UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL MEETING 10 WEDNESDAY MARCH 4, 2009 11 12 + + + + + ROCKVILLE, MD 13 14 The Subcommittee convened in Room T2B3 in 15 16 the Headquarters of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, White Flint North, 11545 Rockville 17 Two Pike, 18 Rockville, Maryland, at 8:30 a.m., Mr Otto Maynard, 19 Chair, presiding. 20 SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 21 OTTO MAYNARD, Chair 22 JOHN STETKAR 23 MICHAEL CORRADINI 24 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. 25 HAROLD B. RAY

1	MICHAEL T. RYAN
2	MARIO V. BONACA
3	WILLIAM J. SHACK
4	DANA A. POWERS
5	J. SAM ARMIJO
6	SANJOY BANERJEE
7	JOHN D. SIEBER
8	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
9	BRIAN HOLIAN
10	KIMBERLY GREEN
11	GLENN MEYER
12	STAN GARDOCKI
13	NAEEM IQBAL
14	BARRY ELLIOT
15	SHERWIN TURK
16	ALSO PRESENT:
17	FRED DACIMO
18	TOM McCAFFREY
19	GARRY YOUNG
20	ALAN COX
21	NELSON AZEVEDO
22	DON MAYER
23	REZA AHRABLI
24	PHILLIP MUSEGAAS

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

8:29 a.m.

CHAIR MAYNARD: All right. The meeting will now come to order.

This is a meeting of the Plant License Renewal Subcommittee to review the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 license renewal application.

I'm Otto Maynard, Chairman of this Subcommittee.

ACRS members in attendance are Jack Sieber, Sanjoy Banerjee, Sam Armijo, Dana Powers, Bill Shack, Mario Bonaca, Michael Ryan, Harold Ray, Charles Brown and John Stetkar. We're expecting Michael Corradini to joint us in a little bit.

There are some other meetings going on today so there are occasions that some of the members may be stepping out and stepping back in.

The purpose of this meeting is to review the license renewal application for the Indian Points Units 2 and 3, the staff Safety Evaluation Report with open items and associated documents.

We will hear presentations from representatives of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the applicant, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Incorporated.

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We also hear comments from Riverkeeper at the end of the meeting.

The Subcommittee will gather information and analyze relevant issues and facts and formulate proposed positions and actions as appropriate for deliberation by the full Committee. There will be no decisions made as to the ACRS's rejection or acceptance of any of the applicant or staff's review today. This can only be done by the full Committee.

The rules for participation in today's meeting were announced as part of the notice of this meeting previously published *Federal Register* on February 13, 2009.

We have received written comments from Ms.

Deborah Brancato of Riverkeeper who also requested time to make oral statements regarding today's meeting. We'll grant Ms. Brancato time at the end of this meeting to make her statements.

A transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be made available as stated in the Federal Register notice. Therefore, the request we the microphones participants in this meeting use throughout located the meeting room, themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard.

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We have several people on the phone bridge line listening to the discussions today. To preclude interruption of the meeting, the phone line is placed in a listen-in mode. It's my understanding that Ms. Brancato is on one of the phone lines and when it's time for her comments, we'll open the bridge line so we'll be able to hear and communicate with her.

I'm not going to go over the details of the plant because I think that's going to be covered by the applicant and staff in their presentations. I will say that this review is a little unique in that these two plants are the same NSSS design and on the same site, but built and operated by two different utilities and operated that way for a number of years. And therefore, that has created some challenges for me in just reading the document, keeping the plants straight what's the same, what's the different. And I'm sure that created a challenge for the staff and I'm going to be interested in hearing how both the applicant and the staff handled the differences and the similarities for the two.

We have a lot of material to cover today, so we've scheduled this for a full day rather than a half day like we have been doing for most of the applications here lately.

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We'll note also that this one come to us with a few more open items then what we've seen recently. I'd like to have the staff discuss that just a little bit.

And to keep from taking up anymore time,
I'd like to proceed with the meeting and call on Mr.
Brian Holian of NRR to introduce the speakers and today's talk.

MR. HOLIAN: Good. Thank you. And good morning, ACRS.

My name is Brian Holian. I'm the Division Director for the Division of License Renewal in NRR.

First, I'd like to cover some introductions and then briefly comment on the schedule and the application and then turn it over to the utility.

To my right, far right, is Ms. Kimberly Green. She's been the project manager for Indian Point throughout. And you'll be hearing in particular from her later during the staff presentation following the applicant's presentation.

Immediately to my right is Mr. David Wrona. He's the branch chief responsible for several plants, including Indian Point.

We do have several members of the staff

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that you'll be hearing from later in the audience, but in particular I'd like to recognize our regional representatives here today. To my left Mr. Glenn Meyer, the senior inspector from the region who you'll be hearing from on a summary and inspection report. And to his right Mr. Richard Conte, the branch chief from the Division of Reactor Safety in Region I.

Just a couple of comments relating to Indian Point. It has had an extended schedule, so I'd like to talk about schedule in particular and as that relates to the open items, as Mr Maynard had said.

I've been back from Region I for about eight or nine months now, and one of the first actions I had to do coming back was to extend the Indian Point schedule by about four months last summer. There are several reasons for that.

(1) As most people know, Indian Point is in the ASLB hearing process that we have five plants in license renewal in the hearing process right now. That results in a number of contentions and a number of issues which is a good process that provides the public an opportunity to comment on individual items.

The impact on license renewal staff is each of those items that are contentions in the hearing process takes staff that are working on our

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SER and issues there also to support OGC through that deliberative process. So that's one item that effects us.

The other item that happened probably a year before the Indian Point application as it was coming in was the Inspector General did a lengthy review of the license renewal process at the NRC. And we had a report both complimentary and critical of that license renewal process that came out from the Inspector General.

Interestingly, Indian Point the audit process and the initial SER process was hitting as the staff was reviewing and looking at the recommendations from the Inspector General's report. And one of the areas you'll see I think today is that the staff took the opportunity to make some improvements in the operating experience aspect: How well we look at the operating experience, how well we document that. I reviewed the Indian Point Safety Evaluation Report I was glad to see a lot more material in there on operating experience and how that informs our process and informs our aging management reviews. So you'll hear more from that later on.

On open items in particular that's from the staff's view, you know, not good and not bad. You

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know, I've covered both sides of that.

We've had a history of a number of open items on several plants as I look back at the plants over the last five years or so. As you go back, we had a plant with up to close to 40 open items. We've had plants within the range of five to eight over the several years. Indian Point was centering in around 20 open items. A lot of that is due to schedule. know, I mentioned at some point we have to cut off our Safety Evaluation Report and get the document ready for publication and out to the committees. continue to work those open items, as we call it, even after we close the SER with open items and issue it to the Committee. So you'll see some of that today. You'll see that we've continued over the last several months working with the applicant on addressing those open items.

Even as we closed this SER out with open items, we had a response from the applicant addressing some of those open items. And we had some choices to make, and that was to either delay the ACRS meeting further or just continue to work the items. And we chose that path.

So I think as you'll see some of the open items that we go through, they're routine and aren't

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1	necessarily indicative of any application
2	deficiencies, really. I would state it like that.
3	It's more an aspect of where we are in the review and
4	when we cut the open items off.
5	So with that, I'd like to turn over to the
6	Vice President of License Renewal for Entergy, Mr.
7	Fred Dacimo.
8	MR. DACIMO: Good morning.
9	Thank you, Brian.
10	Good morning, Mr. Maynard. My name is
11	Fred Dacimo. I'm Vice President for License Renewal.
12	Would you like us to get right into the
13	presentation this morning?
14	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes, I would.
15	MR. DACIMO: Okay. Good. Thank you.
16	Okay. So if we can bring that up.
17	I'm going to introduce the people that we
18	have Entergy from this morning.
19	Joe Pollock is in the audience. Joe is our
20	site Vice President. As you mentioned, I am Vice
21	President of License Renewal, formerly site Vice
22	President.
23	John McCann is our Director of Licensing
24	from Corporate Entergy.
25	Don Mayer is our Director of Emergency

1	Planning at the site.
2	Richard Burroni is our Manager of Programs
3	and Components.
4	Garry Young on my left is our Corporate
5	Manager of License Renewal.
6	Tom McCaffrey is our Manager of Design
7	Engineering.
8	John Curry is the Project Manager for
9	Licensing Renewal at Indian Point.
10	Mike Stroud is our Corporate Program
11	Manager for License Renewal from Corporate Jackson.
12	Alan Cox is our Technical Manager of
13	License Renewal.
14	Bob Walpole is our Manager of Licensing at
15	the site.
16	Rich Drake is our Supervisor of
17	Civil/Structural Engineering.
18	And Nelson Azevedo is our Supervisor of
19	Code Programs.
20	And we got a discount from Amtrak coming
21	down here this morning. That's not in scope.
22	This morning on the agenda I would like to
23	cover a little bit about the background. Because Mr.
24	Maynard, you mentioned it's an interesting background
25	with this plant having started with two owners; give

you an overview of the operating history.

We want to talk a little bit about major plant improvements and give the ACRS a feel for these plants from a major component perspective have largely been rebuilt. Now the list that we're going to go through I will not by any stretch of the imagination portray to you that it is a comprehensive list, but it's just to give you a general feel of the kind of capital improvements that we've made.

We're going to have a scoping discussion. We'll talk about the application NUREG-1801.

We want to give you a feel from the commitment process that we have, because we feel that we've got a very robust commitment process. Where we fall through, we'll narrow things down and we're watching industry very closely.

Obviously, we're going to discuss the topics of interests, open item and issues that we are aware of that you would like to discuss.

And certainly questions at anytime, with questions at the end.

But that's generally our agenda this morning.

The site, you have two Westinghouse NSSS plants designed by UE&C, that's United Engineers and

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Constructors with WEDCO being the actual construction entity that built the plants. has Westinghouse Indian Point pressure turbines, Siemens high pressure turbine and a GE generator. Indian Point 3 has ABB low pressure Siemens HP turbine Westinghouse turbines, and a generator. Now that immediately brings the question 10 that you initially rose. It makes for an interesting 11 operation because the components are not exactly the And we talk a little bit about the background 12 of the plant you'll see because it was owned by two 13 different companies, that is why you will see some 14 component differences between the two units. 15 PWR, large dry containment. 16 17 Both plants are licensed at 3216 megawatts electric thermal. 1078 on Unit 2, 1080 on Unit 3. 18 19 We have once-through cooling from 20 Hudson River. The plants do not have cooling towers. 21 We have on Unit 2 dual speed cir water pumps with the state-of-the-art Ristroph screens that 22 23 really minimize impact to the fishery system. As well as Indian Point 3 has variable 24 25 speed circulating water pumps with Ristroph screens.

We have a staff complement of approximately 1100 people, and that includes security.

A little bit on the operating history. Construction permit on Unit 2 was issued in October of 1966 with the operating license in September of 1973.

You can see it went commercial operation in August of '74.

You can see the three uprates that the unit went through.

Indian Point 3 is similar. We received a construction permit in August of '69. We received an operating license in December of '75 with commercial operation in August of '76. And you can see the three power uprates.

Now here's the interesting history here of Indian Point. It started out a common owner. Con Edison owned both Indian Point 1, 2 and 3. Now Indian Point 1 is currently in a safe-store condition. Fuel has been off loaded from that facility. The fuel has been removed from the spent fuel pool and the spent fuel pool drained, and I'll talk about that a little later on in the presentation. But there are a couple of small systems that support the operation of Indian Point, and we'll talk about during our course of discussion this morning also.

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But Indian Point 3 was purchased from Con Edison by the New York Power Authority in December of 1975. So that's when the plant started to -- the ownership diverged.

Indian Point 3 was purchased by Entergy in November of 2000. So you had a situation where the plants operated side-by-side with Con Ed operating Indian Point 2, New York Power Authority operating Indian Point 3 and then in November of 2000 Entergy purchased Indian Point 3.

In September of 2001 Entergy then went and purchased Indian Point 2, and 1 came along also.

So you went from one owner to two owners back to one owner. And that is kind of like what the root cause is of some of the differences that you obviously see between the two units.

We put our license renewal application in April of 2007. And you can see the expiration dates for the two units, and '13 and '15 respectively.

The intent here of this next slide is just to give you a feel for the kind of things that have been done to Unit 2. And this is really truncated list. You can see we added additional station batteries, new fan cool unit heat exchangers, new main generator, titanium condensers. We went to 24 month

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11	fuel cycles. Converted to best estimate LOCAs. Went
2	to sodium hydroid spray additive with TSP baskets in
3	containment, new low pressure turbines, new hydrogen
4	recombiners, new steam generators, new feedwater
5	heaters; a very extensive rebuild on both units to get
6	the reliability into the units that the region and the
7	company absolutely demands. And as a matter of fact,
8	in 2008 we completed the installation of a station
9	blackout Appendix Romeo diesel.
10	MEMBER SHACK: Wait. You replaced the
11	sodium hydroxide with TSP, right?
12	MR. DACIMO: That's correct.
13	MEMBER SHACK: And do you have calsil
14	insulation?
15	MR. DACIMO: Yes, we do. Yes.
16	MR. McCAFFREY: Yes, we do.
17	
_ '	MR. DACIMO: And we did strain of MODs,
18	MR. DACIMO: And we did strain of MODs, okay, and we can get into that later on, okay.
	okay, and we can get into that later on, okay.
18	, and the second se
18 19	okay, and we can get into that later on, okay. MR. McCAFFREY: Right. And we've also
18 19 20	okay, and we can get into that later on, okay. MR. McCAFFREY: Right. And we've also upgraded from the TSP to sodium tetraborate. MR. DACIMO: Right.
18 19 20 21	okay, and we can get into that later on, okay. MR. McCAFFREY: Right. And we've also upgraded from the TSP to sodium tetraborate.
18 19 20 21	okay, and we can get into that later on, okay. MR. McCAFFREY: Right. And we've also upgraded from the TSP to sodium tetraborate. MR. DACIMO: Right. MR. McCAFFREY: And that was a recent

what we did on Unit 2. charger/inverter, battery

On Unit 3, you can see we added a 4th new fire water tanks splitting off the fire, had a system for Unit 2, new SBO/Appendix Romeo diesel in '84.

Both plants had the control rooms rebuilt.

main transformer, titanium New new condensers, steam generators, feedwater new new heaters, new low pressure turbines.

Again, implemented a 24 month fuel cycle.

New high pressure turbines, new moisture separator reheaters.

So very extensive, again, rebuilt on Unit 3.

made significant investments in we upgrading the infrastructure at both plants. also tell we also paid a lot of attention to the site. And I've a photograph I'm going to show you in a minute. But in '87 a new training building was built.

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We put in a new water treatment facility. built We the new generation support facility. We felt it was very important that people who work at the plant have very good quarters to work out of, very good office quarters to work out

of. That was very important.

We initiated a dry fuel campaign for Indian Point 1, as I mentioned before. We removed all fuel from Indian Point 1 from the spent fuel pool in Indian Point 1 and then we drained the spent fuel pool. And so that's done. And those assemblies are on the pad.

At Indian Point we have removed 96 fuel assemblies. Those casks are on the pad and we are in the process now of getting into the Indian Point 3 spent fuel pool campaign, which is actually ongoing now from the standpoint of design and beginning construction later on.

In 2008 we installed the new emergency plant siren system. That is now operable. And we have planned a new emergency operations facility that will move into the design, procurement and build of that in the near future.

Current plant status is both units are operating this morning at 100 percent power. Unit 2 is online for 274 days. Unit 3 is online for 672 days. Both units are running well with no significant problems ahead of us.

Unit 3 is approaching a refuel outage next week. And Unit 2 refuels in the spring of 2010.

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MEMBER SIEBER: Is that a two-year cycle? MR. DACIMO: That's correct, two-year cycles, Mr. Sieber. Yes. This is a picture facing the river. You can get a feel in the foreground of the generation support building. You can Indian Point 1 is in the middle. That's the pancake type down and the Hudson River is in the background. Next slide. This is just to give you a feel for the 10 plant's operating history. The blue is when Entergy 11 12 purchased the plants. And so we have made some significant changes in the reliability of this unit, 13 certainly due to the investment and infrastructure as 14 15 well as the people at that facility. that, that really completes 16 With mУ 17 presentation and I'm going to turn it over to Garry. Mr. Young who is our Corporate Manager. 18 19 MEMBER SIEBER: You had a power uprate to 20 about 12 percent? 21 MR. DACIMO: Yes. We actually had the power uprates on both units listed, and you can see 22 23 there was 10 percent on Unit 3, a 10 percent uprate in '78, a 1.4 percent in 2002 and a 4.8 percent in 2005. 24 25 Okay. **MEMBER** SIEBER: So that's 14 **NEAL R. GROSS**

percent? MR. DACIMO: Right. Fifteen or so. MEMBER SIEBER: What major changes did you make to the plants to accommodate the uprates? MR. DACIMO: New turbines, new MSRs. You know, obviously, fuel load change. Okay. We also did -- I'm trying to think of what else. We had no issues with pumps, pumps had plenty of margin. Okay. Those are the big picture 10 changes we made to the plant. MEMBER BANERJEE: When did you change your 11 12 steam generators? MR. DACIMO: On Unit 2 the 13 steam generators were changed out, I believe, it was in '99. 14 And on Unit 3 the steam generators were changed out in 15 189. 16 17 MEMBER SIEBER: Ι take it you condensers problems at one time to the extent that you 18 19 had struggled with chemistry control in the steam 20 generators? 21 MR. DACIMO: The history of steam generators certainly is typical what you see in the 22 23 And that's why a lot of plants went to titanium condensers. Same with, you know, minimize 24

cooper intrusion to the steam generators, absolutely.

	23
1	Right.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: What did you have before?
3	MR. DACIMO: I believe it was a Admiralty
4	bronze.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Admiralty?
6	MR. DACIMO: Yes, Admiralty bronze
7	condensers.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Right. Okay. So you
9	didn't have failures where you were leeching the water
10	cooper?
11	MR. DACIMO: Right. Right.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. What experience
13	have you had with condenser tube leaks currently?
14	MR. DACIMO: The condensers
15	MEMBER SIEBER: The Hudson is not perfect
16	from the standpoint of
17	MR. DACIMO: It's brackish water. But I
18	got to tell you, the condenser reliability has been
19	very good. And we have plugged very few tubes.
20	We had one defect on Indian Point 3 a few
21	years ago. It appeared to have been an original
22	construction defect. But other than that, the
23	condensers have been very reliable.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Your chemistry control on
25	the secondary side is moler chemistry control?

MR. DACIMO: When you say "mole" I have--MEMBER SIEBER: Mole ratio. MR. DACIMO: Mole ratio? MEMBER SIEBER: Is that true or not? MR. DACIMO: I'll have to get an answer to I'll have to get an answer to you. MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Yes, maybe you could describe what your chemistry program is? MR. DACIMO: Sure. Be happy to do that. Typically people went to 10 MEMBER SIEBER: all-volatile --11 12 MR. DACIMO: Other questions? Okay, Garry. 13 MR. YOUNG: Okay. I'm Garry Young. 14 And 15 I'm the Manager of the Fleet License Renewal 16 Entergy. I'm going to talk a little bit about the 17 application, the preparation of the application and 18 19 some background on our commitments and our plans to implement our comments. 20 21 First of all, the application itself, this will be the sixth license renewal application that we 22 23 brought to the NRC and to the ACRS for review. incorporated lessons learned 24 from these previous 25 applications. And both the internal lessons learned that we've had with our previous projects, this includes Arkansas Nuclear 1, Unit 1 and 2, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee and Fitzpatrick. But in addition to that we also got lessons learned from the industry through the Nuclear Energy Institute, the experiences of other utilities. And we factored that into our application.

We then did a peer review of our application once it was drafted. Again, working with the Nuclear Energy Institute to have other utilities look at our application, utilities that were in the process of preparing license renewal applications. They gave us feedback and comments.

We had internal reviews of the application by our on site and off site Safety Review Committees and, of course, by our QA.

The application prepared was by essentially the same team that's prepared the other Entergy applications. It's a combination of Corporate Group that has a lot of experience with doing license renewal applications. But then it was supplemented heavily by people with experience at Indian Point so that we got the benefit of detailed knowledge of the plant, the systems and the operating experience that were factored into the

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We then addressed all the comments received from all of these sources and incorporated them into the application.

And another item I'd like to comment here is on the scoping. This was somewhat of a challenge since we had two Westinghouse units but they were built at different points in time. And as a result of that because of some evolving licensing and industry issues in the 1970s, we wound with up a very different split of boundaries for systems. And the actual number of components and the design of the two plants are in fact very similar, but the designation of system boundaries is very different.

And, for example, Indian Point 2 has about half as many systems as Indian Point 3 in our component database.

Another example, just to give you an idea the RHR system between the two units almost identical in boundaries and in the description in the application. But the condensate and feedwater system is an example where Indian Point 2 has two of condensate that form the makeup and feedwater and Indian Point 3 has seven systems. So that's difference the why you such а in see

application in the names of the systems and the number of systems. But in reality if you just look at a piping diagram, they would look very similar.

Okay. The next slide is on the aging management reviews that were done. We used NEI 95-10, which is the industry guidance document for performing aging management reviews for the integrated plant assessment and the time limited aging analyses.

The aging management review results were very consistent with NUREG-1801, the GALL report. we calculated that about 90 percent of the aging management review line items were what we call the notes A through E, which are the notes that show consistency with the GALL report, which is typical for a plant. The other ten percent that did not match generally unique material GALL environment are combinations or components that are not addressed in And, again, that's typical for plants that are GALL. doing license renewal currently.

MEMBER SIEBER: Were you required to take exceptions because of the references to code years versus your licensing basis?

MR. YOUNG: There were a few cases of that, yes. Yes.

MEMBER SIEBER: Is it a few or a lot, or

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how many?

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MR. YOUNG: I've got a later slide that I'll go into that. But there were actually eight of our aging management programs that we actually took exceptions. And some of them were in that category, certainly not all of them.

MEMBER SIEBER: Maybe you could tell us specifically which ones were.

MR. YOUNG: Okay. On the next slide we have 41 aging management programs that we credited for Thirty-one of these programs are license renewal. existing programs and 10 are new programs. The 10 new programs are the ones that you typically see, which include things like non-EO cable inspection our programs, buried piping inspection programs and so on.

In the comparison to NUREG-1801, the GALL report, the breakdown we had is we had eight plant-specific programs that were not GALL programs. And then we had 33 programs that were GALL programs. Of the 33 programs we had eight that had exceptions to GALL.

And some of the examples of the exceptions
-- well, for example, we had the flow-accelerated
corrosion program. We used a later revision of an NSAC
document than the one that's in GALL. So that was an

exception using a newer edition of that document.

In some other cases we substituted some inspections or some criteria; oil analysis program. We do fuel dilution testing, which is different than the flash point testing that's in GALL, but it is more prescriptive.

In our fire protection program GALL recommends a six month interval for inspections and we're doing it on a fuel cycle basis, 24 months; 18 to 24 months, which again is a typical exception to GALL that other utilities have taken.

All of these exceptions, these eight exceptions that we took are similar to ones that had been previously taken by other applicants. And they are also being provided to the NRC staff as part of the GALL revision to see if we can incorporate some of these exceptions into GALL so that in the future we won't have to take these exceptions because they have been reviewed and accepted on other applicants as well as on Indian Point.

Does that answer your question? Okay.

The next slide, our commitment process.

We have made at this point 38 commitments in our license renewal application in the review process. We have made adjustments to those commitments based on

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the NRC review of both the audits and inspection process. So some of these commitments that are in the application have been revised and modified as a result of the ongoing review.

We're using the Indian Point commitment management process which is the same sort of commitment management process we have at our other Entergy plants.

For example right now at Indian Point we have about 10,000 commitments that are being managed by this program, so these additional 38 will also be managed by that same process.

This commitment management process is a well established process and consistent with industry guidance and standards. Entergy periodically does inspections and self-assessments of the commitment management system to ensure that it's working effectively. And, again, this is the same process that we used at our other Entergy plants for managing our commitments.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Is the number of commitment items for the Indian Point plants consistent with the rest of the Entergy fleet?

MR. YOUNG: Yes.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Ten thousand is not an

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unusually high number or anything like that? YOUNG: No. No. It's very similar. MR. Yes. Thank you. MEMBER ARMIJO: That is a two unit site, so it MR. YOUNG: has that difference. MEMBER ARMIJO: Right. Right. MR. YOUNG: Yes, but on a per unit basis it would be. 10 Okay. The next slide is our implementation activities. 11 WE are taking a 12 approach implementation of these to our aging management programs and other commitments. 13 Again, we have a lot of sites that have committed to many of 14 15 these same programs, but each site actually owns the 16 implementation. And then we have a corporate or fleet group that helps provide oversight, consistency and 17 18 support for each individual site, in this case Indian 19 Point. We have a fleet manager that's looking 20 21 overall for the implementation activities for the 22 whole fleet. But then we also have a site coordinator 23 at each site that deals with the specifics. schedule developed 24 We have а for 25 implementing these commitments and we're continually updating and revising that schedule as we develop our aging management programs.

We have several of these programs that are common to the fleet, such things as the buried piping inspection program, the non-EG cable inspection program. We have developed in some cases a fleet standard and then each site will implement that incorporating the site specific differences.

We are still developing some of these programs, some of these new programs. They're not all developed yet, but we have a few that have been developed. And this will continue as we approach the period of extended operation.

Okay. And that completes that presentation on the application itself and the management of commitments and the implementation plans.

The next slide we're going to get into the SER open items. And as I mentioned, we have a total of 20 open items in the SER. And we have been providing information to the NRC staff as requested to allow them to finish their review. Out of the 20 items at this time we believe there are 13 in which we provided the information the staff requested. And it's our understanding that that has addressed their open

1	item. So we put those in the category of ready to
2	close. So on this here when you see "ready," that
3	means that we have provided the information to staff.
4	The staff has indicated that at this time they don't
5	have anymore questions. So they're in the processing
6	of closing. It doesn't mean they're closed.
7	MEMBER BANERJEE: So taken an example,
8	maybe, and take us through.
9	MR. YOUNG: Well, for example, we
10	MEMBER BANERJEE: Can you take the first
11	one, perhaps? Was it they were not part of the MR or
12	something?
13	CHAIR MAYNARD: You're going to go through
14	each one of these, aren't you?
15	MEMBER BANERJEE: Oh, you are?
16	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes.
17	MEMBER BANERJEE: You're going to? Go
18	through each one of these open items?
19	MR. YOUNG: We were planning to focus on
20	just the ones in which the staff is still continuing
21	their review.
22	MEMBER BANERJEE: On their review?
23	MR. YOUNG: And the ones that were
24	resolved, we didn't plan to go through one-by-one.
25	CHAIR MAYNARD: So I think we still may

have questions on this. MR. YOUNG: Yes. CHAIR MAYNARD: Because while the staff may be ready and they can address it --MR. YOUNG: Yes. We haven't really been CHAIR MAYNARD: provided that information. MR. YOUNG: Right. CHAIR MAYNARD: So as far as we're concerned they're still open. 10 11 MR. YOUNG: Right. 12 CHAIR MAYNARD: And we'll still need some dialogue on those items. 13 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. 14 Otto, 15 **MEMBER** STETKAR: when 16 appropriate time to do that? Because I've 17 looking forward a little bit and some of the questions 18 I had we'll get into more details, but some will 19 pertain to the ones that are tagged on this slide as ready. So is it appropriate --20 21 CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes. I think what I'd 22 like to do is to go ahead and let them go through the 23 presentation. We'll focus on the ones that are still 24 open and it will come back those they said ready, and 25 then we'll pick those up.

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1	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
2	CHAIR MAYNARD: So I do want to save time
3	for that.
4	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
5	CHAIR MAYNARD: Because a number of us
6	have questions on those.
7	MR. YOUNG: Okay. Certainly, yes.
8	CHAIR MAYNARD: Again, we haven't seen the
9	staff's resolution or their finals on that.
10	MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. And these next
11	three slides are, again, are just a listing of the 20
12	open items and the status as we understand it at this
13	point. Again, there's seven that the NRC staff is
14	still continuing their review and then 13 which we
15	think we've provided the information that was needed
16	to close.
17	MEMBER BANERJEE: So by ready you mean the
18	staff have closed these items.
19	MR. YOUNG: No. They are not closed. The
20	staff has asked for
21	MEMBER BANERJEE: You've sent down?
22	MR. YOUNG: We've sent the information.
23	MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay. So the staff is
24	still evaluating it?
25	MR. YOUNG: They're still evaluating. But

they've indicated that that information was what they needed. MEMBER BANERJEE: And when you mean "NRC review," you haven't down, is that what it means? MR. YOUNG: No. The -- on the one --What's the difference MEMBER BANERJEE: between "ready" and "NRC review." CHAIR MAYNARD: I think they're saying that out of the 20 open items seven of them I believe the staff still considers open, 13 I think the staff 10 is about to close. I think the staff's going to have 11 12 to be the one to address that. And I think that's the way they're putting it in the category is that --13 MR. YOUNG: Yes. 14 15 MR. HOLIAN: That's right. That's a good 16 summary. 17 MEMBER BROWN: So we should wait address questions on those potentially being closed 18 19 until we hit the closed ones or --20 MR. HOLIAN: Yes. CHAIR MAYNARD: Well, why not just go 21 ahead and let them go through the presentation, focus 22 23 on the seven that are still open. We will come back to any of them that did not get touched. 24 25 MR. YOUNG: Okay.

CHAIR MAYNARD: But we'll expect them to address this stuff. I don't want to just wait until the staff gets up here and find out they're trying to address it.

MR. YOUNG: Okay. Again, there were three slides that just listed all of the open items and the status as we understand at this point.

On slide 24 these are the ones, the seven remaining open items in which the staff is continuing And we've provided information on all their review. of these, but there may be additional information needed by the staff to finish their review is I think the way to characterize it. And what we'll do is on each one of these seven items on this slide on the list that we're calling remaining open items, we're going to provide a more detailed discussion by the experts in these areas. And then we've also got three what we call topics of interest which were topics that requested to provide a presentation were involving the reactor vessel integrity, buried piping program and the containment liner event that occurred in 1973 and the impacts of that. So we'll have a presentation on each one of these in more detail.

MEMBER BANERJEE: That was in OP2 the '73 event?

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MR. YOUNG: Yes.

CHAIR MAYNARD: And again, I won't try to get through this. We'll control the pace because it'll probably be more by a number of questions we ask on these. But we do need to have time to address questions on the other 13.

MR. YOUNG: Yes. Certainly.

Okay. And with that, I'll turn it over to Tom McCaffrey is going to talk about this first open item on the station blackout scope.

MR. McCAFFREY: Thank you. I'm Tom McCaffrey. I'm the Design Engineer Manager at Indian Point.

For the station blackout scoping we have complied for Unit 2 and Unit 3 meeting the 10 CFR 50.4 (a)(3) in the scoping. We've complied with the NUREG guidance of 1800 for the alleged renewal scoping, the recovery boundary for the station blackout.

Right now we're in compliance with the draft guidelines provided by the NRC as a revision to the ISG 2008-01.

Basically right now both of our station blackout recovery paths, the primary path which is the through 138 kV system and the alternate system, the 13.8 are also included in the scoping from The

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39 Buchanan Substation to the power plant. MEMBER STETKAR: Tom, do you drawing that shows -- as I read through the SER and various, there seemed to be various concepts of exactly what paths were included in this evolution. MR. McCAFFREY: Yes. MEMBER STETKAR: Do you have a drawing that what's currently included in shows your application? 10 MR. McCAFFREY: Yes, we do. 11 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. CHAIR MAYNARD: You have have 12 to microphone. 13 MR. McCAFFREY: Sorry about that. 14 15 Okav. So what we have here is schematic we provided in the application. We have two 16 paths of station blackout recovery. One is to our 17 normal 137 kV feeder from Buchanan Substation down to 18 19 the station. On the right side here is our is 13.8 kV alternate supply down to the nuclear power point. 20 21 There's two supplies and they're both contained in the Buchanan Substation, the supplies. 22 23 That's the Con Edison Substation that contains the

345, 138 and 13.8 kV systems where we generate and transit and get power from for the power plant.

