 8 be okay. That's all I thought you were saying. 9 DR. BIRLA: That's exactly right, yes. 10 So, it MEMBER BLEY: we read 11 differently. 12 CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, I read it like John did, because I read it like the FMEA and FTA -13 14 MEMBER BLEY: Since I didn't see the answer, I figured that's all they were telling me was that you 15 16 need to do it, but it's not perfect. 17 DR. BIRLA: So, let's take your observation on will the analyst should look at the history. Well, 18 in this business the history isn't adequate. 19 20 What do you look at the history on? 21 Something that is repeating? Something that 22 consistent? Something that is the same like a family 23 of motors that's been used in industry and we've got 24 an extensive record? We don't have such a thing. 25 In the whole history of NRC's event reports,

we have less than 450 incidents.

MEMBER BLEY: But there's more than that in the common cause database that NRC had one of your labs put together that identified failure modes in this kind of equipment.

Now, they didn't get down - unfortunately, they didn't chase it to the failure modes. They chased it to card level kind of things, which don't let you do the analysis in any -

DR. BIRLA: That's exactly right. You can identify failure modes for simple electronic components. But when it comes to complex systems, we had the discussion in the last review meeting that you just don't have complete enough set along which you can start collecting operating history and develop a statistically significant amount of findings to base any analysis on.

MEMBER BLEY: We've been pounding Research to really chase these failure modes. And the folks who make these things not just for the nuclear business, but for other business, there's lots and lots of these out there, must have collected a lot of information on just what's gone wrong in these systems.

DR. BIRLA: Well, the most renowned organization and its capabilities is JPL. We went to

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 JPL to get their records. We have about 10,000 - we call them anomalies in their database and extract information from them. 3 There isn't anything that you can organize 5 along the lines of suggesting classic failure modes with why would you condemn and start accumulating data, but 7 - and let's us come to the same conclusion. 8 So, what they are doing and what we would 9 like to do is take a lessons learned approach, meaning 10 from each one of those incidents' anomalies, what do 11 you learn. 12 MEMBER BLEY: That's certainly the place to 13 I agree with you there. 14 DR. BIRLA: Right, right. And then go into 15 the preventative direction. What is it in the design 16 or the process that allow such a thing to happen that 17 we should allow? 18 So, the leading organizations are taking more a preventative approach and checking whether the 19 means are adequately specified or not. And secondly, 20 21 whether they are implemented adequately or not. 22 So, if you look at what's happening in 23 Europe right now where even though some organizations 24 talk about reliability of I&C systems or 25 software-reliant systems, the reliability part for the

1 hardware is classic. Because when it comes to software, they begin using a term called "development assurance." 3 MEMBER BLEY: So, we're leaning toward continuing the same kind of hazard analysis we've always done, because it has some value, but we're just saying that we know that can't cover other things. 7 Is that where you guys stand or have I 8 oversimplified it far too much? 9 DR. BIRLA: Well, we will continue to do the 10 same kind of hazard analysis that we have been doing. 11 Well, if you look at the submittals in I&C systems, 12 we have not had anything other than FMEAs. Our licensing officers report that they 13 14 have not seen a single good hazard analysis in their 15 career in this field. MEMBER BLEY: In the I&C field? 16 17 DR. BIRLA: Yes, yes. 18 And to give you a couple of examples, what 19 you call the program manual, software program manual, where it came to the section for software hazard 20 21 analysis, the applicant's answer was we don't do 22 software hazard analysis, because we do it at the system 23 level. 24 So, then you go to the system level and the 25 applicant's response there is, we have no hazards in

1 our system, because it's well proven in the field. SANTOS: In another case, applicant 3 stated if you use our systems the way we told you so, you would be free from hazards. (Laughter.) DR. BIRLA: So, the point is we would not 7 want those kinds of hazard analysis submitted again. 8 MEMBER BLEY: So, what does Appendix A tell 9 us to do or look for? 10 DR. BIRLA: Can you pull up Appendix A? 11 MEMBER STETKAR: What I was going to ask 12 while he's pulling it up, I wanted to kind of understand it. I think I'm getting a better appreciation of this 13 14 right there. 15 The third paragraph says, the application 16 should contain hazard analysis information sufficient 17 to ensure that the applicant has identified the hazards of concern. 18 From what I heard you saying is that there 19 is - does that mean that there has been a comprehensive 20 21 compilation of everything that's ever happened in 22 software failures and that they've provided assurance 23 why their design won't do that? 24 Because you're saying, well, you know, JPL 25 has thousands and thousands of incidents and you can

1 learn from those things. Is that the intent of that, identify the hazards of concern? 3 DR. BIRLA: No, that would be too limiting. MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 5 DR. BIRLA: The operating experience in the whole world collected together isn't enough to cover 6 7 all the possible ways in which we can get this wrong. 8 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 9 MR. SANTOS: The intent is for them to take 10 a systematic approach, okay, of the whole I&C design 11 and understand the ways their identified safety 12 functions can be lost or impaired. And in that context, okay, postulate what 13 14 are things that could lead to that scenario. 15 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Now, since nobody has 16 ever submitted one that your field people have said has been worth a nickel, this is guidance for the reviewer, 17 but what are we giving the people who have to submit 18 something to review such that they won't give you 19 something that's not useful in the future? 20 21 How is this moving forward, or are we just 22 saying nobody is ever going to pass this step and what 23 are we going to do about it? 24 Are we going to say it's okay, or it's not 25 okay? I don't know where we're headed with this.

1 DR. BIRLA: So, what you see here is the first draft, about five pages, sent out into the public domain 3 to start the dialog. The technical basis that it draws from is 5 a research document, Research Information Letter that's also going to be -6 7 MEMBER BLEY: That's not out yet? 8 DR. BIRLA: That's not out. 9 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. So, we haven't seen 10 that. 11 CHAIRMAN BROWN: What document did you say? 12 MEMBER BLEY: The Research Information 13 Letter. 14 DR. BIRLA: That we would like to develop 15 to a point that we can also release that into the public 16 domain, invite some comment, engage in dialog. 17 As you recognize that in an area where this has not been done well enough by anyone in industry, 18 there is going to be a learning curve both on the industry 19 side and on the review side. And this is the beginning. 20 21 MEMBER BLEY: Okay, but we have approved 22 designs. I'm just - now, you've had - as you've built 23 this work we're looking at today, you've had a lot of 24 interactions with the mPower people at least and maybe 25 some of the others. I can't speak for them, but I assume

1 they're getting the idea of where you're headed with this and what they're going to have to do. 3 I don't know if they've actually tried to accomplish something in this new direction or not. MR. CONCEPCION: We have had interactions with them, but this is the first time they see the draft. 6 7 And we receive preliminary comments on the draft, 8 including the section on HA, but we don't know - we don't 9 know what has been done by the applicant in this area. 10 We do not know. 11 MEMBER BLEY: As I read it, it wasn't - I 12 didn't quite get what I'm understanding now, and maybe that's my fault in the way I read it. 13 14 I was left with the idea of, well, you just 15 do the best you can with the event trees and fault trees 16 and tell us a story wit it. But what you're saying is 17 really to get at the root of what's going on and address that in a qualitative -18 MR. SANTOS: Right. And if you look at the 19 structure around evaluation topics, that basically 20 21 drives to the areas that from our current reviews, have 22 been issues that resulted in long RAIs and long issues. 23 MEMBER BLEY: To get at these very things. 24 MR. SANTOS: And our lesson learned from that 25 was, gee, if the applicant from the beginning was taking

189 1 more of a systematic look at their distributed system, we could have altogether come to a place we all understand instead of where we did the reviews that were so, you know, component by component and we were missing kind of the forest view. So, we're trying to do that with this 7 approach. 8 MEMBER BLEY: Is there anything going on in 9 your organization or in research along the lines of 10 digging into this information you received from JPL or 11 other sources to try to do this, look at the hazards across the business of it to get some kind of reference 12 document out there for people to use? 13 14 DR. BIRLA: Let me answer that in two parts. 15 The specific question that you asked seemed to be about, 16 again, the lessons learned, learnable from the history 17

that's known.

MEMBER BLEY: Yes.

DR. BIRLA: There are a couple of papers from NASA that have done very limited analysis of that data. It is not adequate.

We undertook it as internally here to do a more comprehensive lessons learned exercise on it in collaboration with NASA. NASA has a small activity to go on their headquarters website on lessons learned

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	database.
2	We're trying to link with that and join
3	forces, combined resources. We are at the very early
4	stage in that activity.
5	So, first to exercise the process so that
6	we can indeed have lessons learned from -
7	MEMBER BLEY: I mean, it seems that that
8	would be real helpful to an applicant if - because every
9	applicant is not going to go out and do that kind of
10	research.
11	DR. BIRLA: That's right. So, we recognize
12	that. We just haven't been able to scale up the
13	resources to that level, but that's a target on the
14	books. It's part of the research plan.
15	MEMBER BLEY: I don't remember - well, that's
16	your -
17	DR. BIRLA: That's part of the research, yes.
18	MEMBER BLEY: So, that's in the -
19	DR. BIRLA: In the research plan, yes.
20	MEMBER BLEY: Okay. I don't remember that.
21	I'll have to go back and look.
22	DR. BIRLA: So, there's a section in the
23	research plan with the title, operating experience.
24	It's in that section.
25	We subsequently after publishing the

research plan, have an official project with the DCM on it, but just haven't scaled up the activity date.

But let me also give you two other parts to the answer even though your focus was not on both parts. But the more general part of your question was, is there anything being published out there?

The Electric Power Research Institute research team had a project on their books called failure analysis.

A couple of years ago the project was started based on - with industry request, that means at the customer's request, from an observation that you do all these FMEAs that are running thousands of pages long, and yet things go wrong and we lose a lot of money.

Why? Again, in the context of I&C systems. So, that's how the project was started. And the EPRI researchers are converging to a conclusion that I just mentioned to you that the traditional techniques are not good enough.

So, they have now systematically run through a test exercise or you might say case study, about half a dozen different techniques. And are putting together a report that compares the techniques.

Some techniques were able to discover issues that other techniques were not able to. I do

1 not want to steal their thunder. Within a few months you should hear from the field itself. We have been as part of an understanding and the memorandum of understanding research and EPRI researchers been exposed to the work in progress. we believe that they are understanding the issue and 7 are directionally headed in the right plan of action. 8 MEMBER BLEY: We heard from them a couple 9 years ago probably the beginnings of this work. DR. BIRLA: But this exercise was run in the 10 last four months. 11 12 MEMBER BLEY: Oh, okay. DR. BIRLA: Yes, quite, you might say, a 13 14 90-degree turn in direction of what you might have seen 15 a couple of years ago. 16 MEMBER BLEY: And not just information from 17 the nuclear industry? 18 DR. BIRLA: Well, actually the exercise is on a dual heat removal system in the nuclear industry. 19 MEMBER BLEY: Oh, okay. It's aimed at one 20 21 specific -22 DR. BIRLA: Yes, yes. Something on which 23 they have already done - or some plants have already 24 done FMEAs. So, we have some baseline and an 25 understanding.

And internally, you might also be aware that the NRC gave a research grant to MIT about a year ago. And the work under that research grant examined a small part of an EPR submittal to exercise one method and have NROs, technical staff, understand what the issues are in performing a hazard analysis. What difficulties you run into, what are the gotchas, what are the right 7 8 questions to look for. 9 That report is in the review stage right 10 We hope that in a month to six weeks the NRC review 11 would become featured and MIT would be in a position 12 to publish that report. Based on that report, MIT will be making 13 14 a presentation, publishing a paper in risk analysis. 15 And they are making a presentation in the next meeting. 16 MEMBER BLEY: Did they access information 17 that we haven't been looking at previously, or just trying some new techniques? 18 DR. BIRLA: Whatever was on the docket is 19 basically what they had interaction with the NRC 20 technical staff to get an understanding of the immensely 22 complex documents. 23 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 24 MS. STAREFOS: May I also add that there are

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

opportunities in our process to talk publicly with any

21

25

stakeholders that are uncertain about any of the information that's been published in the DSRS?

And because we don't have a parallel reg guide that talks about our minimum application content like the large lightwaters do, we anticipate that we'll be looking closely at these documents, the DSRS sections, to give them some insights on what their application needs to contain.

And we certainly have no intention of leaving them out there alone to try to decipher that.

We plan to have a series of public meetings once the comments are returned. And if necessary, we'll go through and make additional changes to these documents.

I won't promise necessarily this section, but I expect there will be sections that might have additional information that need to be either included or clarified, because there is a variety of stakeholder interest in that clarification.

So, our process allows for that to be done in the springtime.

MR. SANTOS: And, again, I want to repeat one of the improvements I think we can get through both the efficiency and the safety focus is going through this systematic look - is going through some of these topics.

1 If you look at the most contentious issues, the RAIs, I think that took the longest. You can trace it to some of these topics. So, we do believe an approach like this will 5 early on - identify the issues early on, will save a lot of time for both NRC and the applicant through the process. 8 MR. JUNG: Ian Jung. Just to add, there's 9 a reason why this - some topics are in the appendix at 10 this point. 11 These are the type of sort of tools that 12 staff wants to use to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of our reviews. 13 14 Hazard analysis by itself does not have a 15 regulatory requirement that they have to do it here. 16 So, it is supposed to be - or what we envision is to 17 use this, have an integrated hazard analysis approach 18 as part of the, essentially, 7.1 and 7.2. So, 7.1 and 7.2 regulatory requirements and 19 staff guidance is already - they already designed to 20 deal with set of hazards instead of the concerns that 21 22 we have. Without this hazard section, what we will 23 24 see is those hazards are being discussed and even within 25 DSRS in those sections.

