

**19.8 Important Features Identified by the ABWR PRA**

The information in this section of the reference ABWR DCD, including all subsections and tables, is incorporated by reference with the following departures.

STP DEP T1 5.0-1 (Table 19.8-5)

STD DEP T1 3.4-1 (Table 19.8-1)

STP DEP 19R-1 (Table 19.8-5)

**19.8.1 Important Features from Level 1 Internal Events Analyses****19.8.1.3 Features Selected**

STD DEP T1 3.4-1

**High Pressure Core Flooder (HPCF) Logic and Control**

*The operation of the HPCF is controlled by the digital safety system logic and control (SSLC) system. As identified in SECY 93-087, the common cause failure of digital instrumentation and control logic may result in the failure of redundant equipment. A postulated common cause failure of the SSLC would disable the HPCF without a diverse means to initiate at least one loop of the HPCF. One division of the HPCF has been provided with capability for initiation and operation through an independent and diverse "hard wired" circuit. Although the probability of a common cause failure of the SSLC is very low, an independent and diverse means of HPCF operation further reduces the risk associated with system operation through the ~~multiplexed~~ digital SSLC.*

**Four Divisions of Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC)**

*Each microprocessor-based logic processing unit within the Essential Communications Function (ECF) ~~Essential Multiplexing System (EMS)~~ and SSLC undergoes continuous self-test, with a reasonable certainty of fault detection. Undetected faults are identified during periodic (quarterly) surveillance testing, using the operator initiated, offline self-test feature available within each processing unit. This self-test function exercises all programmed logic and also causes outputs to toggle between untripped and tripped states. Faults are logged in each unit's self-test memory and are reported to the operator and process computer. The offline tests are expected to identify any faults not detected by the continuous self-test feature because more logic paths and trip states can be checked with reduced risk of spurious system actuation. This offline testing was judged to be important in the PRA analysis.*

**19.8.5 Important Features from Flooding Analyses****19.8.5.1 Summary of Analysis Results**

The following site-specific supplement discusses internal flooding from the Reactor Service Water pump house.

The ABWR flooding analysis evaluated all potential flood sources and through the use of simplified event trees determined the CDF for each building of interest. The three four buildings determined to have the potential for flooding to affect safety-related equipment are the Turbine, Control, and Reactor Buildings, and the Reactor Service Water (RSW) pump house. The other buildings do not contain safety-related equipment and are not connected to buildings that do. Tunnels from each of these buildings which are routed to the radwaste building are sealed to prevent interbuilding flooding. Therefore, the interbuilding flooding probability through these tunnels was evaluated to be several orders of magnitude lower than direct flooding due to pipe breaks in each building and was not included in the event trees. The adequacy of the tunnel seals should be confirmed by the COL applicant. The CDF for events initiated by flooding in the Turbine Building is extremely small for a low power cycle heat sink (PCHS) and very small for a high PCHS. The CDF for events initiated by flooding in the Control Building is very small, the CDF for events initiated by flooding in the RSW pump house is very small, and the CDF for events initiated by flooding in the Reactor Building is extremely small. The estimated CDF for events initiated by flooding from all internal flood sources is very small for a low PCHS and for a high PCHS.

#### 19.8.5.3 Features Selected

The following site-specific supplement discusses internal flooding from the Reactor Service Water pump house.

##### **Water Level Sensors in the RCW/RSW rooms**

Water level sensors are installed in the turbine building condenser pit, ~~and~~ the RCW rooms in the control building, and ~~in~~ the RSW pump rooms. These sensors are used to detect flooding in the rooms and send signals to trip pumps and close isolation valves in the affected systems. The sensors are arranged in a two-out-of-four logic. The control building and the RSW pump house has have two sets of sensors (lower and upper) which measure the water level using diverse means to eliminate the potential for common cause failures. The sensors also send signals to the control room to alert the operator to a potential flooding condition so that appropriate manual actions can be taken to isolate the flooding source.

STP DEP 19R-1

##### ~~Anti-siphon Capability~~

~~The reactor service water (RSW) system contains anti siphon capability (e.g., vacuum breakers, air break) to stop flooding in the event of a break in a RSW line in the reactor component cooling water (RCW) rooms in the control building. The antisiphon-capability will terminate RSW flow if the RSW pumps are tripped but the isolation-valves in the affected division fail to close. The anti-siphon capability applies to both the RSW supply and return lines from/to the ultimate heat sink.~~

STP DEP 19R-1

##### **Ultimate Heat Sink**

*The ultimate heat sink will be designed such that water cannot gravity drain to the control building ~~in excess of the allowed 4000 meters of RSW pipe from the isolation valves in the pump house (2000 meters each for supply and return).~~*

### **RSW System**

*A ~~maximum of 4000 meters of RSW piping is allowed between the RSW isolation valves at the pump house and the control building (2000 meters each for supply and return).~~*

The following site-specific supplement discusses internal flooding from the Reactor Service Water pump house.