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1	MEMBER BROWN: So they're physically
2	located contiguous to each other?
3	MR. McCAFFREY: Yes, they are. They're
4	about three quarters of a mile away from the power
5	plant, directly across the street from the entrance to
6	the
7	MEMBER BROWN: But they're both in the
8	same location?
9	MR. McCAFFREY: Correct. The same yard.
10	Yes. The same operator who reports to that substation
11	will be operate the 345, 138 and 13.8 kV systems.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Is that manned around the
13	clock?
14	MR. McCAFFREY: That is a manned. The
15	operator reports there. That's a reporting station but
16	does not have to be there. Con Edison has the ability
17	to remotely operate all the breakers from their
18	normally manned location in New York City.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Their dispatch
20	office?
21	MR. McCAFFREY: Correct.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
23	MR. DACIMO: But typically during the week
24	and most times Saturdays on the day shift there are
25	people that

MEMBER SIEBER: But if they aren't there 24 hours, it's --MR. McCAFFREY: They always report there. That's a typical reporting station. So the operator will report there. If they need his help at another substation, they might take him out of there. But that is a critical substation for Con Edison from just a transition flow. So they always try to keep an operator in that substation. 10 MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. do you have any 11 MEMBER STETKAR: Tom, 12 other drawings that actually shows the 137 and 13.8 kV -- the 3.5, 138 and 13.8 kV switchyard configurations? 13 MR. McCAFFREY: Yes. 14 15 MEMBER STETKAR: These kind of go off into there. 16 17 MR. McCAFFREY: Yes. This does not show the 345 kV system because that's really --18 19 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, but you're 20 taking credit for that. 21 MR. McCAFFREY: So what we see here is the highlighted lines are currently what is in scope for 22 23 the station blackout recovery. It's the breakers that supply the normal feed into the station 24 25 and would be the SBO recovery path. And the alternate

1	13.8 kV supplies into the substation down at the
2	plant.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Let me see if I can
4	digest this for just a second. This shows both paths
5	from IP2, is that correct? It shows BT3-4 and
6	MR. McCAFFREY: I'll walk you through it.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, if you could. That
8	would help.
9	MR. McCAFFREY: The unit 2 there, the
10	power line up in here through this, BT3-4, right?
11	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
12	MR. McCAFFREY: And Unit 3 is this one,
13	right. BT5-6 comes in from the side here from IP3.
14	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
15	MR. McCAFFREY: That's the 138 kV supplies
16	into both station.
17	MR. McCAFFREY: Now down here below
18	MEMBER STETKAR: That shows the 13.8 down
19	below.
20	MR. McCAFFREY: it's the 13.8 kV
21	supply.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
23	MR. McCAFFREY: Any connections in the
24	substation there between the 138 kV system and the
25	13.9 kV system, which is all still contained in the

Buchanan Substation, which is across the street from the power plant. MEMBER SIEBER: Now the equipment in the Buchanan Substation is not owned by Entergy? MR. McCAFFREY: And that's not true. Part of the equipment owned by the substation is owned by Entergy and the station is manned by Con Edison and they own the majority of the equipment the substation. SIEBER: Do you down MEMBER 10 Entergy own or does Con Ed own the whiteout path? MR. McCAFFREY: The two breakers that are 11 associated with the 13.8 kV supply alternate are 12 Entergy's feeders and breakers. The 138 kV feeders 13 and breakers are Entergy's breakers and feeders into 14 15 the station. MEMBER SIEBER: So the answer is yes? 16 17 MR. McCAFFREY: Correct. MEMBER SIEBER: That would have been even 18 19 better. Okay. In other words, you don't have 20 anything that you don't own, Entergy doesn't own as 21 license renewal responsibility to part of your maintain? 22 23 MR. McCAFFREY: As is currently -- yes, that's correct. As it's currently in the application, 24 25 yes.

MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Is it going to stay that way? MR. DACIMO: There is no plans to sell anything. MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. MR. McCAFFREY: Right. No plans. MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, but the way you phrased it --MR. McCAFFREY: I'd just say there's draft 10 guidelines out that we believe that we meet compliance with that based upon what I've shown you here today. 11 12 MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. MR. McCAFFREY: The draft guidelines will 13 have to evaluate any of those changes, that change 14 15 then we have to see how we comply with the draft quidelines. 16 CHAIR MAYNARD: I'd like to move on. We 17 have a number of issues. This is also something, 18 19 station blackout scoping stuff that's under review by NRR. There's some more generic items here. And so I 20 21 think that's still under review. So I think --22 This gets to what my MEMBER STETKAR: 23 questions were, so that's fine. MR. McCAFFREY: Okay. And I'll turn it 24 25 over to Alan Cox.

1	MR. COX: The next topic of interest that
2	we have is the auxiliary feedwater pump room fire
3	event. And actually what this is talking about is the
4	aging management approach for systems that are relied
5	on in the event of a fire integrated in the feedwater
6	pump room.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: Now, you have two motor
8	driven and a steam driven and they're all in one room?
9	MR. COX: That's correct.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: So a fire in that room
11	wipes out that aux feed system and then you have an
12	alternate means? Okay.
13	MEMBER STETKAR: Alan, before you go into
14	the specifics for Unit 2 isn't the Unit 3
15	configuration the same? Don't you have two motor
16	driven and a turbine driven pump in the same room for
17	Unit 3?
18	MR. COX: Yes.
19	MEMBER STETKAR: Why is here not a
20	companion Unit 3 auxiliary feedwater room fire event?
21	MR. COX: Well, the Unit 3 auxiliary
22	feedwater pump has a fire suppression system installed
23	in the room, whereas the Unit 2 not.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Does that count? Does
1	

that count as far as your fire protection program? Usually you talk about barriers with suppression systems --MEMBER BANERJEE: These are what, Halon? MR. COX: I believe it's a --MR. DACIMO: The Unit 3 system is a bottle system. And I believed it is Halon. MEMBER SIEBER: Or whatever is successful. MR. DACIMO: Right. Yes, because haven't replaced that. Okay. 10 MEMBER SIEBER: I'll have to think about 11 that. 12 MEMBER BANERJEE: I noticed that --13 MR. COX: I would point out there's very 14 little in the way of combustible loading in the room. 15 So it's very unlikely. Basically in this event a one 16 hour period is assumed for duration when the room 17 would be inaccessible to the operators. And for that 18 19 a one hour period in this event we're crediting 20 normally operating secondary plant system to provide 21 the alternate flow path to get feedwater to the steam 22 generators. 23 MEMBER STETKAR: And just of curiosity, after the one hour time expires what type 24 25 of operator actions are you crediting after the room

MR. COX: Well, after the room becomes accessible we'd be able to restore the auxiliary feedwater system from one of the other train in that room to provide feedwater.

MEMBER STETKAR: That presumes that the fire doesn't effect all of the trains that are in the same room?

MR. COX: Right. So again --

MEMBER SIEBER: I also presume the staff has accepted this as part -- or as part or is fire modeling?

MR. COX: Right. This is part of the IP2 correlation basis, yes.

MEMBER SIEBER: Typically other licenses have done other things, like put a pump in a different room with diesel power.

MR. COX: Again, for license renewal we basically worked with the current licensing basis and this was because this was credited for compliance with 50.48. That's the reason we included these systems in scope.

MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, you could.

MR. COX: Now the unique thing about these systems, the credited systems for this event

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perform their function, the same function during normal operations as the function that they're required to perform during event. So that allowed us an opportunity to take just a unique but still very effective approach to aging management. And that is that the normal operation of the system doing its function intended demonstrates that it will be available for this one hour period that is required to respond to this event.

Ι mentioned that this is unique That while it is unique for Indian Point, approach. this approach is an approach that's fairly common for plants specifically related to the main PWR condenser where acceptable performance of the main condenser during normal operation has routinely has been determined adequate to provide assurance that that condenser remains operable to performance license renewal post-accident intended functions.

So in essence, for IP2 operation of the secondary plant system, you know, right up to the initiation of this event provides the assurance that those same systems are able to perform essentially those same functions during an event. That is of providing an alternate path of feedwater to the steam generator.

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The staff did ask us for some additiona
information. We provided to them, I believe toward th
end of January we gave them some more detaile
component information on the components that ar
associated with these systems and also identifie
which of the components were covered under other agin
management programs. Specifically since these were i
the turbine building we do have some safety-relate
equipment in that turbine building. Most of th
secondary plant fluid field systems are in scope o
(a)(2) and are covered under other aging managemen
programs.
MEMBER BANERJEE: Are there passiv
components? Of course there are, right?
MR. COX: Certainly. Okay. So piping
that sort of thing, would certainly be passiv

components that are included in this evaluation.

Like I say, a lot of them were included for (a)(2) and, of course, the steam systems that are involved in this are part of the --

MEMBER BANERJEE: So how are you, Garry, going to manage the aging, these passive systems?

MR. COX: Again, in this case the normal operation of the plant is putting these systems through their paces under the same design basis

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1	conditions that they will see for this one hour
2	period. So that we basically determined there is no
3	conditional aging management program required for
4	these components because of that demonstration.
5	MEMBER BANERJEE: And the staff agrees
6	with that?
7	MR. YOUNG: That is still under review.
8	MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay. Is that still one
9	of the open items?
10	MR. COX: The concept they've agreed with,
11	again on the BWR side of things, for the main
12	condenser which is credited for a function of hold up
13	and plate out
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Until they write it down,
15	they don't agree.
16	MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay. That is fine. Go
17	ahead.
18	MR. YOUNG: Okay. The next subject Rich
19	Drake will provide the discussion.
20	MR. DRAKE: I am Rich Drake. I'm the
21	Civil/Structural Engineering Supervisor at Indian
22	Point. And I'm responsible for the structural
23	monitoring programs.
24	IP2 reactor cavity structural integrity.
25	The stainless steel liner leakage occurs has

started occurring during the outages starting in the 1970s and then mole leaks started to increase more significantly into 1990s. The refueling cavity is only flooded approximately two weeks every two years during the outages.

Three areas in 1993 were examined with core bore samples in several locations and an area of concrete reenforcing was opened up behind the liner. The evaluation of the concrete samples concluded that the concrete and rebar behind the cavity liner was fully capable of meeting its intended design function for the license renewal period. Minimal effects on reenforcing found. The borated the was penetration was determined to be less than a half inch into the concrete. And the concrete typically has over two inches of concrete cover over the reenforcing steel.

MEMBER SIEBER: What impact has the borated water have on the strength of the concrete? Will it spall off?

MR. DRAKE: No. It was determined that it had very little effect to the concrete.

MEMBER SIEBER: And how did you determine that?

MR. DRAKE: We did core bore samples into

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1	the concrete bening the liner.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: So you cut holes in the
3	liner?
4	MR. DRAKE: Cut holes in the liner, took
5	some core bores and we exposed an area of the
6	reenforcing steel.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: What does the sampling
8	program look like?
9	MR. DRAKE: We took several core bores and
10	we took some breaks and they also did some sampling to
11	determine the extent that borated water would actually
12	penetrate into the concrete. And it was much less than
13	a half inch into the concrete. So it never reached the
14	reenforcing steel through the normal path.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: So far? So far.
16	MR. DACIMO: Well, we also have extensive
17	experience from Indian Point 1 where the Indian Point
18	1 spent fuel pool, which we mentioned, was drained.
19	That pool did not have a liner at all.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. It was like shipping
21	port.
22	MR. DACIMO: Right, exactly. So, you
23	know, and there were some investigations there that
24	indicated that indicated wearing issues.
25	MR. DRAKE: We've done other

That wasn't MEMBER SIEBER: borated, though, was it? MR. DACIMO: At one point in time it was. Absolutely. MR. DRAKE: Yes. MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. MEMBER BANERJEE: What caused the leakage to start in the '70s? Do you recall, do you remember? MR. DRAKE: It's through some pinhole leaks in plug welds or also some porosity in the welds 10 The areas that have been identified have 11 themselves. 12 been plug welds and the weld seams. Typically the leakage occurs midway up on the liner in the weld 13 That's where some of the biggest concerns are. 14 15 And then the plug welds. We've taken remedial action. Over the 16 17 course of the year we've used ceramalite coatings over these identified locations. We use an instacoat 18 19 strippable coating during the refuel outages. And the areas that have been coated are varied with different 20 21 success levels. 22 MEMBER SIEBER: In other words, it didn't 23 work? MR. DRAKE: We're still trying to narrow 24 25 down all the locations.

1	MEMBER SIEBER: Did you ever consider
2	rewelding the areas that are bad, and is that
3	possible?
4	MR. DRAKE: It would be a very dose
5	concentration area.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you could a lot
7	of people have put strippable paint on those
8	MR. DRAKE: Well, that's what we did. We
9	did strippable coating and the
10	CHAIR MAYNARD: But even with that you
11	failed to correct?
12	MR. DRAKE: Yes, we've had limited
13	we've had some success with that. And then the liner
14	during the hydrostatic pressure will deflect slightly
15	in certain locations at the mid height. And that with
16	the strippable coating when we had the ceramalite
17	coating, which is very rigid, we actually had like a
18	knife edge and it cut it and then we started leaking
19	on that.
20	CHAIR MAYNARD: How are you identifying
21	the leakage?
22	MR. DRAKE: It drips down into the 46 foot
23	elevation, which is our bottom elevation normally. And
24	it's captured within the side crane wall. I have
25	another slide I could get to and I could show you

that.

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MEMBER STETKAR: Before we get to the flow path, what was your experience in the 2008 outage? Did you have a leak in 2008 also?

MR. DRAKE: We did still have leakage.

MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.

MEMBER SIEBER: What's troublesome here is that you have a defective condition that you say today is okay but you're asking for 28 years more of a defective condition that can get worse at anytime?

MR. DRAKE: Yes, and we know.

MEMBER SIEBER: To me that's troublesome.

MR. DRAKE: Yes. We are -- presume we are looking at new processes to go. We are pursuing an ARVA process which has had success both overseas and the United States, which is a flexible silicone with a stainless steel backing to it, which we're going to apply.

We're also looking at Westinghouse processes which are still in the commercial development stage. But we are looking at other processes.

MR. DACIMO: But I think to answer your question directly we don't see that while it is a troublesome condition and doesn't meet our

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expectations, it doesn't effect structural integrity of anything that it impacts --MEMBER SIEBER: Today? MR. DACIMO: -- both in the short term and as we extrapolate it out in the long term --MEMBER SIEBER: I --MR. DACIMO: Just let me finish. Based on our experience and investigation, we don't think it's going to effect the long term structural integrity 10 either based on our investigation. MR. DRAKE: We've also made a commitment 11 12 to do --MR. DACIMO: Right. 13 -- extra in upcoming outages 14 MR. DRAKE: to do more core bore samplings and expose another area 15 of reenforcement to determine that. 16 MR. DACIMO: And we will continue to look 17 at this on a going forward basis. And we have a 18 19 formal commitment to do that while we pursue -- as a 20 matter of fact it's quite active, a different repair 21 methodology. 22 MR. DRAKE: Before we do repair 23 methodology we're going to examine that area first and then do the repair. 24 25 MEMBER SIEBER: The staff has an open item

and is considering, right? MR. DRAKE: Yes. MEMBER SIEBER: I'll wait until you make the decision. MEMBER BANERJEE: You were going to show us the flow path. MR. COX: This is Alan Cox. I might add that at the time that we do we have a commitment to do these additional core bore samples. At that time we will have had over 30 years 10 of operation with this condition. So we feel like 11 12 that's a pretty good indication of what we can expect going forward. We're going to have a long history of 13 this condition. We'll be evaluating it at the end of 14 15 that 30 year period. MR. DACIMO: And then when you factor in 16 some of the industry OE there is also a significant 17 body of experience that's out there upon which we can 18 19 draw upon for similar conditions. MEMBER BANERJEE: Could we get copies of 20 21 these backup slide that you're showing us now. 22 MR. DRAKE: This one here is the --23 MEMBER BANERJEE: Oh, it is in there. 24 MR. DRAKE: This is on the next page. 25 So what I'd like to show here --

CHAIR MAYNARD: And anything they use as a backup slide, that gets into the record and we'll get copies.

MR. DRAKE: So our next slide, basically this is a cross section length wise through the reactor activity and the refueling --

MEMBER BANERJEE: It's hard to read the lettering here.

MR. DRAKE: Yes, I'm sorry about that. It's really just for schematics here.

So this is here the cavity length of some of the areas that are leaking in particular, the welds about midway high up in the cavity. And then most of it drips down through construction joints or cracks and it's inside the crane wall. And here is the trench inside the crane wall that will then take it to the reactor sumps, containment sumps. There is all coated with coatings for decon purposes and it capture the water.

The containment liner is way outside and through several other concrete barriers. And this is all captured inside the crane wall, that's where the reactor cavity is. So we capture some here that goes to the containment sump and there's some down below the reactor in the reactor cavity sump down here.

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1	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Now you say it only
2	occurs when you get like above half?
3	MR. DRAKE: That's when we can see that
4	it'll be about half way up. And then it starts leaking
5	instantaneously and then we start draining down, when
6	we get below that point it stops almost
7	instantaneously. It has there must be a small
8	annulus behind the liner that allows it freely flow.
9	CHAIR MAYNARD: And how much volume?
10	MR. DRAKE: I don't know. It's varied
11	every year during the sump mod
12	CHAIR MAYNARD: Is it
13	MR. DACIMO: Well, it's in the area in
14	the area when you fully flow we've seen about 4 gpm
15	is on the outside.
16	MR. DRAKE: Yes, that was the worst case.
17	MEMBER STETKAR: Explain to me a little
18	bit. This in the cross section is a little bit. But
19	how is the water getting I reckon it comes through
20	the liner
21	MR. DRAKE: Yes.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: but does it then seep
23	into concrete and essentially seep out of concrete
24	down at the 46 foot levels?
25	MR. DRAKE: Yes. Basically there's

construction joints and there's some cracks in the concrete that will allow it to come through. MEMBER STETKAR: Now I'm curious about the fact that you said the boric acid is only been -- I don't remember what you said, a half inch or an inch? MR. DRAKE: A half inch into the concrete. MEMBER STETKAR: Because if the water is flowing through several feet of concrete, couldn't it distributed throughout the entire length 10 whatever crack system it's flowing through? It's at -- well, the bottom 11 MR. DRAKE: And it pretty much comes straight 12 portions there. down through the -- into the -- inside the crane wall. 13 MEMBER STETKAR: Where is the construction 14 15 joint? Well, there's several. 16 MR. DRAKE: can't see them on here. But there's cracks that come 17 through the base underneath the fuel pool. 18 MEMBER BROWN: So it's crack leakage, not 19 diffusion for the concrete? 20 21 MR. DRAKE: No, no, no. It comes through the construction cracks. 22 23 The space between the liner, MR. DACIMO: the liner butts up against the concrete wall. 24 When 25 the water penetrates the liner through a defect, okay,

61 and that's where it's flowing down. It flows down against the outside of that wall to a joint at the bottom where a horizontal wall meets a vertical wall. And it ends up in the -- when you go down to the basement of the vapor containment, you can see it coming out of those joints. And then it's captured in a sump that's coated with an epoxy paint. MEMBER STETKAR: You know those are flow paths --

MR. DACIMO: We have a general -- a very good understanding of the flow path and then we have a capture mechanism and we get a correlation

between the makeup related to the pool as well as

the--

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MEMBER STETKAR: No. I was iust more interested as long as you know what that flow path rather than a --

No, but at 40 gpm you're MEMBER SHACK: certainly going to have that annulus full. And if there are cracks, it's going to diffuse through. I can believe that it only goes a half an inch through anyplace that you have integral concrete. But I would also think that it would follow any crack.

MR. DACIMO: Yes. And that's why you see it coming out of more than one location.

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MR. DRAKE: Yes. And it goes -- it's got a free path to go straight down. So it --MEMBER SHACK: Yes, but at 40 gpm --MEMBER SIEBER: That's a lot of water. MEMBER SHACK: -- you know, it's not as though it's a drip sort of rolling down that wall. mean that annulus is full and it's going to whichever way happens to be the easiest way to go. MEMBER BANERJEE: So the surface of these cracks, would the effect go in from -- let's say you 10 have a system of cracks, and cracks in this medium, 11 12 would the effect be felt half an inch from the surface of the cracks or is it just half an inch from the 13 surface? 14 MR. DRAKE: Well, we looked at it from the 15 surface of behind the plate. But, I mean --16 MEMBER BANERJEE: But if you look around 17 the cracks, let's see to the sample around the crack, 18 19 will you find some permeation or is that not? Well, we've done 20 MR. DRAKE: other sampling in other places in the plant where we've had 21 such -- we'll talk about spent fuel pool later, and 22 23 we've actually examined those cracks and the rebar there and found that they do very well. There's been 24 25 studies to show that concrete will protect the rebar

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MEMBER BANERJEE: So let's say you had a crack in the concrete, does the water diffuse or whatever mechanism it is, penetrates on both sides of the crack to within half an inch or --

MR. DRAKE: It probably could.

MEMBER BANERJEE: Could?

MR. DRAKE: We evaluated the rebar also assuming certain thing with that and it still meets design function.

MEMBER BANERJEE: So if the rebar, is there any cracks which are in the vicinity of rebar, like cracks going through the system or --

MR. DRAKE: Yes.

MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay. So the effect could reach the rebar?

MR. DRAKE: Yes. No. And that was evaluated from that respect also.

MEMBER BANERJEE: Right. So even if it reaches the rebar, nothing happens to the rebar?

MR. DRAKE: The rebar still should be in good shape. And we've had other studies in other locations in the plant which show where we saw we had water coming through, we opened up those cracks. And the rebar was found to be in very good shape.

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MEMBER BANERJEE: So the rebar was exposed to the water then? MR. DRAKE: Yes. MEMBER SHACK: But that probably wasn't borated water? MR. DRAKE: It was borated, too. And so it's got acid? MEMBER BROWN: So the boric acid doesn't attack the rebar? MR. DRAKE: This is Alan Cox. 10 I've seen numbers quoted where full 11 leakage borated water has caused corrosion rates on 12 the order of five mils per year. MR. DRAKE: Yes. 13 MR. COX: It does have some effect, but 14 15 it's pretty minimal. MR. DRAKE: And part of the evaluation was 16 17 based on industry reports and evaluations from that. I'm trying to understand 18 MEMBER ARMIJO: 19 this leakage rate and the source. And you mentioned pinhole leakage in defective welds and maybe some 20 21 other defects. But is this liner getting progressively worse or is it the same leakage but year after year 22 23 after year? There have been no --24 MR. DRAKE: 25 MEMBER ARMIJO: And do you know where it

1	all is, all those leaks are?
2	MR. DRAKE: There's no aging degradation
3	effects here. This is all original workmanship.
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: So do you know where these
5	leak locations are?
6	MR. DACIMO: We do not have each one of
7	the leaks in the liner.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: That's what we issue tests
9	on.
10	MR. DRAKE: That's been one of the
11	problems. That's what we've been trying to do where
12	we've been trying to seal up certain areas to see if
13	we could
14	MEMBER ARMIJO: See if you can find the
15	major ones and eventually find them all.
16	MR. DRAKE: Right. And we've coated a
17	large section of the liner with the pinholes and the
18	joints and the seams and the corners with the
19	ceramalite coating and that hadn't solved the problem
20	from two points.
21	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.
22	MR. DRAKE: Mainly because that ceramalite
23	coating was too rigid and it didn't hold up the way
24	we'd like to. Water was getting behind it still.
25	MEMBER ARMIJO: But just to make sure I

understand. Your intent is as soon as you have a process for sealing the liner that's reliable--MR. DRAKE: Yes. MEMBER ARMIJO: -- you're going to do it? MR. DRAKE: We're going to try to correct. Right. MR. DACIMO: That's And correct. unfortunately the processes that we have tried have not been as successful as they need to be. 10 MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay. MR. DRAKE: So we're going to a different 11 12 way --MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes, you're going to try--13 MR. DRAKE: -- a better -- which has been 14 15 successful in other plants inside and outside the United States. And we're going to start going that in 16 certain sections and see if that works better. 17 And then if that shows promise, we'll start going --18 19 CHAIR MAYNARD: I'm just trying to 20 understand what you're currently committing 21 You're committed to pursuing the modification and some type of monitoring? I'd like to kind of summarize 22 23 what you're --MR. DRAKE: We have made a commitment to 24 25 do some core bores and to open up some more areas of **NEAL R. GROSS**

reenforcement steel to determine that the reenforcement holds up. BANERJEE: MEMBER just want to understand the potential for corrosion of the rebar. What's the typical dimension compared to the corrosion rate? In other words --MR. DRAKE: For the size of the rebar? MEMBER BANERJEE: Yes. The cross section. MR. DRAKE: I believe these are a half 10 inch or more. 11 MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay. So half inch. And what is your typical corrosion rate in borated water? 12 MR. DRAKE: Five mils. 13 MEMBER BANERJEE: So how many years before 14 15 you get significant corrosion? MR. DRAKE: I mean if you go 40/60 years, 16 17 you would still be marginally attacking that. And we do have margin in these walls. 18 19 CHAIR MAYNARD: I'd like to move on. 20 is an important topic and it's one that I know we're 21 going to want to talk about in more detail at the next meeting and everything. It is an open item. 22 I'm 23 going to be interested to hear what the staff has to say also. But since it is an open item, it's still 24 25 being reviewed, I'd like to move on.

1	It is an important topic and it is
2	something we're going to be following very closely and
3	want more information on it.
4	MR. COX: Well, before you go, one last
5	comment. The safety year that we talked about for
6	this last time was you have to remember that this
7	is only leaking during refueling outage. So it's
8	basically a two week period very two years.
9	MR. DRAKE: Right. And then it's very
10	hard.
11	MR. COX: And then it's pretty hot in this
12	area, so it's going to tend to dry out any
13	MEMBER BANERJEE: Leaving the boron
14	behind?
15	MR. DRAKE: Boron, from typical reports
16	and industry events says it has to be a moist Boron
17	only effects it corrodes when it's moist. It's got
18	to be like in a moist pool. A poultice type effect to
19	really start to do that. This would be a very dry
20	environment most of the time.
21	MEMBER RYAN: And if you want to defer
22	until later, Mr. Chairman, that's fine. But I'd like
23	to hear a little bit more about the groundwater
24	monitoring and the exterior wall
25	MR. DRAKE: We'll be talking about that in

the next topic.

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MEMBER RYAN: Very well. Very good.

MR. DACIMO: This here has no impact on groundwater. Okay. This is captured within in the vapor containment and pumped the wa --

MEMBER RYAN: Okay. I am just curious how you tied in that monitoring that you mention in this last bullet that's up there now.

MR. DACIMO: Okay.

MEMBER SIEBER: It's not related.

MEMBER BANERJEE: Not related.

MR. DACIMO: It's the next topic.

MR. DRAKE: Okay. And this is the IP2 spent fuel pool issue of structural integrity. The spent fuel pool is located in the fuel storage building which has six foot three inch thick reenforced concrete walls.

liner leakage first The pool was identified in 1992. The pool liner leakage identified on the exterior and was determined from an 18 month's earlier event in 1990 during the reracking modifications when a worker removed an attachment from the line. During that event in 1992 several core bore samples were taken in five separate locations 60 inches deep and the samples were then tested and

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examined. Again, we still had over 3000 psi strength for these samples. In 2005 during excavation of the dry fuel storage building for the installation of the --That repair that you talk MEMBER SHACK: about there, you rewelded? MR. DACIMO: Yes, that's correct. It was repaired in 1992, yes. MR. DRAKE: MEMBER SHACK: This is a thicker liner so you can do the rewelding successfully? 10 MR. DRAKE: Yes, I believe it's a three 11 eights inch stainless steel liner. 12 In 2005 during excavation for the dry fuel 13 storage an exterior concrete shrinkage vac in the 14 15 concrete wall was found. Ιt was previously underground. 16 During extended conditions after that of 17 the liner we determined a leak was found in the fuel 18 19 transfer canal. This is now a normally dry area. In 2005 we also took several more 20 No. core bores in the area of the crack that showed a 21 moist spot underneath the crack. And we exposed some 22 23 again, in excellent And, that rebar was condition and the concrete was acceptable. 24 25 As extended conditions, we did the further

inspections. We found a leak in the transfer canal that was done by extensive UT and visual inspections in the transfer canal and vacuum box tests on the back of the transfer canal. And there was a small pinhole in a plug weld that was also repaired. We found two very minor indications in welds, these were none leaks, they passed vacuum box. But they were just indications in the weld and they were excavated and repaired also.

So to date we've done inspections of all accessible portions of the spent fuel pool, that includes 100 percent of the liner above the fuel, 100 percent of the transfer canal and a 100 percent of the CASS wash pit.

The transfer canal extensive inspection proved that the spent fuel pool liner is sound by both visual inspections and by UT. There are no aging degradation related events observed.

All structural evaluations have concluded that the concrete and rebar remain capable of performing its intended functions. The aging management inspection programs will continue. We do spent fuel pool monitoring. We do shiftly inspections of the pool elevations. And we also are monitoring the groundwater near the spent fuel pool on the outside of

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the wall. And to date our monitoring program supports that there is no current leak from the pool. MEMBER STETKAR: I wanted to follow-up on that last statement you made. Ι think I read somewhere that after you discovered the indications on the exterior you installed some sort of collection system that would route water back --MR. DRAKE: Yes. MEMBER STETKAR: into the primary 10 auxiliary building. MR. DRAKE: Yes. What we did was the crack 11 that was --12 MR. DACIMO: This was a shrinkage crack. 13 This was a shrinkage crack, it 14 MR. DRAKE: 15 was a construction shrinkage crack. Still very tight. We did some excavations. But this location was going 16 17 to be below the new floor that we were installing. So what we did was we installed a stainless box around 18 the whole crack. 19 20 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. MR. DRAKE: We didn't want to just seal up 21 the crack; we wanted to be able to monitor it. 22 23 installed a stainless steel box with a line that goes 24 into the primary auxiliary building. So any moisture 25 venue that came out of that crack would be captured

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1	and then be able to be monitored.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: Have you seen any
3	moisture?
4	MR. DACIMO: It's reduced greatly. Don, I
5	don't know, you want to address this?
6	MR. MAYER: I can
7	MR. DACIMO: Yes, why don't you do that.
8	CHAIR MAYNARD: Can you come up to the
9	microphone and identify yourself?
LO	MR. MAYER: Sure. All right. Hello. I am
L1	Don Mayer, Director of Emergency Planning and also
L2	Special Projects at Indian Point.
L3	I was responsible, actually, for the
L4	groundwater investigation associated with this leak.
L5	So what I can tell you is that the crack collection
L6	box that Rich talked about at the peak when we first
L 7	identified the issue, we had about $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 liters per
L 8	day that we were collecting for, you know, over the
L 9	course of a month or two. Okay.
20	MEMBER STETKAR: And you know it was spent
21	fuel pool water?
22	MR. MAYER: That's correct. Yes, we knew
23	that it had been spent fuel pool water, yes.
24	And at the present time, like for instance
25	the last couple of months, what we collect in that box

is anywhere between zero to 50 mLs of water. So it's very low that enters into the box. MEMBER SIEBER: Per day? MR. DACIMO: Per day. Per day. I'm sorry. Yes, per MR. MAYER: And it was $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 liters per day. MEMBER STETKAR: And the current water is also the spent fuel pool water? MAYER: The current water is still indicating elevated levels of tritium. It's about 25 in the pool. percent of that what's So definitely reducing as you would expect, and there's no indication -- you know, let me put it to you this way: If there was a leak that was active, okay, we would expect to see not zero, we'd expect to see some elevated level with some precipitation related input going forward, and we don't see that. So we're seeing about zero to 50 mLs per day. We do see some peaks which we believe are precipitation related. MEMBER BANERJEE: What do you mean by precipitation? MR. MAYER: What we see -- we're still trying to get our arms around this fully. But we've

retained a hydrologist on this from the beginning. And there's an interstitial space -- this liner does

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not have a tell-tale system. Unit 3 does, this liner
doesn't. And so what we believe has occurred here is
there's an interstitial space between the stainless
steel liner and the concrete that still has a residual
level of tritium that is just being held in that
interstitial space. It's tritiated water, okay? And
what happens is through precipitation events, snow
melt, et cetera, it doesn't take a whole lot of water
to come in and influence zero to 50 mLs per day or
average.
And so over time, and we do see a
relationship in the springtime when we'll see elevated
peak that then will tail off. So the explanation that
we have is that it appears to be precipitation and

groundwater run-off based because the pool is above the groundwater table, okay?

MEMBER BANERJEE: So something is getting in?

Some small amount has to be MR. MAYER: getting in.

MEMBER BANERJEE: From somewhere else?

And causing the concentration MR. MAYER: to be lowering over time, which is what you would expect as this things proceeds.

> MEMBER BANERJEE: So as the top end it's

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open to the environment somewhere? MR. MAYER: Well, as we indicated, Rich better can better describe, but you know shrinkage cracks in concrete are not uncommon. And so what we fully expect is that there may be some other shrinkage crack locations where water can get in as well as get out. But we have a picture of the MR. DRAKE: spent fuel pool here. This is the Unit 2 spent fuel pool building. And basically the 1992 leak that was observed was up in this area here. And it because of an attachment that was removed from the wall in this area here when it was observed and we took core bore 13 samples there. 14 The 2005 crack was actually below this 15 floor that is now there. It was below the ground level 16 in that area here. And that crack now has been sealed by the stainless steel box and is now monitored. 18 19 MEMBER RYAN: But the groundwater is relatively close to the surface, I would quess, for 20 most of the year, is that right? MR. DRAKE: Do you know the hydrology? 23 I don't exactly how deep it MR. MAYER: It's below the bottom of the pool, I don't know 24 is.

how many feet.

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down here. The crack was still higher than that. Yes. The crack is still 68 foot or something like that. So it was higher up, about eight to ten feet up from the bottom of the pool. Yes, and one point, Mike, I MR. MAYER: think I know where you may be going or you may be asking. Is the site is actually elevated. The site at this location is at the 70 to 80 foot elevation and 10 then it drops down to the river elevation at about the 11 five to ten foot elevation. Okay. So the groundwater 12 itself typically runs down around the elevation as it moves into the river, and this is well 13 above that. So what happens is the water comes --14 15 MEMBER RYAN: So well above, five feet, two feet, three feet? 16 17 MR. MAYER: I'm sorry, say again? MEMBER RYAN: Well above is how many feet? 18 19 MR. MAYER: I'd have to go back and double 20 check our drawings. It's at least 20 feet above. 21 MEMBER RYAN: The reason I'm asking this 22 is sometimes, you know in these systems particularly 23 with wintertime events with snow melt and all the things you've mentioned, you know you can get water 24 25 coming back down and it sort of oscillates for a while

MR. DRAKE: Yes. The bottom of the pool is

1	as it's making its way down. And if it's contacting
2	stuff that's accumulating during a dryer period, you
3	can have these pulses.
4	MR. MAYER: We do see that.
5	MEMBER RYAN: You do see that?
6	MR. MAYER: We do see that to a certain
7	degree on some of the welds.
8	MEMBER RYAN: So surface water
9	infiltration is probably more important to think about
10	the groundwater level itself?
11	MR. MAYER: For this particular situation,
12	yes.
13	MEMBER RYAN: Okay.
14	MR. MAYER: That's correct.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: You're doing some external
16	monitoring for tritium, right, weld monitoring?
17	MR. MAYER: Yes, sir, that's correct.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: And you haven't found
19	anything?
20	MR. MAYER: No, we have found tritium in
21	the weld water.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Oh, you have?
23	MR. MAYER: Yes, we have. In fact
24	MEMBER SIEBER: That you attribute to the
25	plant?
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MR. MAYER: Yes. That's correct. MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. MR. MAYER: That was the principle reason behind the large investigation that we conducted. We did identify that this 1992 leak that was referenced by Rich we believe is the principle source of the subsurface tritium that we identified. Because it was a fairly large volume of water over about an 18 month period that did provide a source term. The pinhole that we identified we also 10 know we believe did contribute some smaller portion. 11 12 That was stopped in 2007. And so, you know, we expect and we do in fact see a downward trend in treating 13 concentrations in the pool as a result of 14 15 repairs. MEMBER RYAN: Is that over several cycles 16 17 of the seasonal cycles and all that? MR. MAYER: Yes, sir. 18 19 MEMBER RYAN: So it's a very long term 20 trend. 21 MR. MAYER: It's very long. Including the oscillations--22 MEMBER RYAN: 23 MR. MAYER: That's correct. That's an excellent point, and I'd just like to elaborate 24 25 slightly on that.