1 What this could do is validate the comprehensiveness of all the hazards of concern that we've challenged and should be - especially for new designs like mPower, we are interested in those hazards that are not just I&C initiated, but hazard that could come from outside I&C. 7 So, we want to use this opportunity to 8 enhance and that's our review process. Even without 9 it, I think there's a possibility without full use of 10 this, the individual section, we could still cover the 11 regulatory basis for making a safety finding using individual sections. But this particular process could 12 increase the efficiency of our reviews. 13 14 MEMBER BLEY: In truth, your section on scope 15 reads a lot like a section on a HAZOP for a chemical 16 plant. So, same words to figure out -17 DR. BIRLA: Exactly. If you look at both 18 bullets, you could treat them as HAZOP question set. 19 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. DR. BIRLA: Or you could treat them as 20 21 failure modes at a very high level. Functional overall 22 comprehensive level. 23 But systematically asking each question and 24 answering it appropriately takes care of a lot of those 25 issues.

10,
MR. SANTOS: And although I don't know how
the applicant is going to recite to present their
information, we're not looking or repetition, meaning
compliance with Section 7.1 and then repeat on the
hazard.
I mean, if the applicant can demonstrate
their compliance to their regulatory requirements
through their hazard analysis, we'll definitely take
a look at that.
MEMBER BLEY: We don't have anybody from the
industry talking today.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, there will be some
comments, public comments at the end.
Just relative to this one question, does
this - I just did a word search and could find no place
where FMEAs were required other than a statement in
testing - capability of testing calibration where it
referred to 10 CFR 50.34 F2xxii.
MR. SANTOS: That is a TMI action item, yes.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. And so, it seemed
like you all were just discounting it completely. And
the only thing people were doing and it says for
integrated control system for the effects of input and
output signals, but not the system itself.
So, it looks like not only had you said it

1	hasn't revealed much, we're really not encouraging
2	anybody to do it. And my question is, have people
3	submitted those in the past? Is there a requirement
4	for an FMEA or an FTA to be submitted as part of the
5	design?
6	MEMBER BLEY: The DAC was for ITAAC, was some
7	other design.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Don't say that.
9	MEMBER BLEY: They were.
0	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That was the only place I
.1	could find the failure mode -
2	MR. CONCEPCION: We have GDC-23 that talks
3	about failure modes for the protection system.
4	DR. BIRLA: He is right and -
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Who is right?
6	DR. BIRLA: The -
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm not right, again?
8	MR. CONCEPCION: Go ahead, Sushil.
9	DR. BIRLA: This is Sushil Birla from
20	research again.
21	It's not that the NRC is discounting failure
22	mode inspection analysis altogether. There is hardware
23	in the system and there is single failure criterion.
24	It's a well-used, well-proved,
25	well-established tool to satisfy the single failure

	199
1	criterion.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: The FMEA is.
3	DR. BIRLA: Yes.
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, you expect to get
5	something like that relative to an assessment of a single
6	failure criterion, okay.
7	DR. BIRLA: Yes.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I just - I didn't see any
9	reference to it other than its more generic input to
0	output.
. 1	MR. SANTOS: Actually, as part of Section
_2	2.1 on the hazard analysis, portions of it may be
_3	supported by FMEA.
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: 7.21?
. 5	MS. SANTOS: No, part of Section 2.1 of the
- 6	hazard analysis.
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, okay.
8 ـ	MR. SANTOS: An applicant may support
9	portions of that with an FMEA.
20	DR. BIRLA: Yes, a system is always going
21	to have hardware in it.
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. I just wanted to ask
23	you that and I think you've answered my little fallout
2 4	question.
25	MR. JUNG: Charlie, also not within the DSRS,

1	but in the standards that we endorse I think it goes
2	into one of the ways to handle some of the hazards or
3	FMEAs. And those are mentioned in that space.
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. All right.
5	Anymore, John? Jack? Dennis?
6	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Well, it is 2:15 and
7	I'm about to start Appendix B, I&C System Architecture.
8	I don't know how long it's going to take,
9	but I'm going to take a stab at it. If we have to take
10	a break at 2:30, we're going to take a break, okay?
11	CHAIRMAN BROWN: There may be reasons to take
12	a break.
13	MEMBER BLEY: Even before then.
14	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, would you like a break?
15	We're starting a new section.
16	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Why don't we go ahead and
18	take a 15-minute break so we don't have to break in the
19	middle of the discussion. We'll recess for 15 minutes
20	until 2:32.
21	(Whereupon, the proceedings went off the
22	record at 2:18 p.m. for a short recess and went back
23	on the record at 2:39 p.m.)
2 4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. The meeting is back
25	in session.

MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. So, this is Appendix B, I&C System Architecture. As we said earlier in the presentation, this is new guidance, new material that staff believes is useful to do our I&C system reviews. We provided guidance to assess how those I&C architectures are going to be described. And we expect the applicant to address all of the I&C functions in this I&C architecture along with interfaces between I&C systems, signal flows and descriptions, simplify functional diagrams and that kind of information. And like I said, this is new guidance and we hope to see a description, sufficient detail to support the reviews in 7.1 and 7.2 of the DSRS. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. I'm not disagreeing with anything you've got in here, except with one exception for expansion. Where you're talking about diagrams of the overall architecture, that's a very generic high-level statement of what that means or what that - of architecture. And to me, what you need to do is have and I don't know where you get examples. But if you go back to what we ended up having developed for some

of the projects that we were dealing with, they showed

functional block diagram, which is not mentioned

1

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

directly.

Where it shows process of the signal from sensor through the data - through signal conditioning, through a data processing unit which says trip or don't trip, and then to the voting units, and then out to the actuation, whatever form it is, and what has been missing has been the hardware timer - for software-based systems and probably FPGAs also depending on the design, the hardware nonsoftware-based thing that says, hey, look, if you lock up any particular thing as you all talk about up in Section 7.1.1. I think it's 7.1.1.

So, that level of functional block diagrams are what you really need. I mean, logic diagrams doesn't cut it.

That's like saying I got temperature, I got pressure, I got flow, I got power and I want to put all these things into some algorithm and that's a logic diagram, but I'm talking about a functional signal-crossing diagram that goes from start to the end.

MR. SANTOS: Does Item D -

MS. ANTONESCU: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: It says, key blocks.

MR. SANTOS: Can we expand?

CHAIRMAN BROWN: It doesn't say beginning to end. It just says functional key blocks.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1	MR. SANTOS: Okay.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, I don't want somebody
3	just giving me a block where I have to take a block here.
4	Here's the carburetor, here's the tire. Over here I
5	got a steering wheel. How do I put those together?
6	MEMBER SIEBER: So, there's a block in the
7	middle.
8	MR. CONCEPCION: We can expand the
9	description.
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's all I'm -
11	MR. SANTOS: It's a good comment. We'll
12	take C that talked about end-to-end, and D, and reword
13	it.
14	CHAIRMAN BROWN: The end-to-end signal
15	flows, again, is a little bit more -
16	MR. SANTOS: Got it.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - ambiguous. What do you
18	mean?
19	MR. SANTOS: I got it.
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Here's a piece of data.
21	It goes to here, it goes to there. That just doesn't
22	cut it. You really -
23	MR. SANTOS: We have the example from the
24	_
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: There are several examples
	NEAL D. CDOCC

204 and I'd quote the projects, but I don't want to in this particular meeting. And the words I prefer, it's nice to have examples with pictures, but I admit you have to have words in here to say what we want. MEMBER SIEBER: And what you want functional blocks as opposed to hardware blocks. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, I'm not looking, you know, yes, it's a functional block. And where you have to break down a block into a couple of pieces for instance, there might be a platform that has processing unit and it has a little hardware timer, you know, backup timer there to trip the thing off. It might be on the same platform, but it's independent. I mean, it's a separate set of circuits on - in that little package. And it's independent of software. That's - there are times when you need to break that down and show why does that do what it's supposed to do when it's supposed to do it type thing.

And we've made that comment in the meetings also.

So, I'm just looking for whether you expand C or D or 3 or however you do it. I think that the concept of functional block diagrams, not a piece.

And that's where I had a problem with the key functional part, because I thought, you know,

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

a tire and, you know, have a crankshaft somewhere and then, okay, now that's a car. Do you realize it? 3 I don't' know that's a car. And that's the only comment I had. And it's really kind of a sensor input - sensor, not input, but 6 7 the sensor to the other thing and to show - and those 8 diagrams ought to show the independence. It ought to 9 show that there is no communication and what the nature 10 of that communication is and all that type of stuff. 11 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, the intent is to use 12 this appendix along with 7.1 and 7.2. So, this is kind of like an additional aid to the reviewer to confirm 13 14 those fundamental principles. I understand your 15 comment. 16 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Those words might be in 7.1. 17 MR. CONCEPCION: Those words are -18 CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, 7.1.1 or 7.1.2. 19 not sure. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, those words are at the 20 21 And let me just pull this section. bottom. 22 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I know there's some of that 23 in 7 - whatever. You don't need to go through that. 24 Just that's the point wherever you get it from that 25 I think you need it here because this is, quote,

somebody will show me a carburetor and somebody else

1	architecture.
2	MR. CONCEPCION: There is a paragraph that
3	talks about that in -
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Where?
5	MR. CONCEPCION: At the bottom of the
6	section.
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: The architecture section?
8	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
9	There's a paragraph there.
0	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I missed that. Obviously,
.1	I did this late at night.
_2	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay, at the bottom - I have
_3	it on the screen. The reviewer should consider the I&C
4	overall architecture in concert with the sections
_ 5	relating to the fundamental design principles.
- 6	MS. ANTONESCU: Which page?
- 7	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, but what you're saying
8 ـ	is you want to see it on a diagram.
_9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes. You should consider,
20	I mean, it doesn't say anything about functional block
21	diagrams and I don't see the word like that. Other
22	sections, you should evaluate other sections for
23	consistency.
2 4	MR. CONCEPCION: Your point is taken.
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Thank you. I didn't think
- 1	NEAL D. ADAGO

1	I seen that.
2	MR. CONCEPCION: We'll look into it.
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I know I'm old, really old,
4	but that's beside the point. Okay. That's all I had
5	on architecture, unless anybody else got something.
6	John? Dennis?
7	MR. SANTOS: I just want to point out that
8	while this section is very short, it's very powerful.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I agree with that.
10	MR. SANTOS: There are some designs that have
11	been three years in the review and we still are asking
12	for this type of information.
13	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm well aware of that also.
14	Still waiting for one of them to come back on it.
15	MR. SANTOS: Having this type of information
16	from the beginning is very powerful and we consider this
17	even though short, a significant improvement to the way
18	we've been doing reviews.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: That's going to be the basis
20	of your review.
21	MR. SANTOS: Yes.
22	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. Moving right along
23	to Slide 37, this is the section on simplicity. This
24	is another area where we provided new guidance to enhance
25	the reviews in I&C.

1	We're looking at how simplicity was
2	considered by the applicant in the design of the system.
3	This is a section that will also be used in conjunction
4	with 7.1 and 7.2 of the DSRS.
5	And what we did was, we wrote this section
6	based on those fundamental principles and what we
7	believe shows simplicity for those principles in the
8	way the system is designed.
9	So, we talk about signal flows, separation
10	and segregation among functions, simplify
11	communications and all of that good stuff under the
12	section of simplicity.
13	So, is there any feedback or comments you
14	might have on this section?
15	MEMBER STETKAR: You don't need to open it.
16	There are a couple places in here that say that one
17	of the characteristics is no unnecessary communications
18	between a safety and nonsafety system, unless the safety
19	system is out of service.
20	I was trying to think what that meant. I
21	mean, it implies that - if you want to open it up, it's
22	on Page C-3. It's the last sub thing under Item 3.
23	MR. CONCEPCION: It's a good one, John.
24	C-3?
25	MEMBER STETKAR: It's D(iii). Right there.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

MEMBER STETKAR: And I don't know what that means. It implies that unnecessary communications are okay when the safety system is out of service, which leads me to think about what might those unnecessary communications do to the safety system when it's put back in service.

We have examples of people making changes while - to software updates that have unintended consequences that weren't discovered until, you know, sometime later. So, I was curious what this meant.

MEMBER BLEY: Because of things left in the system.

MEMBER STETKAR: Because things left -

MEMBER BLEY: Because, to me, it bothered me because if the capability is there to communicate when the safety system is down, unless you've got interlocks that remove that when you start up the system, how do you make sure it's never there when it's operating?

MR. SANTOS: First of all, I think the comment - I feel the first thing we need to do to be consistent is to maybe make a comment to better clarify this sentence. And I will strike "unless the safety system is out of service."

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 MEMBER STETKAR: That would sure help me. MR. SANTOS: Seriously. So, I got the 3 comment. MEMBER STETKAR: I think it may appear in 5 a couple of different places. MR. SANTOS: Yes. 6 7 MEMBER STETKAR: This was the first place 8 that I flagged it, but you may want to look. I was trying 9 to understand what - anyway. 10 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, there 11 necessary inter-channel communications at some point 12 through some part of it. That's another way of phrasing 13 it. 14 MEMBER STETKAR: And the other one that I 15 had was if you go way down to the end of the section 16 under - it's on the last page, C and D. 17 C, features added to cope with particular 18 types of hazards that could negatively impact other safety design features. 19 20 And here's where I was struggling to 21 understand what that means, or perhaps you might have 22 some specific examples of things that you've seen in 23 the past where somebody has done this. 24 I'm assuming that both C and D are things 25 that you found in the past.

1	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, I believe this is
2	direct experience with the reviews in the past.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
4	MR. CONCEPCION: So, that's why we
5	incorporated them.
6	MEMBER STETKAR: Without jeopardizing
7	proprietary information, do you have an example of C?
8	Sort of a generic example of C?
9	I sort of understand D, I think. But if
- 0	you had an example of C, something that somebody did
_1	that was intended, I guess, to specifically cope with
_2	one type of problem that introduced other problems
. 3	elsewhere, is that -
4	MR. CONCEPCION: I don't recall. Do you
. 5	recall what - well, we can't get into specifics, but
- 6	we'll look into it.
- 7	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.
8 .	MR. CONCEPCION: We will look into it and
9	we will provide something.
20	MEMBER STETKAR: I'd appreciate something
21	if you had an example.
22	MR. CONCEPCION: Meaning to the actual
23	section.
2 4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I can actually give you an
25	example.
	1

MEMBER STETKAR: Sure.