### **Floods Originating in Turbine, Control, ~~and or~~ Reactor Buildings, or the RSW Pump House**

*The screening analysis indicated that the flooding analysis only needed to address internal flooding from sources in the Turbine, Control, and Reactor Buildings, and the RSW Pump House. Other buildings do not contain equipment that can be used to achieve safe shutdown and flooding in those buildings cannot propagate to buildings which contain safe shutdown equipment. Although flooding originating in the Turbine Building could propagate through the Service Building and potentially enter the Control or Reactor Buildings if watertight doors fail or are left open, the analysis does not consider flooding to originate in the Service Building. The analysis addresses the potential for propagating of flooding through the Service Building.*

STP DEP T1 5.0-1

### **Operator Check Watertight Doors are Dogged**

*The flooding analysis assumes that all watertight doors ~~except the normally open main control room access door,~~ are closed and dogged to prevent floods from propagating from one area to another or from outside to the inside. The watertight doors are alarmed to alert security personnel that a watertight door is open but, with the exception of the watertight doors in the RSW pump house, will not alarm to indicate that a door is not dogged. To guard against a door being left undogged, operators should check the doors every shift to assure that they are closed and dogged. The watertight doors in the RSW pump house are alarmed if open or if left undogged. All plant entrance doors located below the ~~maximum~~ design basis flood level are provided with normally closed watertight doors or other watertight barriers. The equipment access entrances to the emergency diesel generator rooms are provided with watertight blocks that are only removed for necessary maintenance.*

### **View of the Main Cooling Reservoir**

*Plant buildings are located such that security personnel will have a clear and unobstructed view of the main cooling reservoir. Having such a view allows for prompt notification of the main control room so that ~~the normally open~~ all watertight doors ~~to the main control room~~ can be verified closed before failure of the main cooling reservoir*

could be expected to threaten the plant. The area between the plant and the main cooling reservoir is lighted so that clear views are provided at night.

#### **Operator Actions to Ensure Integrity Against External Floods**

In addition to having unobstructed views of the main cooling reservoir, security personnel will be trained to alert the main control room immediately to any indication of main cooling reservoir failure. On such notification, personnel in the main control room will ensure that ~~the access door is closed immediately~~ all watertight doors are verified closed. Also, all external doors located below the ~~maximum~~ design basis flood level will be verified closed ~~and verified~~ on notification of any upstream dam failures. The emergency procedures for Severe External Flooding ensure that watertight barriers are in place and external opening sandbagged prior to the arrival on site of high water levels from external flooding (COM 19.9-3).

Table 19.8-1 Important Features from Level 1 Internal Events Analyses

Feature	Basis
Operability of one high pressure core flooders (HPCF) loop independent of <del>essential-multiplexing-system</del> the Essential Communications Functions(2.2.6).	Provides an independent and diverse means of initiating emergency core cooling in the event of postulated common mode failures in the digital safety system logic and control (SSLC).
Conduct of quarterly testing of the <del>Essential-Multiplexing-System</del> Essential Communication Functions and the Safety System Logic and Control System.	This testing is conducted to discover faults that are not identified by the continuous self-test feature. The conduct of the quarterly testing substantially increases the reliability of the <del>Essential-Multiplexing-System</del> Essential Communication Functions and the Safety System Logic and Control System and the subsequent contribution to the low calculated CDF.

Table 19.8-5 Important Features from Flooding Analyses

Feature	Basis
<del>Anti siphon capability in RSW systems (2.11.9-Interface Requirement</del> Redundant motor-operated isolation valves which receive an automatic closure signal from the RCW/RSW heat exchanger room level switches.	<del>Anti siphon capability will prevent a control building flood from continuing to siphon water after the pumps have been stopped. Failure of this capability could increase the chances of some floods leading to core damage.</del> Redundant motor-operated isolation valves will prevent a control building flood from continuing to drain after the pumps have been stopped. Failure of this capability could increase the chances of some floods leading to core damage.
Buildings other than the Turbine, Control, and Reactor Building, and the RSW pump house, do not contain equipment that can be used to achieve safe shutdown and flooding in those buildings cannot propagate to buildings which contain safe shutdown equipment (Multiple ITAAC entries define ABWR design).	The screening analysis indicated that the flooding analysis only needed to address internal flooding from sources in the Turbine, Control, and Reactor Buildings, and the RSW pump house. If this is not the case, the basic flooding analysis could be invalidated.
<del>A maximum of 4000 meters of RSW piping is allowed between RSW isolation valves at the pump house and the Control Building (2000 meters each for supply and return).</del>	<del>Following isolation of an RSW pipe break, draining of the water in the RSW piping into the Control Building will only affect equipment in one RCW division.</del>
All external entrances to safety-related buildings located below the maximum flood level are provided with watertight doors or barriers.	Assuming that an external flooding event has occurred, ensures that no water enters safety-related buildings, thereby allowing safe shutdown of the plant.
Clear and unobstructed view of the main cooling reservoir is provided from plant buildings.	Allows prompt notification of the main control room of any potential failure of the main cooling reservoir.
Water level sensors in RSW pump rooms and logic in the control building to alert operator and trip RSW pump, and close suction and discharge motor-operated isolation valves in affected RSW division.	Assuming a flood has occurred, the water level sensors and logic, along with motoroperated isolation valve closure, are the only automatic features that can identify and terminate flooding in the RSW pump rooms.