The investigation started formally in October of 2005. Okay. So in hydrologist terms --MEMBER RYAN: You're just getting started. MR. MAYER: -- that's not a lot of time. Exactly. But we do have -- you know, we have retained a good hydrology engineering outfit and we do look at their data closely. And we do have enough data that the hydrologist feels comfortable and confident that we are seeing over these least $2\frac{1}{2}$ /3 years a general 10 downward trend in plume concentrations consistent with what we believe has occurred, which is stopping the 11 12 leak. MEMBER RYAN: And I guess I'd assume your 13 plans that are continuing to do that monitoring to 14 really develop that trend with a little bit more data 15 16 or --17 MR. MAYER: Yes, sir. We actually have a program in place. We call it the long term groundwater 18 19 monitoring program. It's essentially codified in our 20 procedural processes and that's life-of-plant 21 commitment. 22 MEMBER BANERJEE: Does it mean that you're 23 actually making sufficient measurements to map the plume? 24 25 MR. MAYER: Yes, it does.

MR. DACIMO: Which we have done. We actually have done that. MR. MAYER: We have done that. MEMBER RYAN: That would be helpful for us to see what other force you have in that area that could us better understand that. MR. MAYER: Sure. MEMBER SIEBER: Now the drinking water limits, what 20,000? 10 MR. MAYER: 20,000. 11 MEMBER SIEBER: What's the highest 12 concentration? It seems to me I read something like 200? 13 MR. DACIMO: Very low. 14 15 MR. MAYER: No. Actually, what we saw near the fuel pool we saw levels that were in the 16 neighborhood of 400 to 500,000 picocuries per liter. 17 MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. 18 MR. MAYER: So we did substantially 19 elevated in excess of the groundwater concentrations. 20 21 MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. MR. MAYER: Since that initial situation 22 23 was discovered, levels near the pool are down closer 100,000/200,000. So we've seen a 24 to, you know, 25 definite drop. Okay. The last datapoint, in fact,

near the pool is about 95,000.

Down by the -- the way the plume -- you know, if you think about this in terms of macroscopic flow, because we did -- in answer to your question, we did a very detailed hydrological study. It's been well documented. In fact, it's on the public docket. We provided it to the NRC --

MEMBER BANERJEE: Just the XY dimensions or you got the Z as well?

MR. MAYER: No, it's X,Y and Z. And we mapped the entire site. We have transducers in service that give us level and other important information. We sample it for chemicals. We've got the whole gamut.

Got an excess. We've got 40 wells. Most of these wells are multilevel wells. So we have -- in fact, you know, it's not something that I'm particularly happy about, but the fact of the matter is we probably have one of the most intensive thorough groundwater monitoring programs in the United States as a result of some of the issues we dealt with.

Down by the river the concentrations are significantly less. The wells that are closest to the river are in the 200 to 100,000 range. Near the discharge canal we did levels -- we have seen levels

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and still do see levels in the several thousand up to maybe 20,000. But it's lower. And, you know, by the river it's very low. MEMBER SIEBER: Have you found any levels above 20,000 that are outside the protected area? MR. MAYER: No. MEMBER SIEBER: Or the owner controlled area? MR. MAYER: Not outside the owner 10 controlled area, no. MEMBER RYAN: But this big change from, 11 say, the river back up to these protected area wells 12 that you have makes sense. Because if it's a very 13 small volume that's leaking and that tritium is going 14 15 to distribute very, very rapidly in any hydrogen pool it sees in water. 16 17 MR. MAYER: Exactly. MEMBER RYAN: So that further confirms 18 19 the volume leaving, you know, the areas that you've discussed in the cracks has got to be small. 20 21 MR. MAYER: Correct. 22 MEMBER BANERJEE: So you've got a point 23 source of tritium, which is varying with time, let's 24 say? 25 MR. MAYER: Yes, that's correct.

1	MEMBER BANERJEE: And what this is doing
2	is it's mixing into the groundwater by some form of
3	dispersion because it's porous media?
4	MR. MAYER: That's correct.
5	MEMBER BANERJEE: That's what's causing
6	the diffusion of this?
7	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
8	MEMBER RYAN: Well, the tritium exchange
9	very rapidly in any hydrogen pool.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. It's tritium in
11	water.
12	MR. MAYER: It turns out that the tritium
13	as it leaves the reactor is very quickly converted
14	into water.
15	MEMBER BANERJEE: Well the entrance of
16	this plume
17	MEMBER SIEBER: It's water. It's water,
18	it does what water does.
19	MEMBER BANERJEE: which is what is
20	reaching the river?
21	MR. MAYER: Right. That's correct.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: It doesn't concentrate?
23	MR. MAYER: It does not concentrate.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: So you have it can go
25	MEMBER RYAN: I think it's independent of
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the flow -- you know, by hydrogen exchange, it will uniformly seek the hydrogen pool that is available. MEMBER SIEBER: Now the way we used to think of it is --CHAIR MAYNARD: What you're interested in his the point characterization? MEMBER BANERJEE: Yes. I think where it is, what's happening. MEMBER SIEBER: The way for me to think of 10 11 it is --MEMBER BANERJEE: But they don't have it 12 over time, but they have it now. 13 MEMBER SIEBER: -- the leak is stopped and 14 you're monitoring for it and continuing the corrective 15 action. And you have no evidence that you've ever 16 exceeded the drinking water standard --17 Yes. Let me characterize it 18 MR. MAYER: 19 the way that we characterize it for the Commission. it turns out, and this is just a 20 regulatory fact of the business, there are no drinking 21 water supplies. We take no drinking water from the 22 23 site and there are no nearby supplies of drinking water near the site. 24 25 Your statement is absolutely correct. We

have not identified any above that level, but we don't utilize that regulation in discussions with the NRC because as it turns out we're regulated to our off site dose calculation manual level which are dosed, and we're a small percentage of that.

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, my perception of it is more conservative than what you were saying.

MR. MAYER: Yes. Yes.

MEMBER SIEBER: And to me if you don't exceed the limit at the site boundary, you're far better off. Then you don't exceed the limit that somebody's drinking.

MR. MAYER: Absolutely. And we have confirmed with boundary wells on site as well as off site monitoring of off site wells, surface waters and the river.

MEMBER RYAN: One of the last questions, it's maybe a forward looking question so forgive me if you don't have the answer now, and I understand why you don't because you don't have a lot of data; but if you continue this program on into the future, at some point you'll be able say, "Well, some event that causes this in a nearby well is something we ought to investigate more fully because it's indicating a change in the behavior of the system and maybe the

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leak's getting bigger."

Have you thought about what about the future might be and so forth?

MR. MAYER: Yes, we have. Yes, in fact that was one of the principle design parameters of our long term monitoring program is what you just referenced. And so --

MEMBER BANERJEE: So you're going to continue this program?

MR. MAYER: Yes. Life-of-plant.

MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay. Very good.

MR. MAYER: I'd like to answer Mr. Ryan's question. The answer is yes. The program was designed that way. In fact, I focused on Unit because that was the question, but we did provide a network of wells that are across the entire site. Because we didn't want to be myopic looking at just at this one situation. So we provided a well field that covers the whole site. That well field was placed specifically with our experts and the hydrologist to evaluate locations that we could then use as back tracks and sentinels to the potential locations, other fuel pools, other pipe systems and large tanks.

So this long term monitoring program is in place. It's present frequency is approximately

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quarterly. There are some other wells that are It's built into our program different frequencies. and it's designed to determine the effectiveness to monitor the natural attenuation of the plume that we It's also designed to help us do have. potential dose implications from that. And then the third key component of that program is that it is designed with sentinel wells to help us do exactly what Mr. Ryan reflected on, which is assess other leakage points and help us do extended condition.

MEMBER SIEBER: I think that answers my questions.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes. I would like to move on again. We'll be interested in what the staff has to say. And this is an ongoing open item here. So let's go ahead and move.

MEMBER SIEBER: Why don't we move on.

MR. DRAKE: Okay. The next area for discussion is the exterior containment concrete aging management. The containment structures at Indian Point have isolated areas that exist at Cadweld joints of the rebar and at attachment points used for scaffolding during original construction. These were observed, but also then first documented in our initial IWL inspections, as well as our maintenance

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rule inspections in 1995. MEMBER BANERJEE: So the concrete has spalled off or --MR. DRAKE: No. Well, when I say it's it's not the traditional spalling of the spalled, concrete itself. These are cosmetic repaired areas over Cadwelds that were very close to the surface where scaffold embedded metal pieces that were used for construction for the scaffolds as they moved up 10 the dome cylinder were attached to. They came back 11 later and put a cosmetic coating over these things. 12 And then during ILRT tests, because the continuing -that they just popped these right off. 13 MEMBER BROWN: So these are the items are 14 15 referred to as "pop-offs" in the inspection? Yes. They're more pop-offs, 16 MR. DRAKE: 17 they're not true spalls of the concrete, though. it is due to the lack of -- they're just cosmetic 18 19 cover over these embedded items. 20 So it was original. We have not gotten 21 back and not done more cosmetic repairs over these things for two reasons: 22 23 (1) It would not allow us to monitor them if we -- and would also just pop-off again when we did 24 25 the next ILRT. And we have observed no aging effects

1	from these. We've looked at them from structural
2	impact. The reenforcing steel provides most of the
3	strength. The observed surface degradation has no
4	impact for the ability of containment for its intended
5	function.
6	MEMBER POWERS: What did you get in your
7	last integrated containment leakage test?
8	MR. DRAKE: I believe they were done in
9	the last outages for both units. If not the last one,
10	it was the fairly recent one.
11	MR. DACIMO: It was two outages ago
12	MR. DRAKE: For Unit 2.
13	MR. DACIMO: Two outages for Unit 2.
14	MR. DRAKE: And then the last outage for
15	3.
16	MR. DACIMO: No. And two outages ago for
17	Unit 3.
18	MR. DRAKE: But they were within the last
19	five or six years.
20	MEMBER POWERS: Do we have the data from
21	those?
22	MR. DRAKE: I gather that we do.
23	MR. DACIMO: The IRLT data?
24	MEMBER POWERS: Yes. Yes.
25	MR. DACIMO: We can get you that. It
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passed the integrated leak rate test. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Now is the first time you saw, '95 was when it was first identified? MR. DRAKE: It was when we first observed and started documenting --MEMBER SIEBER: That's when they first wrote it down, correct? MR. DRAKE: Yes. The maintenance rule inspections rated the structures on site. And the 10 requirement for IWL were first instituted in 1995. That was our baseline inspections for those programs, 11 12 and they were documented there. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. 13 They were observed further 14 MR. DRAKE: 15 back. We have in several cases, we have observed these and they were documented through our normal 16 17 corrective action process. And we've had pictures of them from there going forward to now. And you could 18 19 put them on top of each other and just notice no 20 change. 21 CHAIR MAYNARD: Have you gone back through your IRLT data to see if there's any step changes at 22 23 any point or any significant --MR. DACIMO: We have looked at the IRLT 24 25 data every time. There's been very tight containments

and there's been no issues with that at all.

MEMBER SIEBER: Initially when you do the initial integrated leak rate test they map cracks.

MR. DRAKE: And all the cracks are mapped.

MEMBER SIEBER: Have you continued to map

MR. DRAKE: We haven't gone back to all of them, but we've made a commitment going forward. NRC came in and did an audit of our program. And we made a commitment to do more detailed mapping of that and measurement in the future.

cracks and watch the extent to which they've expanded?

MEMBER SIEBER: Usually for the first ILRT you can see where somebody has gone on the outside of containment to indicate, usually with paint or something like that, where the cracks are. Because it's important to monitor. You can tell whether the rebar is failing or not or stretching by looking at how far those cracks move or if you have new ones that you didn't have before.

MR. DRAKE: Yes. Most of the tight cracks are still tight, you know, and seal right back up after the IRLT. And there has been no measured staining from any of those cracks.

MEMBER SIEBER: You may be able to do that with some photographic technique because to climb --

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1	MR. DRAKE: Yes, that's what we
2	additionally do.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: into containment is not
4	something
5	MR. DRAKE: No, you can't climb in. We
6	have an opportunity to get up towards above the top of
7	it with the stack for Unit 1.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: Right. Right.
9	MR. DRAKE: And we use high powered
10	instruments per the ISI program to get up close
11	effectively that way and to take pictures.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. And since you brought
13	it up, Unit 1 was one with the afterburner on it,
14	right?
15	MR. DRAKE: Yes.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. And it was a super
17	heated plant. And that stack is the highest feature
18	there?
19	MR. DRAKE: Yes.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: What do you do to make
21	sure that that stack isn't going to fall on some other
22	portion of the plant?
23	MR. DRAKE: That
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Because it's a heavy brick
25	stack with a steel liner.

1	MR. DRAKE: Yes.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: And it's close in.
3	MR. DRAKE: That was analyzed. When Unit 1
4	was all by itself, the stack was higher. When they
5	built Unit 2, they actually shortened it so that it
6	would not contact with the containment building. It
7	has been inspected in the past. It's going to be
8	scheduled to be inspected and painted going forward.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Is that part of your
10	license renewal program? I didn't see it in there,
11	but
12	MR. DRAKE: It's part.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: it's a prominent
14	feature.
15	MR. DRAKE: It's been added to the
16	structural monitoring program, yes.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: Super. Thanks.
18	CHAIR MAYNARD: Dana, do you have any more
19	questions on the IRLT or did you just want to see
20	their data?
21	MEMBER POWERS: I just want to see their
22	data and the audit report from the NRC on process.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: Sorry to interrupt.
24	MEMBER BROWN: So you're no longer
25	repairing these pop-off? They just
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MR. DRAKE: No. Because if we put the
cosmetic repair on them, we wouldn't be able to
monitor them. Besides, some of them are very
difficult to get to. But if we covered them, then we
wouldn't be able to monitor them. They have surface
rust on them and it hasn't changed. And that seems to
be the best
MEMBER BROWN: So you do these by photos?
I mean
MR. DRAKE: We do it photos
MEMBER BROWN: I mean, there's an issue
with that in the instruction
MR. DRAKE: Yes. And what we did is made a
commitment that what we're going to do is when we have
the capability to do some direct measurements of
those, even in the remote areas, by using parallel
lasers and to track them. But we have pictures and
you could almost put the pictures side-by-side over
the 10/15 years, and there's no change.
MEMBER SIEBER: Well, and you're looking
at the length of the rust streaks, correct?
MR. DRAKE: Excuse me?
MEMBER SIEBER: You're looking at the
length of the rust streak as evidence
MR DRAKE: Actually there's no rust

1	streaks
2	MEMBER SIEBER: Oh, there aren't?
3	MR. DACIMO: No. The only rust streaks
4	that are around are from the
5	MEMBER SIEBER: No streaks?
6	CHAIR MAYNARD: Rough idea of the size of
7	one of these pop-offs?
8	MR. DRAKE: The pop-offs, I mean they're
9	about that size. That's where the embedded thing. And
10	there's been one where we had years ago, I was able to
11	we could see the scaling section there. We went
12	out and knocked it off and then we take
13	photographed that one 10/15 years later, it hasn't
14	changed.
15	MEMBER ARMIJO: Are these tens of these or
16	hundreds of these pop-offs? I can imagine lots of
17	points when you're building.
18	MR. DRAKE: Yes. At Unit 2 the Cadweld
19	areas, embedded areas that we have identified, there
20	are 41 locations in Unit 2 and there's seven in Unit
21	3.
22	MEMBER ARMIJO: These are all
23	MR. DRAKE: Seven. They're all on the
24	cylinder, none on the dome.
25	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.

1	MEMBER STETKAR: So there are on the
2	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you didn't the
3	scaffolding on the dome.
4	MR. DRAKE: There are seven Cadweld
5	connections and locations.
6	MEMBER STETKAR: And you've seen the pop-
7	off? When you say "Cadweld connections," the pop-off
8	locations on Unit 3?
9	MR. DRAKE: Yes. They're either Cadwelds
10	or from the scaffolding.
11	MEMBER BROWN: Why is there no concern
12	that there's something underneath the rebar sections
13	that you can't see and that there was a penetration
14	into the concrete in containment? Oh, it's not
15	visible from the surface?
16	MR. DRAKE: No. We know the Cadweld
17	joints
18	MEMBER BROWN: I mean, you've got
19	environment conditions going all the time if you leave
20	them open
21	MR. DRAKE: Yes.
22	MEMBER BROWN: and expansion and water
23	and everything else getting on them.
24	MR. DRAKE: Yes. We just haven't seen
25	anything that would indicate anything else is going

on.

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MEMBER BROWN: Okay.

MR. COX: As Rich indicated, these are on the side of the building so there's not much for water getting into and dam -- it's not going to pool in there.

MEMBER BROWN: All right.

MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Thanks.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Let's move on. We'll do one more item and then we'll take a break.

MEMBER SIEBER: No question.

MR. DRAKE: Okay. The next issue is the concern for the water-cement ratio. NUREG-1801 for effects for aging concrete in outdoor air environments, this recommends that the evaluation consider water-cement ratio. The water-cement ratio for Unit 3 was examined and is outside the recommended requirement.

Unit 2 and Unit 3 used ACI 318-63, which is the original code of record at time of construction. And this document basically allows two different methods to determine the required strength and durability of the concrete.

Indian Point used method 2 where we did actually did testing and we took cylinders and breaks

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1	after the fact and concluded that all our concrete
2	exceeded the strength requirements of the 3000 psi,
3	our minimum cylinder that we broke was 3600. Almost
4	all of them were much higher than that.
5	The actual test reports confirmed that.
6	And there has been no aging effects observed of the
7	concrete.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: So this is easy to close?
9	MR. DRAKE: We feel so.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: You submitted all the
11	records and everything to the staff to deal with,
12	right?
13	MR. DRAKE: Yes. Yes.
14	MR. YOUNG: The staff is continuing a
15	review, and we understand they're making some
16	additional questions on these records. But
17	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. But what you did is
18	typical of what the industry has done on that
19	MR. YOUNG: Yes. Yes.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: construction of
21	containment.
22	CHAIR MAYNARD: But I don't believe that
23	this one's one that the staff's ready to close out
1	
24	right.

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1	their review on this.
2	CHAIR MAYNARD: They're still, they're
3	going back and forth on this on the side.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: Good. We can take a
5	break.
6	CHAIR MAYNARD: Not yet. Is there any
7	questions on this one?
8	Okay. Let's take a break. We'll take a
9	15 minute break. Let's be back at 24 after.
10	(Whereupon, at 10:08 a.m. off the record
11	until 10:24 a.m.
12	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Let's come back
13	into session here and go back to the item, I think
14	that's aging management of concrete subject to
15	elevated temperatures.
16	MR. DRAKE: That is correct.
17	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay.
18	MR. DRAKE: This stems out of the concern
19	that IP2 hot piping penetrations are allowed to
20	operate at temperatures greater than 200 degrees
21	Fahrenheit. NUREG-1801 allowed local area concrete
22	temperatures greater than 200 degrees fahrenheit with
23	plant specific evaluation.
24	So IP2 has done plant specific evaluations
25	for the effects of temperatures up to 200 degree F.

And basically the engineering evaluations determined that the maximum 15 percent in strength in concrete temperatures up to 250 degrees is enveloped by the concrete structural characteristics that exceeded by 20 percent over the original design strength of 3000 psi.

This basically stems the change in the FSAR which highlights this, stems from a 1994 event from April to October 1994. Normally the operating temperatures in this area is less than 140 degrees. But during this period it was noted Unit 2 that slightly higher temperatures above 150 were observed. The bulk average temperature was approximately 153 degrees. The highest measured area measurement was 176 with two very isolated temperature readings of 201 to 205 degrees for a short period of time between the penetrations. So the evaluation was done to determine that this is acceptable for these short durations. And the FSAR was changed up to 250 degrees.

MEMBER SIEBER: What caused that?

There were some problem with MR. DRAKE: the blowers at the time. Normally bulky knits have blowers on each unit; two are in operation, standby. Then we have two are on annunciators in the control room that if one of the

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blowers is out of service, the alarm response procedure immediately notifies the NPOs and blowers. standby And since we have annunciator procedure in effect for temperatures below 150 we don't see it as it any structural concern.

MEMBER STETKAR: Let me ask a question.

You kind of stumbled across this. When you screened out the hot penetration cooling system from aging management you --

MR. YOUNG: Yes.

MR. COX: Well, let me answer that. That is correct, the hot penetration cooling system will essentially assist in maintaining the environment of the concrete. And typically, you know, that's not one of the scoping criteria so we haven't included those types of systems. There are a number of other systems that also serve a similar function of maintaining an environment. An example would be containment normal cooling systems.

MEMBER STETKAR: I understand. As I understand it, I read through the analysis, and the claim is that the maximum temperature, as you note here, of the concrete would be 200 degrees Fahrenheit if there was no cooling flow, meaning I guess the blower's not operating. And the blowers are obviously

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the AMPs anyway. Did those analyses look at no flow, other words blockage of those little cooling channel paths such that there was no convective heat transfer from the concrete? Because you're looking at 500 degree plus piping transmitting heat into the concrete in those adjacent areas. And I was curious how you came to the conclusion that the maximum temperature of 10 the concrete and you'd see was 200 degree Fahrenheit, 11 if there was actually no flaw? In other words, if the cooling channels were blocked? 12 Rich, can you speak at it? 13 MR. COX: These pipes are isolated, so that is one other factor 14 15 there. MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. 16 17 MR. COX: But Rich is part of the group that made that analysis. 18 MR. DRAKE: They're well insulated 19 Yes. and we have the blowers that pass through there. And 20 21 in this particular event they were actually taking--22 MEMBER STETKAR: But I'm not asking about 23 the blowers. I'm asking about plugging the little -- I the little cooling channels 24 read about how 25 fabricated with the little ribbed and concentric --**NEAL R. GROSS**

active components and they wouldn't be included under

you know, sort of a radiator kind of configuration that the air blows through. If those cooling channels became plugged, fouled such that you had no air passage through there or substantially reduced air passage, regardless of the status of the blowers, would you still reach only a maximum of 200 degrees Fahrenheit?

And where I'm headed, obviously, is an aging management program to verify that those channels are open. Because they are a passive flow component.

MR. DRAKE: Right.

MEMBER ARMIJO: It would take an inspection of some sort.

MEMBER STETKAR: Some sort of inspection to verify, you know, volume of flow or -- I'm not going to design a program. It's just a question of are those -- the same way that you verify whether or not a water-to-water heat exchanger is plugged or fouled or whatever. Because these are just air-to-air--

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, there's two components to that. You have to calculate to assure the temperature remains 200 degrees. And then you have to go out and check to make sure that all the channels are open.

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MEMBER STETKAR: Well, the calculation actually showed that the maximum steady state temperature was 200 given no convective air flow through those channels --MEMBER SIEBER: That it was 205, yes. MEMBER STETKAR: I feel though that --MR. DACIMO: But we know, though, that there is no issue at 250, right, Rich? MR. DRAKE: That's correct. 10 MR. DACIMO: Okay. 11 MR. DRAKE: At even higher. Even the ACI 12 code is under review to revise their standards even higher. 13 MR. DACIMO: So 250, if you would operate 14 15 250, it would not be an issue. MEMBER STETKAR: I understand that. 16 the rationale that I read was that it wouldn't 200 17 degrees if you had no forced flow. And I was curious 18 19 what you would exceed if you had no air flow from there at all. 20 21 Yes. There was a study to say MR. DRAKE: that, especially on Unit 3 studies that if you didn't 22 23 have anything, temperatures would go to up certain temperatures over, you know, a 1000 hours. But --24 25 yes, we're going to have to get back to you on that,

1	okay? We don't have an answer right now.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Thank you.
3	CHAIR MAYNARD: Any other questions on
4	this item? Okay. Topics of interest.
5	MR. YOUNG: Yes. On the next topics of
6	interest, Nelson Azevedo will make the presentation on
7	the next two, the reactor vessel integrity and the
8	buried piping aging management program.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: I'd just note, are we done
10	with open items?
11	CHAIR MAYNARD: No. We're going to come
12	back to these, Jack. We're getting the other ones
13	here.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: All right.
15	MR. AZEVEDO: Okay. Good morning. My name
16	is Nelson Azevedo. I'm the Supervisor of Code Programs
16 17	
	at Indian Point. I'll briefly discuss the status of
17	at Indian Point. I'll briefly discuss the status of
17 18	at Indian Point. I'll briefly discuss the status of both reactor vessels at Indian Point 2 and 3 with
17 18 19	at Indian Point. I'll briefly discuss the status of both reactor vessels at Indian Point 2 and 3 with respect to upper shelf energy as well as the ${\rm RT}_{\rm \tiny PTS}$ with
17 18 19 20	at Indian Point. I'll briefly discuss the status of both reactor vessels at Indian Point 2 and 3 with respect to upper shelf energy as well as the RT_{PTS} with the thermal shock limits of 10 CFR 50.61.
17 18 19 20 21	at Indian Point. I'll briefly discuss the status of both reactor vessels at Indian Point 2 and 3 with respect to upper shelf energy as well as the RT_{PTS} with the thermal shock limits of 10 CFR 50.61. The Unit 2 reactor vessel, similar to Unit
17 18 19 20 21	at Indian Point. I'll briefly discuss the status of both reactor vessels at Indian Point 2 and 3 with respect to upper shelf energy as well as the RT _{PTS} with the thermal shock limits of 10 CFR 50.61. The Unit 2 reactor vessel, similar to Unit 3 was manufactured by Combustion Engineering, both are
17 18 19 20 21 22	at Indian Point. I'll briefly discuss the status of both reactor vessels at Indian Point 2 and 3 with respect to upper shelf energy as well as the RT _{PTS} with the thermal shock limits of 10 CFR 50.61. The Unit 2 reactor vessel, similar to Unit 3 was manufactured by Combustion Engineering, both are Combustion Engineering reactor vessels.

an intermediate shell plate. And the upper shelf energy effective full power years, which is the expected end of extended operating period accumulated fluence is 48.3 ft-lbs. Although this is less than the 10 CFR 50.61 Appendix G screening criteria at 54 ft-lbs, it does exceed the minimum required of 43 ft-lbs that was the evaluation done by the Westinghouse Owners Group back in early 1990s were in response to Generic Letter 29.01

With respect RT_{PTS}, the most limiting location for Indian Point 2 is circumferential weld 34B-009 at 268.4 degrees. Again, that's at 48 effective full power years. And this is less than screening criteria of 300 degree. 300 degree is the limit for circumferential welds.

Going on to the Unit 3 reactor vessel.

Also manufactured by Combustion Engineering. The upper shelf energy at the limiting location is Plate B2803-3 at 49.8 ft.lbs. Again, this is just slightly less than the Appendix G screening criteria of 54 pounds but it does exceed the 43 ft.lbs required by the Westinghouse Owners Group analysis done for Westinghouse.

With respect to $RT_{\mbox{\tiny PTS}}$, the limiting locations plate is the same plate, B2803-3, at 279.5

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1	degrees. And this does exceed the screening criteria
2	of 270 degrees.
3	As required by 10 CFR 50.61 Indian Point 3
4	will submit a plant-specific safety analysis at least
5	three years prior to reaching the screening criteria.
6	MEMBER SHACK: When are you projected to
7	do that?
8	MR. AZEVEDO: We're projected to reach the
9	270 degree limit at approximately 37 effective power
10	years, which is approximately nine years into the
11	period of extended operation.
12	And we have implemented both low leakage
13	scores as well as flux suppressors at Indian Point 3.
14	MEMBER SHACK: But you're taking credit
15	for that in these projections?
16	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes, we are.
17	MEMBER BROWN: You mean taking credit, the
18	fact that they'll have a successful
19	CHAIR MAYNARD: It means they're going to
20	have to do something else in addition
21	MEMBER BROWN: Yes, in addition.
22	CHAIR MAYNARD: in answer to this prior
23	to that time frame or shutdown.
24	MEMBER BANERJEE: But you're taking credit
25	for the low leakage score and the flux suppressors?
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1	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes, we are. The fluence
2	calculations for 48 effective full power years do
3	account for the low low leakage score as well as the
4	flux suppressors.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: You haven't gone as far as
6	things like hafnium rods or
7	MR. AZEVEDO: No.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: in that projection?
9	MR. DACIMO: No, we have not gone as far.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: A change in the PTS rule
11	will help you?
12	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. We're following the
13	revision to 10 CFR 50.61, which is 10 CFR 50.61(a).
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
15	MR. AZEVEDO: Indian Point 3 was one of
16	the reactor vessels analyzed as part of the rule
17	change. And if that becomes part of the regulation,
18	that will address this issue to Indian Point 3.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. But yours isn't the
20	most severe among the vessels that were examined.
21	MR. AZEVEDO: I know that Indian Point 3
22	was one of the vessels evaluated. I don't know if it
23	was the most limiting vessel or not.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you're down the list
25	of a few. You're close, but you didn't win.

MR. AZEVEDO: Okay.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Next.

MR. AZEVEDO: So next slide I will discuss the buried piping of aging management program. For license renewal Indian Point committed to NUREG-1801 program section XI.M34. The program includes consideration of operating experience, and this morning I will just briefly discuss some of the recent operating experiences that we have experience at Indian Point.

We performed an inspection the fall of 2008. We actually dug up two locations. We exposed six pipe sections. These were two locations where three pipes ran parallel to one another. The inspections revealed some coating degradation. There was approximately five locations that had to be repaired.

The pipe wall thickness was measured using ultrasonics, and these UT results indicated the pipe remained at full thickness.

MEMBER SIEBER: Now you're relying for your buried pipe corrosion resistance on the outside coating?

MR. AZEVEDO: We are relying on the outside coating. And we are factoring in operating experience and making adjustments as we see fit.

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MEMBER SIEBER: Now operating experience
at some PWRs for cooling water lines shows corrosion
occurring from inside the pipe. And you're relying on
your UT measurements to say that the inside of the
pipe is not corroding?
MR. AZEVEDO: Our service water system has
experienced corrosion from the inside.
MEMBER SIEBER: What have you done to
repair it or are you just monitoring it?
MR. AZEVEDO: We do approximately 40 RT
inspections every outage as well as robotic
inspections, visual inspection from the inside of the
pipe for the larger diameter pipes. So we are
inspecting those pipes.
MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Could you describe
in just a few words what the robotic inspection
consists of? That is pipe's at what, at 36 inch or
something like that?
MR. AZEVEDO: They vary in size. I believe
that we individually inspect anything above 14 inches.
If we can install crawler, we'll remove a valve or
somehow we get into the system. And then we go as far
as we can with a visual crawler and we document the
inspection results.

MEMBER SIEBER: Have you found build ups

1	of lots of crud and animals and so forth in there, you
2	know, crustaceans and
3	MR. AZEVEDO: No, we haven't. The
4	predominant issue with the service water is at weld
5	joints. Our piping is concrete lined, cement lined.
6	And if the cement line chips in a certain location,
7	that weld will develop a through-wall leak. That has
8	been our experience.
9	MR. DACIMO: And we also install the Weko-
10	seals.
11	MR. AZEVEDO: In some locations that's
12	correct.
13	MR. DACIMO: In some locations we actually
14	sent a in the joint itself is a seal that you can
15	snap in place, okay, to protect that joint and
16	protects service water from migrating through the
17	joint to the metal.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, operating experience
19	would tell all of us that we need to pay particular
20	attention to service water. It has the potential of
21	picking up chemicals. And since the flow is not high
22	at all times, the conditions are good for corrosion
23	and blockage.
24	MR. COX: And a little clarification.

This is Alan Cox.

1	Let me add one clarification. The program
2	that we're talking about here is really focused on the
3	outside of the piping. We do have a number of other
4	programs that we could talk about that deal with the
5	inside and the service water heavy program is one of
6	them that Nelson was describing that deals with the
7	inside of the service water pipe.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: No. I think for the
9	purpose of license renewal we have to consider both.
10	MR. COX: Right.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Both the outside
12	protection and the inside corrosion resistance,
13	plugging and associated things. Operating history
14	tells us it's important.
15	MR. COX: Right. I just wanted to clarify
16	that not all of that is going to be under this
17	particular program that Nelson was discussing.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: All right.
19	MR. COX: It's under a number of programs.
20	MR. AZEVEDO: Okay. So both of these
21	locations we repaired the coating that had been
22	degraded and we backfilled the holes. This was done,
23	again, in the fall of 2008.
24	Going on to the next slide. More recently
25	specifically on February 15, 2009, we had a leak in an

1	8 inch condensate line. This was due to external
2	corrosion which led to a through-wall defect. This
3	location was excavated. The areas of concern were
4	repaired. One section of the pipe was replaced and the
5	line was returned to service.
6	A failure analysis is ongoing, has not
7	been completed yet on the removed section. And we'll
8	use the results of this failure analysis to establish
9	both scope and frequency of inspections going forward.
10	MEMBER ARMIJO: Is this a carbon steel
11	line?
12	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes, it is.
13	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.
14	CHAIR MAYNARD: I know you don't like to
15	speculate until the analysis is done, but do you have
16	any preliminary conclusions or the cause of this?
17	MR. AZEVEDO: Other than say that the
18	corrosion is from the outside, I really don't have any
19	additional information at this time.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: You say that was a
21	condensate line?
22	MR. AZEVEDO: It was a condensate line,
23	that's right.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: That's under the turbine
25	room basement?