System, but it was a turbine generator control system with a voltage regulator where we wanted - we did not - we had dual regulators. And we wanted to be able to handle a failure of one regulator and have it automatically transfer to the other one within five milliseconds so that it would not lose the load. And it was very important in the particular context of the systems we were using.

And when you think about five milliseconds when you're at a high load and you want to transfer, that means you have to have some fairly complicated thought processes, plus the heartbeat between the two that are saying, okay, is the other one still following you directly?

And in the process of doing that, you can potentially put yourself into a case where you lose excitation or drive it in the wrong way and can create some problems.

So, my point being is that that's a circumstance - that's a complex circumstance that's not a reactor trip circumstance, but it's a control system circumstance.

The same thing goes with governor controls.

### **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1	If you want to switch those without losing a load, it
2	requires an even more complex type of - and ability to
3	transfer fast.
4	And so, that capability to know the other
5	one is in service is not going to take you in the wrong
6	way because it's got something else going on with it
7	you haven't -
8	MEMBER STETKAR: Well, but I guess in the
9	context of this, is the solution to say, well, because
10	that's so complicated, we'll take the trip because we
11	don't want to transfer -
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, you might do that.
13	MEMBER STETKAR: - because it's the only
14	way to deal with -
15	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You might do that. I don't
16	know.
17	(Simultaneous speaking.)
18	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Which has its own
19	implications internally.
20	MEMBER STETKAR: Exactly. You had to think
21	about it was the only point I'm saying. Am I willing
22	to accept that and what do you do and, et cetera.
23	MEMBER BLEY: And that's kind of covered here
2 4	with the negative impact.
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I think it's a good -

1 MEMBER BLEY: It's a tradeoff. CHAIRMAN BROWN: It's just difficult. 3 MEMBER BLEY: Now that you've raised it, I'd like to make sure I understand D, and I did. Now, in hardware you might limit the testing because of wear-out. Here, the problem is just the availability 7 of the system to do its normal function if you're 8 diagnosing too much? 9 MR. CONCEPCION: Not just the availability. 10 Also potential interference with the safety function 11 because of those self-diagnostics running at the same time. 12 MEMBER BLEY: At the same time. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, there's another 15 circumstance where you can have self-diagnostics that 16 are running and I say, gee, I've got a problem. 17 what does it do? It resets everything. And now, your 18 entire channel is being reset, rebooted right when you don't want it to be rebooted and that's a problem. 19 20 And if you look at the way the platforms 21 that people are using so far, these things take forever 22 to reboot. They're not blink of an eyelash rebooting. 23 MEMBER BLEY: And that's what I was thinking. 24 That's an availability problem. It's not there when 25 you want it.

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Exactly.
2	MEMBER BLEY: You also raise the
3	interference problem that while it's actually an action,
4	this thing could start and interfere with the action.
5	It's not blocked somehow.
6	Do they have ways to block the - I'm sure
7	you could block the self-diagnostic if -
8	MR. CONCEPCION: You could have a feature
9	to, I guess, prevent the self-testing or self-diagnostic
0	to -
1	MEMBER BLEY: If the system is in some other
2	state, yes.
_3	MR. SANTOS: So, to clarify, we are an action
4	item here from the members on these two items, or are
_5	we just commenting?
6	MEMBER BLEY: What I captured was 7C and 7D
7	perhaps we may have an example using generic statements
8 ـ	that could perhaps clarify those two provisions in
9	there.
20	MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, for me personally
21	I'm happy with what I heard here. I just wanted to make
22	sure that indeed there were some examples that you had
23	seen of these types of issues.
24	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, these are two examples
2.5	from previous experience and reviews.

1	MEMBER STETKAR: I tend to agree with Dennis
2	that there is a tradeoff. That taken literally, C says
3	if there is something installed to combat Hazard A that
4	could impact negatively - or a hazard for Safety Function
5	A that could potentially have a negative impact on Safety
6	Function B, that ought not to be there. And I'm not
7	necessarily convinced that that's always true.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: It doesn't say they're not
9	- you can't do it. I mean, I didn't read it that way.
10	MEMBER STETKAR: Well, it says -
11	MR. CONCEPTION: Carefully considered.
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes.
13	MEMBER STETKAR: Carefully considered is -
14	MR. CONCEPTION: In the context of
15	complexity.
16	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Unless you do a tradeoff
17	kind of analysis if you need to.
18	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, then I'm done.
19	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. So -
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'd like to ask one relative
21	question relative to staff reviews. This is just one
22	I forgot to ask in other places.
23	Always had a problem with self-diagnostics.
24	And then when somebody detects a problem, there's
25	normally a default status that has to be done.

And I do remember and this is back in the early days when we were first doing this, that unbeknownst to us and it was not a system thing, an internal self-diagnostic default put something to a, oh, well, it's not working exactly right, we got a little twidget over here.

Everything else was working fine and it was not related to the direct path of the signal, but some other feature of that run-through was giving them heartburn and they defaulted to zero and ended up with a reactor scram.

We found that out the wrong way. So, self-diagnostics are always interesting and the defaults.

And do you all look - do you all have somebody assess what default circumstances are already a part of your all's review process for all the self-diagnostics?

I'm not saying you've got to list it in here.

I'm just asking if you do that.

MR. JUNG: I think we typically do go into - and some designs definitely take more credit for self-diagnostic features. Some others don't, you know, sometimes they try to take credit for tech specs or meeting certain 603 requirements.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	In those cases, we delve into a little more
2	detail.
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Otherwise, you don't
4	necessarily - if they put in a default that somehow
5	screws them up sometime, it's just life in the big city
6	as long as it's not a safety function type thing.
7	MR. JUNG: And then in addition to that,
8	those features would eventually have a - the
9	requirements through the testing and other things come
10	along. So, they need to demonstrate that.
11	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Hopefully.
12	MR. SANTOS: Including strategies for
13	testing the tester.
1 4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, that's all.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: I take it all the software
16	is read-only memory software.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, that's a good
18	question. We haven't addressed that before.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Otherwise, you can't recover
20	it.
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: The way the program, the
22	application program and the stuff is in there, is that
23	in programmable read-only memory-type thing or do you
2 4	know?
25	I mean, do you have any requirements on that

1	where you have to physically change out a chip to change
2	the software, or can they come in and put a clip over
3	the processor and do it with a laptop and download and
4	offload software?
5	MEMBER BLEY: It's in the security sense.
6	CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, this is for you can
7	change - that's not a security issue. This is just a
8	matter of whether -
9	MEMBER SIEBER: It can be.
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, yes, it can be an access
11	control. It could be a configuration control issue.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Right. It can be a security
13	issue, too.
14	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, I agree with that.
15	MR. JUNG: And those designs are very
16	specific designs and those get - and some designs
17	actually take the card out, put it in the temporary
18	safety delay.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Reprogram it?
20	MR. JUNG: They reprogram, replace it, fully
21	test it, and actually put it back in with that particular
22	channel.
23	That's very safe and we've seen that, but
24	some other cases more complex and we delve into more
25	details and how to mitigate any potential hazards.

1 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Do you deal with that under configuration control management? 3 MR. JUNG: Oh, yes, they have to have an admin control specific, but we also looking at the design itself. How are - what are the design features that you're going to utilize to perform the test? 7 Is that a separate cabinet? Is it online 8 you're going to do it? Are you pulling the card out 9 online? And you ask all the questions to make sure, 10 you know. 11 We've seen experience of those things 12 causing hazards. MS. SANTOS: And what are the features for 13 14 integrity checks and CRC checks and everything else that 15 they have to check integrity of changes. 16 MEMBER SIEBER: Well, my question is if 17 there's an instantaneous loss of power and recovery, is there any reloading of software that has to occur? 18 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I think the answer is yes. 19 MEMBER SIEBER: Or is it ready to run -20 CHAIRMAN BROWN: On the platforms we've seen 21 22 to date, I'm saying that only for the ones that we've 23 looked at -24 MEMBER SIEBER: The ones that I've seen, 25 they're ready to run.

1 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Not the ones in the projects. I don't think so. They've got to reload the software. That's like a five-minute or six-minute -5 they said a boot-up can be anywhere from three to ten minutes for one of the particular platforms depending on -8 MEMBER SIEBER: That's a problem. 9 MR. CONCEPCION: But you have to consider 10 full loss of power for that to happen. And, you know, 11 we're talking about platforms that have backup systems and have batteries and all of that. 12 So, I don't want to get into more detail 13 14 about that. 15 PATICIPANT: Almost hardly ever happens. 16 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Hardly ever. 17 (Simultaneous speaking.) 18 MEMBER SIEBER: All you have to do is have a noisy cluster that has circuit breakers on it and 19 20 pulses you can get messed up like I have. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, that was one of the 21 22 problems, Jack, when we were looking at one of the 23 designs where the hardware backup timer actually reset 24 the entire system and they said, well, okay, it's being 25 reset, it will be okay.

1	But if you go look at the manual itself or
2	the platform itself, it took anywhere from five to ten
3	minutes to reboot. Well, by that time you've melted
4	the plant.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: You might want to think about
6	that.
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, they've got multiple
8	other channels depending on how it goes about it.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: It depends on -
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Poor choice of words.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: If the same thing happens
12	on all the channels, you're -
13	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, I made that point and
14	nobody liked it.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
16	CHAIRMAN BROWN: It could scram
17	automatically if you've locked them all up and they're
18	all resetting.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, well -
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: If you read the tech manual,
21	it looked like nothing was going to happen until they've
22	gone through another resource like -
23	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I read someplace where
2 4	mPower has endless -
25	MR. CONCEPCION: I think we've included

1	provisions through DSRS for that.
2	PARTICIPANT: I'm not sure if that's the
3	best answer.
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: What, scramming? Well, if
5	they're all locked up and not operating, it probably
6	is because you're not getting anything. Your meters
7	cannot be in one place.
8	MEMBER STETKAR: I will give you the example
9	of the Zion nuclear generating station that is no longer
10	operating. So, I can tell you that when we had
11	insufficient component cooling water, our tech specs
12	required us to immediately shut down both units, which
13	put us in a situation where we really needed that
14	component cooling water more than we did during normal
15	power operations.
16	Sometimes shutting down isn't necessarily
17	the best thing to do.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: But sooner or later you're
19	going to do it.
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: All your safety systems,
21	reactor trip systems are -
22	MEMBER STETKAR: Standby systems will start
23	because -
24	(Simultaneous speaking.)
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: All right. We're
	NEAL D. CDOCC

1	digressing here for a few minutes. So, are we finished
2	with this one?
3	MR. CONCEPCION: If there is no more
4	questions, I think we can -
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You're going to get a lot
6	of discussion, I'm sure, on the simplicity thing.
7	MR. CONCEPCION: We sure hope so.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Be interesting to see what
9	the feedback is. I like, I mean, I like the idea of
10	trying to get the point across.
11	MEMBER BLEY: I think the - as you guys said
12	early on, it's real hard to define "simplicity."
13	MR. CONCEPCION: It's not a simple task.
14	MEMBER BLEY: But against the design
15	principles, simplicity is say, here, it has to be clear
16	that you meet the design principles.
17	If it is clear, it's probably simple enough.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, but simplicity is like
19	handsome.
20	PARTICIPANT: It what? I'm sorry.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: It's all in the eye of the
22	beholder.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That only applies to some
24	of us, Jack.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Some of us, right. Not
	NEAL R. GROSS

	225
1	many.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay.
3	MR. CONCEPCION: All right. Moving along,
4	now we got into 7.2, which is system characteristics.
5	These characteristics come directly out of IEEE 603.
6	And what we did was we segregated or was
7	like we discussed, we segregated the fundamental design
8	principles and now we're talking about those design and
9	functional requirements are contained in 603 and the
0	way we expect applicants to address them.
. 1	If you notice, this is pretty much a slide
2	that covers all of the 15 sections of 7.2. And I did
_3	not intend to get into the details of all of them, but
4	two that are on the slides.
. 5	If you have any particular questions about
6	any section regarding 7.2 aside from 7.2.1 and 7.2.2,
7	we can get into the details now or maybe after I go
8 ـ	through the next two slides.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: What's wrong with 7.2.23
20	That one is all written. We got to look at that one,
21	didn't we?
22	MR. CONCEPCION: No, I just -
23	MEMBER BLEY: He says he's going to talk

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, when you get there.

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

about it.

24

1 So, what are you going to do first? MR. CONCEPCION: I'm going to talk about 3 7.2.1 right now. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, okay. Everything went 5 blank in the document. MR. CONCEPCION: This is directly related 7 to BTP 7-14, which is software development. What we're 8 doing is we're evaluating the review responsibilities 9 and the role of I&C in this programmatic area and we're 10 trying to come up with a better way to address the 11 software and system development and leverage the folks 12 in Chapter 17 for this activity. 13 This is still a work in progress. 14 personally working on this section. We're trying to 15 expand BTP 7-14 and address development at the system 16 level considering hardware and software and their 17 integration as part of the system. 18 So, that is pretty much what I have to say regarding this section. I sure hope to be done with 19 it before the end of the year and circulate it internally 20 21 so that we can share it with the public or, I guess, 22 share with ODC first, and then publish it for review 23 and comment. 24 Any questions or comments about it?

**NEAL R. GROSS** 

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, one comment.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: This is a suggestion. My own personal suggestion.

There has to be a fundamental principle in which the assumption you look at software is relative to the safety systems. And a fundamental assumption in my own mind, at least what I used for three-and-a-half decades - two-and-a-half decades, was that there is no - software will always fail on you.

It will always have characteristics something will happen which will be unexpected and you
should design your systems, overall system, to assume
that software will fail. Doesn't mean it all has to
fail in every channel simultaneously, just it will fail.

And that's one of the reasons not necessarily for diversity, but for multiple, independent divisions of anything or channels of anything you are particularly interested in.

So, it's a thought process that from the quality of the review you should test it, because you all cannot do that. You will not be setting up a full-scale set of the instrumentation for any particular plant.

