15.2 Increase in Reactor Pressure

The information in this section of the reference ABWR DCD, including all subsections, tables, and figures, is incorporated by reference with the following departures and supplements.

STD DEP T1 2.3-1

STD DEP 8.3-1

15.2.1.3.1 Inadvertent Closure of One Turbine Control Valve

The following site-specific supplement addresses the COL License Information Item ~~in this section of~~ the reference ABWR DCD.

No departures are being taken from the fuel design licensing basis that is described in the reference ABWR DCD, including the core loading map used for response analysis in Figure 4.3-1 and the basic control strategy in Table 4A-1. Consequently, ~~T~~the analysis for the initial core is ~~will be~~ provided in subsection 15.2.1.3.1 of the DCD.~~as an amendment to the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e), at least one year prior to fuel load. This analysis will reflect the final fuel design for the initial core loading. (COM 15.2-1)~~

15.2.2.3.2.3 Generator Load Rejection with Failure of All Bypass Valves

The following site-specific supplement addresses the COL License Information Item in ~~this section of~~ the reference ABWR DCD.

No departures are being taken from the fuel design licensing basis that is described in the reference ABWR DCD, including the core loading map used for response analysis in Figure 4.3-1 and the basic control strategy in Table 4A-1. Consequently, ~~T~~the analysis for the initial core is~~will be~~ provided in subsection 15.2.2.3.2.3 of the DCD.~~as an amendment to the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e), at least one year prior to fuel load. This analysis will reflect the final fuel design for the initial core loading. (COM 15.2-2)~~

15.2.4.1.1 Identification of Causes

STD DEP T1 2.3-1

Various steamline and nuclear system malfunctions, or operator actions, can initiate main steamline isolation valve (MSIV) closure. Examples are low steamline pressure, high steamline flow, ~~high steamline radiation,~~ low water level or manual action.

15.2.6.1.1 Identification of Causes

STD DEP 8.3-1

The non-emergency AC power to the station auxiliaries is provided by three unit auxiliary transformers. The unit auxiliary transformers are powered by the unit

turbine/generator via a medium voltage generator breaker. ~~Each~~ Two of the *unit auxiliary ~~transformer~~* transformers *(UAT) ~~provides~~* provide *power to ~~three~~* two *electrical buses which provide* power to *the unit's auxiliary loads, including the reactor internal pumps (RIPs), as follows: UAT-A* and UAT-B each *~~provides~~* provide *power to a RIP MG* set *with 3 RIPs and* both UATs have *a separate bus* providing *~~powers~~* power *to 2 RIPs directly (i.e. no MG* set *)~~,UAT-B powers 2 RIPs directly (i.e., no MG), and UAT-C provides power to a RIP MG with 3 RIPs~~. Following a generator trip and during plant startup, the medium voltage generator breaker is open but the high voltage breaker at the switchyard remains closed to backfeed power from the normal preferred power grid to the unit auxiliary transformers.*

15.2.10 COL License Information

15.2.10.1 Radiological Effects of MSIV Closures

The following site-specific supplement addresses COL License Information Item 15.4.

The STP site-specific Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) long-term routine release (annual average) χ/Q is 1.5E-05~~3.3E-06~~ sec/m^3. This χ/Q value conservatively assumes no decay. ABWR DCD Table 15.2-12 provides MSIV closure doses as a function of χ/Q. The STP EAB doses associated with the inadvertent closure of MSIVs are provided below:

Dispersion sec/m^3	Thyroid mGy	W Body mGy	Beta mGy	Skin mGy
1.5E-05~~3.3E-06~~	4.5E-04~~9.9E-05~~	1.3E-02~~2.9E-03~~	2.0E-02~~4.4E-03~~	3.3E-02~~7.3E-03~~