1	MR. AZEVEDO: This specific location was
2	under the main feedwater lines and next to the aux
3	feedwater pump room.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. And is that buried
5	piping?
6	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes, it is.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
8	MEMBER BANERJEE: How did you find it?
9	MR. AZEVEDO: We had water there's a
10	flow penetration sleeve and the water was coming out
11	of the sleeve and pooling on the floor.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
13	MEMBER BANERJEE: Would that happen in all
14	cases or is it this particular
15	MR. AZEVEDO: Not necessarily. If the leak
16	had been outside the building, we may not have seen as
17	quickly as we saw coming out of the sleeve.
18	CHAIR MAYNARD: How did you have to get to
19	this? Did you have to go through concrete or
20	anything?
21	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. We had to cut a hole in
22	the floor and dig a whole approximately 10 to 15 feet
23	deep.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
25	MEMBER SHACK: And your coating is what

type?

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MR. AZEVEDO: Bitumestic. It's the black tar.

MEMBER BANERJEE: Now those leaks in other pipes, what sort of way would you know what would be-- is there a sort of a diagnostic which helps you to detect them?

MR. AZEVEDO: EPRI has been working with Duke Power and we've been also participating. Some promising new techniques that the industry is working on, but right now there is no proven technique other than just digging holes and visually inspecting pipe. But we're hopefully that in the near future there will be some ND techniques that we can use.

MR. DACIMO: But it also is dependent upon the system also. In the case of condensate you would see, depending on how large the leak would became, your makeup or of you condensate storage tank would start becoming excessive based upon what your other system or expected system losses would be. So in reviewing logs at some point in time you pick up on that.

CHAIR MAYNARD: So a number of it that's the way -- that's the way it would be picked up is through performance --

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1	MR. DACIMO: Right. That's correct.
2	CHAIR MAYNARD: flow test or break-up
3	rates, things like that.
4	MR. DACIMO: Right.
5	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes, it's a good point that
6	at least for this ASME section XI class 3 systems we
7	do flow tests or pressure tests so we would be able to
8	pick-up through-wall hole defects.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. This line you usually
10	it operates at a very low pressure and if it leaks,
11	it really doesn't effect safety-related systems.
12	MR. AZEVEDO: Right.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: On the other hand, it can
14	degrade the foundation of the building, you know,
15	because you're making a cavity under the floor.
16	MEMBER RAY: Fred, is there any difference
17	between safety function lines, picking up on Jack's
18	point?
19	MR. DACIMO: What we do is our buried
20	piping program ranks the systems that we'll look at
21	based upon safety significance.
22	MEMBER RAY: Okay.
23	MR. DACIMO: So, you know, service water
24	obviously in condensate storage actually is high.
25	MEMBER RAY: That's right.

1	MR. DACIMO: As a matter of fact,
2	condensate the reason it was picked initially to pick
3	those locations that we looked at was because it
4	screened out as being
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, RWST also.
6	MR. DACIMO: Right. That would be a high
7	system also.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
9	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. We would like to
10	move on.
11	MR. YOUNG: Okay. Rich Drake will be
12	covering the next item on the 1973 feedwater event.
13	And then following that we can go into the open items
14	that we didn't talk about earlier.
15	CHAIR MAYNARD: That's right. Yes.
16	MR. YOUNG: Okay.
17	CHAIR MAYNARD: I'm keeping my eye on the
18	clock. We are going to have time to do that.
19	MR. DRAKE: Okay. This is a question that
20	was asked about the Unit 2 containment liner 1973
21	feedwater event. On November 1973 during initial
22	plant startup from 7 percent power there was a
23	feedwater hammer which caused a pipe crack inside
24	containment near the containment penetration area.
25	The flashing of the steam impinged on the unprotected

1	containment liner causing a bulge to develop.
2	Subsequent to that piping was repaired.
3	Other modifications were made to the steam generator
4	to prevent to preclude reoccurrence of this event.
5	This actually led to the whole industry J tube
6	modifications. And the deformation restored to the
7	containment liner with a
8	CHAIR MAYNARD: Somebody's got papers on
9	the speaker there.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: This occurred before you
11	put J tubes in?
12	MR. DRAKE: This is correct. This is one
13	of the
14	MEMBER SIEBER: So the water hammer came
15	from the drain
16	MR. DRAKE: That's correct.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: of the sparger?
18	MR. DACIMO: The J tube model modification
19	actually came out of this.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
21	MR. DACIMO: This was one of the earlier
22	MEMBER SIEBER: And you're the guys that
23	caused that?
24	MR. DACIMO: Yes.
25	MR. DRAKE: Indian Point 2 and we were the
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guys that were associated with it. So that basically modify --It was not so artfully MEMBER SIEBER: phrased, but you got --MR. DRAKE: Yes. The piping to the steam generator modified and the piping itself was repaired. MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. MR. DRAKE: So the area of insulation of the liner then is expanded to cover a greater area 10 liner, insulation to prevent reoccurrence of this 11 also. 12 They performed UTs and a 100 percent mag particle of the liner itself in the area that the 13 bulge occurred to make sure that it did not crack. 14 15 They performed analysis to determine the as-left condition and also that the liner was good for 16 17 continued operation. MEMBER SIEBER: But the liner is not the 18 19 support. The support is inside the containment wall. 20 The liner just happens to be attached to it. 21 MR. DRAKE: That's right. It's just a 22 pressure --23 So what do you know about MEMBER SIEBER: the inside of the containment wall? How much of that 24 25 got ripped apart?

1	MR. DRAKE: What they did is they did UTs
2	of the embedded studs and determined that there were
3	several of them that were broken, and that was also
4	analyzed.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. But the concrete is
6	there, too.
7	MR. DRAKE: Yes. But this was a very short
8	transient effect. So it was just the liner that
9	bulged.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
11	MEMBER ARMIJO: So was it a buckling in?
12	The liner heated up but buckled
13	MEMBER SIEBER: What happens is that pipe
14	tries to drive itself through to the containment, it
15	takes the liner
16	MR. DRAKE: It's the steam contains the
17	heat?
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Oh really?
19	MR. DRAKE: Yes. The steam contains the
20	heat.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: So it's not the water in
22	the
23	MR. DRAKE: No, no, no. No. The water
24	hammer caused the pipe to crack and that steam pluming
25	then continues under the liner

1	MEMBER SIEBER: The liner, right.
2	MR. DRAKE: and then the heat popped it
3	out.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
5	MR. DRAKE: They did mag particles to show
6	there was no cracking. And then they were able to
7	restore most of the configuration of the liner back,
8	basically.
9	MEMBER ARMIJO: So you basically just push
10	it back in? There must have been some plastic
11	deformation
12	MR. DRAKE: Yes. They used an ILRT
13	basically to restore and push it back into place. It
14	was measured.
15	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.
16	MR. DRAKE: There was sight remaining
17	plastic deformation that had occurred in certain
18	locations.
19	MEMBER ARMIJO: But to Jack's point, the
20	duration of the steam impingement was relatively
21	short
22	MR. DRAKE: That's correct.
23	MEMBER ARMIJO: within an hour, half
24	an hour or
25	MR. DACIMO: John, do you have any sense
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1	of how long that was. John Curry, he's a Project
2	Manager for License Renewal.
3	MR. CURRY: As Fred stated, my name is
4	John Curry.
5	When this incident took place from the
6	time logs that were taken, the time that the feedwater
7	actually flowed on where this crack was approximately
8	a half an hour. So it was a very short time
9	MEMBER SIEBER: About the temperature
10	MR. CURRY: that it impinged on the
11	containment liner.
12	MEMBER BANERJEE: And what sort of
13	temperatures were
14	MEMBER SIEBER: 400 degrees, probably.
15	450.
16	MR. CURRY: Yes. The final feedwater
17	temperature at that particular point in time was
18	approximately 425 degrees. And the unit was at 7
19	percent power from the reports.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
21	MEMBER ARMIJO: So you could calculate
22	thermal stresses and see if that exceeded some
23	spalling criteria or something that would damage the
24	concrete if
25	MR. DRAKE: Yes. For a short period
- 1	

duration for 400 degrees, it wouldn't be a concern. MEMBER CORRADINI: I quess if I were in your shoes, I would answer the question in a sense that this was like a sunburn blister. It pulls out and it insulated itself. MR. DRAKE: That's correct. MEMBER ARMIJO: That helps sort of. MEMBER CORRADINI: It sure does. MEMBER SIEBER: Sort of. MR. DRAKE: Just for the record, is we 10 11 have done and we're going to submit the data very successful ILRTs on a number of occasions since then. 12 MEMBER SIEBER: The last item on that 13 containment, you probably have done three. 14 MR. DRAKE: Yes. It was last done in --15 MR. DACIMO: And in reality after that 16 event there was a "partial unofficial ILRT" then there 17 was an official ILRT. So --18 MEMBER SIEBER: The unofficial one was to 19 20 restore the --MR. DACIMO: Well, it was 1973 and it's a 21 little fuzzy, but I think that was the intent. 22 23 MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, going back to this 24 blister, can I ask you so you have a pipe which is 25 cracked. There's a jet of --

1	MEMBER SIEBER: Steam.
2	MEMBER BANERJEE: steam and water or
3	whatever
4	MEMBER SIEBER: Steam.
5	MEMBER BANERJEE: coming and hitting
6	this liner. Why is it bulging outwards?
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: It is expanding. It cane
8	from behind you, it can't go that way.
9	MEMBER BANERJEE: So it's just a
10	temperature effect, right?
11	MR. DRAKE: Right.
12	MEMBER BANERJEE: It's not due to any
13	forces?
14	MR. DRAKE: No. No.
15	CHAIR MAYNARD: It expands, it can't go
16	out, it's got to come in.
17	MEMBER BANERJEE: So it's a little blister
18	due to the heat
19	MR. DRAKE: Exactly.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: I would have said either
21	way, but
22	MEMBER BANERJEE: expansion?
23	MEMBER ARMIJO: You are talking about a
24	foot in diameter, 20 feet in diameter?
25	MR. DRAKE: It was over a 60 foot arc.
1	

1	MR. CURRY: And another unique design
2	feature of Unit 2 and Unit 3 on the containment liner
3	all of the plate-to-plate welds that were made in the
4	field are covered with a channel
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
6	MR. CURRY: that is welded over them
7	which we refer to as the weld channel system. And that
8	is pressurized with 52 pounds of pressurization. And
9	that air that is fed into that system is monitored.
10	And over the life of the plant and throughout this
11	whole incident that took place in 1973 no change in
12	the weld channel flow was indicated. So as the plates
13	did buckle, the welds also showed that their integrity
14	was maintained.
15	MEMBER SIEBER: Do you keep that
16	pressurized all the time?
17	MR. CURRY: Pressurized all the time.
18	MR. DACIMO: Yes, we're one of the few
19	plants in the country that had that. Connecticut
20	Yankee being one, Zion being another one.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Usually the welds
22	that would fail is the channel welds as opposed to the
23	liner welds.
24	MR. DACIMO: Right. Right.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: And most people decided

1	MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes. We had an open
2	question about the site of the buckle.
3	MR. DRAKE: It was over a 60 foot arc.
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: Give me in square feet or
5	whatever so that that's a pretty big it's not a
6	local
7	MR. DACIMO: Sixty by ten?
8	MR. DRAKE: It's yes, by 10 or
9	something like that.
10	MR. DACIMO: The deformation though in
11	inches was what? Was 5/8th of an inch?
12	MR. DRAKE: About an inch and a half
13	MR. DACIMO: An inch and a half.
14	MR. DRAKE: in the worst case.
15	MEMBER ARMIJO: It was a large area
16	MR. DRAKE: Yes.
17	MEMBER ARMIJO: with a small
18	MR. DRAKE: Yes. Right.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: You say the liner
20	thickness is an inch and a half?
21	MR. DRAKE: No. No. The worst case, about
22	an inch and a half.
23	CHAIR MAYNARD: But the liner really isn't
24	there for structural purposes. It's there for
25	pressure

MR. DRAKE: Right, just for pressure. CHAIR MAYNARD: -- and you did the ILRT after that and you'd still be all right. MEMBER SIEBER: It's a membrane. MR. DRAKE: Yes. So we've done ILRTs. We had the weld channel that's in service, continually pressurized. this last outage we did a visual inspection of the as-let condition and confirmed that the configuration is still in the same point. 10 That was with the insulation on, though. 11 12 We have done ILRTs since then to prove integrity. There is no age degradation observed of 13 itself. the liner We continue do ISI/IWE 14 inspections and we'll continue to do that 15 And we made a commitment to perform a one 16 time behind insulation in those areas inspection to 17 determine if there's any other degradation going on. 18 19 MEMBER BONACA: Would you say it again? Which area? 20 21 We're going to go with those MR. DRAKE: areas where there is the permanent deformation and 22 23 with the liner buckled that we're going to go -remove the insulation do a one time visual inspection. 24

MEMBER BONACA:

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Okay.

1	MEMBER ARMIJO: Remove? You're not going
2	to cut the liner?
3	MR. DRAKE: No, no. We're going to just
4	removed the insulation and do a visual inspection
5	behind the insulation.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
7	CHAIR MAYNARD: This would be the
8	insulation around the pipe, the penetration area?
9	MR. DRAKE: No. This will be of the areas
LO	where the bulge and buckling occurred.
L1	MR. COX: This is Alan Cox.
L2	There was insulation that was added to the
L3	surface of the liner after this event.
L4	MR. DRAKE: And that was done for both
L 5	units after this event.
L6	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay.
L 7	MEMBER RAY: For the
L 8	MR. DRAKE: Up to like the 80 foot
L 9	elevation which is almost up
20	MEMBER SIEBER: What kind of insulation?
21	MR. DRAKE: to the operating floor deck
22	of the containment. So anything below be now covered.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: What kind of insulation?
24	MR. DRAKE: Thatit's a metal jacketed
25	I don't know exactly what the size

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1	MR. CURRY: It's a foam glass type of
2	insulation.
3	MR. DRAKE: Yes. And it's
4	MR. CURRY: It's name was FLOAMGLAS.
5	MR. DRAKE: Yes.
6	MR. CURRY: And there's an asbestos
7	backing paper. So against the liner there's an
8	asbestos backing it in, there's foam glass insulation
9	
10	MR. DRAKE: Then it's covered with
11	stainless steel.
12	MR. CURRY: And then covered with a
13	stainless steel.
14	MR. DRAKE: And this is also outside the
15	crane wall where you wouldn't get any immediate jet
16	impingement except if you had a pipe break or
17	something like.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Except for the pipe, that
19	reason why you put it there.
20	MR. DRAKE: But it wouldn't be
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Would it go to the sump?
22	Would it go the sump if you washed it off the wall.
23	MEMBER BANERJEE: So how high is this?
24	Eighty feet?
25	MEMBER SIEBER: It's high.

1	MR. DRAKE: It goes up to our 80 foot
2	elevation from a 40 foot from a 46
3	MR. DACIMO: It's a band, right? It's a
4	band at how many feet high?
5	MR. CURRY: Well, it's from the 46 foot
6	elevation
7	MR. DRAKE: Almost to the 80th.
8	MR. CURRY: to the 80 foot elevation.
9	MR. DRAKE: All the way around.
10	MR. CURRY: And the full area of
11	containment. And it extends above in the hot piping
12	penetration areas. So it was extended at the time of
13	the incident and then carried over to Unit 3.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: When you GSI-191
15	calculation for debris is that included?
16	MR. DRAKE: This was all that was
17	considered. Oh, yes, that was considered. Absolutely.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Because that's
19	MR. DRAKE: And it's also outside the
20	crane wall.
21	MEMBER BANERJEE: And it is jacketed?
22	MR. DRAKE: It's got it's covered with
23	the steel. I said "jacketed," that was probably a
24	misnomer. It's covered with the same metal.
25	MR. COX: It's still the same thing.

1	MEMBER SIEBER: Sheet metal?
2	MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, it's not fibrous
3	or anything like that, right?
4	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, it is.
5	MEMBER SHACK: It's all glass.
6	MEMBER BANERJEE: Is it fiberglass?
7	MEMBER SHACK: Yes.
8	MR. CURRY: Well, it's a rigid it's a
9	rigid piece of insulation. It's a
10	MEMBER SIEBER: You can break it up in
11	your hand.
12	MR. CURRY: made of basically it's
13	molten glass with air pockets in it, foam
14	MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay. It crumbles into
15	what? Particles?
16	MR. CURRY: Yes, well it's not fibrous.
17	MEMBER BANERJEE: But not fibrous?
18	MR. CURRY: But not fibrous.
19	CHAIR MAYNARD: I'd like to move on. I
20	think this topic would be of interest during a GSI-191
21	discussion.
22	MEMBER BANERJEE: I'm sure they're thought
23	about it.
24	CHAIR MAYNARD: But for license renewal,
25	I'd like to go ahead and move on.
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What I'd like to do now is go back to page 21. Just step through the ones that are marked "Ready" and give the members a chance to ask questions or to dig into these a little bit deeper. You don't have to go into great detail, maybe just discuss it. We'll get you into you into the great detail.

MR. YOUNG: Okay. Alan Cox is going to walk through each item and give a little summary of what the item is and what response. All of these items we've provided responses in a letter that went in toward the end of January, if I remember right.

MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, we have the letter.

MR. YOUNG: So that's what all these items are. They're part of that January 26th letter.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes, I understand. We briefly want to pursue these a little bit. And the other items we've been talking about that are still open issues, there's going to be information going back and forth and these we'll get an opportunity to review new information.

You know, this is one we're probably not going to see any information on and that's what we've got to see if there's areas that we want to ask for or need more information on. So that's why we need to step these.

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1	MR. YOUNG: Yes. Okay.
2	Alan?
3	MR. COX: Okay. The first item is on the
4	I think the title is yard hose houses and chamber
5	housings. These are ruptures in the fire protection
6	system. The yard hose houses, but essentially it's a
7	storage cabinet to contain tools and nozzles and
8	MEMBER BANERJEE: So how do you determine
9	that there's no degradation of these, you inspect
10	them?
11	MEMBER SIEBER: It doesn't make any
12	difference even if there is.
13	MR. COX: It doesn't make any difference.
14	You could run over them with a truck and the fire
15	systems would still perform its function. It's a
16	convenience item for storage.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: The only thing you have to
18	worry about is the configuration of the hose that you
19	store in there. And you test those regularly anyway.
20	MR. COX: The hoses are tested
21	continually.
22	MEMBER BANERJEE: And you are testing
23	them, yes?
24	MR. YOUNG: Yes. The staff question was
25	why aren't they in scope. And then we provided the
1	NEAL D. ODGOO

answer that they didn't provide an intended function that met the criteria. And that was the answer we provided in the January letter. MEMBER SIEBER: And in most plants they're just sheet metal shacks with a door on it. The chamber housings, again, it's a surge chamber that's intended to prevent false due to pressure surges in the fire water have license renewal system. They no 10 They've got an orifice coming in and an orifice going out, so there's not really a pressure boundary for the 11 12 fire water system. When you talk about STETKAR: 13 MEMBER "chamber," this one is filled with valves, right? 14 15 MR. COX: Right. MEMBER SIEBER: Right. 16 17 MR. COX: The next one is the main feedwater system stop valves. 18 19 MEMBER SIEBER: Scoping. It's a scoping question about 20 MR. COX: 21 whether those were included within scope. I believe we 22 have some of the valves that are safety-related that 23 feedwater isolation. used for main These 24 particular valves are used backup feedwater as 25 And they were included in scope as (a)(2). isolation.

1	Since they weren't safety-related, they didn't really
2	fit under the (a)(1) category. So we did include them
3	for (a)(2) and they evaluated in the maintenance
4	tables for the (a)(2) components.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: I think the units are
6	different. You've got different scoping depending on
7	what years you're talking about.
8	MR. COX: Yes. I think the it alludes
9	to the BFD-90 valves on one unit are credited and not
10	on the other unit.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
12	MEMBER STETKAR: I had a question: Why is
13	that?
	MUMPUP CIUDED Outstand lineare heats
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Original license basis.
14 15	MEMBER SIEBER: Original license basis. MEMBER STETKAR: What? Because the lines
	MEMBER STETKAR: What? Because the lines
15	MEMBER STETKAR: What? Because the lines are physically precisely the same size on each unit.
15 16	MEMBER STETKAR: What? Because the lines are physically precisely the same size on each unit.
15 16 17	MEMBER STETKAR: What? Because the lines are physically precisely the same size on each unit. The valves perform the same function on each unit. So
15 16 17 18	MEMBER STETKAR: What? Because the lines are physically precisely the same size on each unit. The valves perform the same function on each unit. So I was curious why on Unit 2 the BDF-90 valves are
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1	MR. COX: Let me finish. It's the license
2	the analysis. And it had to do with two different
3	people doing the analysis and the assumptions under
4	one analysis was that these valves operated and the
5	assumption on the other was they didn't. And both
6	results both analyses provided acceptable results.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: This might be more a
8	question for the staff then
9	MEMBER SIEBER: It's a legal issue.
10	MEMBER STETKAR: because it's not at
11	all clear functionally.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: All right. Move on.
13	MR. COX: Okay. What's next?
14	MR. YOUNG: Inaccessible fire barrier.
15	MR. COX: The inaccessible fire barrier
16	penetration seals, it's probably one of the process
17	for doing evaluations to justify if you do have any
18	fire accessible fire barrier seals to justify not
19	doing the inspection. You know, you look at the fire
20	hazards and that sort of thing. And you have to have
21	a documented evaluation for those cases.
22	So the question here was do we have any
23	evaluations and in looking through again, the
24	process requires it for inaccessible seals, but we
25	determined there were no inaccessible seals for which

we had to have that evaluation.

So the simple answer was we don't have any inaccessible seals, we don't have any evaluations.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Well, I think you skipped one, the IP2 auxiliary feedwater pump room fire --

MR. COX: Okay. I'm sorry. You talked about that earlier from the aging management perspective. The question on scoping was to identify the systems we relied on, the secondary systems that relied in that event and to identify we on specifically what parts of the systems that we relied on and whether those systems were covered under the AT scoping. And we provided that information in the response.

MEMBER SIEBER: Right.

MEMBER STETKAR: I had a question about it doesn't have -- I asked earlier about the fire event.

But I had a related question to auxiliary feedwater pump. And I notice that you have screened out the HVAC systems, heating/ventilation systems for the Indian Point 2 auxiliary feedwater room. I think based on a rationale that operators could locally open doors and provide alternate cooling for that room, if I understood the rationale correctly, is that correct?

MR. COX: I'm not familiar with that

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1	issue. I don't know if we have that
2	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. I have a two part
3	question. One is the basis for screening out the Unit
4	2 HVAC completely and the other is that I didn't see
5	anything to address the HVAC for the Unit 3 auxiliary
6	feedwater pump room, which as best as I can tell, is
7	the same type of configuration.
8	MR. COX: We can look at that and get back
9	to you later.
10	MR. DACIMO: Well, we have Tom McCaffrey.
11	MR. McCAFFREY: Tom McCaffrey, the Design
12	Engineering Manager.
13	We do have an analysis, the high energy
14	line break analysis that credits the operator action
15	to open up the roll-up doors for 30 minutes. It's a
16	procedure to control for both units and for the
17	operators to take those actions. They have set points
18	associated with that to give them indication that they
19	need to take that action.
20	MEMBER STETKAR: Do you have analyses to
21	show that the cooling that you can provide is
22	effective since the steam and feedwater lines go
23	through there and it can get pretty hot pretty fast?
24	MR. McCAFFREY: Correct. Correct. And we

show that the operators still have the option.

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1	believe the number is 250 degrees approximately. I
2	don't know the number off the top of my head. It's in
3	that ballpark.
4	The operators will have plenty of time
5	when they get the alarm to go out there, roll open the
6	roll-up door to provide cooling to that room
7	MEMBER STETKAR: This room is full of now
8	hot pressurized steam when he opens up the door.
9	MR. McCAFFREY: Yes. The roll-up doors
10	would be a garage door type of
11	MR. DACIMO: They're very large doors,
12	like a garage door.
13	MR. McCAFFREY: The room is not it's
14	smaller than this room here. So the room that they're
15	opening is not a in relationship, it's probably
16	half of this room size where the garage door is
17	probably bigger than the entrance way here.
18	MEMBER STETKAR: The same rationale
19	applies for Unit 3?
20	MR. McCAFFREY: Correct.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: It is 200 pounds of steam.
22	That's to feed to the turbine driven steam pump.
23	MEMBER STETKAR: The main steam lines go
24	through there, don't they?
25	MR. DACIMO: No. The main steam lines do
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1	not go through aux pump room.
2	MR. McCAFFREY: In the other room. This
3	is purely going to be the aux feed line break from the
4	steam going to the aux steam pump, aux door feedwater
5	steam driven pump in the room. And that's the line
6	break you're going to have in this room.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. It is either the
8	steam supplied to the turbine or the aux feedwater,
9	which
10	MR. DACIMO: Those are the two highest
11	pressure lines in that room.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
13	MR. McCAFFREY: Correct.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: And they're sort of
15	intermediate, as I see it, as far as energy is
16	concerned.
17	MEMBER STETKAR: And that analysis that
18	you mentioned as part of the current licensing basis
19	for not requiring operability of those ventilation
20	systems for that room, is that I'm not familiar
21	with the current licensing basis.
22	MR. McCAFFREY: I'm not really sure of the
23	question. The current licensing basis we do credit an
24	operator action to open up the roll-up doors to help
25	mitigate the high-energy line break. And the

1	operators, we have timed this with the operation to be
2	sure they can get there, you know during a scenario
3	they can get there and open up the roll-up door within
4	30 minutes.
5	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. So essentially I
6	guess what I'm asking you is the current licensing
7	basis doesn't require operability of those ventilation
8	systems to support the auxiliary feedwater system, is
9	that correct?
10	MR. McCAFFREY: I'd not I don't know
11	that answer.
12	MR. DACIMO: John Curry, do you have that?
13	MR. CURRY: I don't know the answer
14	directly, no.
15	MR. DACIMO: Okay.
16	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. And this other,
17	the current tech specs, do they require operability of
18	those ventilation systems to support the auxiliary
19	feedwater system?
20	MR. McCAFFREY: No.
21	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Thanks.
22	MEMBER BROWN: I missed something on
23	something on the fire protection seals.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, I got a question or
25	two.

MEMBER BROWN: When I looked into the
responses there was still a response you all gave
back, I guess, to the staff. But it looked like your
position was that it's still going to come down to if
you couldn't get to a fire barrier protect penetration
seal, you didn't have to inspect it. Is that
MR. DACIMO: Well, I didn't hear your
comment a moment ago.
CHAIR MAYNARD: Let me go back over the
comment then.
MR. YOUNG: Yes. The question on this one
was in our on site documentation we show that if there
is an inaccessible seal that we can't inspect, we have
to do an analysis to document that and the basis for
not inspecting. In the follow-up to that procedural
requirement we found there were no inaccessible fire
barrier seals so there were no calculations.
If in the future we do have a change in
which one of these seals becomes inaccessible, then we
will have to follow the procedural requirements that
the staff had reviewed. But at this time we have no
inaccessible seals.
MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
MEMBER SIEBER: But the reasoning is not

too great behind excluding them had you had some, in

1	my opinion.
2	MEMBER BROWN: No, that was my concern.
3	Was that because inaccessibility it wouldn't have
4	passed inspection
5	MEMBER SIEBER: If you don't have them,
6	it's not an issue. On the other hand if you had
7	similar seal failures in accessible areas, I would
8	certainly look at inaccessible
9	MR. YOUNG: Well, absolutely. That would
10	be part corrective action program, yes. Right.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, that wasn't in your
12	submittal, the
13	MR. YOUNG: No. But we haven't had any,
14	you know, any
15	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, I got that.
16	MR. YOUNG: Okay.
17	MEMBER BROWN: Thanks.
18	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. The heat exchanger
19	monitoring.
20	MR. COX: The heat exchanger monitoring
21	was a question that we received on provide more
22	details on the inspection criteria. And we provided an
23	answer to discuss the qualifications we got a
24	qualified heat exchanger engineer that does the
25	inspections and we identified some of the specific

things that he would be looking for in terms of surface roughness caused by corrosion, erosion pitting, whatever it might be. And, of course, any unacceptable signs of degradation would be evaluated through the corrective action process. And, again, this would all be done by an engineer that's got a qualification for that particular function.

Any questions on that?

CHAIR MAYNARD: ISI Lubrite sliding supports?

MR. COX: Lubrite sliding supports was similar to that. We were asked, you know what exactly are you going to look at as part of inspection that we've committed to. These are inspected as part of the overall inspection of the support, as part of the Section XI IWF program. And basically inspection will involve looking at the -- you know, you can't see a lot of the Lubrite because it's supporting the component. And, you know, you can't see the edges. You can see signs of scoring and scratching on the surfaces that are supposed to slide. And, you know, basically you're looking for gouges or binding that would effect the performance of that support.

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, are you actually -- it's not like it's just sitting there for 60 years and

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not moving. Because every time you heat the plant up, every time you start and stop a pump and check valve slams shut, those surfaces slide. MR. DACIMO: We do an inspection at the end of every outage where you go do and do a visual part to look at it. To look at it? Yes. MEMBER SIEBER: Ι mean, this is -- it's not it's hidden and it's not like it never gets exercise because there's a lot of 10 plant maneuvers in view that actually cause these 11 things to function. 12 Again, it's all part of the IWF MR. COX: program for looking at those supports. We'll be using 13 the same IWF frequency and maybe looking for signs 14 of--15 If you look as far as 16 MEMBER SIEBER: 17 seismic analysis concerned and also the bending of structural components. And so it has an importance, 18 19 but it's not impossible to visually observe. 20 MR. COX: Anything else on Lubrite? The next item was a question we had on 21 Code Section XI. We had in our Section XI ISI program 22 23 we had talked about corrective actions and the staff had asked for a clarification if that meant that we 24 25 would implement the corrective action provisions in

1	specific sections of the code. That would be
2	Subsections IW A, B, C, and D and F that were
3	applicable to that component class. And the answer was
4	yes, that is what that meant. So it was basically
5	just a clarification of our intent.
6	The next one was excuse e.
7	MEMBER SHACK: I am just go on to the
8	next one.
9	MR. COX: Okay. The next one is periodic
10	surveillance preventative maintenance program. Again,
11	it's a clarification or a request for additional
12	details on the specifics of that program.
13	MR. YOUNG: Alan, this is a nickel
14	CHAIR MAYNARD: We have to go by our list
15	so we can keep track.
16	MR. COX: That's fine.
17	MEMBER SIEBER: My question on nickel
18	alloy is you had over the years about a 14 percent
19	increase in power, licensed power output which
20	obviously has moved TH up and up and up, right?
21	What's your TH right now at a 100 percent power?
22	MR. COX: Nelson, have you got any
23	information on that?
24	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. My name is Nelson
25	Azevedo.

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1	I don't have the exact number. It's
2	around 600.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: 600? That's pretty low.
4	Okay.
5	I was going to say the sensitivity change
6	in the color is around 610. But you're probably below
7	that.
8	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. Unit 2 we
9	MEMBER SIEBER: That's my benchmark, Bill.
10	MR. AZEVEDO: Unit 2, reactor both the
11	reactor vessel heads are T-hot so they don't have the
12	bypass cooling. And the Unit 2 ran historically in
13	the 580s. And after the power uprates they went up to
14	around 600. I don't have the exact number. I could
15	get that for you, but it's around 600.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
17	MEMBER BANERJEE: And Unit 3?
18	MR. AZEVEDO: Unit 3 is roughly the same
19	within a couple of degrees. And again, I can get the
20	exact numbers. I don't have
21	MEMBER BANERJEE: It would be useful to
22	have the exact numbers.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: I think there's only two
24	degrees difference between, as I read it.
25	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. I will get the exact
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1	numbers.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
3	CHAIR MAYNARD: And those are low compared
4	to what some of the PWRs are still operating at.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Go ahead.
6	MR. COX: Yes. The basic of this question
7	was to provide some clarification on exactly where we
8	had nickel alloy components and welds. And we provided
9	that information in response to that.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Are you sure they replaced
11	where you say you have thermal sleeves?
12	MR. COX: I would give that question to
13	Nelson.
14	MR. AZEVEDO: I'm sorry. What was the
15	question again?
16	MEMBER SIEBER: Are you sure that you have
17	thermal sleeves everyplace that your design drawing
18	showed?
19	MR. AZEVEDO: Well, we had one thermal
20	sleeve that dislodged from its location and we found
21	the pieces in the reactor vessel and
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Have you analyzed that?
23	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes, we did that analysis
24	to
25	MEMBER SIEBER: You probably didn't

1	replace it, right?
2	MR. AZEVEDO: We did not replace it. But
3	we have seen no other indications that any of the
4	other thermal sleeves have dislodged from their
5	locations.
6	CHAIR MAYNARD: With their age of plant,
7	their design probably does identify them all. In the
8	'80s there was a design change made that drawings for
9	some plants that it'd show a thermal sleeve there, but
10	that changed in the construction and it was removed.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: They didn't put it in.
12	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes. So but your age of
13	plant, I'm not aware of any design changes on thermal
14	sleeves that were current at that point.
15	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. I believe that changed
16	occurred in the mid-1980s.
17	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes.
18	MR. AZEVEDO: But by that point both units
19	were already operating.
20	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, you're right. In
22	some plans there's some confusion as to whether they
23	exist or not.
24	CHAIR MAYNARD: Right. Because there's a
25	fuel change after the original design.

