



Overview of Spent Fuel Pool Neutron Absorbing Material Degradation

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
**Nuclear Reactor Regulation/Division of Engineering
Steam Generator Tube Integrity and Chemical Engineering Branch**

Public Meeting on Neutron Absorbing Material Degradation

October 4, 2012

Overview

- Safety Significance
- Material Types
- Historical Issues
- Recent Events
- Staff Observations
- NRC Questions
- NRC Actions
- Knowledge Base
- Surveillance Methodologies



Picture: Spent Fuel Pool





Safety Significance

- Prevent the occurrence of any inadvertent criticality events in the SFP
- Neutron absorbing materials have a direct impact on safety
 - Unidentified and unmitigated degradation poses a criticality and safety concern
 - Challenges compliance with NRC subcriticality requirements: 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62
- NRC staff has identified this issue as potentially safety significant

Material Types


- Most popular at US plants
 - Aluminum Boron Carbide Cermet
 - BORAL®
 - Non-metal Matrix Composites
 - Boraflex
 - Carborundum
 - Metal Matrix Composites
 - METAMIC®
- New Metal Matrix Composites
 - Bortec®
 - Alcan Composite



Pictures: BORAL® cross-section and Bortec® micrograph

Historical Issues

- Boraflex (1970s-1980s)
 - Silica polymer matrix degradation
 - INs: 87-43, 93-70, 95-38
 - GL 96-04: Maintain 5% margin
- BORAL® (1980's)
 - Blistering & bulging
 - IN 83-29




Recent Events

- Carborundum, Palisades 2008


- Stuck fuel assemblies
- BADGER testing found up to 70% degradation

- BORAL®

- Blistering
 - Seabrook 2003
 - Beaver Valley 2007
 - TMI 2008
- Bulging
 - Susquehanna 2009



EPRI Report TR1013721



Picture: Carborundum microphotograph and example of Boral blister and bulge



Recent Events (con't)

- **Boraflex**
 - Turkey Point Unit 3, 2010
 - Areal density was less than the licensing basis
 - Ineffective implementation of corrective actions
 - Ineffective in identifying and mitigating degradation
 - Peach Bottom Unit 2, 2010
 - Panels degraded below the TS requirements
 - Ineffective implementation of corrective actions
 - Monitoring and mitigating the degradation not adequate
 - IN 12-13



Staff Observations

- Surveillance program important to detect onset of degradation
- Effectiveness of surveillance monitoring programs impact management of the SFP
- Effective operating experience evaluation can lead to early identification
- Unknown degradation mechanisms and rates could result in reduced subcriticality margins.



NRC Questions

- Materials in each SFP and monitoring method
- Monitoring and mitigating the material degradation
- Degree of accuracy of in-situ neutron attenuation measurements
- Surveillance intervals to monitor degradation
- Material degradation affect on the criticality analysis



NRC Actions

- IN 09-26, LR-ISG 2009-01, update to GALL (NUREG 1801 Rev 2), and IN 12-13
- NRC evaluating material degradation mechanisms, surveillance techniques, and predictive modeling
 - Literature knowledge base
 - Confirmatory research on the surveillance methodology
 - Confirmatory research on the surveillance interval adequacy



Knowledge Base

- Current NRC state of knowledge
 - Commercial and decommissioned SFPs
 - Lists materials in each SFP
 - Periodically updated
- Issued public
 - Technical Letter Report: ML113550241
 - Spreadsheet: ML121090500



Surveillance Methodologies

- Boraflex methodologies (predictive code and in-situ method) examined
- Reports published
 - TLR on Boraflex, RACKLIFE, and BADGER methodologies: ML12216A307
 - TLR on BADGER tool: ML12254A064
- BADGER report pertains to all neutron absorbing materials