The vendor won't be doing that. He'll be doing little partial pieces and they will not run tests

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1 that are totally prototypic. I can almost - maybe I'm speaking out of school here, but I bet you that's going 3 to be the case. You'll never see a full suite of equipment 5 set up with a massive computer modeling the plant that they had feeding everything in through emulators and 6 7 running it through every possible mode and operation. 8 I don't think - that's extremely expensive. 9 There is a program that does that, but it won't be this 10 one commercially. 11 So, anyway that's - I just say you all are 12 encumbered by not being able to do line-by-line and other types of code validations and verifications. 13 14 ought to - my suggestion is to make sure you have a 15 process that allows you through the design, 16 architecture in the way the systems are designed to 17 ensure that, yes, software - we'll do the best we can, 18 but we've got to make sure the software doesn't kill us and we put other protections in place. That's just 19 20 a suggestion. 21 MR. SANTOS: Yes, we understand that. CHAIRMAN BROWN: And I didn't see that stated 22 23 anywhere. 24 MR. SANTOS: Yes, we will work on it, but 25 basically high-quality software development process is

1	not sufficient to claim that the software will be free
2	from defects.
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's right.
4	MR. SANTOS: So, we understand that. And
5	when we do that, we can -
6	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, absolutely. We're
7	still - this section has not been published. It's still
8	in the works.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Just bear in mind that
10	people were irradiated by the Therac-25 and died. You
11	can't talk to them right now. And it was all a matter
12	of keystrokes and a few other things in terms of the
13	way the computing system, the software interpreted
14	keystrokes and the timing and everything else.
15	There were a number of factors, but that
16	was one.
17	MR. CONCEPCION: It did what its designers
18	wanted it to do.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Exactly right.
20	MR. CONCEPCION: The operator didn't know
21	how it was programmed yet.
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's right. So, no
23	matter how smart, they know it was simple compared to
24	this stuff. We had to tell it to do two things. Here's
25	how much, and here's how long.
	1

Equipment

MR. CONCEPCION: So, like I said, this is an area where we're trying to improve the guidance in So, from that perspective we're trying to expand it to address system development and come up with something that we can use for licensing reviews. We're considering industry standards in this area as well. So, more to come. That's what I have to say. Anything else? CHAIRMAN BROWN: Not on this one. MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. qualification. We wrote this section and this is an area that is also addressed in IEEE 603. Talks about seismic and environmental qualification. And what we're trying to do is do the coordination with Chapter 3 and leverage the expertise and qualification that is in the NRC today. We're going to be doing confirmations that the equipment, the I&C equipment located in mild environments is qualified in accordance with requirements that are established for those systems. And we're trying to improve in this area, because in the past we had - we took over some of these activities where we clearly didn't have the right

expertise. So, this is an area where we're trying to

1

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 improve the coordination. The seismic aspect has been always handled 3 in Chapter 3. What we're trying to do is better coordinate with Section 3.11 of the DSRS, have better coordination. We're still retaining some of the 6 7 responsibilities associated with instrument sensing 8 lines and EMI/RFI, but the aspect of qualification and 9 the qualification program that will be used to qualify and see equipment is going to be handled by the folks 10 in Chapter 3. 11 MEMBER STETKAR: And we made the note this 12 13 morning about that instrumentation that specifically 14 intended to operate beyond design - under beyond design 15 basis conditions. We have to close that loop. 16 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, we captured that. 17 Yes. CHAIRMAN BROWN: This one is - did you just 18 use the words that the Chapter 3 people are responsible 19 for making sure your stuff is qualified to the equipment 20 21 qualification process? 22 I thought that's what you just said, I 23 thought. 24 MR. CONCEPCION: We're going be 25 leveraging the expertise of -

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You've changed -
2	MR. CONCEPCION: - Chapter 3 people.
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - the words.
4	(Laughter.)
5	MR. CONCEPCION: For the review of
6	environmental qualification of I&C equipment located
7	in mild environment.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: If your stuff is supposed
9	to work from five degrees, I'll just pick some number,
0	five degree C to 50 degree C and it doesn't work, who's
. 1	responsible for making sure it does work? You, or
_2	Chapter 3 people?
. 3	They don't know squat about your equipment.
_4	All they know is it's supposed to work over that range.
_5	You're responsible for making sure it works over that
6	range.
- 7	MR. CONCEPCION: And that should be
- 8	confirmed through the environmental qualification
9	program.
20	MR. JUNG: Charlie, let's explain. The DSRS
21	Chapter 7 that we are doing -
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: The what?
23	MR. JUNG: The main purpose of Chapter 7,
2 4	we are talking about chapters. That's important
25	distinction.

If you go to Chapter 3, seismic qualification is led by mechanical engineering branch discipline. And electrical qualification, environmental qualification, EQ, is led by electrical engineering branch. And I&C branch is the supporting branch.

So, when we say Chapter 3, who's going to do that work as agency is going to put in the right resources? We're going to work with electrical branch and their expert is in EQ and seismic qualification.

And I&C is supporting branch. So, we'll work with them to make sure the right expertise are applied.

From the perspective of DSRS, what we wanted to clear is Chapter 7 had a lot of descriptions on EQ that's already covered in Chapter 3. So, what we are doing is Chapter 3 has a fully - Chapter 3 fully describes the necessary guidance for the Agency staff.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: I don't have a problem with nonduplicating, you know, repeating this stuff. I mean, I'm sitting here thinking, okay, it goes off and the seismic requirements are defined. And then, but who's responsible for making sure that the seismic - that it actually performs to those requirements?

I mean, if they go run a seismic test on a cabinet, is that you all that have to agree that it

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	worked okay, or is it the seismic guys that have to agree
2	that it worked okay?
3	MR. JUNG: I think it worked okay from the
4	mechanical structure guys, the seismic -
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: But it's not always
6	structure.
7	MR. JUNG: Yes, I understand. Structure is
8	typically seismic characteristics are transferred to
9	structures. Structures are transferred to mechanical
10	devices and electrical I&C. We understand the
11	framework.
12	So, a lot of the - we did a lot of
13	confirmation working with those people to make sure the
14	qualification requirements in Chapter 3 in fact covers
15	I&C.
16	CHAIRMAN BROWN: What if you get
17	intermittent making and breaking of pins when you plug
18	the card in that it makes and breaks and ends up with,
19	you know, signals that are undesirable or cause
20	unintended consequences?
21	MR. JUNG: During the operation or -
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, during the seismic
23	test.
24	MR. JUNG: Those -
25	MR. CONCEPCION: That should be part of the
	NEAL R. GROSS

1 qualification program for those pieces of equipment. MR. JUNG: There's an ITAAC associated with that if that becomes an issue. The applicant and 3 licensee has to address that issue. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes. MR. JUNG: Inspection goes out and finds 6 7 those will verify their corrective action program is 8 appropriate. If mechanical engineering branch helping Region 2 constructions with the inspection program 9 10 identifies the need for I&C expertise to be involved, 11 we will be involved. 12 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I guess this is not clear 13 for -14 MEMBER BLEY: Well, what's not completely 15 clear, I think, is how that interaction works. Going 16 back some years ago, most of the seismic qualification 17 work was done by structural and mechanical guys even for electrical - electronic equipment. 18 And electrical, I mean, the mechanical guys 19 20 didn't really understand how the equipment was built 21 internally. So, and some of the SQUG stuff had this in it. 22 23 So, when they'd do a test for seeing if you 24 had contact chatter, relay chatter, they didn't realize 25 that if the device is energized, those contacts are

1 really locked shut and aren't going to vibrate. And if it's not energized, they will. So, they didn't have the right testing. 3 And they didn't come to the electricals, because they didn't understand how the equipment worked. So, the electrical electronics people, I&C 7 people, need to be involved in making sure that the tests 8 are set up to test the parts of the equipment you care 9 about. 10 So, if you're relying on the seismic folks 11 to come to you when they need to, that might not be good 12 enough, because they don't know they need to come to you if they don't understand how your things can fail. 13 14 And, you know, Charlie's pin thing is one 15 of the ways these can fail. 16 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Contact bounce on switches, 17 also. 18 MEMBER BLEY: That's all we're trying to get If it's relying on them to come to you, maybe that's 19 20 not good enough. Maybe you need to be in on the review 21 of the test to make sure the equipment you care about 22 is being tested in a way that meets your needs. 23 MR. JUNG: You know, for a design and 24 certification perspective, some of these obviously 25 detail design and qualification testing, of course I&C

1 is going to be later after the design certification. So, during the licensing review, you know, 3 certification of the design like mPower, the description of their EQ is going to be more programmatic. 5 they'll identify types of equipment for a lot of the I&C equipments are tested at the cabinet level. 6 7 Peter Kang is here. So, Peter can explain 8 more from electrical engineering branch, NRR. 9 there's a limitation of how much we can look at it, but 10 Peter's branch has been on the same floor until recently 11 became part of NRR. 12 So, I'll leave it up to Peter if you can 13 add anything you want. 14 KANG: My name is Peter Kang from 15 electrical engineering from NRR. And basically EQ 16 50.49, equipment qualification of electrical equipment, 17 I&C equipment and a digital portion of it is - we are coordinating between I&C, as well as electrical, as well 18 as mechanical aspect of it. 19 So, when we write the safety evaluations, 20 21 we do take all the input from three guys and electrical 22 engineering group is taking all combined together. 23 But on the other hand, there is three 24 important to safety, which is safety-related equipment, 25 as well as nonsafety-related equipment, which failure

1	equipment factor safety-related functions. And also
2	the PAM equipment, I&C equipment is also listed. Those
3	are classified as important to safety and monitoring
4	equipment.
5	So, when applicants, they are supposed to
6	go out, test or they should have what they call this
7	EQ DP, equipment - environmental qualification data
8	package, which they tested all this equipment.
9	And based on IEEE or 323 or whatever, we
10	use 1974 version, but I&C portion is like lately later
11	ones. Like most of our computer systems is mild
12	environment. For that, we have IEEE 323 later version,
13	2003 version is used.
14	So, based on that that we're supposed to
15	test. And supposed to record all the results of the
16	findings and make a summary of environmental
17	qualifications.
18	Also, we have ITAAC system. ITAAC, we
19	supposed to verify all the equipment, I&C equipment.
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, the ITAAC is done when
21	you're in place. That's largely at the plant, isn't
22	it, after it's installed?
23	So, that's not really a -
24	MR. KANG: Are you talking about the special
25	inspections?

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, that's -
2	MEMBER SIEBER: Acceptance -
3	MR. KANG: ITAAC.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: - of installed equipment
5	at the plant.
6	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, that's what I'm
7	saying. You bring it in, you plug it into the plant.
8	That's not a qualification test. That's just that you
9	hook it up right.
_ 0	MR. KANG: Yes.
. 1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's an operational test,
_2	effectively.
_3	MR. KANG: 14.2, yes. Initial testing
4	programs and that those once they install, that they
. 5	are testing, yes.
- 6	CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, I understand that.
7	MR. KANG: Yes.
. 8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I thought I understood that
. 9	part. I'm only looking on the qualification side.
20	MR. KANG: Right.
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I mean, for example, and
22	agreed I haven't read all the versions of 323. I'll
23	guarantee that.
2 4	But are they tested in an operational state,
25	a normal operational mode and such that they're - let's
	NEAL P. ODOGO

1	go to a rear actuator or whatever they re supposed to
2	control?
3	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. I guess the important
4	aspect about 323 is that it is not influenced by I&C.
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I understand that.
6	MR. CONCEPCION: I'm struggling with the
7	concept of what is it that is really unique to I&C that
8	needs to be factored in the 323 qualification -
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Failure design. That's
10	what I'm used to. So, that's why I asked the question,
11	okay. I had cradle and grave. And so, that's what I'm
12	used to and that's why I'm asking the question trying
13	to make sure I understand.
1 4	Here, it's not cradle to grave, from what
15	I understand. There's disparate groups that have
16	pieces -
17	MR. CONCEPCION: We're still coordinating
18	with them.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Pardon?
20	MR. CONCEPCION: We're still coordinating
21	with Chapter 3 people, but we don't have the expertise
22	to review EQ programs though. We do not.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: All right.
2 4	MR. CONCEPCION: Those 323 programs, we
25	don't have the expertise.
- 1	

1	MR. KANG: Basically, the applicants is
2	supposed to test it and have data files in order to form.
3	So, under 50.49, always make it available to staff go
4	down and inspect it.
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Somebody review the actual
6	test procedure that they -
7	MR. KANG: Yes, there is a test. DCIP has
8	a test and -
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Who?
10	MR. KANG: DCIP, Division of -
11	MR. CONCEPCION: Inspection and -
12	construction inspection and operational programs.
13	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. So, somebody who has
14	no knowledge of I&C is reviewing the test procedure.
15	MR. CONCEPCION: They're doing it with our
16	support in I&C. At least in NRO, yes.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: All right. I'm stop
18	beating this horse for a minute. Let's go on. Let's
19	go ahead and roll into the next one.
20	MR. SANTOS: I just want to -
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm not sure what to do with
22	this, Dan.
23	MR. SANTOS: The theme has been consistent
2 4	regarding all interactions and interfaces of Chapter
25	7 with any chapter.

1 So, you can come up with similar question 2 for any other interaction with other staff. 3 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I understand. 4 MR. SANTOS: So, we understand the comment. 5 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I gave you my viewpoint 6 earlier relative to what I thought and I'm just a little 7 bit concerned about the left hand, the middle hand, the 8 next to the middle hand, the right hand and a piece of 9 foot over here that are all not knowing who's doing what 10 or coordinating what. 11 Where is the brain that puts it 12 altogether? And I don't see a brain that's putting it altogether based on the discussions. I just see that 13 14 he's responsible, he's responsible and they may talk 15 to us or they may not, depending on what they see. 16 I'm not trying to be disparaging on it. 17 I'm just - it's just what it appeared to be relative 18 to my experience. And that's, you know, that's fine - well, it's not necessarily fine, but that's the way 19 it is. 20 21 MR. JUNG: We understand and we are very 22 cognizant about the full coverage using expertise by 23 the Agency. 24 And Chapter 3, you know, the overall topic 25 belongs to Chapter 3. Chapter 3, we'll coordinate with

the Chapter 3 folks. Maybe there could be additional language to highlight the role of I&C much clearer.