MEMBER SIEBER: After the drawings were made the analysis was done. Okay. Thanks on that. MR. COX: I guess the second part of that particular item dealt with the bottom head penetrations on the vessel. MEMBER SIEBER: Right. MR. COX: And I think we had used the term in one of our audit question responses bottom head drain safe ends. And we don't actually have any 10 bottom head drains. So we clarified that that was the 11 12 safe ends on the bottom head were the safe ends that were used to connect to the in-core instrumentation. 13 The bottom mounted instrumentation to the --14 15 MEMBER SIEBER: You have about 50 of those? 16 17 MR. COX: Fifty? MR. AZEVEDO: We have 58. 18 19 MEMBER SIEBER: Fifty-eight. Okay. 20 MEMBER BANERJEE: With the upper head you 21 inspections show nothing around have CRDMs or anything? 22 23 MR. DACIMO: We'll let Nelson answer that question. 24 25 MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. We've been doing NDE of

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1	the upper head. By the way, for Unit 2 we have 97
2	penetrations and Unit 3 we have 78 penetrations. And
3	we have not found any indications.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: You're doing a visual on
5	the outside?
6	MR. AZEVEDO: We do both visual of the
7	outside surface of the head as well as NDE from the
8	inside on both units.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
LO	MEMBER BANERJEE: No cracks, nothing?
L1	MR. AZEVEDO: We have not found any
L2	indications, any rejectable indications.
L3	MEMBER SIEBER: You have the susceptible
L4	material in penetration nozzle? There is a class of
L 5	penetrations that were more susceptible than others.
L6	MR. AZEVEDO: You're talking about the
L 7	upper head penetrations?
L8	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes.
L 9	MR. AZEVEDO: Our penetrations were
20	Huntington alloy penetrations. They're not the B&W
21	material.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Thanks.
23	MEMBER ARMIJO: Also are any of them like
24	spares or basically where it's a dead space error?
25	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. We have spares and we
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also run the instrumentation through some of those as well as active control rod drives. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. And do you know, do you guys do a vacuum filled for filling up.? MR. COX: Yes, we do. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. And you inspect the MEMBER BANERJEE: welds as well of the --MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. We use the Westinghouse approach which is a dual probe eddy NUT, which we do 10 inspect approximately 10 percent of the weld material 11 12 as well as the entire base metal, MEMBER SIEBER: Great. 13 CHAIR MAYNARD: 14 Okay. 15 MEMBER SIEBER: CASS components. MR. COX: Okay. The question on the CASS 16 17 There were two parts of the question. 18 Part A basically questioning whether we were relying 19 \mathtt{UT} examinations for CASS components. And response was that because the ultrasonic testing is 20 21 not reliable for those type of materials, we did not rely on that as part of our program. 22 23 MEMBER ARMIJO: What do you rely on? 24 MEMBER SIEBER: What do you rely on? 25 MEMBER ARMIJO: He's setting us up, I'm sure.

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MR. COX: We would usually rely on basically the visual inspections and surface examinations.

MEMBER SIEBER: Do you UT -- I recognize that it's very difficult to find flaws in CASS stainless, but --

MEMBER ARMIJO: No, this is limited to like CASS piping as opposed to bell bodies where you know the chemistry of the alloy --

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, the centrifugally cast has some unique features of its own.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes. Yes. But the alloy chemistry effects whether it's going to embrittled or not.

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, let me ask this Most plants that have CASS piping of the era of Indian Point Unit 2 and 3 have augmented tech specs for inspections. Do you have augmented tech specs for the inspection of the reactor vessel for piping worlds where they require additional and above what has inspections over later been required?

MR. AZEVEDO: No, I'm not aware of any augmented inspection. We just follow the Section XI

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1	IWB requirements.
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: What are your largest CASS
3	components, not valve bodies but let's say piping?
4	MEMBER SIEBER: The piping, 36 inch
5	MEMBER ARMIJO: But you large diameter
6	CASS piping?
7	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Oh, yes. The whole
8	cooling system.
9	MEMBER ARMIJO: Well, that's
10	CHAIR MAYNARD: We'll let them answer
11	that.
12	MR. AZEVEDO: I believe the only CASS
13	materials that we have are the Finnies, the elbows.
14	So I have to verify as far as the piping goes.
15	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay. So it's very
16	limited? You don't have your big piping
17	MEMBER SIEBER: It's the important stuff,
18	though.
19	MEMBER ARMIJO: system isn't CASS
20	stainless?
21	MR. DACIMO: When you say piping, you
22	talking about RCS piping?
23	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes, I'll have to verify on
24	that. But my understanding is the elbows the RCS
25	elbows are CASS material. I have to verify the piping
1	1

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1	material.
2	MR. DACIMO: We have to get back to you on
3	that.
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.
5	MEMBER BANERJEE: What is the concern you
6	have?
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: Well, they're very
8	difficult because they're very thick walled, the way
9	they're made the microstructure makes it almost
LO	impossible to do ET exams. And there's concerns about
L1	embrittlement.
L2	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, there's a lot of past
L3	issues.
L4	CHAIR MAYNARD: They need to verify their
L5	material. I believe it was a little bit later when
L6	many of the RCS systems related to the spun CASS
L 7	stainless steel. So they may not have that.
L 8	MEMBER ARMIJO: If it's forged, we're
L 9	wasting time.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: But before we leave these
21	kinds of components and go off into the service water
22	system, have you replaced baffle bolts in these
23	plants?
24	MR. AZEVEDO: No, we have not.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Have you seen baffle

1	jetting, any evidence of it?
2	MR. AZEVEDO: We have not seen the
3	evidence of that, although we do have the 347
4	material.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Have you replaced
6	split pins?
7	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes, we have replaced split
8	pins. In fact, we're replacing split spins again on
9	Unit 3 this coming outage starting next week.
LO	MEMBER SIEBER: You mean the ones the
L1	first replacements?
L2	MR. AZEVEDO: That's right. This is the
L3	second time for Unit 3.
L4	CHAIR MAYNARD: You were probably in with
L 5	the first batch and they actually made improvements in
L6	the split pins after the first ones had been
L 7	installed. So be my guest.
L 8	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Okay. Thank you.
L 9	MR. COX: Anything else on the CASS
20	components?
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Service water?
22	MR. COX: Let me find the right page of my
23	notes here.
24	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes, the service water
25	system.
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MR. COX: Here we go. The service water
question that dealt with some differences in aging
effects for titanium materials in two different
locations. And it turns out that in one location we
actually knew the particular grade of titanium, and it
was a grade that was not susceptible to this
particular aging effect. The other location we didn't
have the specific information on the type of titanium.
So we took the conservative approach and called out
that aging effect for that component.
MEMBER BANERJEE: So your main system is
titanium where the river water is going through?
MR. COX: We have some titanium in the
service water. I won't say the whole system is, but
there is some titanium.
MEMBER BANERJEE: So the heat exchangers,
are they, the water there are they titanium? Tubes
or
MR. COX: The shell for this heat
exchanger is titanium. It's a question about
MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, I'm talking about
the heat exchangers with the river water, correct?
MEMBER SIEBER: The main condenser type?
MEMBER SIEBER: The main condenser type? MR. DACIMO: The main condenser is

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1	MEMBER BANERJEE: Yes. Anything which
2	river water is coming into contact with.
3	MR. COX: Well, there's a whole series of
4	heat exchangers.
5	MEMBER BANERJEE: Now they're all titanium
6	or they're
7	MR. DACIMO: Every heat exchanger is not
8	titanium.
9	MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay. So there's some
10	MR. COX: Some of them are. I mean, we
11	had to put that material in the table because we did
12	have some titanium heat exchangers. Like Fred's
13	saying, there's others that are other materials.
14	MEMBER BANERJEE: Okay.
15	CHAIR MAYNARD: But the bottom line of
16	this one was where you could not identify the specific
17	type of titanium, you have included it in an aging
18	management program?
19	MR. COX: Right. But I think we probably
20	included both of them in an aging management program,
21	but we included it for this specific aging effect in
22	this case because we can't say it wasn't susceptible
23	to that.
24	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay.
25	MEMBER BANERJEE: So do you monitor the

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1	thickness of the titanium tubes and things like that?
2	MR. COX: Well, we do eddy current
3	testing. We do visual inspections on the inside of
4	you know, the areas that are accessible for visual
5	inspections. Different techniques are employed
6	depending on the location.
7	MEMBER BANERJEE: And do you have to clean
8	them out often, all sorts of vegetation?
9	MR. DACIMO: We have a prevent well,
10	it's chlorinated, okay, so that minimizes the amount
11	of cleaning that you have to do. But additionally
12	there is a preventative maintenance program where you
13	open up heat exchangers on a relatively reasonable
14	periodicity to clean them out and check them out.
15	MEMBER BANERJEE: So you don't have
16	systems like these little balls and things which
17	MR. DACIMO: No, we do not have a Amertap
18	system.
19	CHAIR MAYNARD: That's usually just for
20	the main condenser.
21	MR. DACIMO: The main condenser, that's
22	correct. We do not have Amertap in each one of those.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: No. You only do that on
24	smaller ones.
25	MR. COX: And I think actually as we do

the periodic inspections and if we see that the need for frequent cleaning based on those inspections, we would do that. But, I mean, we got a pretty long history with the program, so I think we --MEMBER SIEBER: I presume you do heat balances on these exchangers, too? MR. DACIMO: We monitor inlet and outlet temperatures, absolutely. Absolutely. MEMBER SIEBER: And you can judge from 10 that. MR. DACIMO: Particularly for the diesel, 11 absolutely. 12 MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. 13 Okay. CHAIR MAYNARD: Periodic surveillance and 14 15 preventive maintenance, program elements? Yes. PM was a question, again, 16 MR. COX: 17 where we had to provide -- that's the one I started to talk about while ago. We had to provide more detail in 18 19 terms of what specific components -- I quess we had included those in the general description of 20 21 program already, but not under the scope section. So we basically pointed out where that information could 22 23 description. found in the program identified specific techniques, inspection techniques 24 25 that were going to be employed on those components

162 depending on the aging effect that we were monitoring. And basically we could have credited the techniques that are recommended in the GALL report. Under the one-time inspection program there's a table that says for a particular aging effect here's the acceptable inspection technique for that effect. And that's what we provided in response to this question. Components supports, a question was on the around the anchors where the component primarily And, aqain, was supports. this

clarification to say that that concrete around those anchors, concrete anchors and supports was included in the structures monitoring program that was looking at the floor or the wall that that support was attached to.

MEMBER SIEBER: This is mainly Hilti bolts and things of that nature?

MR. COX: Right.

MR. DACIMO: There's Hiltis and embedded anchors depending on the location. There's embedded anchors also.

MEMBER SIEBER: Oh, okay.

It was just a clarification that MR. COX: the structure monitoring program covered the concrete as opposed to the program that dealt specifically with

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1	the support.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: Now you can visually
3	inspect a Hilti bolt location and not be able to tell
4	whether it's going to stay in there or not.
5	MR. COX: Right. Right.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: So I presume you tug on
7	them every once in a while?
8	MR. COX: I'm not familiar with the
9	details.
10	MR. DRAKE: Actually, as part of the scrub
11	program, the resolution of that issue, we did do tug
12	tests on many components. We also did some
13	retorquing checking on some of those, too.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Now the classification B1
15	to B5 was different between the units, was it not?
16	MR. COX: I'm not aware
17	MEMBER SIEBER: I got the feeling that
18	there was some differences between which ones were in
19	each one of the categories.
20	MR. COX: I wasn't aware of any
21	differences in that.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
23	MR. COX: Do you know specifically? Reza
24	may have some additional information.
25	MR. AHRABLI: This Reza Ahrabli. I can

1	probably clarify that.
2	MR. DACIMO: Would you state your position
3	also?
4	MR. AHRABLI: I'm the Service Lead for the
5	License Renewal for Entergy.
6	As Alan pointed out, I think that question
7	rise from the fact that as we are rolling on the
8	application it almost imply that they be used on
9	either IBF ISR program for monitoring for inspecting
10	the concrete surrounding the anchors. That wasn't
11	really intended to be implied that way because the
12	stress monitoring program looks like the concrete
13	surrounding the anchor bolts and IBF looks at the
14	anchors.
15	So the clarification as Alan pointed out,
16	that is correct.
17	And back to your question as to B1 through
18	B5, that's really categorization as provided by the
19	NUREG-1801, by the GALL.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
21	MR. AHRABLI: So B1 applied to the
22	containment structure and B2 through B5 is different
23	than the containment.
24	So clarification was there was, you know,
25	background on that question that the staff asked us.

1	MEMBER SIEBER: Thank you.
2	MR. COX: Again, I'm not aware of any
3	differences, but if you've got some specifics on that
4	we can certainly dig into it.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, it's not important.
6	MR. COX: Okay.
7	CHAIR MAYNARD: Class 1 fatigue?
8	MR. COX: Class 1 fatigue, this was a
9	question on the number of heatups and cool down
10	transients. I believe when we put the application
11	together we had a period of time when we didn't have
12	data readily available, so we made our projections on
13	the number of heatups and cool downs based on a
14	MEMBER SIEBER: On a shorter period.
15	MR. COX: shorter period. And during
16	the audits we had an opportunity to go back and get
17	the additional data and provided the revised numbers.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Do you have complete data
19	now? You only took about a ten year period and said
20	well this period is like all the others.
21	MR. COX: Well, we actually took the
22	MEMBER SIEBER: But you do have the data
23	because you have operator logs.
24	MR. COX: We actually had a it was I
25	think longer than a ten year period. More like a 20

year period, but it didn't include the last ten years, I believe. MEMBER SIEBER: Ten years? Yes. MR. COX: And we went back and added that data. MEMBER SIEBER: CHAIR MAYNARD: As I recall, wasn't this an area where you -- the available data for IP2 and IP3 were a little different and you may not have used 10 the same periods of time. That's right. Because they were 11 MR. COX: 12 operated by different people, the programs had evolved a little bit differently. And actually have some 13 commitments going forward to go back and revisit those 14 15 projections for -- I think we had already gone and kind of reconstituted that history on one of the units 16 17 and we've got a commitment to do that for the other unit. 18 MR. DACIMO: Unit 3. 19 The fatique analysis here 20 MEMBER SIEBER: is usually for large components and major heatups and 21 22 cool downs as opposed to high frequency cyclic changes 23 that you find in small air lines, correct? MR. YOUNG: 24 Yes. 25 MR. COX: That's correct.

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Is that the last one? MEMBER SIEBER: I think that's it, right? MR. YOUNG: And that covers all of the--CHAIR MAYNARD: You may think you're done, but I've got a few other questions. One, and I think we'll be hearing about this this afternoon a little bit, it's on the water in the manholes and some of the cables. And I don't want to get into the whole generic issue of what's being 10 looked at right now. I just want to get a good understanding what cables that you guys have. Do you 11 12 have any statement? DACIMO: We're going to ask 13 MR. McCaffrey, our Design Engineering Manager to discuss 14 that. 15 I'm Tom McCaffrey, the 16 MR. McCAFFREY: 17 Design Engineering Manager. We have approximately six cables, 13.7 kV 18 19 coming down from Buchanan Substation to the station and one 6.9 kV tie between the two stations that would 20 21 be the license renewal underground medium voltage They have manholes that they run through, and 22 cables. 23 that would be the scope of what would be in the license renewal program, the medium voltage cables and 24

manholes.

1	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, let me ask a couple
2	of questions. One of them is what's the structure
3	from one manhole to another? Is it duct work,
4	conduit, piping, concrete boxes? And when the manhole
5	is full of water, is that interconnection full of
6	water also?
7	MR. McCAFFREY: So in some of the
8	situations it's a direct buried cable between
9	manholes.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
11	MR. McCAFFREY: In other situations it's
12	conduit. So there is a variety of connections between
13	the manholes and the manhole for each cable section.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Can I assume then that if
15	there's water in the manhole, there's water in the
16	conduit?
17	MR. McCAFFREY: As we kind of talked
18	before, the plant is kind of built on a hill.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, I got that.
20	MR. McCAFFREY: So what you're going to
21	get is
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, it goes downhill.
23	MR. McCAFFREY: any water is going to
24	flow downhill. So you're going to get some type of
25	precipitation, rainwater in the conduit or the
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1	manhole, that's going to eventually flow out of the
2	manhole and down towards the river.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: Right. Now the power
4	supply to things like service water pumps, service
5	water pumps in your screen house. Service water pumps
6	are safety-related? You immediate voltage cable
7	connects from there to the plant, and that's usually
8	underground, right?
9	MR. McCAFFREY: Our service water cables
10	are 480 volt AC cables.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: 480?
12	MR. McCAFFREY: All of our safeguard
13	motors and loads are 480 volt loads.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: Are any of your submerged
15	cables qualified to operate in a submerged condition?
16	Are they qualified?
17	MR. McCAFFREY: Our cables are designed to
18	be underground, they're not designed to be submerged
19	cables.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: That's not what I asked.
21	MR. DACIMO: So well the answer to your
22	question is no.
23	CHAIR MAYNARD: No. He said no.
24	MEMBER SIEBER: Now, do you have splices
25	in the manholes or in the cable runs between any
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manholes?

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MR. McCAFFREY: We typically have splices in the manholes.

MEMBER SIEBER: Right. That's where you pull the cable from?

MR. McCAFFREY: We do not do -- correct.

MEMBER SIEBER: Now splices are harder to qualify than undisturbed cable because they're handmade. What tests do you run to determine that the insulation and how often do you run them?

MR. McCAFFREY: Well, going forward we are going to be implementing a new -- as a corporation we've decided to go off and start testing using the EPRI guidelines for medium voltage testing. We're going to be doing a Tan Delta or partial discharge testing on our cables. We're currently evaluating which is the better method for us to use for our medium voltage cables going forward here.

MEMBER SIEBER: But you haven't done that yet, right?

MR. McCAFFREY: We've done some section high pots and Meggers of the cables, but as you know that is not a true indication of the cable insulation testing.

MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.

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1	MR. McCAFFREY: And you know the industry
2	has recently come out with that guidance and we're
3	currently evaluating what's the proper use of us at
4	Indian Point.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: In your operating history
6	have you had cable failures of these cables?
7	MR. McCAFFREY: Well, we've had cable
8	failures. They've been related to workmanship. They
9	have not been age-related failures.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: At splices or in the
11	pulling process?
12	MR. McCAFFREY: Very close either in
13	the splice or very close to the entrance to the
14	manhole, which would be basically your cable pulling
15	failure.
16	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
17	CHAIR MAYNARD: John?
18	MEMBER STETKAR: I just wanted to clarify.
19	You said that in going forward you're going to do
20	whatever the EPRI recommended testing was for your
21	MR. McCAFFREY: Yes.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: medium voltage cables.
23	But that are you going to apply that same testing
24	to any of the 480 volt cables?
25	MR. McCAFFREY: We're going to evaluate
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and see how that works. The cables are different style cables, the shielded cable versus nonshielded. So that's going to get into some issues with how we test their cables. I don't know if I answered your question completely. But there is --MEMBER STETKAR: No, you didn't. I guess my simple question is are you going to be doing more in depth testing of the insulation on the 480 volt 10 cables? 11 MR. McCAFFREY: We're going to evaluate 12 how to use -- right now EPRI is really focused more on the medium voltage and the shielded. 13 STETKAR: I know that, 14 MEMBER 15 trying to find out whether you're drawing the line at the six cables, 6.9 Kv and above or extending it down 16 17 below? MR. McCAFFREY: Well, I think the best way 18 19 right now is right now, yes, we're going to see how it 20 works on the 6.9 and the higher voltage and see if we can apply it to the lower voltage. But I can't say 21 it's going to work perfectly as a trendable tool on 22 23 the lower voltage cables. CHAIR MAYNARD: I really don't want to get 24 25 too much there. I think we're really talking more on the current license regime right now. I want to stick to what's it mean for license renewal. And I think understanding what you have in scope that is potentially subjected to this is important.

MEMBER STETKAR: Well my question is key of that because there's a grey area between 480 volt and higher voltage cables right now. And because all of their safety-related equipment at this plant happens to be 480 volt, that grey area becomes relatively more important at this plant for license renewal than other plants that have 4 kV pumps. That's the only reason I'm interested in that.

Right. And we do it for MR. McCAFFREY: the safequard, the 480 volt motors, we do testing, we do online motor testing from switchgear to the motor. So we test the whole cable of motor cables from the switchgear to the motor itself. And we use that to trend what's going on and pick up if we have any dead areas in the cables we'll pick it up and address it there.

And I was kind of hedging my words about the new technologies. I do not know how it's going to work on the lower voltage cables.

MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, that's right.

MR. McCAFFREY: And what we do right now

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as part of our current preventative maintenance program for our safeguards and 400 volt equipment, we test it, we measure it, we use like a Baker testing or PBMA technology to trend our commission of cables and orders.

MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks.

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I agree with Otto that it's not a license renewal issue. It's a current issue. And it's one that needs to be addressed. And whatever the resolution in the current time frame it will extend to the period of extended operation.

MEMBER BROWN: Yes. The inspection report that was issued, the staff noted that I guess one of the manholes with the 6.9 kV cables and the splices were submerged.

MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. They had water.

MEMBER BROWN: And the assessment was that the cable and the splices were satisfactory but there was no basis for saying hey how did we assess that. Was it just a visual, did you run some electrical tests, was it -- they just look nice and pristine, you just brushed the water off and a little bit of the dirt that's accumulated and --

MR. McCAFFREY: Basically what has been done is a visual inspection. There is no -- you know,

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1	as you know, a high pod or a Megger test at that
2	level, it's a destructive test and there's really no
3	good technology to say, hey
4	MEMBER BROWN: Well, high pod is
5	destructive. A Megger test is not necessarily
6	destructive.
7	MR. McCAFFREY: But a Megger is not
8	necessarily looking at a 1300 volt or, you know, even
9	a 6900 volt level, which is really a 15 volt cable.
10	It's going to pick up a degradation of the insulation
11	that you'd get from water intrusion that you know,
12	with the degradation of the insulation.
13	There's new technology with a partial
14	discharge and 10 delta are really going to help you
15	understand if you have that insulation breakdown,
16	which a Megger, you know unless you have a short round
17	with that cable voltage, of the voltage class of
18	insulation you're not going to be able to detect that.
19	MEMBER BROWN: Well, I'll preserve my
20	judgement on it.
21	MR. McCAFFREY: Okay.
22	MEMBER BROWN: Megger is not as bad as you
23	say.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Let me ask you, this is
25	Otto starring me so I'll make sure that this is
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license renewal. It's somewhat related to existing, though I can't really -- right now the commitment for the license renewal program says that you're going to inspect the manholes for water accumulation once every two years, I believe, is the commitment for the license renewal.

MR. McCAFFREY: Right.

MEMBER STETKAR: Don't your currently inspect them once every quarter?

MR. McCAFFREY: Yes. And that's really more of a --

MEMBER STETKAR: And you say you're going to use plant experience as the basis for your license renewal inspection frequency. So I'm curious about why you inspect them every quarter now which must be driven by some plant experience.

MR. McCAFFREY: The quarterly inspections is the really the root water. We do not do the complete visual inspection, get down there and go out there and inspect all of the supports and the back arms for the cables. It's not the full 100 percent inspection. That's what the two year inspection will include when we do the entire visual inspection along with pumping down the manholes, which we do quarterly.

MEMBER STETKAR: So the current is just a

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quarterly open up the manhole and pump it down. Okay. Thanks. It just appears with us to MR. DACIMO: be, well it is, good operating practice if the manhole is strong. CHAIR MAYNARD: And I agree. I think this is going to, again, be resolved as part of the current licensing issue. First, I don't find once every two years and these manholes being useful for much at all. 10 I mean, if you find water, you pump it down. I don't know. But anyway, I think it's going to be dealt with 11 12 in the current licensing --MEMBER STETKAR: 13 I was more concerned about how they're using current -- you know, 14 15 operating experience to be into a new license renewal, you know, inspection frequencies and things like that. 16 CHAIR MAYNARD: I wanted to discuss this a 17 little bit because I know it's going to come up later 18 19 and we might as well discuss some of it while you were here in front of us here to talk about it. 20 Fred, I believe that you had some answer 21 to some of the previous. 22 23 MR. DACIMO: Yes. We want to bring up three issues. One, address the issue on the type of 24 25 chemistry we were doing. Second, the spent fuel pool.

And third there's a question about the use of hafnium.

We do use hafnium on Unit 3, okay. And have been since '95. Okay. So that addresses that.

And I've asked Don Mayer to come up on the -- John Curry? Okay. John is our Project Manager for License Renewal.

MR. CURRY: There was a question that you had asked. Mr. Sieber. on the type of chemistry

MR. CURRY: There was a question that you had asked, Mr. Sieber, on the type of chemistry control that we used. Right now both plants use the volatile chemistry treatment, AVT.

MEMBER SIEBER: Right.

MR. CURRY: Unit 2 had started out its life with phosphate control. And that was taken out during hot functional testing or right after. They both went commercial with AVT and we use ethanol, adamine and hydrozine are the additions.

MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Okay.

MR. CURRY: And in addition to that your question on the moler control. We maintain a very high pH, 9.6. And so with that high pH, and as Mr. Dacimo had mentioned earlier, we have a new factor factory. So we have very good water that's added, and that's so between the good water and the pH control, the corrosion products are kept up.

MEMBER SIEBER: You probably haven't had

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1	much of an insult from your early use of TSP?
2	MR. CURRY: No, and actually
3	MR. DACIMO: We've got new steam
4	generators.
5	MR. CURRY: we have new steam
6	generators.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, good luck on your
8	current steam generators.
9	(Several speaking simultaneously.)
10	MEMBER SHACK: corrosion of the
11	MR. CURRY: Yes.
12	MEMBER SHACK: So you have no cooper
13	anywhere in the system?
14	MR. CURRY: Very low corrosion rates in
15	the secondary plant, that's correct.
16	MEMBER BANERJEE: I have a general
17	question, Otto, if I may ask them. I don't know if
18	it's within the scope of the review or not.
19	There's always been concern in this area
20	about warm water going into the Hudson and there's
21	lots of discussion about this. Now what is the long
22	term implication, say, 20 years more operation? Is
23	this going to have some deleterious effect or any
24	effect that can be identified which is different?
25	MR. DACIMO: You mean as it relates to the
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1	environmental impact statement and with the
2	environment?
3	MEMBER BANERJEE: Yes. I'm just asking as
4	a general interest. It is out of scope, probably.
5	CHAIR MAYNARD: This is truly out of scope
6	for this review. The environmental report is included
7	as an attachment. It has its own process that that
8	goes through.
9	MEMBER BANERJEE: It doesn't come to us?
10	CHAIR MAYNARD: We get a copy of it. But
11	there's a process for handling the
12	MEMBER BANERJEE: But we don't have to
13	comment on it?
14	CHAIR MAYNARD: Right. Okay.
15	MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, then it's out of
16	scope.
17	MR. DACIMO: I will say the fishing has
18	never been better of the Point.
19	CHAIR MAYNARD: They do have to answer
20	that question and I know that there were several
21	public meeting and the staff. But that is a separate
22	process for that.
23	MR. DACIMO: We have one more issue on the
24	spent fuel pool I'd like Mr. Mayer address.
25	MR. MAYER: Hello again. Don Mayer.

Fred had asked to me just provide a couple of additional comments and clarify a couple of things.

First of all, I'd like to just make it a little clearer that the data that we have in front of us right now indicates that the Unit 2 spent fuel pool is not leaking. I did discuss that during the course of the meeting, but Fred just wanted me to make that a little clearer.

The pool concentrations downstream, et cetera, are indicative of no active leak. We continue to monitor that as part of our quarterly monitoring process.

And the second part of what I was asked to comment on is I mentioned the long term monitoring program. A key, and in fact one of the principle components of that program is to act as an indicator of a potential new leak. And in fact, we believe the sensitivity for leak detection at the Unit 2 pool in particular is quite good. We have welds that are very close to the pool, in fact several feet from it. So we do have the capability to detect new potential leakage should it occur.

Thank you.

MR. DACIMO: And just by way of background information, Unit 3 pool has a coffer dam system

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182 around it. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Fred, did you have anything else? DACIMO: That really completes our MR. prepared statement. CHAIR MAYNARD: All right. Appreciate your time. And obviously stick around because as we hear from the staff, we may be asking you some questions and stuff. At the end of the day we will go around 10 the room and identify what we believe the members are 11 12 going to need more information on, especially at the meeting. And Ι know that some of these 13 containment issues and the cavity leak and the stuff, 14 15 there are some important issues that we're going to need to dig into much further. We'll kind of go 16 around the room at the end of the day and identify for 17 our next meeting those things. 18 19 MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes. Otto, some of us are going to have to be in another meeting. Could we 20 21 bring up some issues now? 22 If you want, I might suggest MR. DACIMO: 23 I can just go through the list of things that I have.

CHAIR MAYNARD: No, we'll go around the

room.

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MR. DACIMO: Okay.

MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. Let me ask how many people are going to the PTS meeting?

MEMBER BANERJEE: In and out, I would say.

MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, I'm going.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Bill and Jack.

We do have a few minutes here. So since you're not going to be here this afternoon, you'll be in the PTS meeting. So say some things right now you want.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes. When we were talking about this buckling of this liner, the only thing I didn't hear enough on is how you concluded that there was no significant damage to the concrete behind that liner when that event occurred? And I'd just like to hear a little bit more it later.

MR. DACIMO: Okay.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Jack?

MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I made a list of questions before I got here. And I think they've been satisfactorily answered. On the other hand, there's a lot of open items and more than I've seen in recent times. And my final opinion was on how you closed the open items that you have and how the staff decides that your responses acceptable. But right now I don't

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find anything on the material in the license renewal application or the safety evaluation that would preclude at this time, pending resolution of these outstanding items, my acceptance of the LRA.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Bill, did you have anything you want --

MEMBER SHACK: No issues we haven't discussed.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. And again, at this point the key is more in what do we want to make sure that we address later. Because we can all have our individual opinions right now, but it doesn't really mean anything until the full Committee meets until we see how the NRC actually resolves some of these things. And there are several of these items that are going to get discussed, but I'd like to get it narrowed down to key items of interest for us. And we will do that. Either at the end of the day, we'll go around on it afterwards. But we'll also have some things for the staff that we will be providing to them, too.

So with that I'd like to go ahead and take lunch break. We'll be back at 1:00. And at that time we'll start with the staff's presentation.

So thank you.

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(Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m. the meeting was adjourned, to reconvene this same day at 12:59 p.m.)

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A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N

12:59 p.m.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Like to bring the meeting back into session. And we'll start with the staff's presentation. I'll turn it to Brian Holian.

MR. HOLIAN: Good. Good afternoon. I just had a couple of items before I turn it over to Kim Green, the Project Manager. A couple from this morning and one I forgot.

One, I'd like to remind the staff is they support the Project Manager and the region up there to identify yourself to go to the microphone.

There are a couple of introductions I also wanted to make. Also up at the front table you'll see Maurice Health. He's previously been the Project Manager for Sharon Harris and has Duane Arnold, which is later on in the cue. But he's up assisting Kim with slides.

One other introduction. Often times license renewal has contractors that work with us as part of the SER process and the audit process. Sometimes I don't acknowledge them. But today I wanted to acknowledge Brookhaven National Lab worked on the Indian Point application with this. And Rich Morante, Mr. Rich Morante is with us today also. And

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he was also responsible looking back at the operating experience with our staff, in particular on the concrete items that you heard discussed this morning.

Two other items I wanted to just touch on. A lot of it came up on one question this morning about environmental reviews in particular. And I did want to mention really that side of the staff that's also working on Indian Point on our environmental reviews, that is a separate process and goes through the draft SEIS. And then the final SEIS. And just to remind the Committee that we did issue the draft SEIS a few months ago and held a couple of public meetings up in the Indian Point area in February. And those were widely attended. So over 300 people at each of those meetings, the daytime meeting and the evening meeting. And covered a wide variety of potential impacts that were disclosed in the environmental impact statement.

And the staff, you know, got a lot of interest on the environmental aspects up there. I think a normal plant on a scoping process we get 300 comments on environmental scoping. On Indian Point the staff received over 3700 comments. And now the draft SEIS is out and that comment period, I believe, ends in March time frame. So we'll be responding to those comments and that'll be a separate track.

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The last item I wanted to mention came up a little bit this morning, and I'm sure we'll cover it again, is the groundwater monitoring that's ongoing on the site. And one item that I wanted to mention there, as the utility I think covered very well, I wanted to mention an inspection report that was sent out, and I'll get to the ACRS Committee, in May of 2008 from Region I. We did not bring that part if the Division of Reactor Safety with us today, but the inspection report speaks well to the issues groundwater and monitoring for what they've done in the last year, year and a half. The accession number, just to read it into the record, is ML081340425.

And the region did conclude in the inspection report that public health safety has not been nor likely will be adversely effected. And they went into the split sampling that gets done between the NRC and the utility. So I wanted to mention that.

With that, I'll turn it over to -- oh, one other item on that. In the reactor oversight process we have had an open deviation, which is in the reactor oversight process one method that we could use to add inspection resources to a plant. And Indian Point has had, you know an open deviation memo for a couple of items, but in particular this groundwater monitoring

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has been one. I think the siren system was another one that did receive additional inspection resources up and above what we normally do under the ROP. That's it. With that, I'll turn it over Kim Green. MS. GREEN: Good afternoon. mentioned, my name is Kim Green and I am the Safety PM for the Indian Point license renewal application. you've already met Brian, he's the 10 Director for License Renewal, he's joining me. well as Dave Wrona, who is my branch chief. 11 And also 12 in the audience I'm joined by members of the technical staff who participated in the review or in the audits 13 that took place at the applicant's facility. 14 15 I'll begin my presentation by providing an overview of the license renewal application. 16 Next I'll discuss the staff's review as 17 its documented in Section 2 of the Safety Evaluation 18 19 Report. 20 And then Mr. Glenn Meyer, who was the lead inspection team leader, will discuss 21 renewal license renewal inspection and what took place in the 22 23 findings of that inspection. And then I will come back and discuss the 24 25 staff's review as documented in Sections 3 and 4 of

the Safety Evaluation Report.

And lastly, I'll go over the open items. Mainly I was going to focus on the seven open items that are still under staff review, but I do have in my slides the open items that the staff has information for which they feel they can close the open items. And I will discuss those as you see fit.

The license renewal application was submitted by the applicant by letter, dated April 23, 2007. As they've mentioned, they are both Westinghouse 4-loop power pressurized water reactors. They're each rated at 3216 megawatts thermals and they have an electric output of about 1080 megawatts each.

And they have already mentioned that the operating license for Unit 2 expires at midnight on September 28, 2013 and for Unit 3 it expires on December 12, 2015.

As they already mentioned, the plant is located about 25 miles north of the North York City limits.

On January 15, 2009 the staff issued its Safety Evaluation Report. In that report we identified 20 items. The staff issued 121 requests for additional information. And during the audits we asked 272 audit questions. The applicant docketed its

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responses to those questions in letters dated December 18, 2007 and in March 24, 2008.

The applicant made a total of 38 license renewal commitments. And the number of RAIs that we asked in the audit questions and the commitments is fairly typical of a plant going through license renewal.

This next slide just enumerates the audits and regional inspections that occurred during the course of the review.

As previously mentioned, the SER was issued with 20 open items. At the time of the issuance the staff requested additional information by formal letter, dated December 30. 2008. So it was pretty present. Or we actually requested additional information within the SER itself for some of the open items.

For the remaining six open items that we did not request additional information, the staff at the time was still reviewing information we had from the applicant. Some of that was submitted in early November of 2008.

I just wanted to point out that last week the staff did issue a draft request for additional information on five of the open items. And we've had

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a phone call with the applicant on those. And as soon as the staff looks at a few things, we'll finalize those RAIs and issue those formally to the applicant so they can respond.

letter dated January 27. 2009 the applicant submitted additional information for 14 of staff the items. The has reviewed that open information and based on the information contained in that letter we feel that we will be able to close 13 of the 14 open items. And as I proceed through this presentation I'll note the status of the open items.

Section 2.1 of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's scoping and screening methodology. Based on its audit and review the staff was able to conclude that the applicant's methodology is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4 and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

Section 2.2 of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's plant-level scoping results. The staff determined that the applicant initially omitted the IP2 chlorination and the IP3 hydrogen systems from the scope of license renewal. Therefore, we issued a request for additional information. And the applicant subsequently included the IP2 chlorination and the IP3 hydrogen systems

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within the scope of license renewal.

MEMBER STETKAR: Can I ask just a quick one on that? I notice they did add the IP3 hydrogen system. Is the IP2 hydrogen system included in the scope? I couldn't find it, but it's a big document.

MS. GREEN: I don't know that off the top of my head. But Stan Gardocki, who performed

the review might be able to answer that question.

MR. GARDOCKI: This is Stan Gardocki.

I think it was included, and we noticed that it was included on a unit, and that's why we asked the questions and we had them it include it on the other one.

We were specifically looking at the attached pipe into the BCT whether it was safety-related --

MEMBER STETKAR: I understand.

MR. GARDOCKI: That's what brought our attention to it. So I know if it wasn't included, it would have brought it to my attention. So it was brought up in IP3 that hydrogen was not -- it was in the table of attached -- there's an attached that says not in scope. So it was particularly called out there.

MEMBER STETKAR: Right.

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MR. GARDOCKI: But IP2 is included under the gas systems. So under nitrogen and hydrogen it was included in there. MEMBER STETKAR: Perhaps. MR. GARDOCKI: Yes. MEMBER STETKAR: The big discussion on IP2 is intended to focus on nitrogen. There was a lot of discussion about nitrogen. And hydrogen was mentioned as another gas system. Anyway, could you confirm whether it's 10 included? 11 12 MR. GARDOCKI: Yes. MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks. 13 So the applicant, like they MS. GREEN: 14 15 said, they included these two systems within the scope of license renewal. And with these inclusions the 16 staff concluded that the applicant did identify the 17 systems and structures within the scope of license 18 19 renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). Section 2.3 of the SER documents 20 the 21 staff's review of the applicant's scoping and 22 screening results for mechanical systems. In the 23 license renewal application the applicant identified 59 mechanical systems within the scope of license 24 25 renewal for IP2 and 87 for IP3. And I think the

applicant explained adequately this morning why the difference exist in the number of systems. And as they explained, they were basically owned by two different utilities for numerous years. And that resulted in how they named and identified their system boundaries. And so that resulted in a difference of the number of systems identified.

For the balance of plant systems, those being the auxiliary and steam and power conversion systems, the staff employed a two tier approach.

For the tier 1 systems the staff reviews the application and the UFSAR if there is a discussion of the UFSAR for that system.

For the tier 2 systems the staff reviews the application, the UFSAR and the license renewal drawings that are provided by the applicant.

The staff did perform a 100 percent review of the mechanical systems identified by the applicant as within the scope of license renewal.

The staff identified the omissions of some nonsafety-related components from the scope of the IP2 containment spray system. Since staff requested the applicant to do an extended condition review and as a result the applicant identified three other systems whereby nonsafety-related components were omitted from

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the scope of license renewal. These are the IP2 and IP3 closed cooling water systems and the IP3 folding vent sampling system.

The applicant amended the application and added the nonsafety-related components to the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).

Section 2.3 of the SER staff identified three open items. At this point I should point out that the A in the numbering scheme identifies an issue particular to Unit 2 and a B would identify an issue particular to Unit 3.

So for the first open item 2.3A.3.11.1 that was the open item that questioned the aging management review results for the yard hose houses and chamber housings. And the applicant covered that.

Do you have any --

CHAIR MAYNARD: You say that's only for 2.

Am I missing something? Why wasn't that applicable to 3 also, just the same question?

MS. GREEN: Well, I think at the time we asked the question, the applicant had mentioned -- when the staff reviewed the license renewal application we were under the impression that for these particular components they were within the scope of license renewal. Because the applicant scopes at a

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system level. So if they identify that a system meets one of the intended functions in 54.4, they will put the entire system. They'll say the entire system is in scope. But then when they do an aging management review they determine which portions of the system actually support an intended function and need to be subject to an aging management review.

And so when the staff asked the question it only of Unit 2, I think. And they identified these as being within the scope of license And since they are passive and long-lived renewal. components, if they're in scope we would expect them to be subject to an aging management review. after they provided information in the letter dated January 27th they indicated that they're not in scope. meet any of They don't the intended functions. Therefore, they wouldn't be in scope. that clarified that for us.

But I don't think we asked that particular question for Unit 3. But if I wanted to know for sure, I'd have to ask Naeem Iqbal to come to the mic and to answer your question.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. We should ask, because it sounds reasonable but there are some other differences between 2 and 3. So is the same

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conclusion for 2 applicable to 3 in this case?
MS. GREEN: I'll let Naeem answer.
MR. IQBAL: Okay. We'll answer this
question. Naeem Iqbal from NRR.
Yes, we asked this question. I asked this
question specifically because in their application
they specify for the Unit 2. So we asked this
question.
CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. This question was
asked for IP2.
MR. IQBAL: Right.
CHAIR MAYNARD: Why wasn't it asked for
IP3?
MR. IQBAL: Because in the chapter 2 they
only identify for Unit 2. So that's why.
CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Why wasn't it
identified for 3 then? Why is 3 absent from this?
MR. IQBAL: Maybe they don't have that.
Those components. Because these plants are two
different plants. Different so maybe the plant
configuration may be a little different.
CHAIR MAYNARD: I understand that. And if
somebody said that 3 doesn't have them, that all of
them that are there are really associated with 2, then

199 that. I've heard speculation, but I don't know --MS. GREEN: We would have to get back to you on that. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. The next open item is 2.3.4.2-MS. GREEN: 1. questioned the exclusion of feedwater isolation valves, or the apparent exclusion. We had asked the applicants to clarify if the valves that we were questioning, the BFD5s at Unit 2. And I 10 think the BFD5s and BFD90s at Unit 3. They're mentioned in the UFSAR as providing backup feedwater 11 12 isolation during main steamline break, I think. it wasn't clear. Because the applicant does not 13 highlight on their drawings the components that are in 14 15 scope for -- nonsafety-related components that were in

So we asked and the applicant provided information and clarified that the valves that we were questioning are in fact in scope for the purposes of 54.4(a)(2). So with that information, we think we'll

scope for (a)(2). So it's not always clear to the

staff whether the components are subject to aging

be able to close this open item.

CHAIR MAYNARD: John?

management review and if they're in scope.

MEMBER STETKAR: And I asked the applicant

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this morning, I'm not sure I got a satisfactory answer, could you explain to me why the BFD90 valves are not mentioned at all for Unit 2, but they are in scope for Unit 3 when they're precisely the same valves performing precisely the same function?

MS. GREEN: We did ask that as part of our RAI for the applicant to explain if the condition exists for Unit 2. But Stan Gardocki was the reviewer, so I'll have him answer your question.

MR. GARDOCKI: This is Stan Gardocki,
Balance of Plant Branch.

The BFD90s are motor operated valves that close as a redundant isolation to the safety-related fuel reg valves. So on one drawing on one drawing, on the station drawing it shows an SI signal to those valves. And it also shows on that valve drawing that the signal going to the feedwater bypass valves. So that's why I included two valves on one unit and just the one valves on the other unit.

MEMBER STETKAR: Let me ask Entergy then.

On Unit 2 do the BFD90s, the feedwater bypass reg

valves, the small lines, do they receive an SI signal

to close also, the motor operated isolation valves on

Unit 2?

MR. DACIMO: Yes, they do.

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MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you. Hence, my question.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Identify yourself.

MR. DACIMO: Fred Dacimo, Vice President License Renewal.

MEMBER STETKAR: Hence my question. The DFD90 values on Unit 2 will also receive a safety injection signal, then why didn't the staff question their inclusion?

MR. GARDOCKI: We did, and that was part of the RAI. We asked them similar to the other unit should these also be effected on that unit. questioning the licensing basis, but we asked them under extended conditions in that RAI should they be included. And basically what the staff is looking for whether these valves should be included as an (a)(1) component versus an (a)(2) component if they had a specific related function. And they weren't included the drawings as within the boundary flags identified as (a)(1) components. So our question said should they have been included within the boundary flags as a safety-related component providing a safety-related function.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Well, I think John's question is really about --

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MEMBER STETKAR: I understood the question about the drawings and whether things were highlighted. My question is that on Unit 2 the normal feed reg control valve, isolation valves, are designed BFD5. And the feed reg bypass valve, isolation valves, are designed BFD90. And that's the same designation on Unit 3. The valves are designated the same.

You raised the question apparently on Unit 3 because you saw both sets of motor operated valves, 90s and the 5s, receiving a safety injection signal, is that correct?

MR. GARDOCKI: Correct.

MEMBER STETKAR: And we just confirmed that indeed both sets of valves on Unit 2 also receive a safety injection signal, but the open item in all of the questions that I see pertain only to the number 5 valves on Unit 2.

MR. GARDOCKI: And the reason why they were specifically addressed to that was is it specifically states in the UFSAR for one unit that they are credited. And the other unit it specifically states they are not credited for closing on low power operations. That's why the bypass valves were not included in the RAI.

So one unit -- they're similar units,

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1	that's where our confusion was. So we asked that
2	under extended condition should they have been. But
3	their design basis document that we looked at, the
4	UFSAR specifically say in low power operations they
5	don't have to close the feedwater reg bypass valves.
6	So that's why we didn't ask specifically that valve
7	for (a)(1). It wasn't credited.
8	MEMBER STETKAR: For Unit 2 you didn't ask
9	it?
10	MR. GARDOCKI: Correct.
11	MEMBER STETKAR: You did ask it for Unit 3
12	because Unit 3
13	MR. GARDOCKI: Say in their UFSAR they do
14	credit. So there was a difference in their design
15	basis documents between the two units.
16	CHAIR MAYNARD: Well, I don't think we're
17	going to get an answer here.
18	MEMBER STETKAR: No.
19	CHAIR MAYNARD: I think it's something we
20	make a note of and we need more information on for the
21	next time we meet.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: No, that's fine. I just
23	wanted a clarification.
24	CHAIR MAYNARD: I think we need to have,
25	you know, why are they different. And I understand

that one may have a different licensing basis, but I think we also need to understand why do they have a different --

MEMBER STETKAR: That's one issue. I'm just trying to find out some of the things that I was concerned as I went through this is there are real physical differences between the two units and there are some differences that are more paper differences between the two units. And I wanted to understand if there are differences in the SER or the license renewal application between the two units, what the basis for those differences are. Real physical differences are obvious.

MR. GARDOCKI: But the answer it came down to was they were nonsafety-related valves and they can use nonsafety-related valves as a redundant isolation. So the question of whether they should have been safety-related was dropped. So --

MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. And this issue has come up on many license renewal applications. This is not a new threshold issue for us at all. The question is why the difference between Indian Point Unit 2 and Indian Point Unit 3 for valves that are precisely the same size performing precisely the same physical function. I don't want to get into what's written in

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UFSAR. And valves that also need safety injection signals. MR. COX: This is Alan Cox. Let me add one point of clarification. As far as the LRA and licensing goes the valves are not treated any differently. Again, their question was on whether they should be classified as (a)(1). bottom line is they're both -- both unit the same valves that we're talking about here are in scope and 10 subject to aging management review for (a)(2). MEMBER STETKAR: (a)(2)? They are? 11 MR. COX: Yes. 12 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Good. Thanks. 13 CHAIR MAYNARD: 14 Okay. 15 MEMBER STETKAR: That helps a lot. long as the staff agrees that none of them are under 16 17 scope for (a)(1), none of -- however many of them are, eight, sixteen. As long as none of them are in scope 18 19 for (a)(1), then that's a valid conclusion. And if you say all of them are in scope for (a)(2) regardless 20 21 of whether they're the 90s or 5s, that's good. MR. COX: All right. 22 23 MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks. MEMBER RAY: Mr. Chairman, as 24 long as 25 we've got this here.

1	CHAIR MAYNARD: Sure.
2	MEMBER RAY: On the RAIs that are yet
3	going out do we understand how we will have the
4	benefit of the responses for our deliberations?
5	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes, we will get copies of
6	those, anything that we want and that's responsive.
7	When we meet again, then all of those
8	should be resolved in some manner or not, and we will
9	have that to review ourselves and see if we agree or
10	disagree or have additional questions on them.
11	MEMBER RAY: I just wanted to be sure.
12	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes.
13	MR. GARDOCKI: If I can follow up on your
14	earlier question with the hydrogen system, I did find
15	it in the LRA under Section 2.3.3.5 for Unit 2. It
16	describes the nitrogen system. And it not only
17	includes the nitrogen system, it includes the carbon
18	dioxide system and hydrogen.
19	MEMBER STETKAR: So it does include
20	hydrogen? Thanks.
21	MR. GARDOCKI: And it describes to the
22	VCT.
23	MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you.
24	MS. GREEN: Okay. The third item on this
25	slide is 2.3A.4.5-1, which is the IP2 aux feedwater

pump room fire event. Basically for that issue the applicant provided information just describing the systems that were needed to provide flow to the steam generators during the one hour fire event. But the staff didn't feel that it had enough information at the time to make a determination that they had provided adequate information for those components that are subject to aging management review since that's what's required by the rule.

So we asked the question and the applicant did provide that information to us in a letter, dated January 27, 2009. So with the information that they provided they fulfilled the requirement of the rule identifying those components that are subject to aging management review. So we feel with that information we can close out this open item.

In Section 2.4 of the SER the staff concluded that there were no omissions of structures or structural components from the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a). And there were no omissions from an aging management review in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

Section 2.5 of the SER document, the staff's review of the scoping and screening results for the electrical and instrumentation and control

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system, the staff identified one open item in this area which deals with the station blackout scoping. That's open item 2.5-1. The staff is still evaluating the applicant's scoping boundary for that. I will cover that in a little more detail and we've heard a little bit about it this morning from the applicant.

But with the exception of the station blackouts open item, the staff concluded that there were no omissions of electrical and instrumentation and controls systems components from the scope of license renewal. And there was no omissions from an aging management review in accordance in 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

At the end of Chapter 2 our conclusion in the SER was that the applicant's scoping and screening methodology is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a) and with the 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

And the staff also concluded that with the exception of the open items there were no omissions from the scope of license renewal. And there were no omissions from the aging management review.

So at this time I'd like to turn the presentation over to Glenn Meyer.

MR. MEYER: Good afternoon, Chairman Maynard and ACRS members. I'd like to briefly discuss

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the results of the regional inspection.

The inspection has basically two primary objectives. We take a look at the scoping of nonsafety systems structures and components to make sure that in the field there is no potential interaction that could effect the safety systems. And we also take a sample of the aging management programs to look at what exists on site in terms of program support, prior history, plans to implement the programs.

There is a secondary objective wherein we pick a few systems to look at the condition of the system, to look at how the aging management programs cover them and also the operating experience by the system. And in this case we looked at auxiliary feedwater on both units and we also looked at the Unit 2 station blackout diesel generator.

MEMBER STETKAR: Can I ask a question?

And this might not be relevant for you, but your inspections tend to look at operating experience.

MR. MEYER: Yes.

MEMBER STETKAR: I had a general question.

We've had at least one other applicant that I can think of who used a rather narrow interpretation of NEI guidance related to operating experience, and in particular they initially interpreted the NEI guidance

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and

for the use of operating experience documentation of that operating experience as being relevant only to "existing programs" rather than new programs. Was that same distinction made here or are you confident that the operating experience that you looked at in your inspections and that's documented in the application applies across the board both to new and to existing programs? programs Because thinking of this other applicant who actually had to go back in and finish up that experience for the new programs because it is relevant. MR. MEYER: Let me clarify. The previous applicant, could that be Beaver Valley. MEMBER STETKAR: I don't --Okay. Was it a month ago that MR. MEYER: you had the meeting? MEMBER STETKAR: There's at least one other applicant. MR. MEYER: Okay. Well we had in Region I, it turns out that Beaver Valley's application is later, but the report was issued before Indian Point. But it's become clear that on new programs this does tend to be an across the board approach that they take. That the GALL for new programs is based on

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industry operating experience. And the applicants rely on that and don't do an in depth look at their own experience thinking that when the new program is implemented prior to the period of extended operation, at that point they'll review their own operating experience.

So experience from in my recent inspections Indian Point would tend to be similar to others they don't where pursue operating experience for a new program and instead rely on the industry experience that has been taken credit for in the GALL report.

MEMBER STETKAR: But if I understand that, let me make sure that I understand it. That what you're saying is that they will consider their own plant operating experience, but not until that program is implemented?

MR. MEYER: You know, basically design constructed and implemented, right. They have the basics of the new program and their commitment to the GALL exists now, but the operating experience part of it will go into depth later.

So in fact, in the Beaver Valley case when I inspected there and found that they were aware of operating experience, would tend to say that they were

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outside the industry, that they still felt that they were going to deal with that later and had not really dealt with the issue. MEMBER STETKAR: But you were at least aware of that operating experience; that's my point. At this time are we aware of the --MR. MEYER: It came during the out inspection. Our issue was that even though they were aware of it, it was cast iron pipes that were failing. MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. 10 11 MR. MEYER: And even though they were 12 aware of it, they had not adjusted aging management program to address that. They were still taking 13 credit for a one time inspection, which is to confirm 14 that the conditions are not --15 MEMBER STETKAR: That's a specific concern 16 17 at Beaver Valley. But I think my point is that --But I would say that their 18 MR. MEYER: 19 approach would be consistent -- we should ask Entergy, 20 but believe their new programs, there 21 distinction between existing programs and new programs. And I believe their new programs are based 22 23 on the industry experience that's taken credit for the GALL report. So --24

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CHAIR MAYNARD: Well, I think it would far

to ask Entergy. I think what you're asking is in developing these new programs did they take any of their own operating experience into account?

MEMBER STETKAR: That's correct. Making commitments for the frequency of inspections or the type of inspection or additional testing to be performing those new programs?

MR. YOUNG: Yes. This is Garry Young.

In the operating experience review we actually have two parts to it. One is to look at the adequacy of the aging management program through operating experience and the other is to look at aging effects through operating experience.

So the first part, the part where we look for aging effects we do look at all operating experience to determine if we have aging effects that are different or somehow beyond the scope of what's already covered in the GALL report or 95-10 or other industry guidance. So that operating experience we look at everything.

The operating experience to look at the effectiveness of an aging management program we do focus primarily on existing programs. For example, since the cable inspection program doesn't exist, then there's no operating experience to show the adequacy

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of that program other than what's already been documented in the GALL report. So, but we do have two parts to it. look at all operating experience on aging effects to see if we captured all the aging effects and then separately we look at the operating experience on the adequacy of the program. And that is focused on existing programs and not new programs that don't exist. CHAIR MAYNARD: I think what I understand 10 you said was that in developing the programs, the 11 12 frequency, the types of examinations that you may do, you do consider all your operating experience that you 13 have available. 14 15 MR. YOUNG: Yes. What you don't consider 16 CHAIR MAYNARD: 17 for the new programs is the effectiveness of those programs --18 19 MR. YOUNG: Yes. CHAIR MAYNARD: -- because you haven't had 20 anything to compare the effectiveness to. 21 22 MR. YOUNG: That's correct. So, yes, 23 there's two parts to the operating experience. And that's right. 24 25 So, yes, if we --

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I see the rationale.

Yes. Thanks. CHAIR MAYNARD: And I think the important part is getting it factored into the initial --That's right. And my MEMBER STETKAR: primary concern was has that type of review been performed and is it available for the staff to make a conclusion that the elements of the programs that you're committing to, you know, accurately account for 10 that experience. I think, I mean -- and 11 MR. YOUNG: Yes. 12 again, the example you gave where there was operating experience that an aging effect that previously had 13 not been identified is requiring aging management and 14 15 therefore could be subject to one time inspection. That is exactly the kind of experience we're looking 16 17 for to see if we can in fact credit that program. 18 MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you. CHAIR MAYNARD: Go ahead. 19 I think we talked about two 20 MR. MEYER: the system that we looked at. 21 22 Turning to scoping. The inspection 23 concluded that Entergy's scoping of nonsafety system structures and components was generally accurate and 24 25 their method acceptable. In our review we looked at

MEMBER STETKAR:

both the structural and spatial interaction parts to reach that conclusion.

I do want to note that during aging management program we found two errors in scoping, and I'll address those shortly.

So turning to aging management programs. When looking at the service water integrity program our inspector found that were components, specifically baffles under the service water pumps, that were not included in Entergy agreed that scope. it appropriate and concluded that the structural monitoring program was the place to put that so the license renewal application was amended to address that their program documents are planned to be updated to address that.

In a similar fashion when we looked at the lubricating oil analysis program the reactor coolant pumps have motors with heat exchangers for cooling. Entergy was under the impression that the cooler when the motors are refurbished are replaced. So as such, they wouldn't need an aging management program. Our inspectors found that wasn't accurate, that they were actually refurbished and reused. And so they were suitable for an aging management program. They agreed to change the scope of that component in the license

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We also had some concerns in the diesel fuel monitoring program, specifically the Indian Point 3 fuel oil storage tanks. Our plan to have wall thickness measurements, but the existing procedure and acceptance criteria for that. So they changed the LRA in that respect.

Also, Unit 2 has a fuel oil tank truck that in an emergency would be used to transfer fuel. And their procedure for doing that was deficient regarding sampling, process and location. So they adjusted their procedures and amended the application.

And also the Unit 2 security diesel generator, the fuel tank for that had been omitted from the program for diesel fuel oil. And they did add that and amended the application.

In the water chemistry program there were disparities regarding pH and glycol concentration testing. And also including the security generator for the sampling on those processes. They did amend the application and planned to address the program.

In the metal enclosed bus inspection program, their existing procedure didn't specify an appropriate acceptance criteria regarding basically the possibility for dirt and dirt to effect the bus.

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And so they did amend the application in that regard and are addressing that in the procedures.

Next slide.

Also, the next two are new programs. In the selective leaching program the application stated there would be a selected set, but wasn't specific as to how that set would be determined. And they agreed that a 90 percent confidence that 90 percent of the components did not have degradation, would be a suitable sampling approach and amended the application to include that.

In the non-EQ bolted cable connections monitoring program there was a disparity between what the application had and interim staff guidance regarding methods to monitor the bolted connections. And they agreed that they would make certain that the final guidance would be what they met. And they adjusted -- they amended the application to address that.

Also during the inspection we addressed the exposed rebar that you heard about this morning. We looked at the records and their evaluations of the existing conditions and felt that they were appropriate, but their plans were to continue to monitor it in a qualitative manner. And it was our

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belief that to truly monitor and trend the condition would involve some quantitative measures. And they did subsequently provide Commitment 37 to describe those additional quantitative inspections.

issues that did There were other address site and didn't involve application changes. One was operating experience on the metalenclosed bus program. It's an existing program. The inspection determined that there was 2004 example had been inoperable and bus yet their operating experience review and program basis documents didn't include that. And we felt it should the record, although it didn't of be part substantively change the metal-enclosed bus program. And they agreed they would change their operating experience review report to include that sample.

In the heat exchanger monitoring program we did have the opportunity to look at instrument air closed cooling heat exchanger that were open during the inspection. And following up on that there was a disparity between the units where one unit included the instrument air closed cooling heat exchangers in the program and the other did not. So they agreed that they both should be in and would adjust the program to do that.

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We looked in the electrical area Indian Point Unit 2 has а material that they for use separation. fire electrical cable It's not protection purpose. And one of our inspectors had looked in that are previously and noted that transite, a material that's specifically for this electrical cable separation, hadn't been addressed in their aging management review. They agreed that they had looked at all the fire protection materials. And so they did take a look at transite and concluded there were no aging effects, but they would adjust their aging management review documents to note that.

And lastly, there were in walking down various systems in the plant, there were a few isolated incidents where inspectors noted degraded conditions. And in following up, found that they hadn't yet been entered into the corrective action system in the structural monitoring, boric acid corrosion and fire protection areas. And Entergy agreed that that was appropriate and they did put these conditions into the corrective action program.

We did return after the main inspection to do a few additional inspections. One was the Unit 2 station blackout diesel generator --

CHAIR MAYNARD: I'd like to ask Entergy,

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Entergy's items, these condition reports for isolated degradation entered into your corrective action program, I'm sure you entered the condition. Did you also enter or take a look at why these hadn't been identified before or did you just put the condition in and --

MR. MEYER: In fairness I should note that in a lot of these program areas they do periodic inspections. And we may have identified evidence of boric acid that subsequent inspection would have identified but, you know, it hadn't yet occurred. But regardless --

CHAIR MAYNARD: I understand that. And it's usually pretty obvious whether something has been there a short time or a long time. And I'm just wondering --

MR. DACIMO: But our corrective action program requires you do that on a generic basis. Why aren't your own people identifying some of these issues? Right. And we looked at that.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Good.

MR. MEYER: We returned. The SBO diesel generator was declared operational on April 30th, so we returned following that both to look at the scoping of this new system and also to review how the aging

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management programs are going to address this new system. And we felt that they had done an acceptable job of including it within the application.

We did return to look at the electrical cable vault or manhole as it's been described, to observe that. And that is documented in the report.

And I think we've addressed the fact that there was some water. Some splices were under water and they drained that vault. So I think that's been discussed.

And lastly, we returned during the Unit 2 refueling outage because we did note that there had some corrosion on a part of the containment liner. I don't believe this is the same as the containment liner problem that's had extension discussion. So this one was accessible. We had inspectors return and take a look at the conditions. Found them to be similar to what was described in their documents and it didn't seem to be a problem in that respect.

So based on our inspections we concluded that scoping of nonsafety system structures and components and the sampled aging management programs are acceptable. And our inspection results support a conclusion of reasonable assurance that aging effects will be managed and intended functions maintained during the period of extended operation.

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1	I'd also like to briefly address current
2	performance. Both units are in the licensee response
3	column of the action matrix. That's the lowest level
4	of regulatory oversight. As Brian mentioned, there
5	are what we refer to as deviation memos that permit us
6	to do more inspections in areas that are suitable for
7	more inspection. And that has been the alert
8	notification system and also the ground water issue.
9	Over the past 12 months all of the
10	findings that we've had, the inspection findings have
11	been green, the lowest level of safety significance.
12	And all the current performance indicators and over
13	the last 12 months are green and have been. And that
14	indicates that their performance is suitable.
15	That concludes my presentation. If there
16	are no questions, we'll
17	CHAIR MAYNARD: It doesn't mean there
18	won't be some later.
19	MR. MEYER: I'll remember that.
20	CHAIR MAYNARD: John, you looked like you
21	were going to
22	MEMBER STETKAR: No, I'll wait.
23	MS. GREEN: Okay. I'm going to start with
24	section 3 now. Section 3 of the Safety Evaluation
25	Report consists of the staff's review of the aging

management programs and aging management review results. I won't go over each of the subsections. I'll just touch on those and have an open item or item of interest.

Section 3.0.3 contains the staff's review of the applicant's aging management programs. In the LRA the applicant identified 41 aging management programs; 10 were identified as new programs, 31 were identified as existing programs.

Fifteen of them were reported to be or identified as consistent with the GALL report. And 10 were identified as consistent with the GALL report with enhancements.

Eight were identified to have exceptions.

And eight were identified as plant specific programs.

So in this section of the SER the staff identified eight open items. And by letter, dated January 27, the applicant submitted additional information that will enable the staff to close the five open items that are listed here.

Would you like me to cover each one or do you have any particulars? The applicant covered them this morning.

CHAIR MAYNARD: I would just ask if any of the members for these from the previous discussion

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this morning have any questions for the staff right now on these?

MEMBER RYAN: No.

CHAIR MAYNARD: We can go on then.

MS. GREEN: Okay. The following three open items are still under review by the staff. And I'm going to cover those in detail later toward the end of the presentation.

Section 3.1 of the SER documents staff's review of the aging management review results for the reactor vessel, internals and the reactor coolant system. There were two open items identified section of the SER. We've received this information from the applicant by a letter dated January 27th. And we should be able to close these two open items out.

Any questions on these two for the staff? Okay.

Section 3.3 of the SER the staff's review of the aging management review results for the auxiliary systems is documented. There is one open item in this section, and that's about the titanium heat exchanger components. We've received the information and the clarification we needed from the applicant in the letter dated January 27th. So we

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should be able to close this particular item out.

Section 3.4 of the SER documents the staff's review of the aging management review results for the steam and power conversion systems. There was one open item in this section, and that's the IP2 aux feedwater pump room, the fire event. And I'm going to cover this a little bit more later. Because this item is still under review by the staff.

And Section 3.5 of the SER we document the staff's review of the aging management review results for the structures and the structural components. There were three open items identified in this section of the SER. Two of them are still under staff review, going address later in the to those presentation. The third open item was about concrete, the aging management program that would be used to manage the effects of aging for the concrete and surrounding B1 supports. The applicant clarified which they are using, so we'll be able to close out that open item.

Questions?

MEMBER STETKAR: I have a question about under the structures. There was an RAI that was raised regarding parts of the service water intake structures, the bar racks and the screens and some of

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those things. Not necessarily the physical concrete
parts of the structure, but structural elements in the
intake structure.
And as I read the resolution of that RAI
it seemed to focus on Unit 3 specific line features.
As I understand it. Correct me if I'm wrong, if I
remember the plans correctly. Unit 3 has an intake
structure with the six normal service water pumps and
then it has a set of three backup service water pumps
to take suction from the discharge canal. But Unit
only has the single intake structure with the six
service water pumps with no backup pumps, is that
right?
MR. McCAFFREY: This is Tom McCaffrey from
Entergy.
That's correct for Unit 2. Unit 2 in
addition has a river water system which can supply
like a third operation for service water to the
station. It's a separate intake function from Unit 1.
MEMBER STETKAR: That might be the answer
to my question.
MR. McCAFFREY: Okay.
MEMBER STETKAR: Those river water pumps
are not located in the same intakes? Are they located

in the same intake structure?

MR. McCAFFREY: No, they're a separate intake structure.

MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks. I'll stop.

MS. GREEN: Okay. Section 3.6 of the Safety Evaluation Report documents the staff's review the aging management review results electrical systems and instrument control system. In the LRA the applicant identified a 138 kV high voltage cable associated with station blackout as within the scope of the license renewal and subject to aging management review. However, the applicant stated that that time that there aging effects were no requiring management. And that for the material environment aging effect combination that neither the component, being the cable, or the material environment were evaluated in the GALL report.

The applicant also stated at the time that the cable was designed for continuous wetted conditions.

So the staff questioned the applicant's conclusion regarding that cable and issued a request for additional information. Ultimately the applicant amended the LRA and added that high voltage cable to the scope of the periodic surveillance and preventive maintenance program. And the staff found this solution

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to be acceptable.

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For Chapter 3 the staff concluded that with the exception of the open items the applicant has demonstrated that the aging effects will be adequately managed during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3).

Section 4 of the SER documents the staff's review of the applicant's time-limited aging analyses. Again, I'm not going to go over each of the subsections, but we'll touch on those that have open items or matters of interest.