MEMBER BLEY: I like what I'm hearing on coordination, but you guys need to understand in the last three or four designs we've sat through, the Chapter 3 people come and say, no, you'll get that in Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 people come and say, no, you'll get that somewhere else. Those people come and it didn't seem to be working the way we're talking about it here.

If it is in the future, I think that's great. We'll be happy.

MEMBER STETKAR: How long has it - you guys belabored this long enough. There's something, and I'm not sure whether it's relevant or not, but in the qualifications under environmental environmental design it says systems, the environmental control systems may rely upon monitoring environmental conditions and credit for take appropriate action to ensure that environmental conditions are maintained within predetermined limits within which system or component damage will not occur during the period until the environmental control systems are returned to normal operation.

That's a long sentence. Down below in that area it says, well, part of that assurance is that, for

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 example, temperature sensors are separate from the environmental control system. Now, well, that's okay. The environmental 3 control people look at that and they say, okay, we've got a cooling system for this room and we've got temperature sensors that are not part of that cooling 7 system. So, everything is okay. 8 The I&C people, maybe you need to restore 9 that cooling within, oh, 27 seconds before a particular 10 failure mode presents itself. 11 The environmental control people don't know 12 that. They don't' know anything about that. All they're looking at is a cooling system and a temperature 13 14 sensor, right? 15 So, how does that kind of loop get closed 16 that the design is adequate? Is that within your 17 purview that adequate time is available for people to, 18 I don't know, open up doors and put in portable fans or do what? 19 MR. KANG: Dr. Stetkar, I think you're sort 20 21 of a little bit - we're talking two different things. 22 MEMBER STETKAR: That's the problem. 23 MR. KANG: Equipment qualification versus 24 environmental qualifications. So, you are actually in 25 space of equipment qualification area, right? That's

1	what you're talking about.
2	Is that going to be able to - but
3	environmental qualification is slightly different.
4	This is within accident atmosphere contained within
5	equipment mostly inside of a containment or the accident
6	LOCA conditions or large-break LOCA conditions is that
7	equipment going to be survived.
8	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Yes, yes, I think
9	I was confusing that. That's the first - that's
10	addressed in the first paragraph your notion of
11	equipment qualification.
12	This is the second paragraph about
13	environmental control systems and it sounds as though
14	that's totally under your - in your house.
15	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. Yes, it is.
16	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. I'm sorry. I
17	misinterpreted that. Thank you. That helps. Thank
18	you.
19	MR. CONCEPCION: I shouldn't say that I'm
20	confused wit this and your feedback, but I will, but
21	I move on. I really don't understand what is it that
22	is -
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'm not sure we have any
24	_
25	MR. CONCEPCION: - confusing in 7.2.2.

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I don't think we have a
2	specific piece of feedback for you right now on the
3	discussion. I don't. I can't speak for my peers.
4	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay.
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Just leave this as a
6	diaphanous, amorphous discussion.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: It's one of the reasons we
8	have subcommittee meetings.
9	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. I'm going to go back
10	real quick to this slide and -
11	MEMBER STETKAR: I had one more.
12	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sir.
13	MEMBER STETKAR: On 7.2.3.
14	MR. CONCEPCION: Let me just pull that
15	section up.
16	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, if you could, it will
17	help. And this is - I don't think it's a big deal.
18	I just need some help.
19	MR. CONCEPCION: 7.2.3?
20	MEMBER STETKAR: 7.2.3, correct. And it's
21	the -
22	MR. CONCEPCION: Reliability, integrity and
23	completion of protective action.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: And it's on Page 7.2-9.
25	I think it's the next page. Right there. It says the
	NFALR, GROSS

1 DSRS acceptance criteria are as follows. And Number 2, it says the components and system should conform to the reliability guidance in NUREG/CR-6101. 3 I'm not familiar with that NUREG. I didn't 5 have enough time to download it and read through it. I did note that it's dated 1993. So, it's 20 years 6 7 old. 8 I also noted that nothing under the Review 9 Procedures makes any reference whatsoever to that NUREG. They do refer to 7-4.3.2. So, I curious 10 11 - I don't know - I was curious why it's listed here as 12 one of the requirements for the acceptance criteria given the fact that it's 20 years out of date. 13 14 Now, it might be wonderful. As I said, I 15 have not read it, but one suspects that we've learned 16 a lot more in the last 20 years about these things and 17 the fact that it's not cited anywhere from a reviewer's perspective, just raises a question in my mind. 18 MR. SANTOS: Well, I think it's a great 19 20 catch. 21 MR. CONCEPCION: Well, I have to say that 22 usually going back to why we have the guidance the way 23 we have it is because it is existing guidance in the 24 SRP.

That is not a justification, but I'm using

1	what I have and put it in the context of the sections
2	that were put together as part of 7.2.
3	MR. SANTOS: It's a good catch.
4	MR. CONCEPCION: The adequacy of 6101 is
5	something that we have to consider and I believe it is
6	a good catch.
7	MR. SANTOS: Yes, and I'll take the action
8	item to take it out, basically.
9	MEMBER STETKAR: Is it worthwhile looking
0	at that? I was going to download - I just didn't get
. 1	a chance to look at it.
2	MR. SANTOS: When I say that, you know -
. 3	MEMBER STETKAR: No, okay. Thanks.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: There may be something
_5	newer.
- 6	MEMBER STETKAR: I have enough other things
- 7	to read.
8 ـ	MR. SANTOS: We have looked at it already.
9	It should not belong in there.
20	MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you.
21	MR. SANTOS: We will take the action item
22	to evaluate it accordingly, go through the process.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You're looking up something
2 4	for somebody, or are you just -
25	MR. CONCEPCION: I am, but I'm not - if
1	

1 there's no more questions, I will -CHAIRMAN BROWN: I wanted to ask kind of a 3 related - unrelated, but 7.2.2 and three. And it might show up somewhere else, but I stopped looking after that. In the DSRS acceptance criteria for 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 -6 7 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. 8 CHAIRMAN BROWN: - there is no reference 9 under the specific acceptance criteria for DSRS for reliability or completion. There's no reference there, 10 11 or in the 7.2.2 to IEEE 603. 12 Yet, the lead-in paragraph in both of them refer to Section 5.4 for equipment qualification. 13 14 the lead-in under requirements refers to IEEE under 15 integrity, completion of protective action refers to 16 IEEE 603. 17 And if you'll look at IEEE 603, it has words and criteria relative to completion of protective 18 19 action, et cetera. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes. 20 21 CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, they were - it was 22 missing. There was no reference. Instead, 23 referenced 7-4.3.2 which is not as complete. 24 quess the disconnect for me was why was it missing?

The other interesting thing was 603 also

1 calls out under equipment qualification IEEE Standard I don't know what that is, but I just notice it was missing from all the equipment qualification. I don't think I saw that. Either that, or 5 my brain fried at that time. So, I just - that was a leave-out relative to the - we keep going to 7-4.3.2, which is somewhat less definitive if I go off and look at that again. 8 9 MR. CONCEPCION: Peter, do you recall 10 IEEE 627 is endorsed whether for equipment 11 qualification? I don't think it is, right? CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, it is in 603. 12 MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, but that is not an 13 14 endorsed standard though. 15 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, it's in the rule. 16 MR. CONCEPCION: It is in the rule, yes. 17 MR. CORTE: Can I add something? 18 MR. CONCEPCION: But it is not an endorsed standard in our framework. 19 Yes, sir. 20 21 MR. CORTE: Norbert Corte, I&C. 22 look at the statements you 23 consideration for 603, it basically said something to the effect it's a matter of law that all standards 24 25 referenced in 603 are not incorporated by reference

1	unless they're explicitly done so.
2	So, basically every time you say it shall
3	do this per this standard in 603, that's not a regulatory
4	requirement. And that's stated in the statements of
5	consideration.
6	So, basically any standard that's
7	referenced in 603, you basically ignore unless it is
8	separately referenced - incorporated by reference or
9	endorsed by a Reg Guide.
10	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, if it is within our
11	framework, then it has to be addressed.
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, but a Reg Guide,
13	somebody doesn't - that's a guide. Nobody has to follow
14	that if it's a guide.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: You have to follow -
16	CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, why does - 323 does not
17	come into play even for equipment qualification if
18	that's the case.
19	MR. CORTE: It's just the legal legalities
20	associated with it incorporated by reference. It's
21	only 603, and nothing that's referenced by 603 that's
22	incorporated.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Right.
24	MR. CORTE: That specific license -
25	regulatory action. And that's why some of those
	NEAL R. GROSS

1	standards are not endorsed by any Reg Guide and are not
2	spoken to at all.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: There's a lot of reg guides
4	out there.
5	MR. CONCEPCION: I can come up with another
6	example in 603 where there is no, I mean, probability
7	assessments under single failure have pointers to two
8	IEEE standards that are not part of our framework. So,
9	that's another example of where we don't consider those
10	as part of the review guidance.
11	CHAIRMAN BROWN: All right. Well, put 627
12	aside.
13	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, and do you have another
14	question? I couldn't understand.
15	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, no. 603 is not
16	included under the acceptance criteria in -
17	MR. CONCEPCION: Under which section?
18	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Either 7.2.2. or 7.2.3.
19	MR. CONCEPCION: Okay, I have 7.2.3.
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: It's under the general
21	acceptance, but it's not under the DSRS acceptance
22	criteria. It's excluded.
23	MR. CONCEPCION: This is 7.2.3 up on the
24	screen. And as per the requirements within the
25	acceptance criteria, the requirements point to the

1 sections on reliability, system integrity and completion of protective actions as called in IEEE 603. 3 And there's a typo there. It says 1191, but -CHAIRMAN BROWN: I got that. Yes, yes, I'm 5 not worried about that. MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, but -6 7 CHAIRMAN BROWN: But when I get over under 8 the specific DSRS acceptance criteria for are as 9 follows, that almost sounds like those supercede what 10 was under the other thing. 11 We say, well, okay, if they conform to this, 12 we're happy. MR. CONCEPCION: But that is not the intent. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's why I've got a 15 disconnect between what's over in the, quote, the 16 general requirements part and then the DSRS acceptance 17 criteria. 18 Sometimes you say there are none, and then I refer back here and sometimes you say there are some, 19 and they don't list the ones that are over here. 20 21 MS. STAREFOS: Mr. Brown, we wrote those as 22 cumulative. The way we should read these is that's the 23 requirement. 24 And in addition, the specific DSRS criteria 25 will be considered for acceptance in this case.

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, okay. I didn't realize
2	that.
3	MS. STAREFOS: That's -
4	MR. CONCEPCION: Is that explained in
5	Chapter 1 of - or will it be explained in Chapter 1?
6	MS. STAREFOS: Well, I think this is
7	consistent with the way our SRP is set up as per the
8	SRP requirements.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I suggest you put that up
10	in 7.0.
11	MS. STAREFOS: Okay.
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Make it clearer.
13	MS. STAREFOS: We'll take that as - thank
1 4	you. That's a great point.
15	MR. CONCEPCION: We'll take it as an action
16	item.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Something actually worked.
18	Under 7.2.9, which is another one on your list, and
19	maybe I'm missing something here, but there were no -
20	this is control of access, identification and repair.
21	MR. CONCEPCION: Right.
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: And there's some general
23	- again, the general requirements. And then under the
2 4	DSRS acceptance criteria you covered two of them. One
25	for identification, and one for - I'm not sure what this
	i

1	one is - oh, both of them are identification.
2	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: And there was no control
4	of access criteria.
5	MR. CONCEPCION: Or no guidance for repair,
6	because there is no reg guide or additional guidance
7	associated with those two topics beyond what's in 603.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Other than what's in 603,
9	okay. All right. Thank you. That's consistent now
10	with what you said that these are cumulative.
11	MR. CONCEPCION: Right.
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That would be helpful if
13	that was added.
14	MS. STAREFOS: We will make that clearer.
15	Thank you for that.
16	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay.
17	MR. CONCEPCION: And I'm going to make
18	another relationship between IEEE 603 and 7-4.3.2. You
19	have those complimentary standards because you have the
20	requirements in 603. But if you use computer systems,
21	you have to refer to 7-4.3.2.
22	So, that shows up in those areas where there
23	is specific guidance associated with certain topics in
24	7-4.3.2 as additional or cumulative.
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I didn't look at them that

1	way. Now, I - as long as I understand the process, the
2	metric, that works. You've eliminated a bunch of other
3	notes that I had throughout here.
4	MS. STAREFOS: And we'll add that to our
5	clarification in the -
6	CHAIRMAN BROWN: 7.0 or whatever or
7	someplace.
8	MS. STAREFOS: Yes, we intend to actually
9	have a preface or introduction to the table that talks
10	about how we're going to use this, what the point was
11	and how we developed it.
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: This is like Chapter 1 or
13	something?
14	MS. STAREFOS: Kind of like a preface to
15	Chapter 1 of the DSRS. And it will explain all of this.
16	And that's the perfect place for that.
17	And perhaps even the standard details that
18	you had pointed out that earlier that repeat throughout.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay.
20	MS. STAREFOS: Thank you.
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: All right. So, when we see
22	this the next time, all that other stuff is going to
23	disappear and we're not going to know where it went.
24	The black hole, right?
25	MS. STAREFOS: I can't make those promises

1	
1	257 on -
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Because we haven't seen
3	
	Chapter 1 yet.
4	MS. STAREFOS: - the record, but I will do
5	my best.
6	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Onwards and
7	upwards. I don't have anymore now that you've - that
8	eliminated some of my other comments then.
9	MR. CONCEPCION: Great.
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: So, we can go on to whatever
11	the next slide is, which is the summary, I guess.
12	MR. CONCEPCION: I have a blank slide. I
13	don't know if it is relevant at all, but -
14	MR. SANTOS: I think it's important because
15	some of the feedbacks we've gotten is to add additional
16	content in some areas.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Add additional what?
18	MR. SANTOS: Additional context regarding
19	some topics.
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You mean the references?
21	MR. SANTOS: No, no. What I'm trying to say
22	is we could add references to help address some of those
23	comments.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Oh, all you're saying is

you could add more to what you've already done.