Section 4.2 of the SER we document the staff's review of the applicant's reactor vessel neutron embrittlement TLAAs. It was mentioned earlier today, for the IP2 the limiting beltline material is lower shell Plate B2002-3. And since the irradiated Charpy V notice upper shelf energy value is projected to be less than the acceptance criteria of 50 footthe applicant has provided an equivalent pounds,, margins analysis that demonstrates that the reactor vessel will have margins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME code and will satisfy the requirements of Section 4(a)(1)(a) of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 through the end of the period of extended operation of

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Unit 2.

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MEMBER BROWN: Can I ask a question on that?

MS. GREEN: Sure.

MEMBER BROWN: The other document that we had indicated that this 48.3 value was less than the acceptance criteria of 50, Entergy presented that. But they also noted that it was greater than the Westinghouse Owners Group equivalent margin to -- I've forgotten what the rest of the words were -- of 43. And so I guess I've got a disconnect right now between 50 --

MS. GREEN: Okay.

MEMBER BROWN: -- which is the criterion,
54 which says, hey, you out to have margin to the 50
but the analyses are saying we don't need any margin
to the 50 and it's right up against. So they do
another analysis to some other criteria which is not
stated. What is this criteria and why is okay to be
greater than -- why is it -- let me phrase this
properly. Why is okay to be significantly above this
43 value which was previously understood to be the
margin that you ought to have.

MS. GREEN: Okay. Barry Elliot is just--MR. ELLIOT: I couldn't hear the question.

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I'm sorry. MEMBER BROWN: That's all right. I'm not even sure it was clear. Where are you? MR. ELLIOT: I'm right here. I had see you. I can't hear. Well, that's all MEMBER BROWN: Okay. right. I can't see without my glasses. CHAIR MAYNARD: This is going to be an interesting discussion. 10 Entergy presented when 11 MEMBER BROWN: 12 they presented their paper they said the Westinghouse Owners Group value for -- and I can get it back out, 13 the equivalent margin from the 50 was 43. 14 15 MR. ELLIOT: Right. MEMBER BROWN: They were going to be at 16 49, whatever the number is in here. 48.3 at the end 17 of the extended period of operation, which was less 18 19 than 50. 20 MR. ELLIOT: Right. 21 MEMBER BROWN: And I guess my question 22 what good is 43 if that's where you're supposed to be 23 margin purposes, but yet it's okay to be up to the 24 acceptance criteria for 50.

MR. ELLIOT: Okay.

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MEMBER BROWN: And then Kim brought up this other issue about well because they're up real close, they do this other analysis for the code and found that it met some criteria, but which she didn't state.

MR. ELLIOT: Okay.

MEMBER BROWN: So I guess I just wanted to understand why it's okay to be so close to the margin.

MR. ELLIOT: Okay.

MEMBER BROWN: Excuse me. Above whatever

MEMBER BROWN: Excuse me. Above whatever the margin was we had before we'd eaten it all up or close to it.

MR. ELLIOT: Okay. Okay. Let me explain to you, first off, they're meeting the regulation and why they're meeting the regulations.

My name is Barry Elliot.

I'm surprised. The only people I thought would ask the question aren't here. But that's very good. That's a very good question.

And let me just explain and give you a little background on the regulation. The 50 footpound criteria is established at if you're above that energy level for the reactor vessel materials, we're sure that you have adequate fracture toughness to withstand events that we are concerned about, design

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basis events.

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So the purpose of the evaluation of upper shelf is to determine whether or not you're below 50 foot-pounds.

MEMBER BROWN: Yes.

MR. ELLIOT: Once you demonstrate that you're below 50 foot-pounds, which is what they have demonstrated here, we have another part of the regulations which says you have to reach Appendix G criteria. The way that is satisfied is two ways. There are two documents that we use to satisfy that criteria.

One is Appendix K of the ASME code which gives criteria and methodology by which you can demonstrate that you have adequate fracture toughness.

MEMBER BROWN: Even though you're below the 50 --

MR. ELLIOT: Even though you're below the 50 foot-pounds.

The second criteria is we have a Regulatory Guide, which is Regulatory Guide 1.161 which gives guidance on how to use the ASME code.

Now what happened here is the licensee evaluated their vessel to something that was done in the '90s. It was 1993 or '94 document that the NRC

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234 reviewed and it reviewed it to the documentation that was appropriate at that time. So as part of this review I requested that they update it to the current regulations, which was the current ASME code and the current Regulatory Guide. And it compared the two. And the comparison determined that the guidance in the past and the requirements in the past, there only difference. And that the was was equivalent margin analysis. There was one difference

guidance in the past and the requirements in the past, there was only difference. And that was the equivalent margin analysis. There was one difference and it was more conservative in the past than it is today. So that they have demonstrated that they could meet the guidance today. And the guidance today that they meet would be applicable to 43 foot-pounds. And as long as the vessel has more than 43 foot-pounds they are meeting today's regulatory requirements.

MEMBER BROWN: Okay. So I guess there was an industry accepted basis for saying we can make it less conservative than it used to be?

MR. ELLIOT: Yes. Industry methodology, the ASME code criteria, which we have endorsed. The NRC has endorsed it.

MEMBER BROWN: I know that you have endorsed that.

MR. ELLIOT: And now we've asked them to update it, and they made the comparison. And they

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meet those requirements today.

CHAIR MAYNARD: As I recall, it's not just changing acceptance criteria. If you meet the 50, then you don't have to do have to do anymore. If you're below that, there's additional evaluation and analysis that have to be done before you can take advantage of the lower acceptance criteria.

MR. ELLIOT: Right. Yes. And that's what they've done. They've done it through а generic analysis and now they've demonstrated that the generic applicable today. And analysis is they've also demonstrated that it's applicable to their plant. that's the reason it's acceptable.

MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I think.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Go ahead.

So similarly at Indian Point 3 MS. GREEN: they have a limiting beltline material, and that's shell Plate 2803-3. And again they provided since their value is going to be less than the acceptance criteria of 50 foot-pounds, they provided a margin now that demonstrates that their reactor vessel will have margins of safety against fracture toughness equivalent to those required by the ASME code and also by Section 4(a)(1)(a) of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50 through the period of extended operation.

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MEMBER BROWN: Same --

MS. GREEN: Same answer.

MEMBER BROWN: Same answer, so I'm not going to say anything on this one.

MS. GREEN: Ditto on that one.

Αt Indian Point 3 with regard pressurized thermal shock, the applicant calculated the referenced temperature for PTSIU for the limiting plate. That's the 2803-3 plate. In accordance with the current PTS rule and position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide The staff requested that the applicant 1.199 Rev. 2. estimate when the screening criterion would exceeded. And the applicant estimated that it would be exceeded approximately nine years into the period of extended operation. That's what they told us and that's what they said this morning. So that would be 2024. And at that time --

MEMBER BROWN: Is it where? The reason I ask that is that they said it would occur at 37 effective full power years. Somebody made that statement this morning.

MS. GREEN: Yes.

MEMBER BROWN: Yes. And the extension was 38. When they go to 60 years they'll have 48 effective full power years, correct? Somebody else

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1	made that statement. Correct me if I'm wrong. And
2	based on they said they would meet they would get
3	there no. They were going to their limit at 37
4	effective full power years. So I just did a ratio
5	roughly and said it would about 2021, 2024. So I'll
6	allow some error there.
7	So that means what do you have in place?
8	I mean, I just kind of look at this, okay, you're
9	going to get well ahead of you finishing your extended
10	period. And you have to figure out what you're going
11	to do or shut down. Do you wait until the eleventh
12	hour and fifty-ninth minute? This is kind of a
13	MR. AZEVEDO: No, you don't.
14	MEMBER BROWN: theoretical question, I
15	guess.
16	And, Otto, if I'm stepping.
17	CHAIR MAYNARD: Well, you're not. We've
18	addressed this for a number of other plants, though.
19	MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
20	CHAIR MAYNARD: And we can have them
21	address it here or talk about it a little bit. But
22	the bottom line is you have to have a program in place
23	that identifies before they exceed any limits.
24	MEMBER BROWN: No, I understand that.
25	CHAIR MAYNARD: Before they meet that they

1	have to do something to either reduce it
2	MEMBER BROWN: Do they reduce power to do
3	that to change that, is that what you mean?
4	CHAIR MAYNARD: Or if they can't, they
5	reach that point, they shut down.
6	The license renewal, getting a license for
7	operating an extended period of time does not give you
8	the right to violate any of the rules or regulations.
9	MEMBER BROWN: I understand.
10	CHAIR MAYNARD: So if you've reached that
11	point, you have to shut down. The applicant's not
12	required to have in place what they're going to do at
13	this point. They just have to have it done before
14	they
15	MEMBER BROWN: Now is that by rule also?
16	CHAIR MAYNARD: Now let me have them go
17	ahead it here.
18	MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I don't want an
19	announcement. I mean, we go on I mean if that's the
20	case.
21	CHAIR MAYNARD: Well, let them go ahead.
22	MEMBER BROWN: All right.
23	MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. The short answer is, in
24	fact, and some of the other members of the ACRS in a
25	different meeting, the PTS rule is being changed. And
- 1	1

1	10 CFR 50.61 does provide an alternative way to
2	demonstrate that we have the adequate fracture
3	toughness. And if that gets approved, that will
4	resolve our issue.
5	There are other things that we can do
6	MEMBER BROWN: Is that analytic or a test
7	basis? I'm not in that meeting, so
8	MR. AZEVEDO: Well, it's different
9	screening criteria that we would have to do different
10	calculations to demonstrate that we meet the
11	alternative requirements.
12	MEMBER BROWN: All right. That's enough.
13	I won't beat that one to death anymore. I'll stop.
14	CHAIR MAYNARD: Well it is an important
15	issue. But within the concept of license renewal
16	we're looking at programs to be able to detect and
17	identify and manage these
18	MEMBER BROWN: Yes. And my past experience
19	in our programs, this is a number we paid a lot of
20	attention to. That's all.
21	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes.
22	MEMBER BROWN: So I was just interested in
23	the thought process as to where they were.
24	CHAIR MAYNARD: And there are discussions
25	going on right now and other alternatives and stuff.

But the bottom line is for license renewal we're looking at what do they have in place -- the staff, what do we have in place from a regulatory standpoint to ensure that this issue either gets addressed before any limits are exceeded. And if not, the plant shuts down.

MEMBER BROWN: Okay.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Go ahead.

MS. GREEN: And because the applicant has predicated that they'll exceed the PTS screening criterion, it included Commitment 32 which states that as required by 10 CFR 50.61 before IP 3 will submit a plant specific safety analysis for Plate B-2903-3 to the NRC three years prior to reaching the screening criterion.

They also added in that commitment that alternatively the site may choose to implement the revised PTS rule when approved. Obviously if they don't approve the rule, that goes away. But if they do the staff just points out that the rule is -- the revised rule is draft at this time.

MEMBER BROWN: And they've seen that, I take it? They said that would solve their concerns, is that correct? Okay. I thought I heard you say that.

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CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes, this has been worked on for some time.

MEMBER BROWN: That's fine. No, I am aware of that based on the last meeting we had on it.

I just didn't know how extensive it was.

Section 4.3 of GREEN: the document is the staff's review of the applicant's metal fatique analyses. Sixty year fatique analyses were performed for all NUREG/CR-6260 locations with the exception of two locations at Indian Point 2 and three locations at Indian Point 3. And that's because Indian Point 2 and Indian Point 3 are ANSI B331.1 plants and therefore they do not have cumulative usage factors for the these particular locations. But they have made a commitment to manage aging under their fatique monitoring program for all new NUREG/CR-6260 locations in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii). And that's identified as license renewal Commitment 33.

There was one open item in this section. There was open item 4.3-1. And the staff asked the applicant to provide the actual number of heatup and cool downs for IP3. In the LRA did not have that information. I guess at the time they submitted the application. Unfortunately at the time that I was

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242 issuing the SER with open items I didn't realize that they previously provided that information to us in response to an audit question. And they pointed that kindly to me. And they also provided information again in a letter dated January 27th. So now that we have information, it can be closed. CHAIR MAYNARD: I'm surprised that you didn't remember everything. MS. GREEN: Ι know. It's overwhelming after a while.

little

That should not have been. Ιf had realized at the time, that would not have been identified as an open item.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Better to have it this way than to -- so that's fine.

MS. GREEN: Okay. Well, I'm going to try to over the open items that are still under staff review at this time. As I stated in the beginning, the SER was issued with 20 open items. And since before the issuance of the SER the staff has been working with the applicant to obtain the information that we need to complete our view.

So by letter dated December 30th, 2008 we did issue a request for additional information for nine of the open items. And in the SER we requested

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additional information for five more of the open items. That left six that were under the staff review at the time.

We had information for some of them. I think five if I recall in a letter that the applicant sent to us in the beginning of November. And the time we were issuing the SER, the staff hadn't completed its review of that information. So we weren't able to ask the applicant for additional information at that time. So they had nothing to provide to us.

By letter dated January 27th the applicant did submit additional information for the 14 open items for which we requested additional information. And based on our review of that information, the staff has informed me that 13 of the open items can be closed. We don't expect to ask for any additional at this point in time. We feel we have enough information to close 13 of those open items. And we informed the applicant of that information.

So we still have seven open at this time. And they're listed on this slide. And I'm going to try to cover them, what the staff's thinking is the these particular items. You heard from the applicant what their view is. Now I'm going to try to cover the staff's.

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So for station blackout, as you know it's basically a generic issue that the staff has been evaluating. At Indian Point -- when we were reviewing their application the diagrams that they had in the LRA did not identify two independent recovery paths. So we asked them a question. And when they responded to us, they revised the figures. But at the time they revised the figures, they changed the boundary from a circuit breaker to a motor operated disconnect, which kind of threw us because the staff believes that the boundary should end at a circuit breaker. That's what our guidance suggests.

So then by letter dated March 24th the applicant revised it's LRA response to end the boundary at a circuit breaker. And then by the letter dated August 14th, 2008 the applicant clarified that the recovery paths did include the structural foundations needed.

So the staff is still reviewing the applicant's boundary and the information that we've received. And at this time it's still an open item. Okay.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Go ahead, John.

MEMBER STETKAR: I don't know if it's fair to ask and you can say no it's not fair.

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CHAIR MAYNARD: We don't have to be fair, John. MEMBER STETKAR: You can make a pretense. Since this is not one of these kind of a track, 13 or 14 that are well underway to being resolved, could I ask what particular concerns the staff still has related to the scope? I got confused 8 as I went through the timeline also. And when Entergy showed me the drawing this morning that showed the switchyards with the circuit breakers 10 whole 11 pathways highlighted, it seemed 12 straightforward. MS. GREEN: Right. I'm going to let my--13 MEMBER STETKAR: I want to say I don't 14 15 want to say don't want to --MR. HOLIAN: I take this. 16 17 MEMBER STETKAR: -- fairly straightforward in terms of acceptance, at least I could clearly see 18 19 where the boundaries are. MS. GREEN: Well, I'm going to let Brian--20 MR. HOLIAN: Yes. This Brian Holian, 21 Division Director. And I'll cover this one. 22 23 And we also had a simplified drawing that 24 we were preparing also to try to make it a little more 25 clear, at least the area of disagreement. And I'll

cover it in a couple of sentences here.

One, you know, this station blackout issue has been around for a couple of years, the generic aspect of it. As much as different plants have feed reg valve differences on whether that's in their COB or not. At this point you're looking at how far out does the plant boundary go for license renewal. And that's what it really gets at. And the basis behind some of the questions. And even how clear that is from plant-to-plant on their COB is a question. So it's an appropriate area for the regulatory and the plant to be discussing in license renewal, and it has been.

We do have existing guidance out there now. And it's generally worded. It talks about the path that's required. Typically includes the switchyard circuit breakers. And so that's general guidance. Typically is an issue for interpretation from plant-to-plant. And I think as we look back at the history it was written that way because it was to be based on what they were licensed to, even as they came in with their electrical diagrams on that. So it's the first item I wanted to mention.

The second item we put out, the staff put out, to try to clarify that existing guidance a year

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ago, more detailed guidance that basically said, and it's still in draft and it's out and it's been commented on, that we'd like you to detail this a little bit further to make it consistent across all the plants. And you will take it out plants to transmission system voltage. I'm paraphrasing, but that's one of the items in the revised guidance. And it gets it way into the switchyard.

And what you saw at Indian Point, Kim described earlier an area where they beefed it up, I'll say, to meet our first guidance, our existing guidance. So they quickly -- just the existing guidance. Typically where do you go and, as she mentioned, pass the disconnects to a circuit breaker that is typically met. So I think from the utility's viewpoint they meet the existing guidance.

This transmission-system voltage what you saw in their drawing was they have one line that comes down from 138 kV, the second line that goes out it stops at the 13.8, 6.9 transformer. That's still in the switchyard, at the edge of the switchyard. Our electrical staff would basically say take it out on that second path, the redundant path, to the next circuit breaker set that are still right there in the switchyard.

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So that's the area of delta; how far out do you go into the transmission.

A little criticism from the industry that, hey, how far out do you want us to go, you know, the next transformer pass that or not? So that's the area of disagreement.

I will just touch on it now. We do have quidance, and even NEI has weighed in on this in the last year on the draft quidance, that even the station blackout rule itself might not have been written to go to that aspect of the rule. And staff, their criticism of the staff, which I brought up to the Subcommittee here during our general briefing license renewal issues a few months back, was that you should go after this in clarifying the station blackout rule vice an interim staff quidance in the license renewal aspect. And that's a good criticism, I think.

And the electrical branch might be choosing to go at it that way to clarify the boundary for the station blackout event vice, you know, a plant-by-plant issue as we come into license renewal.

So to summarize, and this is still being decided upon by the staff, but you might see us retract from that proposed guidance that's out there

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MEMBER STETKAR: The transmission voltage?

MR. HOLIAN: That transmission-system voltage. And if that's so, it will clarify this open item and it'll be closed. But that discussion is still ongoing.

MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks. That helps me an awful lot. Because I hadn't appreciated the subtly of the transmission voltage criteria, let's say. Thanks.

MS. GREEN: Okay. The next open item that you heard about earlier from the applicant about the Indian Point 2 refueling cavity leakage. During the on site audits the staff identified that IP2 refueling cavity leaks when flooded during refueling operations. And as the applicant mentioned, that usually lasts about two weeks out of a 24 month refueling cycle.

The staff questioned the applicant about what corrective actions have been taken to repair the leak. And as you heard, the applicant's made several attempts to repair the leaks, but they haven't proven successful yet.

And the applicant mentioned that it has an action plan to permanently remedy the issue. But when they told us about it, they did not make it a license renewal commitment.

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And as they also mentioned, they had previously taken bore samples in the region of the leak to determine the extent, if any, of degradation to the concrete. And as they also mentioned, the sample showed that none has yet occurred.

So the staff asked the applicant what they had planed to do for the period of extended operation. And the applicant committed to perform a one time inspection in this region. I think they plan to take another bore sample in the region to confirm the absence of concrete and rebar degradation. And that was provided as license renewal Commitment 36.

And as I mentioned earlier, last week we sent them a draft request for additional information to seek information on their plans to monitor degradation in this region during the period of extended operation.

I can add a little bit more to this. The information that they gave us for their permanent fix I think is going to take three refueling outages, which would be after their current license expires. If a renewed licensed were to be issued, they wouldn't know whether or not the permanent fix that they might implement would be successful. And so not knowing that, the staff has just simply asked what do you plan

to do to monitor it during the period of extended operation to confirm that no degradation is occurring. So that's where the staff is at this point.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Well, I think we talked about this one a lot with the applicant. And this was the one that for me I'm having probably the biggest struggle getting my arms around it as to what the overall confidence level in, you know what degradation if any has been done. You know the overall safety significance of this. And I don't know, for me it's probably not worth talking about it anymore at this point. But I know the next meeting for me we're going to have more discussion and I need to see some more information on that. That's something I'll cover later. But we can wait also and see how the staff resolves this and stuff, too.

John?

MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. Can I ask a question that I didn't think of it until right now. It's really a question for Entergy. Just to help me file some things away, if nothing else.

Is there -- I don't want to call it annular, but an interspatial space between the refueling cavity liner and the concrete? We talked a little bit about that with respect to the fuel pool

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this morning and that, you know, there might be water there. Is there a similar space that water might be permanently residing? Or do you feel that if there is a space, that water has such a free path that it drains away?

MR. DACIMO: Yes. We feel fairly strongly that there is no trapped water in this area.

MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. That any water that enters basically winds up down on the --

MR. DACIMO: And we can see that via starts and stops when you flood and when you -- lower levels, okay. When you flood the cavity up and also on your lower levels, start and stop. Additionally, we had done some mass balances previously when we had done our containment sump strainer modifications. And we could see the make up rate is really equivalent to the train rate. So that gives us a feel for what's going in is going out. Okay.

Additionally if you look at the geometry we feel pretty confident that the geometry, the way the vertical walls are, that you're getting good drainage. There's nothing that's going to pool under there. And particularly you can kind of look up in the basement of the vapor containment and kind of see where it's coming from. Where it's draining from. So

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that in itself gives us a fairly confident that is all drained.

Last but not least is we also feel on top of all of that, okay, it is only wetted two weeks per two years. So the amount of time if we were to assume -- let's assume that we're incorrect. If we are incorrect, we really feel that the impact on the structure itself would not be significant.

And we'll -- I assume this is going to be a discussion next time. So we'll bring --

MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. Yes.

MR. DACIMO: -- those issues to the table.

CHAIR MAYNARD: And I think for me it would help, go ahead and talk about it, maybe some better pictures and stuff to go into what you think the path is. Just a little bit better detail than what the pictures that we had there.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ DACIMO: We will be prepared to do that next time.

Now, all of that notwithstanding, I don't want to imply that again that we're happy with this. Okay? We're going to live with this but on the other hand, though, don't think it really presents a long term challenge for this facility if it remains uncorrected.

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MS. GREEN: Okay. The next open item is the one that addresses the IP2 spent fuel pool leak. the applicant mentioned, and has already been established, that the Indian Point 2 spent fuel pool leakage. has experienced And as the applicant mentioned, the spent fuel pool does not have leak chase channels which makes it more difficult to detect and quantify leakage.

So to assess for potential indications this spent fuel pool leakage, the applicant did commit to test the groundwater outside the IP2 spent fuel pool for the presence of tritium from examples taken from adjacent monitoring walls every three months. And they've identified this as license renewal Commitment 25.

Entergy in the application and in their program they didn't state that they plan to perform augmented inspections of the spent fuel pool structure during the period of extended operation. So the staff requested some additional information on the condition of the concrete and rebar in the area where the leakage had been detected. And the applicant did provide this information including information about their bore samples that they had taken. But at the time of the issuance of this SER the staff was still

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evaluating the information. But they did that in the November 6th letter. But since that time, like I said, last week we did send a draft request for additional information to ask the applicant how the AMP or the aging management program will determine if a degraded condition exists during the period of extended operation or explain how the AMP will adequately manage the potential aging of concrete due to borated water during the period of extended operation.

CHAIR MAYNARD: And again, I think this is another important item that we certainly want to discuss next time. I'm not sure there's need to discuss anymore here. I don't know it might --

MEMBER RYAN: Just to reiterate what we said earlier, you know, a better understanding, a little more depth on the geohydrologic program and how it relates to the engineering conditions. And I think it would be particularly helpful to give your insights from the monitoring you've done as to what you think it means relative to how the defect is behaving. That's particularly useful. Because I'm sure you've got a record of monitoring now over some period of time. So gaining your insight into what that tells you would be very helpful.

MR. DACIMO: Yes. We'll be prepared to

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share the conclusions that we've had -- you know, all this stuff is on the public record. We'll bring that in and we will share that everyone. MEMBER RYAN: Good. One thing you didn't mention we talked a lot about tritium, because that's the indicator. And any other radionuclides that are detected and what your interpretation of those positive that you've got, if any, would be helpful as well. MR. DACIMO: We'll be prepared to do that. 10 11 MEMBER RYAN: Thank you. 12 CHAIR MAYNARD: I'd like to take a break right now. Let's come back at 15 'til and we'll go 13 ahead and finish. 14 15 (Whereupon, at 2:27 p.m. off the record until 2:44 p.m.) 16 17 CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Let's come back into session. And, Kim, go ahead with the next item 18 19 here. Okay. 20 MS. GREEN: The next open item 21 that's under staff review is the one that addresses 22 exterior concrete spalling of the containment 23 During the on site audit staff reviewed some operating experience relative to the concrete 24 25 spalling and asked a lot of questions. The applicant

provided information about the areas and the reasons for the spalling. As they mentioned earlier, it occurs primarily where the Cadweld sleeves have insufficient concrete coverage and also where they have applied some concrete over the anchor embeddments that were used for erection of scaffolding during initial construction.

The applicant also mentioned that they did evaluate the structural margins for the IP containments and concluded that at the locations where the rebar is exposed there is sufficient design margin to ensure structural integrity. And they also said that this condition is being monitored under their containment inservice inspection program.

In response to the staff's request about this issue, the applicant committed to enhance the containment inservice inspection program during the period extended operation. Glenn of As also mentioned, they covered that during the inspection. applicant said that they would enhanced characterization of the degradation. I think they're going to quantify it using some camera that is able to record measurements. And that will allow them to perform effective trending of the degradation. And that was identified as license renewal Commitment 37.

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And this is another item that we recently submitted a draft RAI on, and we're just trying to find out how the applicant will use the enhanced inspection results and the design margin calculations to ensure that there's no loss of intended function during the period of extended operation.

item 3.4 - 1addresses the Open aging management review results for those components needed to support a fire event in the IP2 aux feedwater pump In the application the applicant stated that the systems needed to supply feedwater to the steam generators during the fire event are continuously in operation and are monitored. They also stated that significant degradation that could threaten the performance of the intended functions the components will be apparent in the period immediate preceding the event and corrective action will required to sustain continued operations. And for the minimal one hour period that the systems would be required to provide makeup to the steam generators that further aging degradation that would not have been apparent prior to the event is negligible. So therefore the applicant did not identify any aging since normal plant operation ensures effects that adequate pressure boundary integrity, the post fire

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intended functions to provide feedwater to steam generators is assured. Therefore, they did not identify a specific an aging management program would be required.

Because these systems contain passive and long-lived components, the rule states applicant should demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed during the period of extended operation such that the intended functions maintained consistent will be with the current licensing basis for the period of extended operation. And based upon the information LRA that we had, the staff did not believe it had sufficient information to make this determination.

So by letter dated December 30, 2008 the staff asked Entergy to provide details of the AMR results for those systems credited for providing flow to the steam generators during the fire event. They provided that information in a letter dated January 27th. And the staff is still evaluating the response at this time.

CHAIR MAYNARD: I'm still trying to get my hands around this one. The aux feed is so important that I'm still -- like I don't know that I've got a question. I'm just kind of expressing some

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nervousness here that I've got to do some more reviewing on my own for this situation and really what the effect is on aux feed and everything here.

So, John, you look like you have --

MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, Kim, I kind of share Otto's uneasiness, and I'm not quite sure if I can get my hands around exactly why. Because in some cases I'm not intimately familiar with kind of the rules of defining these fires.

From what I heard you just say noticed on the second item on the slide there says that applicant stated that aging related degradation occurs during one hour is negligible. And what I say is you aren't particularly you that considering that one hour time window in your evaluation, is that correct? You're more concerned with the availability of the normal systems to provide flow regardless of whether it's one hour after the fire or a couple of hours, is that correct?

MS. GREEN: Correct. That's correct.

MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. So the one hour doesn't really enter into your evaluation, is that correct?

MS. GREEN: Yes. That's correct.

There are some systems that are used

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during this event that are already in scope for other reasons.

MEMBER STETKAR: Right. Right.

MS. GREEN: And then there are some systems that are only -- I think the only reason they're in scope is because of this fire event.

MEMBER STETKAR: Right.

MS. GREEN: And the applicant is making a statement that because these systems are in continuous operation they'll always be monitored and therefore they would identify if there was a problem with the system prior to the fire event ever occurring. And they've cited some precedents in other applications, as they mentioned, where the staff has for the BWRs in particular I think, accepted the justification that in particular condensers that they're continuous operation and the post accident intended function would be maintained based on continuous operation.

I think the staff is still evaluating this because we haven't seen this yet for a PWR.

MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.

MS. GREEN: And so the staff is still trying to come to terms with whether or not there are some passive long-lived components that would have

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known degradation, not necessarily at this plant but in GALL, the components of particular material would experience some aging related degradation. And whether or not it's one hour the staff doesn't -
MEMBER STETKAR: Doesn't care how long after T° the thing -
MS. GREEN: Right. Correct.

MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks. That helps me a little bit with the one hour.

And I'll ask it again just to make sure I understand that the staff agrees that because of the Halon protection system in the IP3 auxiliary feedwater room this is a nonconsideration for IP3, is that correct? And there isn't a corresponding IP3 auxiliary feedwater room at the --

MS. GREEN: That is my understanding.

I think in this particular zone for the aux feedwater pump room at IP2 there is an exemption that they have for fire protection, but it's due to the fact that they don't have -- well, I went back and tried to dig up the history on this. And this is one of those areas that doesn't have adequate suppression, so therefore they have to take credit for providing some--

MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, that was pretty

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1	clear this morning.						
2	MS. GREEN: Right.						
3	MEMBER STETKAR: That IP2 doesn't have						
4	adequate protection. But it's concluded that IP3 does						
5	have adequate protection?						
6	MS. GREEN: That is my understanding.						
7	CHAIR MAYNARD: I would think that's						
8	something that we would want to get clarified at the						
9	next meeting.						
10	MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, it sounds like						
11	it's part of the current licensing basis. It may be a						
12	physical difference between the two plants because of						
13	the existence of the protection systems, the						
14	differences in those systems. I just want to make sure						
15	that						
16	MS. GREEN: We can find that out and make						
17	sure that we understand that; that it is not an issue						
18	for IP3.						
19	MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, I was just						
20	curious because in the SER there's a section heading						
21	that says IP3 auxiliary feedwater room fire event and						
22	it just simply says not applicable						
23	MS. GREEN: Right.						
24	MEMBER STETKAR: without any further						
25	discussion about why that is or						
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	MS. GREEN: Well, that was my gentus.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: I'm sorry.
3	MS. GREEN: They identified in Section
4	2.3.4-5 in their LRA. And if I had put in 2.3.4-5 as
5	their condensate system for IP3, it would leave a
6	you know, in the numbering. And so I put it in and
7	just said it's not applicable.
8	MEMBER STETKAR: And so it was easy for me
9	to find the section to go look, because it was there.
10	MS. GREEN: So by doing so, I guess I've
11	caused some confusion. But we will definitely find
12	out for certain.
13	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. We're easily
14	confused, but that's all right.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: We're easily confused.
16	CHAIR MAYNARD: Harold, were you
17	MEMBER RAY: Yes. I mean, I guess the
18	issue comes down to whether or not there are in fact
19	systems relied upon in this event that are in service
20	all the time prior to the event, correct?
21	MS. GREEN: That's what they tell us, yes.
22	MEMBER RAY: Well, but I mean that's the
23	question in your mind?
24	MS. GREEN: Yes.
25	MEMBER RAY: Are you all confirming that?
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CHAIR MAYNARD: We need to make sure that the staff has looked at that and agrees with that.

MEMBER RAY: Yes.

MS. GREEN: That was one of the questions we had asked. If they are going to take -- in scoping -- this issue is kind of divided. It has two parts. The scoping and screening aspect of it which we had an open item on, which they provided the information and we can close based on the information they provided.

And then there's the aging management review results which are a little bit different which the staff is still evaluating.

One of the questions we did ask and the staff caught this, was if you're going to take credit for continuous operation of systems they found some systems that the applicant had credited which are continuously operated. They are only operated intermittently. And when we asked them about that, they went ahead and added that particular system to scope and said "Okay, this is in scope and it's subject to aging management review because it's not in continuous operation."

But we did, we did question about the systems that were continuously operated versus the ones that were intermittently operated.

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266 MEMBER RAY: Okay. But that's a long way of saying, I think, that the unresolved issue hinges on the question of whether or not there are or are not systems relied on in this scenario that are continuous operation. It sounds like. MS. GREEN: Yes. MEMBER RAY: Okay. CHAIR MAYNARD: Again, I think it's important for the next meeting for us to know what the staff's final review and position on that. Well, yes. And what the MEMBER RAY: basis of it is. I mean, someone tell us what the systems are that are in dispute here, if there's a dispute at the end of the day. MS. GREEN: The next open item is 3.5-1 and it addresses the water-cement ratios that were cited in the license renewal application for concrete.

In the LRA the applicant had identified water-cement ratios to support its claim that certain aging effects identified in the GALL report that required further evaluation are not applicable to the concrete.

The staff noted that the applicant referenced an inconsistent combination of air

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entrainment and water-cement ratios per American Concrete Institute Standard 318-63 and asked the applicant to clarify the correct water-cement ratio value that it used.

So by letter, dated November 6, 2008, the applicant stated that the ACI Standard 318-63 provides two methods for determination of concrete properties. And it further stated that the concrete mixture at IP was established based on tests of concrete mixtures with varying water to cement ratios per method 2 of the standard.

The applicant stated that the actual test for containment concrete showed compressive strengths above the required 3000 psi.

The staff recently issued a draft RAI to ask the applicant to define the water to cement ratios and provide results of original concrete strength tests or alternatively the applicant may identify applicable aging effects and describe how they will be managed during the period of extended operation.

I think this is my last open item to cover. It's 3.5-2, and that addresses the reduction of strength and modulus of concrete due to elevated temperatures.

As mentioned earlier in the LRA the

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applicant stated that the concrete surrounding the IP@ penetrations can reach temperatures of up to 250 degree Fahrenheit. The GALL report recommends further evaluation to manage the reduction of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperatures greater than 200 degrees Fahrenheit.