1 MR. SANTOS: Yes. CHAIRMAN BROWN: I mean, there's a list of references right now. 3 MR. SANTOS: So, that could be our -5 CHAIRMAN BROWN: But remember in the - excuse I'm going to use this word again. In the context 6 7 of what you're trying to do in terms of putting stuff 8 in places where they'll see it and not have to refer 9 off, there probably is some subset of information in 10 the reference that you want to put in while you would 11 then say - and then either hit the reference for the 12 Req Guide or whatever the other reference is if that's 13 necessary. 14 But you need to flag it somehow as opposed 15 to just let it be going around in the cloud. 16 MR. SANTOS: I agree. 17 CHAIRMAN BROWN: I said that on purpose. 18 MR. CONCEPCION: Okay. So, this is my We understand that we're breaking 19 summary slide. 20 ground with this new approach. There are some things 21 that we still have to improve in the content of the DSRS, 22 some areas that need to be expanded, some clarifications that we need to consider, but that's why we're here. 23 24 I believe we've accomplished what we 25 intended to do. This document is still in the process

of being evaluated or considered by the public. We're still in the process of collecting that feedback, processing that feedback and also factor that into the content of a document to make it better. And hopefully by the next time that we publish this document, it's in a better shape to be ready to be used and implemented by some of us who will be around to implement it. (Laughter.) CHAIRMAN BROWN: Are you implying you're going to be gone, or are you waiting for me to be gone? MR. CONCEPCION: I don't know.

We will continue - we will hope to continue interactions with ACRS. Like I said, we will maintain that - the same level of interactions we have had with B&W and look forward to additional interactions with this committee, and also with members of the public.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay, question. We've gone through and there have been a number of - you've taken some action items, notes, whatever you want to consider them to be that you will consider.

And before we - you asked if you could address those, and we'll be happy to have you run through those.

And after you do that, it would be - we would

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

appreciate it if you would send a copy to Christina of that written down so that she can send them to us and we'll at least have our memory - old memories calibrated on what you're thinking about. And I guess my next question after that is if you're going to be doing something, you're going to be then issuing this for final - in final for comment to the public and I'm thinking back to the schedule. This is November the 16th. So, what's the time frame for trying to take into consideration these astute observations that we've made during the meeting and getting them into this before they go back out for comment, or would they be subject to incorporation after you get public comments back? Don't shake your head up and down yet. You're not supposed to telegraph what was said. MS. STAREFOS: I would say it depends, but I think right now we're pretty close to the end of having gone through our concurrences by our high levels of management and our Office of General Counsel. In order to do this. reiterate or reevaluate, we would have to revisit that again through

concurrence and OGC.

So, it would probably work out better for us if we could delay and incorporate that at the point

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

	201
1	where we were incorporating all of the comments from
2	the members of the public as well, and then revisit that
3	with you at that stage.
4	Would that be acceptable?
5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, no, I think that would
6	- I think that's reasonable.
7	MS. STAREFOS: Okay.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: And the thing I would like
9	to have before we have our December 6th meeting, full
10	committee meeting, at least to have a copy of the notes
11	or -
12	MS. STAREFOS: Absolutely.
13	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - action items, if you
14	want to call it, so that we just have something in hand
15	not completed, just what you agree to at least think
16	about subsequently.
17	MS. STAREFOS: Yes, we'll commit to that.
18	You will absolutely have that.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's about three weeks
20	away.
21	MS. STAREFOS: That's not a problem.
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Again, I'm not asking for
23	how you intend to resolve them or whatever, but just
24	that you're cognizant of them.
25	MS. STAREFOS: You have quite a list. I'm
	NEAL R. GROSS

1	not sure you'd understand my henscratch here.
2	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Milt said he's going to run
3	through some.
4	MS. STAREFOS: I know that we need to kind
5	of work together to get a collective list. So, we'll
6	do that and get it to Christina.
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: And if you want to collect
8	your stuff afterwards and add stuff to it, but you wanted
9	to go through something now, or did you want to do it
10	later? What did you want to do?
11	MR. CONCEPCION: Whatever works for you.
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: We've got some time if you
13	want 15, 20 minutes to walk through a list. You could
14	run through it briefly.
15	MR. CONCEPCION: Yes, sure. Absolutely.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: I think you have more that
17	went on during this meeting than you would produce in
18	the list. On the other hand, I think maybe staff can
19	figure out what they agree to and not agree to you're
20	going to need the transcript.
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. So, that's a good
22	idea. So, you all want to go ahead and think about this
23	after the meeting and -
24	MS. STAREFOS: That would be best for us.
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - put together this stuff?

1	MS. STAREFOS: Yes, sir.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: That brings up another
3	question. If you're going to use the transcript as the
4	basis for our comments to you for updating after public
5	comments, you probably won't need a letter for the
6	December meeting, right?
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, it's a question of what
8	you all expect to see. I mean, we can wait until after
9	public comments if you so desire to get a letter.
0	MS. STAREFOS: Can we discuss that in -
. 1	MEMBER STETKAR: The Committee decides
_2	whether we issue a letter.
_3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, I guess that's true.
4	MS. STAREFOS: Yes.
. 5	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Whether you want one or not,
- 6	we may decide to issue one.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
8 ـ	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, I mean, I'm sorry.
_ 9	I'm learning how the process works here. That's why
20	I keep getting corrected all the time.
21	We won't make a decision on that, but go
22	ahead and do that and you could at least just get us
23	the list -
24	MS. STAREFOS: Absolutely.
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: - of what you think is
	NEAL D. ODOGG

1 there to work on or not work on. We'll then wait to try to see what's done after the public comment period 3 and you're ready for the next step. We'll figure out what we're going to do in 5 the interim period relative to letters or no letters. MS. STAREFOS: Okay. 7 MR. SANTOS: This is Dan -8 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Hold on. Jack. 9 MEMBER SIEBER: Just keep in mind that you're 10 going to have to prepare the letter before you make the 11 decision as to whether -12 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, I know. I always have to do stuff when I'm sleeping. I'll figure out a way 13 14 to do that and then we can accept or reject the 15 suggestions as we go. That's my job. 16 MR. SANTOS: This is Dan here -17 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Hold it, Dan. 18 MS. ANTONESCU: We have a short meeting or presentation scheduled for the full committee meeting 19 on December 6. 20 21 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes. I mean, if they 22 wanted to address some of our comments then, they can. 23 If they're not ready to and they want to do it after 24 public comment, they can do that also. I just want to 25 make sure we get what we've gone through.

1	MS. ANTONESCU: It's kind of a short time
2	for them to prepare.
3	CHAIRMAN BROWN: One other point is for the
4	full committee meeting, we obviously have to shorten
5	this up a little bit. Hadn't really thought about where
6	to shorten, but that's always the issue.
7	MR. CONCEPCION: And I don't have the
8	strategy of how to do it.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Do one. One, two.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Could you make a day only
11	an hour long?
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I would focus on the - well,
13	a schedule. You've got to get a schedule. We've got
1 4	to have a schedule presented, okay, as part of the full
15	committee meeting. That's easy. You got one.
16	And I guess I would focus on 7.0, 7.1, 7.2.
17	In other words, the independence, you know, in other
18	words, the four principles.
19	MEMBER BLEY: Principles, and I'd get
20	something in on the hazard analysis.
21	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, that was the other one.
22	MEMBER BLEY: Something short that says
23	where you want people to head. Not what you don't want
2 4	them to do, but what you want them to do.
25	CHAIRMAN BROWN: And in 7.1.2, you - in that

1 7.1.1 through 7.4.5, you can cover architecture as well. I wouldn't do that one separate. 3 The simplicity one, I think you ought to have a slide on the concept of incorporating simplicity as a thought process as something to be considered doing the design. 6 7 So, those are the pieces. I guess that's 8 where I would focus the full committee meeting on. Any 9 disagreements, Jack, Dennis, John? 10 MEMBER BLEY: No, no, I think that's right. 11 MR. CONCEPCION: Let me see if I understand 12 correctly what you just stated. You want us to present 13 in addition to a schedule which we already have, you 14 want us to present 7.0, 7.1, 7.2 and the three 15 appendices. 16 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Only something if - okay, 17 let's start back. 18 We're only going to cover what we talked about today. You don't have to -19 20 MEMBER SIEBER: A subset of that, yes. CHAIRMAN BROWN: It will be a subset of that. 21 22 And the subset should be part of the overall, the 23 lead-in to 7.1 - or 7.0, 7.1, however the - and then 24 7.1.1, two, three, four, five. 25 MR. CONCEPCION: The principles.

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: The principles. And then
2	a little bit on - talk about the hazards, Appendix A,
3	and something on simplicity since that's a new - that's
4	kind of new concept that we ought to throw that out at
5	least, get the members' reaction.
6	MEMBER BLEY: But that's probably a slide.
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: That's 7.1.1 or two.
8	MEMBER STETKAR: I think the message is 7.2
9	in its entirety doesn't need to be discussed.
10	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Exactly. Thank you.
11	MR. CONCEPCION: I got it.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: I think it's okay to mention
13	simplicity that is qualitative rather than
1 4	quantitative.
15	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, well, that's the whole
16	point.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: The philosophy as opposed
18	to something you could measure.
19	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, that's very clear
20	from reading Appendix C.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
22	MR. SANTOS: Mr. Chairman, this is Dan here.
23	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Go ahead.
2 4	MR. SANTOS: Going back to the question of
25	the letter, clearly we will coordinate through our
	i

1	project office. I'm just going to offer from the
2	technical staff perspective only for consideration is
3	that even the significance of this work, it is our
4	opinion from the technical staff that getting some sort
5	of high-level letter that provides some feedback on the
6	general direction of the effort would be very valuable
7	to the staff. And we'll coordinate the projects.
8	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, that's fine. I
9	understand your point. I'm not going to commit the
10	Committee to anything right now.
11	MEMBER BLEY: Because you can't.
12	(Laughter.)
13	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I'd like to walk out of the
14	full committee meeting still on two feet.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Voice of experience.
16	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, I've learned that.
17	It's been hard.
18	MR. CONCEPCION: How much time do we have
19	on December 6, you said?
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You probably have, what?
21	An hour and a half.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: An hour and a half or less.
23	MS. ANTONESCU: And hour and 25 minutes.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: No, you're going to make
25	sure we get an hour and a half - no, an hour and 25.

	why is it only - on, it's at 6:33 to 10:00.
2	MS. ANTONESCU: Antonio's schedule.
3	MEMBER BLEY: You can go to P&P, Charlie.
4	CHAIRMAN BROWN: No.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: The Chair has to give his
6	introductory remarks.
7	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. We've covered the
8	comments, what you all do with those. We'll wait until
9	after public comment to get resolution. We discussed
10	what to do in full committee. We've got a picture of
11	what that is.
12	If you've got questions, just contact
13	Christina and she'll fire it off and we'll think about
14	it if you need anything else.
15	And I guess next on the agenda if we're -
16	MS. ANTONESCU: Open the lines.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, keep the line closed
18	right now.
19	MS. ANTONESCU: Okay.
20	MR. CONCEPCION: We have two individuals
21	from the public that wanted to -
22	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I understand that. I was
23	going to call right now to see if there's any folks out
24	here that would like to make a public comment. We have
25	a microphone.

1 Go ahead and announce who you are and where you're from. (Pause in the proceedings.) 3 4 (Discussion off the record.) 5 DR. BIRLA: Just to give you a few tidbits that I missed in answering Dennis' question earlier, 6 7 when you were talking about NUREG/CR-6101-1993 so old 8 9 MEMBER BLEY: Well, that was my copy. DR. BIRLA: Right. But in that same spirit, 10 11 there is another old NUREG, software hazard analysis, 12 that I would like to mention because in a NASA safety systems handbooks, that NUREG has been cited as an 13 14 excellent piece of work. But, again, that NASA handbook 15 is also very old. 16 So, recognize that at that time, those 17 pieces of work were considered very highly. But also 18 as you pointed out earlier today, so much has happened, technology changes and the new knowledge, that we have 19 to revisit that. 20 21 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, I think that's the 22 basic concern. So much has transpired in the last 20 23 years. 24 DR. BIRLA: That's why NRO issued the UNR, 25 user need request, to research to undertake this work.

1 On the EPRI side, I forgot to mention a couple of other events that they planned. I mentioned a research activity in progress on which in a few months we expect a report out. Following that report, we have plans to conduct the workshop. Again, this whole idea of how 7 do you get the learning curve and a training package. 8 So, in the training package right now from 9 the Office of Research at the NRC and the research team 10 in EPRI, we are exploring how we can synergize. 11 MEMBER STETKAR: I was going to ask you that. I know you've mentioned that it's under the MOU that 12 you've been informed of this, but were you actually 13 14 working more closely together than just keeping abreast 15 of what they're doing? DR. BIRLA: First of all, remember four years 16 17 ago we were on diametrically opposed viewpoints, if you 18 remember. We have made a significant turn. We are on That's a great accomplishment. 19 the same wavelength. 20 And now we have to move forward in synergy without 21 commingling resources. You understand these. 22 MEMBER STETKAR: Sure, sure. 23 DR. BIRLA: And my director of engineering 24 at the Office of Research is very supportive of this kind of collaboration. 25

1	So, we are watching our Ps and Qs. We hope
2	to get there in the training program.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Is there any notion of
4	issuing a joint NUREG as has been done for other issues,
5	you know? A NUREG/EPRI report or -
6	DR. BIRLA: I would not like to do that.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
8	DR. BIRLA: I would like - let me tell you
9	what my vision is. My vision is that in this particular
10	matter, industry takes the lead. And just as in the
11	seismic hazard analysis. And say, hey, we have a better
12	way and this is what we like the NRC to take home.
13	So, they need some independence in that
1 4	respect rather than get associated with the regulator.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
16	DR. BIRLA: But in terms of sharing knowledge
17	and exercising synergy, yes, that's going on.
18	MEMBER STETKAR: At least you know you're
19	not diametrically opposed anymore.
20	DR. BIRLA: That's right.
21	MEMBER STETKAR: That's important.
22	DR. BIRLA: That's right. Just a matter of
23	how do you synergize watching the Ps and Qs.
24	MR. SANTOS: And we in the licensing office
25	are being invited by research. So, we have been

1	observing some of these interactions realtime. So,
2	it's not like research is out on their own. We are very
3	connected too.
4	DR. BIRLA: So, just to give you an idea on
5	that research information letter on review guidance for
6	hazard analysis that research is working on, in the
7	beginning of October Research gave a presentation under
8	the MOU to the EPRI research team and a couple of their
9	advisors from industry.
10	And the reaction of one person from a
11	utility company who's got 30 years of experience was,
12	this is good guidance. Why does it have to be limited
13	to safety systems? If I have this - the freedom, I would
14	apply to every I&C system on the planet.
15	There was another individual on the EPRI
16	research team, contract support team who's also got more
17	than 30 years of experience. His reaction was, this
18	piece of work is so comprehensive. I've never seen all
19	this put together in one place.
20	So, those are a couple of examples or
21	getting on the same wavelength.
22	MEMBER BLEY: We look forward to seeing that.
23	That sounds interesting.
24	CHAIRMAN BROWN: You all finished now?
2.5	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.

1	CHAIRMAN BROWN: We'll proceed on with the
2	public comments, I believe. What order do you want to
3	go in?
4	Peter Hastings, are you on the line? Just
5	say something.
6	MEMBER STETKAR: For confirmation if anyone
7	is out there, just say something, please. We really
8	don't know whether the line is actually open.
9	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, something clicked off
10	while they were talking. It sounded like somebody -
11	MEMBER SIEBER: I heard a beep.
12	CHAIRMAN BROWN: I head a beep.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: I don't know what that means.
14	(Discussion off the record.)
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you very much. We
16	now know the line is open.
17	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Who was that? NuScale,
18	okay. Thank you. So, the line is open.
19	MEMBER BLEY: Mr. Hastings, have we got -
20	CHAIRMAN BROWN: Is Peter Hastings there?
21	(Discussion off the record.)
22	MR. ARNHOLDT: My name is Brian Arnholdt.
23	I'm with B&W. I'm the manager for I&C design and
24	simulation and just appreciate the opportunity to come
25	here today and hear the interaction with the ACRS staff

and the NRC staff.

We've been working with the NRC staff, oh, for the better part of this year on the DSRS effort for the entire program.

We've provided several comments back to about 25 sections of 40 that have been issued for the entire program.

I'll jump right into the Chapter 7 issue, because that's my area of purview. We had a meeting with the staff back in June, looked at Section 7.1, one of the appendices in 7.0, provided them comments back.

Actually had a really good public meeting with them. I think the staff has been very receptive to our feedback and other feedback.

Some specifics as far as how we see this DSRS effort affecting us in our application with respect to Chapter 7, I think it gives us a clearer line of sight to an application submittal.

There was a lot of dialog about the level of detail that we need and we're vetting that internally. We've given that comment back to the staff.

I think as we work through, we're actually generating content right now based on the framework internally, reviewing it internally. Hope to share that with the staff soon so we can start getting a dialog,

1 hey, this is the right level of detail, but we need more here. couple 3 comments about the hazards analysis. We have the exact same comment back to the staff as what are you looking for in a hazards analysis? There's a lot of good practices out there 6 7 and a lot of different industries. I heard HAZOPS for 8 chemical industry. 9 We've got some thoughts internally about 10 what we want to do that I won't share publicly, but I 11 think - I agree working with the staff. I think if we 12 come up with a method and actually demonstrate from an integrated system standpoint, we can make our case more 13 14 clear instead of focusing at the component level how 15 a card fails, how a channel fails. 16 If you look at it integrated across the 17 system and its interaction with the plant, I think the 18 approach is sound. Just a couple of things. The way the DSRS 19 is structured, it was actually fairly coincidental. 20 21 It actually lines up quite well with the systematic 22 engineering approach we've applied to our I&C design and architecture. 23 24 So, when we met with the staff and we've 25 given them updates and shared a lot of information with

1 them, they shared information with us on the framework that they were planning for the DSRS and they actually 3 lined up quite nicely. And right now as we speak, we are making 5 some design changes based on content that the staff has put into the DSRS. So, that helps us put material in 6 7 front of the staff that hopefully will facilitate a more 8 efficient, effective review. So, that's - I think it 9 remains to be seen, but I think we're on a clear path 10 for that. 11 And then lastly, the thought fundamental 12 design principles, that really has - we spent a lot of time in the last couple of months focusing on how do 13 14 high-level architecture elements meet those fundamental 15 design principles? We shared a series of information with the 16 17 staff and we're going to continue to build that into 18 our design, but I think that gives us a way to more straightforwardly focus our application material to 19 facilitate a more focused review. 20 21 So, that concludes my comments. Thank you. 22 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. 23 (Discussion off the record.) 24 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Is there anybody 25 else in the audience that would like to make a comment?

MR. GRAHAM: Good day. Chris Graham with Safeware Engineering. And we're going to be working on the RAL 1101. Today, my comments are more from me as a citizen. I was an NRR reviewer back about ten years ago here at NRC. And I see - what I've seen today of how the SRP is being repackaged and condensed, one of the things that concerns me is there still doesn't seem to be a system level approach to making sure that these interactions that need to occur between the Chapter 7 and things such as human factors.

1

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I know when I was a reviewer, there's things that I need to review in human factors, and there are things that the human factors folks need to review.

The human factors folks can tell you where switches need to go, what color the light needs to be, alarm prioritizations. But me as the I&C reviewer, needs to verify that those requirements are instantiated and largely now they'll be instantiated in software. And so, moving those requirements just to another section may not cause that interrelation.

Ten years ago there was no one forcing me as a reviewer to make sure I interacted with the electrical folks doing Chapter 8.

The electrical folks now have to deal with

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1 software in their breaker control such as undervoltage, overcurrent. Those are going to be oftentimes software setpoints. 3 So, I get the impression today that there's 5 going to be a forcing function to require these interrelations. So, my suggestion is that we have a 7 system - that you consider at least a system level 8 approach to ensure that these interactions - I&C is not 9 It goes in a specific system, goes on a in a vacuum. 10 specific skid, goes into specific housing. And to fob 11 off those requirements like environmental 12 qualification, some of those we in the I&C world, some of those the other folks did. 13 14 I'm talking a little bit too much here. 15 Sorry. I'm just trying to - I just didn't see a forcing 16 function that's going to require these interrelations 17 to occur. And this is a great opportunity for the NRC 18 to for me as a reviewer back ten years ago, try to sort out to make sure that I go talk to the human factors 19 folks, I go talk to electrical. 20 21 That's my comment. Thanks very much. 22 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Anyone else from the 23 audience. 24 MEMBER BLEY: Or on the phone. 25 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Hearing none, is there

1 anybody on the phone that would like to make a comment? (No response.) CHAIRMAN BROWN: Now, no people are still 3 on the phone; is that correct? Somebody answer just to make sure you're still - I heard a pop. Are you all still there? 6 7 PARTICIPANT: Yes, NuScale is still here, 8 yes. 9 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. 10 PARTICIPANT: Thanks for letting us listen 11 in. We appreciate it. 12 CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. Thank you very much. Hearing nobody on the phone line that wants to make 13 14 any additional public comments, I guess I'll close the 15 meeting - oh, no, I'm sorry. I forgot the important 16 part. The members. 17 MEMBER STETKAR: You just don't have enough subcommittee meetings, Charlie. 18 19 (Laughter.) (Discussion off the record.) 20 21 MEMBER STETKAR: No, I don't have anymore. 22 I'd like to thank the staff. I think you've covered 23 a lot of material in the time, clarified a lot of 24 information. And look forward to seeing what it looks 25 like after the public comment period.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Dennis.

MEMBER BLEY: I liked what I've read. I liked what I heard today. Primarily, I think it all hangs together pretty well. I think they're well on their way for a pilot that will maybe evolve into something even better.

On the last commenter, I like what I hear about these interactions and I'd like to see something that really ensured that. And right now I think it's happening, but it comes and goes over time.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: jack.

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I'd like to thank the staff also. I think that this subject is very complex. It's got a lot of little pieces. And to try to pull it altogether in a framework that's manageable, I think, is an accomplishment. And I think you're well on your way to doing that.

And so, I don't see any fatal flaws in the direction that you're taking. And I think there may be a little difference between my idea of what the detail is and others mainly because I like detail and it's easier for me to understand what's going on when I see it.

Your reviewers, I'm sure, have seen these things over and over again and can make decisions based

on more functional documentation.

But overall, I think this was a very productive meeting. I think the staff has done well in this project and I wish them great success.

CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. As the chairman, I would like to echo what everybody else said. I'm not going to repeat it ad nauseum here, but this was a substantial effort.

And in my view since I've come here, this is a substantial - I don't want to say reorientation in terms of how you approach a complex design with the new software-based systems and how you come to a conclusion in a rational, well-documented basis that it will meet the fundamental principles and deliver, you know, the safety actions that you need for these plans.

I thought the organization was put together pretty well. It was readable, which was in English.

That's what I meant by that. You could actually understand it, which was very useful.

And I think you all did a very good job of putting this together and obviously there's some ways to go. And I'm sure you'll get some more very enthusiastic comments from the public when this is issued.

And there's a lot of players that are going to want to dabble with this and I fundamentally think that this is pretty significant and that it sets the boundaries for consideration of how to expand this concept to a general thought process and a standard review plan as well in the long run.

So, I wanted to thank you all. I think you all did a good job. Those were good conversations.

A lot of interaction. You were very straightforward and were not hesitant to give us answers that we may or may not have wanted to hear.

And since I've messed up already, I'll mess up again and I'll pass it - I'll ask Mohammed if he would like to say anything else here.

MR. SHUAIBI: I do. I just want to thank the committee. We appreciate all of your comments. It's obvious that you're going through the material in detail. We do appreciate that. We're taking back your comments. We take them seriously. We are going to go back and try to incorporate those.

And at some point in time we'll come back to you and share with you this is what we've taken, this is what we'll put in, this is the logic for the ones - if we decide not to take any, this is the logic for why that didn't go in.

1 So, I'm sure we'll have that dialog in the 2 I want to make sure that you get a sense of how seriously we take those comments and will come back and share that with you. So, again, thank you for your time and for 6 your efforts in working through our guidance documents. CHAIRMAN BROWN: Okay. One last point. I 8 hope you will get at least the notes to us before the 9 meeting. No answers necessary, but at least so that we'll have them to jigger our thoughts when we get there, 10 11 okay? 12 With that, am I missing something? We'll 13 close the meeting. Thank you. 14 (Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m. the meeting was 15 adjourned.) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25



# An Update on the Initiative for the Licensing Review of Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) for the mPower™ Small Modular Reactor Design

Milton Concepcion, Sr. Digital I&C Engineer
Division of Engineering
Office of New Reactors

Ian Jung, Chief
Instrumentation and Controls Branch
Division of Engineering
Office of New Reactors

Dan Santos, Senior Technical Advisor
Division of Engineering
Office of New Reactors



## Objectives

- Provide a briefing on the draft mPower<sup>™</sup>
   Chapter 7 Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS)
- Receive feedback from the Committee



# Agenda

- DSRS Status and Schedule
- DSRS Chapter 7 Goals
- DSRS Key activities
- Background
- DSRS Development Process
- Section 7.0, "Introduction & Overview of Review Process"
- Section 7.1, "Fundamental Design Principles"
- Appendix A, "Evaluation of Hazard Analysis"
- Appendix B, "I&C System Architecture"
- Appendix C, "Simplicity"
- Section 7.2, "System Characteristics"
- Appendix D, "References"



### **DSRS Status and Schedule**

### Approximate Timeline for Finalizing the mPower Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS)

September 2012~

Draft mPower DSRS is completed and labeled For Interim Use and Comment

October 2012~

Internal Concurrence; OGC NLO obtained

November 2012~

Federal Register Notice FRN is prepared and mPower DSRS is issued for public comment

- Document and Memo sent to ACRS
- Document and Memo sent to CRGR
- Notice sent to OMB for Congressional Review Act review

February 2013~

**Public Comment Period Ends** 

March -August 2013~

Resolve Public Comments revise document as appropriate
Prepare Final mPower DSRS Document

May 2013~ SRP Updates Finalized to Support mPower DC Review (coincides with APOB schedule)

September 2013~

Internal Concurrence; OGC NLO obtained

ACRS letter received

November 2013~

Prepare FRN and issue final mPower DSRS

- Document and Memo sent to ACRS
- Document and Memo sent to CRGR



# Top DSRS Goals

By applying lessons learned in a timely manner

- 1. Enhance safety focus of staff reviews
- 2. Improve review efficiency



# Background

- Licensing reviews of I&C have been a significant challenge from the perspective of both safety demonstration and schedule/resources for all design centers for new large light water reactors
- Industry has consistently expressed licensing certainty of I&C to be one of their highest priorities for new reactors
- The staff examined lessons and identified areas that can support the goals



# Background (continued)

- The core of the DSRS Chapter 7 approach is based on the concept of applying <u>proven</u> system engineering principles (under the current regulatory framework):
  - Defense-in-depth
  - Design principles
  - Simplicity attribute
  - Integrated hazards
  - Technology neutrality
- The approach is further aided by structural changes in guidance for clarity and efficiency



# **DSRS** Development Process

Reorganize review guidance to separate design principles from specific system requirements

Provide guidance on Fundamental Design Principles at system level

Remove redundant and non-applicable information

Eliminate the use of DAC

Introduce Simplicity and Hazard Analysis

Ensure adequate coverage of regulatory requirements and applicable guidance



# Review process

- Reviewers who have used the existing SRP provided the horsepower to accomplish these actions.
- Reviewers from other disciplines were enlisted to help eliminate overlapping review responsibilities.



# **DSRS** Development Process

# Reorganize review guidance to separate design principles from specific system requirements

Provide guidance on Fundamental Design Principles at system level

Remove redundant and non-applicable information

Eliminate the use of DAC

Introduce Simplicity and Hazard Analysis

Ensure adequate coverage of regulatory requirements and applicable guidance



### **DSRS** Results

Improve the safety focus of the staff reviews by ensuring the licensing application has sufficient detail to clearly demonstrate that the applicable regulations are met and key design principles are addressed.

#### SRP Chapter 7

- The "Independence" design principle is addressed in 23 of the 36 distinct pieces of the SRP.
- Information needed to perform review of the application is not explicitly stated.

#### DSRS Chapter 7

- The "Independence" design principle is addressed in one location.
- Review of design information, including functional block diagrams, descriptions of operation, and architectural descriptions.



### **DSRS** Results

Organize the review material so that it aligns well with integrated I&C designs.

#### SRP Chapter 7

 Review guidance was presented on a system basis. As systems evolved, Branch Technical Positions were issued to document additional guidance. Limited cross referencing was provided.

#### DSRS Chapter 7

- Fundamental design principles segregated to Section 7.1.
- System Characteristics segregated to Section 7.2.

 All BTPs have been incorporated in the guidance.



# **DSRS** Development Process

Reorganize review guidance to separate design principles from specific system requirements

Provide guidance on Fundamental Design Principles at system level

Remove redundant and non-applicable information

Eliminate the use of DAC

Introduce Simplicity and Hazard Analysis

Ensure adequate coverage of regulatory requirements and applicable guidance





### DSRS Chapter 7 Structure

	7.0 – Introduction and Overview	7.1 – Fundamental Design Principles	7.2 – System Characteristics
Areas Of Review	• Review objectives	<ul> <li>Safety system design basis</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Quality</li> <li>Equipment qualification</li> <li>Reliability, Integrity, and completion of protective action</li> <li>Operating and maint. bypasses</li> <li>Interlocks</li> <li>Derivation of system inputs</li> <li>Setpoints</li> <li>Auxiliary features</li> <li>Control of access, identification, and repair</li> <li>Interaction between sense and command features and other systems</li> <li>Multi-unit stations</li> <li>Automatic and manual control</li> <li>Displays and monitoring</li> <li>Human factors considerations</li> <li>Test and calibration</li> </ul>
	<ul><li>Review interfaces</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Independence</li> </ul>	
	<ul><li>Review process</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Redundancy</li> </ul>	
	Mapping of regulatory	<ul> <li>Determinism</li> </ul>	
	requirement to DSRS location	• Diversity / Defense-in- Depth	



# **DSRS** Development Process

Reorganize review guidance to separate design principles from specific system requirements

Provide guidance on Fundamental Design Principles at system level

Remove redundant and non-applicable information

Eliminate the use of DAC

Introduce Simplicity and Hazard Analysis

Ensure adequate coverage of regulatory requirements and applicable guidance



### **DSRS** Results

Improve the efficiency of reviews by eliminating unnecessary information from being docketed and reviewed, and by improving guidance to avoid unnecessary RAIs.

SRP Chapter 7

Included IEEE Std. 279.

 500+ pages (SRP & ISGs) of material including a considerable amount of background information and repetition. DSRS Chapter 7

- Removed reference to IEEE
   Std. 279 since it only pertained to pre-1995 licenses.
- ~150 pages containing specific instructions to the reviewer.



# Redundancy Examples

Examples of redundant review requirements between the SRP Chapters.

#### SRP Chapter 7

"Human factors engineering principles and criteria should be applied to the selection and design of the displays and controls. Human-performance requirements should be described and related to the plant safety criteria. Recognized human-factors standards and design techniques should be employed to support the described human-performance requirements." (BTP 7-19 acceptance criteria)

#### DSRS Chapter 7

This instruction was deleted after verification that it is included in Chapter 18.



# **DSRS** Development Process

Reorganize review guidance to separate design principles from specific system requirements

Provide guidance on Fundamental Design Principles at system level

Remove redundant and non-applicable information

#### Eliminate the use of DAC

Introduce Simplicity and Hazard Analysis

Ensure adequate coverage of regulatory requirements and applicable guidance



### **DSRS** Results

#### Eliminate the use of DAC

Chapter 7 information should be sufficient for NRC staff to address all safety questions at Design Certification stage without the use of DAC [design acceptance criteria] by the applicant.



# **DSRS** Development Process

Reorganize review guidance to separate design principles from specific system requirements

Provide guidance on Fundamental Design Principles at system level

Remove redundant and non-applicable information

Eliminate the use of DAC

#### **Introduce Simplicity and Hazard Analysis**

Ensure adequate coverage of regulatory requirements and applicable guidance



### **DSRS** Results

#### Provide guidance on new areas of review

The application of Hazard Analysis is described in Appendix A of DSRS Chapter 7.

The application of the "Simplicity" design principle is described in Appendix C of DSRS Chapter 7.



# **DSRS** Development Process

Reorganize review guidance to separate design principles from specific system requirements

Provide guidance on Fundamental Design Principles at system level

Remove redundant and non-applicable information

Eliminate the use of DAC

Introduce Simplicity and Hazard Analysis

Ensure adequate coverage of regulatory requirements and applicable guidance



### DSRS Chapter 7 Mapping Examples

Regulations	Location in DSRS
IEEE 603-1991*, Section 4, Safety System Designation	<ul><li>7.1.1 Safety System Design Basis</li><li>7.1.4 Determinism</li></ul>
IEEE 603-1991*, Section 5.1, Single-Failure Criterion	7.1.3 Redundancy 7.1.5 Diversity and Defense-in-Depth
IEEE 603-1991*, Section 5.2, Completion of Protective Action	7.2.3 Reliability, Integrity, and Completion of Protective Action
IEEE 603-1991*, Section 5.4, Equipment Qualification	7.2.2 Equipment Qualification
GDC 10, "Reactor design"	Coordinated with Chapter 4 of the DSRS
GDC 13, "Instrumentation and control"	7.1 and 7.2 of the DSRS

<sup>\* 10</sup> CFR 50.55a(h) approves use of IEEE 603-1991



### Review Guidance Structure

#### Existing Guidance

- 7.0 Overall Review Process
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 Reactor Trip System
- 7.3 ESF Systems
- 7.4 Safe Shutdown Systems
- 7.5 Information Systems
- 7.6 Interlock Systems
- 7.7 Control Systems
- 7.8 Diverse Systems
- 7.9 Data Communication Systems
- BTPs (7-1 to 7-21 & 8-5)
- ISGs

#### DSRS Chapter 7

- 7.0 Overview of Review Process
- 7.1 Fundamental Design Principles
  - Design Basis
  - Independence
  - Redundancy
  - Determinism
  - · Defense-in-Depth and Diversity
- 7.2 System Characteristics
- Appendix A, Hazards Analysis
- Appendix B, I&C System Architecture
- Appendix C, Simplicity
- Appendix D, References



**DSRS 7.0** 

#### 7.0 Introduction & Overview of Review Process

- Establishes differences between SRP and DSRS
- Provides DSRS Review Scope, Objectives, Review Interfaces, and Review Process for I&C
- DSRS Table 7-1 provides mapping of regulatory requirements and guidance with review responsibilities



**DSRS 7.1** 

### 7.1 Fundamental Design Principles

- 7.1.1 Safety System Design Basis
- 7.1.2 Independence
- 7.1.3 Redundancy
- 7.1.4 Determinism
- 7.1.5 Diversity and Defense in Depth



**DSRS 7.1** 

#### 7.1.1 Safety System Design Basis

- Section 4 of IEEE Std. 603-1991
- Areas of review include:
  - Identification of the I&C systems' safety functions and corresponding protective actions
  - All monitored variables used to control each protective action
  - Minimum number and location of sensors required for protective purposes
  - Range of transient and steady-state conditions throughout which the safety systems shall perform
  - System performance
- Coordination with Chapter 15



**DSRS 7.1** 

#### 7.1.2 Independence (slide 1 of 3)

- Section 5.6 of IEEE Std. 603-1991
- Review addresses the concepts of:
  - Physical independence
    - Physical separation and physical barriers
  - Electrical independence
    - Electrical isolation of safety system circuits and electrical equipment



**DSRS 7.1** 

#### 7.1.2 Independence (slide 2 of 3)

- Section 5.6 of IEEE Std. 603-1991
- Review addresses the concepts of:
  - Communications independence
    - One-way communication should be used among redundant channels or divisions and between safety and non-safety systems.
    - Data flows between redundant portions of safety systems should be limited to those required for coincidence logic voting for actuation and interlocks used for the performance of safety functions.
    - A safety division should not be dependent upon any information or resource originating or residing outside its own division to accomplish its safety function.
    - Each safety division should receive plant data only from sensors dedicated to that division and that data should not be shared among divisions.
    - Review criteria for designs that implement sharing of data between trip processing units and voting unit processors, or among voting unit processors.



**DSRS 7.1** 

#### 7.1.2 Independence (slide 3 of 3)

- Section 5.6 of IEEE Std. 603-1991
- Review addresses the concepts of:
  - Functional independence
    - Verify isolation of a safety system from other safety systems.
    - Successful completion of the system's safety functions should not be dependent upon any behavior (including failures and normal operation) of another system, or upon any signals, data, or information derived from the other system.



**DSRS 7.1** 

#### 7.1.3 Redundancy

- Section 5.1 of IEEE Std. 603-1991
- Level of redundancy used to assure that:
  - No single failure results in loss of the protection function.
  - Removal from service of any component or channel does not result in loss of the required minimum redundancy unless the acceptable reliability of operation of the protection system can be otherwise demonstrated.

#### – Review covers:

- Single-failure criterion RG 1.53.
- Guidance for reviewing channel assignments to address redundancy and diversity requirements.



**DSRS 7.1** 

#### 7.1.4 Determinism

- Evaluate real-time performance of the proposed digital I&C platform and data communications systems:
  - Verify that system timing derived from DBEs has been allocated to the digital I&C system architecture.
  - Confirm deterministic performance of data communications.
- Appendix B (I&C System Architecture) supports the review of determinism.



**DSRS 7.1** 

#### 7.1.5 Diversity and Defense-in-Depth (D3) (slide 1 of 2)

- Acceptance Criteria used for D3 review:
  - SRM to SECY-93-087, Item 18.II.Q
  - NUREG/CR-6303
  - BTP 7-19
- Coordination with Human Factors and Reactor Systems branches to evaluate D3 assessment.
- This section also covers 10 CFR 50.62, the ATWS rule, which requires, in part, automatic initiation of ATWS mitigation systems and equipment that is diverse and independent from the reactor trip system.



**DSRS 7.1** 

#### 7.1.5 Diversity and Defense-in-Depth (D3) (slide 2 of 2)

- Applicant shall provide a D3 assessment for the proposed I&C system that demonstrates that vulnerabilities to CCF [common cause failure] have been adequately addressed.
- Review of the D3 assessment addresses:
  - Identification of any vulnerabilities to CCF in the I&C system.
  - Analysis for each event that is evaluated in Chapter 15 with a postulated CCF using best-estimate methods.
  - Information to demonstrate that adequate diversity is provided.
  - Automatic and/or manual actions used as a diverse means.
  - Display and controls used for D3.
  - Prioritization between safety-related and diverse actuation signals.



App. A

### **Appendix A – Hazard Analysis**

- New guidance provides an approach to review Hazard Analysis.
- Focus on verifying whether the applicant:
  - Identified and evaluated each loss or impairment of safety function.
  - Developed necessary hazard restrictions and controls in the form of architectural constraints.
- Provides a set of evaluation topics.
- Discusses ITAAC [inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria] for implementation activities.



App. B

#### **Appendix B – I&C System Architecture**

- Architecture description will support review of fundamental design principles.
- Review areas:
  - Description of all I&C functions that are part of the design basis.
  - Interfaces between I&C safety systems.
  - Safety to nonsafety interfaces.
  - Signal flows and descriptions.
  - Simplified/functional logic diagrams.



App. C

### **Appendix C – Simplicity**

- Evaluate whether simplicity has been considered in the design of the digital I&C systems.
- Review concurrent with each fundamental design principles.
- Key factors for simplicity:
  - Logical, modular description of interactions, signal flows, definition of interfaces.
  - Separation or segregation among I&C functions.
  - Safety systems designed for only the minimal required functions.
  - Simplified communications and system integration.



**DSRS 7.2** 

#### 7.2 System Characteristics

- 7.2.1 Quality\*
- 7.2.2 Equipment Qualification
- 7.2.3 Reliability, Integrity, completion of protective action
- 7.2.4 Operating and maintenance bypasses
- 7.2.5 Interlocks
- 7.2.6 Derivation of system inputs
- 7.2.7 Setpoints
- 7.2.8 Auxiliary features
- 7.2.9 Control of access, identification, and repair

- 7.2.10 Interaction between sense and command features
- 7.2.11 Multi unit stations
- 7.2.12 Automatic and manual control
- 7.2.13 Displays and controls
- 7.2.14 Human Factors consideration
- 7.2.15 Capability for test and calibration
- Hyperlink to DSRS 7.2

<sup>\*</sup> Under Development



**DSRS 7.2** 

#### 7.2.1 Quality (work in progress)

- Scope will address system engineering as well as software engineering – technical and quality requirements.
- Program description will address system/software engineering activities instead of reviewing projectspecific plans.
- Leverage reviews conducted in Chapter 17, "Quality Assurance."



**DSRS 7.2** 

#### 7.2.2 Equipment Qualification

- Scope addresses seismic and environmental qualification.
- I&C review of equipment qualification is limited to confirmation that I&C equipment (including isolation devices) subject to seismic and environmental qualification requirements has been selected and identified in the application.
- Review of Environmental Control Systems.
- Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference (EMI/RFI) – RG 1.180.
- Coordination with Chapter 3, equipment qualification sections.



App. D

### **Appendix D – References**



# Summary

- The staff has implemented lessons learned and restructured existing guidance in the development of the mPower<sup>TM</sup> DSRS Chapter 7 to:
  - Ensure clear line-of-sight from regulatory requirements to review guidance.
  - Enhance staff review focus.
  - Improve review efficiency.
  - Leverage NRC staff cross-organizational expertise.



# **Next Steps**

- Issue draft DSRS for formal public comments.
- Continue ACRS interactions.
- Collect and resolve public comments.
- Continue pre-application interactions with B&W and other stakeholders.
- Issue final DSRS Chapter 7 to support the mPower<sup>™</sup> application review.