The applicant concluded that the reduction strength and modulus is not of aging effect an requiring management. So the staff questioned the applicant's conclusion and asked the applicant evaluate the effects on the properties of concrete exposed to the elevated temperatures. The applicant determined that there is a reduction in strength of approximately 15 percent from elevated temperatures but found this to be acceptable because compressive strength tests showed that the actual strength is 15 percent higher than the design strength of 3000 psi.

And this is another one where we recently issued a request for additional information to ask how the strength of margin was determined and if reduction in modulus of elasticity was considered in the evaluation.

CHAIR MAYNARD: For me on this one if they're using what the actual strength versus the design strength is, I think it's important. I think

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this is part of the staff's question to them is in showing how they know that, how did they determine that? You know, if you take one sample and say it's applicable to everything, that's probably not enough. So what was used and how do they know what the actual strength is? It would be important to me once we see how this gets ultimately resolved, if it does.

MS. GREEN: Right. So we've asked them for that information. So hopefully, when they provide the information we've requested, we'll be able to close out.

As they mentioned earlier, the temperature
-- and we found this out during a phone. There was
some question about 250 degrees; was that during
normal operating conditions or was it post accident
conditions. And they had said that the temperatures
really are more around 150 degrees during normal
operating conditions. So with that information, too,
that was helpful to know to get that clarification. So
they're going to provide that to us in writing.

MEMBER STETKAR: That 150 degree temperature, though, is based on operation of that air cooling system, is that correct?

MS. GREEN: That's my understanding.

CHAIR MAYNARD: And you'd ask questions--

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MEMBER STETKAR: I had asked questions about that this morning. CHAIR MAYNARD: There's another one that would need to be addressed when we meet again on this. MEMBER STETKAR: Yes the basis for the fact that it basically can't become higher than 250 degrees. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. MS. GREEN: I think that concludes my 10 presentation. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Any other questions 11 12 for the staff here? Charlie? MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I just had a 13 question on the audit report. This is the one I 14 15 talked to you about earlier. This is your alls audit report. Under the flow-accelerated corrosion section, 16 17 pate 13. You all noticed event chamber drain piping and high pressure turbine drain piping and another --18 19 a two inch line and then a three-quarter inch line. And you all -- they did wall thickness checks. 20 21 quess on one of them, the event chamber drain piping, I guess the minimum acceptable thickness is 123 mils 22 23 and the actual measured was 52 mils. And there's some required thickness for two more years of 24 25 135 mils, which obviously they don't meet.

Then there were two other ones. One of them was almost identifiable. They were kind of right on, very, very close.

And I guess my question came out as there went on to be an explanation. There was a response that said hey you go -- if you encounter these things, there's certain things. You take more samples and you test those, and you do a bunch of stuff for similar sized pipes.

One thing I didn't see in the program for doing that, this is Entergy's response to that, is you found a situation where your inspection process did not identify a minimum that was unacceptable before it actually occurred. And typically you would like to do that.

Now I'm not sure this is a safety system. but the principle is kind of the same in that the whole corrective action process doesn't address changing the frequency of inspections for certain particular elbows or, you know, flow redirections or what have you in order to ensure you have a process that does identify that you're getting close. That you don't surprised. And this was fairly big. A big number difference. It's like almost a third of the required.

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272 that was my question is that process they didn't give a specific program, I guess maybe it's your alls' program because it talks about So my question is why isn't their fact program. frequency a factor once you find your inspection doesn't identify a problem before it actually becomes program or it's significantly below thickness? Is Entergy to --MR. DACIMO: We can comment on that. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Go ahead. MR. AZEVEDO: Yes. Μy name's Nelson Azevedo.

The FAC program and in point follows the NSAC 2020, just to give you a standard, as well as the EPRI quidelines.

I can't comment on the point that you're bringing up, but I can tell you in general terms just because you exceed the required thickness does not mean that section is no longer acceptable. There's a localized wall thinning evaluation that we can do. And, again, just because you exceeded the minimum 360 requirement doesn't mean that that section was unacceptable.

But more going to the other point as what do we expand. We add additional locations that we do

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1	inspections
2	MEMBER BROWN: Well, that's locations. I
3	understand the locations part.
4	MR. AZEVEDO: Right.
5	MEMBER BROWN: It was frequency that I was
6	addressing.
7	MR. AZEVEDO: Well, what we do is we
8	calculate the erosion rate and based on that rate we
9	extrapolate to when we need to additional inspections
10	at this or other locations before we exceed whatever
11	the minimum required is. So that is part of the
12	program.
13	MEMBER BROWN: Okay. But this one didn't
14	work?
15	MR. AZEVEDO: Again, I have to get the
16	details of this one here. Just because it was below
17	the minimum thickness does not mean it was
18	unacceptable.
19	CHAIR MAYNARD: I think what you're
20	getting at here did they make adjustment to their
21	frequency when they found this?
22	MEMBER BROWN: Exactly. Thank you.
23	Exactly. That would have been my reaction. Here I
24	found a circumstances where I did not identify it
25	before it really became a problem. And with whatever

1	other process you did do, would you have adjusted your						
2	frequency to try to ensure and look at other						
3	circumstances to see if hey, is my approach really						
4	giving me a frequency in which I can find these						
5	before?						
6	MR. AZEVEDO: The answer is yes.						
7	MEMBER BROWN: But it's not stated in the						
8	response. When I looked at page I'll find it here						
9	in a minute. I think it's page 70.						
10	MR. DACIMO: We'd have to review. We'd						
11	have to look at that document. But the program						
12	requires that.						
13	MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Now, did you all ask						
14	that question or not?						
15	MS. GREEN: I can't tell you whether we						
16	asked the question or not. The individual reviewer is						
17	not at this meeting. I could find out and get back to						
18	you on it.						
19	CHAIR MAYNARD: What I would suggest that						
20	we do is have Entergy take a look at the audit report						
21	and the staff do. And our next meeting						
22	MEMBER BROWN: That's fine with me.						
23	CHAIR MAYNARD: address what						
24	MEMBER BROWN: Yes, that's fine.						
25	CHAIR MAYNARD: they did and what the						
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1	program required.						
2	MEMBER BROWN: That's fine.						
3	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes, I think that would be						
4	good.						
5	Any other questions for the staff?						
6	MEMBER BROWN: Hold on. Hold on. No.						
7	CHAIR MAYNARD: What I'd like to do now						
8	is, Theron, if you could bring on, let's see, Ms.						
9	Deborah Brancato and we'll hear comments that she						
10	prepared. We also received documents from her.						
11	Ms. Brancato, are you on?						
12	MR. MUSEGAAS: Actually, this is Phil						
13	Musegaas, Judge. Or, you're not a judge, I guess. Mr.						
14	Maynard, is that who I'm speaking to.						
15	CHAIR MAYNARD: That's correct, yes.						
16	MR. MUSEGAAS: Okay, sir. My name is						
17	Phillip Musegaas. I'm the lead counsel for Riverkeeper						
18	on the Indian Point proceeding. So there was a little						
19	mix up because Deborah submitted the comments, but						
20	I'll be giving the statement today.						
21	Would you like me to spell my name for the						
22	record?						
23	CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes. If you would, please.						
24	MR. MUSEGAAS: Okay. P-H-I-L-L-I-P and						
25	last name is M-U-S-E-G-A-A-S.						
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And I just have a statement that will probably just take a few minutes. And you have our written submissions as well, which go into more detail.

I just want to thank the ACRS for giving us the opportunity to provide comments today and to make a statement today. We appreciate it.

To begin with, Riverkeeper is a not for profit organization dedicated to protecting the Hudson River and its tributaries from pollution. Since our inception in 1966 Riverkeeper has used litigation, science, advocacy and public education to raise and address concerns relating to the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant. Our predecessor organization, actually, which the Hudson River Fisherman's Association actually was an active party opposing the original licensing of the plant.

Riverkeeper's offices are located 22 miles from Indian Point. And we have numerous members that reside within at least 50 miles of the plant, and many of them within 15 miles.

Over the years Riverkeeper has been actively involved in raising safety concerns associated with the plant's operation.

In November of 2007 Riverkeeper filed a

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petition to intervene challenging Entergy's license renewal application. We were subsequently admitted as a party and granted a hearing. Three of our five contentions were admitted for adjudication.

What I'd like to do today is just very briefly highlight two of our admitted contentions which bear directly on the information in the application, of course, and in the staff's draft SER. And then also mention some concerns we have relating to a contention which was not admitted, but which we feel we should bring to the ACRS Subcommittee's attention.

So I'd like to talk just briefly. I'm going to talk about metal fatigue, flow-accelerated corrosion and then severe accident mitigation alternative analysis.

So to being with metal fatigue. The NRC regulations require that license renewal applicants evaluate the time limited aging analyses for covered components effected by metal fatigue and demonstrate that such analyses remain valid for the extended licensing term or that they have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. This is pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21(c)(1)(i) and (ii).

If the applicant is unable to do so, it

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must submit an aging management plan demonstrating that the effects of aging on the intended functions will be adequately managed for the extended period of operation.

Entergy's license renewal application fails to demonstrate the TLAAs remain valid for the period of extended operation, or that they have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation. And there's, I think, three points I'd like to make here.

First, the TLAAs and the LRA for selected representative components show that the environmentally adjusted cumulative usage factors, which are the CUFs or C-U-Fs, for a number of components will exceed one, which is the unity, during the license renewal term.

Second, Entergy's list of components with CUFs of less than one in Tables 4.3-13 and 4.3-14 is inaccurate because:

(a) Based on data in NUREG/CR-6909 Entergy used an unrealistically low environmental correction factor, which is referred to as a FEN;

Second, Entergy did not project the analysis to 60 years but rather used the CUF of record, which is the current CUF accounting for the

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original 40 year license term, and;

Third, Entergy did not calculate several limiting locations since data was unavailable.

Had Entergy employed proper methods and assumptions, the number of components with CUFs greater than one would be much larger than depicted in the LRA in these tables.

And I neglected to mention at the outset, but the technical contentions that we filed challenging the metal fatigue and the flow-accelerated corrosion are supported by technical expert Dr. Joram Hopenfeld. So we have expert support for these contentions.

I'm not an attorney. I'm not an engineer. S if you do have specific technical questions related to this, we can happily have our expert to respond to those. I certainly wouldn't be able to.

So going on. Our third main point on metal fatigue. Entergy's assessment of TLAAs is incomplete because having identified components that exceed unity, Entergy was required to expand the scope of the TLAAs in which it considers exacerbating effects of environment conditions on the fatigue of metal components. This is according to NUREG-1801, which is the GALL report.

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And had Entergy applied the FENs to reflect the fact that these listed components operate in a very harsh environment, not just in the vacuum and in the air environment that's being modeled but in the environment of water and stream that are known to reduce fatigue life, many of the CUFs would have far exceeded unity.

An aging management program must provide sufficient detail to demonstrate that the applicant will adequately manage aging of equipment. And it is not sufficient to merely "summarize options for future plans." And I'd like to emphasize the point because while this may be more of a legal matter than a technical matter at this stage of the proceeding, Riverkeeper is particularly concerned about this.

In its application Entergy basically has put out several options for addressing metal fatigue during the extended period of operation. They made some adjustments to their plan following Riverkeeper's petition and New York State's petition to intervene, which also metal fatigue concerns. However, the current state of Entergy's application, Entergy's has stated that they will choose among three options to address metal fatigue:

(1) Refine the fatigue analysis to

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determine CUFs less than one when accounting for the effects of reactor water environment;

- (2) Manage the effects of aging by an inspection program, or;
- (3) Repair or replace the effected locations before exceeding a CUF of 1.0.

Unfortunately, none of these options satisfy the NRC's safety regulation.

To demonstrate that aging will be managed an effectively, Entergy must provide actual description of its monitoring program that includes a clear definition of the type and frequency of its inspection in order to ensure that components replaced or repaired in а timely manner. An acceptable aging management program must also specify criteria for repair or replacement. Ιt sufficient to merely presume that these things will happen based on a vague commitment to comply with the regulations in the future.

Riverkeeper feels, and we believe the regulations require, that Entergy should be required to demonstrate that they comply with the regulations and provide the analysis prior to approval of license renewal. However, the staff's SER finds that Entergy's TLAA assessment is entire acceptable, as I believe

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Kimberly Green explained. The SER concludes that the effects of aging on the intended functions of relevant plant components will be adequately managed for the period of extended operation.

I will continue with flow-acceleration related corrosion. And I know I have limited time, so I'll try to be concise here.

NRC regulations require license renewal applicants to have a program to effectively manage wall thinning due to FAC. Detection of FAC should occur before there is a loss of the structure and the component's intended function. So again, this is supported by NUREG-1800.

The wall thinning must be monitored or inspected to ensure that the structure and component's intended function will be adequately maintained over the extended operation term.

Entergy's program is inadequate to ensure that the effects of FAC on relevant plant components will be properly managed. First, Entergy's reliance on the CHECWORKS computer program is misplaced because it has not adequately re-benchmarked the program to account for changes in plant operating parameters. And this refers to the latest power uprates that were granted to Indian Point 2 and 3. Respectively, Indian

Point 2's uprate was in October 2004, an increase of 3.26 percent. And Indian Point 3, the uprate was granted in March 2005 and that was a power increase of 4.85 percent.

changes effect velocities, Such power temperatures, coolant chemistry and steam moisture, especially on the secondary side of the plant where the flow and feed flow increases steam are approximately proportional to the power increase. Accordingly, CHECWORKS must now be properly updated.

And in more detail we change the way in which Entergy used CHECWORKS in their application.

Since CHECWORKS cannot be property relied upon to monitor and detect thinning from FAC, Entergy must provide detailed information regarding the method and frequency of component inspection and its criteria for component repair or replacements. This, again, according to NUREG-1800.

The program should include a methodology for analyzing the results against applicable acceptance criteria. And we don't believe Entergy has either used CHECWORKS accurately or provided detailed information, regarding as I've said, their methodology, frequency of component inspections or any real program for when they would actually repair or

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replace components.

Next I would like to briefly talk about severe accident mitigation analysis, alternative analysis. Entergy's LRA seriously underestimates the potential containment bypass during a core damage accident. In light of current knowledge about severe reactor accidents it is prudent to assume that:

(1) Any high, dry accident sequence, i.e., those in which the secondary side dries out due to the unavailability of feedwater and the reactor coolant system pressure remains high, all primary coolant is lost and the core uncovered would involve induced failure of steam generator tubes and that would result in one or more of the secondary side's safety valves, downstream of the effected stream generators would remain open after tube failure.

Taking these assumptions into account, Riverkeeper believes the conditional probability of atmospheric release categories in the event of core damage due to this type of accident is over 50 percent.

In the context of the SAMA analysis
Entergy has not properly considered the contribution
to severe accident costs made by severe accidents
involving such reactor containment bypass via the

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induced failure of the SG tubes. Because it does not account for the above mentioned functions, Entergy's estimates of conditional probabilities of atmospheric release categories are incorrectly low. Correspondingly the value Entergy assigns to the cost risk associated with atmospheric releases is mistakenly low.

And again, in the interest of time we've given you detailed information on support for these concerns.

second issue relating to the SAMA analysis, Entergy's LRA does not adequately take into account the safety risks of spent fuel pool fires. While initially it was assumed that the storage spent fuel generally did not pose significant risks, with the introduction of high-density closed form storage racks into spent fuel pools beginning in the 1970s, this understanding is no longer valid. The closed form configuration of high-density racks can create a major problem when water is lost from a spent fuel pool including, of course, significant pool fire.

And we have in support of our petition we have included an expert report that supports this concern.

In the context of the SAMA analysis

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Entergy has not considered the contribution to severe accident cost that would be caused by fire in either of the spent fuel pools in Indian Point 2 or 3. If the cost of pool fires were considered, the value of SAMA's would be significant.

And just to note, Riverkeeper is well aware that SAMA analysis has traditionally been applied only to reactor accident and then any spent fuel storage or spent fuel issues are generally considered category 1 by the NRC and are exempt from license renewal review. However, we think it is important to raise this issue before the ACRS.

Finally, Entergy's license renewal application does not adequately take into account the safety risks of intentional attacks on Indian Point 2 or 3 or their spent fuel pool. These attacks are reasonably foreseeable and indeed, have been addressed to some degree by the NRC.

One final point and then I have a quick comment and I'll wrap up here.

Entergy grossly miscalculates the radiological consequences in performing its SAMA analysis. Specifically, Entergy significantly underestimated off site costs resulting from a severe accident at Indian Point in three ways:

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	(1) Th	ey us	ed a	source	e term	that	resul	ted
in unusually	mean	off s	site	accid	ent c	onsequ	ences	in
comparison	to res	ults	obta	ined	with	sourc	e te	rms
vetted by in	depende	nt ex	perts	and a	actual	ly rec	commen	ded
for use by th	ne NRC,	and;						

- (2) Failing to adequately consider the -in its consequence calculations resulting from
 meteorological variations, and;
- (3) Inappropriately using the \$2000 per person rem dose conversion factor.

Due to such underestimation, Entergy has significantly under estimated the off site cost of severe accidents. Entergy's erroneously low cost estimate has therefore led it to underestimate the benefits of SAMAs that mitigate or avoid the environmental impact of severe accidents.

And this particular aspect of our SAMA challenge is supported an additional expert report.

And that concludes most of my presentation. I just want to make a couple of comments based on some things I heard this morning on the phone.

First, in the discussion of the spent fuel pool Indian Point 2's spent fuel pool leak. I just would like to note for the Board's attention that

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there were actually two large plumes of contaminated ground water that are now on the site. One is primarily a tritium plume, I believe, originating from the Indian Point 2 pool. It underlies a large portion of the site between the IP2 pool and the Hudson River. And actually this contaminated water is presumed to be leeching into the Hudson.

In addition, there is a large plume of groundwater contaminated with strontium-90, cesium-137 and nickel-63 and other radionuclides that originated from the Indian Point 1 pool. That pool, as Don Mayer explained to you, has been drained the source of that leak presumably has been eliminated. However, the residual contamination remains in the groundwater and remains on the site. Just so you have a full picture of extent of contamination there. And that plume is additionally leaking into the Hudson River through the groundwater and up into the water table.

Riverkeeper would list to ask the Board respectively that if and when Entergy submits revised calculations regarding the CUF calculations for metal fatigue, we would like the opportunity to present our critique or our response to that calculation to the ACRS. And we would have our expert do that, of course. So we would just like to lodge that request with the

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ACRS at this time. That concludes my comments. Thank you very much. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. I'd like to thank you for your comments. And we were and have been taking notes on what you said. We did copies of the documentation that you had provided to us. And relative to future meetings or future consideration we have of this or any of the other 10 items, you'll certainly have an opportunity to provide your comment before we make any final decisions. 11 12 meetings will all be public meetings. So you will have an opportunity if you choose to to comment 13 information relevant to license renewal at that time. 14 15 MR. MUSEGAAS: Okay. Thank you. ask you a quick question just 16 Can I procedurally? If you don't mind, I'll be very quick. 17 18 Are you --19 CHAIR MAYNARD: One of the advantages that we have is that we don't have --20 21 MR. MUSEGAAS: --going to have additional 22 Subcommittee meetings or are you going to a full 23 Committee at the next stage? CHAIR MAYNARD: I'm sorry. I can't answer 24

that right now.

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1	CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. What I'd like to do		
2	now is to go around the room. I think the focus needs		
3	to be we've talked about these individually, one more		
4	time what items before we meet again, whether it be		
5	another subcommittee meeting, full Committee meeting,		
6	whatever, as to what additional items you know what		
7	things do we need to see some information and stuff		
8	on. We've talked about some of these.		
9	I'll kind of go over my list from what I		
10	heard. Charlie, you had asked for some information on		
11	the FAC program and what they did, maybe specifically		
12	for this items in the audit report there.		
13	MEMBER BROWN: Yes.		
14	CHAIR MAYNARD: Sam Armijo had asked about		
15	the buckling and the condition of the concrete		
16	underneath it and how that was determined.		
17	MEMBER BROWN: That's the feed break.		
18	CHAIR MAYNARD: Where you had the feed		
19	break there.		
20	John, you'd asked about the temperature		
21	analysis, what if those bits were plugged on that		
22	cooling system there.		
23	You asked for plume data from the spent		
24	fuel.		
25	ILRT data for DAna. Dana Powers had asked		

for the integrated leak rate testing.

And three of the key issues that we talked about here that need a little more discussion in the record:

Cavity leakage both from the applicant and the staff. I know that's an ongoing review and stuff, but I think that's something that several of us felt nervous that we would need to see more information, more specific information relative to that;

Spent fuel pool for IP2. More information on that and where the plume data and stuff comes into play, and;

That the aux feed pump room fire, you know, different between 2 and 3 and does the fire suppression system, is that enough to qualify for not having to have the aging effects in there.

Let me go around and see if there's anything else that the members -- John, I'll start with you. Are there any others?

MEMBER STETKAR: No, I don't, Otto. I'm quickly looking at my notes here. And I think that --

CHAIR MAYNARD: This doesn't have to be your last chance. Because if we think of something later, we'll get it to you, Kimberly. And I'll also canvass the other members that weren't here or weren't

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able to stay for this portion and see if there's some other items to focus on. MEMBER BROWN: The aux feed system thing, continuous use you didn't mention. MEMBER RAY: Yes, he did mention that. MEMBER BROWN: He did that. Okay. MEMBER RAY: He mentioned it in the context of fire protection. MEMBER BROWN: Okay. All right. 10 MEMBER STETKAR: Just to make sure, and this is a question to you, Otto, or perhaps Peter, or 11 12 I'm not sure. With respect to what we just heard about the SAMA concerns, we typically as a Subcommittee 13 don't review -- that's all part of the environmental 14 15 impact report submittal and that's not within our scope of review, is that correct? 16 17 CHAIR MAYNARD: Right. We qet information to look at it, but --18 19 MEMBER STETKAR: But it's simply 20 information. The only reason I was concerned about 21 that is because of my PRA background. A lot of the contentions that are raised, kind of go over into the 22 23 risk assessment area. And we don't normally comment or question about those issues for the license renewal 24

process.

CHAIR MAYNARD: That has its own process there that it goes through there. MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. I just wanted to make sure of that because that's something that I looked at. CHAIR MAYNARD: And as an individual if you have comments or input on that, you can certainly 8 provide that to the staff for their consideration. MEMBER BROWN: Well, you covered my items. 10 I had one other, I guess, enquiry or thought relative to the ground monitoring. Do they provide one of those 11 12 little, you know, boundary plots to show where the tritium. You hear all the words and everything, but a 13 little plat picture that shows a line going around 14 15 that says what the concentrations are. I don't know--I think we got agreement 16 MEMBER RYAN: 17 that we're going to get some additional information. (Whereupon, simultaneous discussions.) 18 MEMBER RYAN: I was just trying to get a 19 20 understanding pictorially for my visually 21 oriented mind growing up in the television age. 22 CHAIR MAYNARD: One other question for 23 I think that the staff has offered Charlie. this, you know, put a little information together on 24 25 the embrittlement the Charpy V test, the and

295 requirements and stuff there --MEMBER BROWN: Okay. CHAIR MAYNARD: -- and the program for that. MEMBER BROWN: Yes. As long as it's not 5,000 pages. If it's kind of crisp summary, a page and half. I don't know. Something that's reasonably readable in my lifetime. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. Harold? 10 MEMBER RAY: I'm not -- I wouldn't express 11 the issue leakage, but I think what you're 12 intending I agree with, which is any challenge to structural adequacy arising as a result 13 leakage. 14 15 MEMBER BROWN: Right. MEMBER RAY: That issue, the sufficiency 16 17 of the sampling that's been done to establish that that's not a problem, is it even possible to eliminate 18 19 it as an issue merely by sampling, perhaps analysis would be more fruitful. 20 21 And then I guess you and John had an exchange there about the issues that were raised by 22 23 the gentleman on the phone link right now. I guess I need some tutorial on that subject matter. 24 I mean, I 25 can't imagine us duplicating a process that's already underway at the SLB, for example. But on the other hand, I'm not sure how we process it. And the business about well it's not something that we take into account may well be correct excerpt as input that we receive. But I guess I'm just feeling at this point, Otto, that I need a little more education about how we deal with the number of things that were brought to our attention there as concerns.

This I don't think is the right time or place to do it. Maybe the full Committee discussion is the right place. I'm not sure.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay.

MEMBER RAY: But that's the thing I would add to what's been said so far. I just need more education about how do we process that input.

CHAIR MAYNARD: Yes. And I think the full Committee would be a good place we can kind of talk about that a little bit. And the bottom line by any input that we get from the public gets considered, we'll take a look at what is within our scope. Anything else, you know, the staff has heard this and we can always refer things to the staff instead of --

MEMBER RAY: Exactly.

CHAIR MAYNARD: It's not that there's a box here and anything outside of that gets ignored.

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It's just a matter of what we consider versus what's considered through another process. Well, it would take quite a MEMBER RAY: bit for us to step through that again. And I just wanted to put that on your list of to-dos. Because I do feel that we do need to digest it and discuss it to see what we should be doing. CHAIR MAYNARD: Okay. MR. TURK: At the risk of volunteering, 10 sir. 11 CHAIR MAYNARD: Come to a microphone. MR. TURK: I'll probably follow the advice 12 or I'll fail to follow the advice of never volunteer. 13 CHAIR MAYNARD: Could you give your name. 14 15 MR. TURK: My name is Sherwin Turk. I'm a lawyer in the Office of General Counsel, and I'm 16 17 working with the staff on the Indian Point license renewal review. 18 19 Matters that were raised by Riverkeeper before the licensing board were looked at by the 20 21 Board. They reached a decision on whether the issue should be admitted or not. Their decision is subject 22 23 to appeal and review by the Commission directly. 24 Αt the time, any comments that same 25 Riverkeeper EIS, the has the draft draft on

supplemental EIS which the staff issued, would be looked at by the staff before issuing the final EIS. They'll be addressed in the final EIS. And, again, the EIS itself will be part of the record that the Commission considers it reaches decision а on licensing. there is this twofold process for considering environmental concerns.

MEMBER RAY: But I don't know that that answers the question what cognizance should we take I mean, that's hopeful but not dispositive, I don't think.

MR. TURK: Yes. I'd have to leave that up to ACRS' own counsel.

MEMBER RAY: Right.

CHAIR MAYNARD: And again, I think you're talking from discussion of the full Committee meeting there. So, yes. Okay.

Mike?

I think the issue of the MEMBER RYAN: groundwater we've touched on enough. And to me it's one where there might be some insights developed and gained by looking at the data in terms of what the behavior of a leakage is rather than any other environmental assessment beyond that.

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So I think from the plant renewal standpoint it's useful for us to hearing more about that with regard to the renewal questions more than, you know, some of the other questions that we were raising on the forum. So I'm happy we'll take a look at that.

CHAIR MAYNARD: One other item. I think when I was reading the introductory remarks, I think I left a sentence out. I think I failed to identify that Peter Wen wa the Designated Federal Official for the meeting here. So get that on the record. We did have one.

Okay. I'd like to thank everyone for their presentations, the applicant, the stuff. I appreciate the public comments from Riverkeeper.

We will take all these comments and items and factor those into our further review. And have discussions at the full Committee meeting to determine what our next step for us would be. But I think we've provided you with some of the key things that we think we certainly need to focus on. And that doesn't mean that there might be other issues that will come up and or when come time for another meeting, that we have different questions. But at least these are things that I think are the top of our minds right now.

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So, with that, I don't know, Brian, did you have any closing remarks?

No. I just have a couple of MR. HOLIAN: comments and it's just quickly just a couple of process takeaways that I took from some of the questions. And I just wanted to mention that I had one comment about the reactor cavity leakage that's applicable.

One, on the question of RAIs or requests for additional information on feed reg valves. I take that as a process issue that we've been looking at in license renewal for when we ask a specific question about one plant, say IP2 or 3, that we also are open ended enough to ask the utility to address, you know, the difference in the COB on that. So I do understand that. And we would expect the utility if there was an issue related to the application, to pick that up also. But I take that as a process improvement for us.

The second item was a discussion on operating experience and the issue of what you look at now vice what you look at for a program to be and to come. I do just mention that we do have a couple of plants this year entering the extended period. And there will be operating experience on aging management programs that we will expect these applicants to take

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into account. So I think the question was more of whether they're doing it now or whether they're saving up their operating experience to apply it to the program at the right time. But that will be an item that we'll check on in our process for ensuring they do that.

The last comment I had was just briefly on cavity leakage. We will bigger reactor get discussion of that both from the staff and applicant. But I will mention that the ACRS will probably hear Prairie Island. I don't know when that Subcommittee meeting is, but we had a public meeting with them just Monday of this week on reactor cavity leakage similar to what you heard discussed here today at the Prairie Island plant. So more to come on that one.

CHAIR MAYNARD: And Harold reminded me we do need to emphasize, like on the leakage, it's not so much the leakage as what's the safety significance of that and what's --

MR. HOLIAN: That's exactly right. And a last plug for some of the some of this operating experience that was looked at at Indian Point. You know, Dr. Sam Lee and I were discussing that prior to coming to the Subcommittee. It's we've been criticized

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302 for not including enough operating experience. And we looking to make sure that the GALL items, especially in the concrete items that you heard about today, whether we have the applicable items in there for aging effects. So that we look at that as a success story as the staff's been pulsing some of those areas. CHAIR MAYNARD: Fred, did you have any closing? MR. DACIMO: Yes. Fred Dacimo. technical item that we'd like One address before we just wrap it up.

MR. AZEVEDO: Again, my name is Nelson Azevedo.

Some question this morning as to what the temperature was for the reactor vessel heads at both units. The temperature is 592 degrees for both units.

MR. DACIMO: We appreciated this opportunity to speak to the ACRS this morning and this afternoon. I think the questions were insightful. And we will certainly address all the issues at however the ACRS decides what venue they want to have this meeting the next time. And we're looking forward to that.

That's all I've got.

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
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CHAIR MAYNARD: All right. If nobody has anything, we will adjourn the meeting. Thank you very much. (Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.)


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Indian Point Energy Center





Indian Point Energy Center Personnel in Attendance



Entergy

Joe Pollock Vice President, Site - IP

Fred Dacimo Vice President, License Renewal - IP

John McCann Director, Licensing

Don Mayer Director, Emergency Planning

Rich Burroni Manager, Programs and Components

Garry Young Manager, License Renewal

Tom McCaffrey Manager, Design Engineering

John Curry Project Manager, License Renewal - IP

Mike Stroud Project Manager, License Renewal

Alan Cox Technical Manager, License Renewal

Bob Walpole Manager, Licensing

Rich Drake Supervisor, Civil/Structural Engineering

Nelson Azevedo Supervisor, Code Programs

Agenda



- Background
- Operating History
- Major Plant Improvements
- Scoping Discussion
- Application of NUREG-1801
- Commitment Process
- Topics of Interest
- Questions

IPEC Site Description



- Westinghouse NSSS UE&C (AE) WEDCO (Constructor)
- IP2 Westinghouse low pressure turbines, Siemens HP turbine, GE generator
- IP3 ABB low pressure turbines, Siemens HP turbine, Westinghouse generator
- PWR, large dry containment
- 3216 MW thermal power
 1078 MWe IP2, 1080 MWe IP3
- Once-through cooling from Hudson River
- IP2 dual speed circulating water pumps with Ristroph screens
- IP3 variable speed circulating water pumps with Ristroph screens
- Staff complement: approximately 1100

IPEC Operating History



Indian Point Unit 2

Construction permit

October 14, 1966

Operating license

September 28, 1973

Commercial operation

August 1, 1974

Uprated power licenses

11.4% (3071 MWt)

March 7, 1990


1.4% (3114 MWt)

May 22, 2003

3.26% (3216 MWt)

October 28, 2004

IPEC Operating History



Indian Point Unit 3

Construction permit

August 13, 1969

Operating license

December 12, 1975

Commercial operation

August 30, 1976

Uprated power licenses

10.0% (3025 MWt)

August 18, 1978

1.4% (3067 MWt)

November 26, 2002

4.85% (3216 MWt)

March 24, 2005

IPEC Operating History

License Transfers



IP3 Con Edison to NYPA

IP3 NYPA to Entergy

IP2 Con Edison to Entergy

LR application (IP2 & IP3)

Operating license expires

- IP2

IP3

December 24, 1975

November 21, 2000

September 6, 2001

April 23, 2007

September 28, 2013

December 12, 2015

Palisades Waterford 3
Grand Gulf
IPEC
Echelon
WPO
FitzPatrick River Bend
Pilgrim
Cooper
Entergy

1978

1981

1982

1985

1990

1995

1996

1997

Indian Point Unit 2

One additional station battery and inverter

Fan cooler unit heat exchangers

One additional station battery and inverter

Rebuilt control room with human factors

and new computers

Dual speed circ pumps & Ristroph screens

Main generator

Titanium condenser

Implemented 24 month fuel cycle

Converted to best estimate LOCA analysis

Replaced NaOH spray additive with TSP baskets in containment

2008

Indian Point Unit 2 (cont)

1998 Low pressure turbines

1999 Autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners

2000 **Steam generators**

Feedwater heaters

Converted to alternate source term

2004 High pressure turbine

Moisture separator reheaters

2006 *Main transformers*

Containment sump improvements

SBO / Appendix R diesel generator

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1989

Indian Point Unit 3

4th battery charger / inverter

Two new fire water tanks and pumps

Fan cooler unit heat exchangers

SBO / Appendix R diesel generator

Variable speed circulating water pumps

Rebuilt control room with new computers

and human factors

One main transformer

Titanium condensers

Steam generators

Condensate polishing system and blowdown recovery

Feedwater heaters



1993

1995

1997

2003

2005

2007

2008

Indian Point Unit 3 (cont)

Low pressure turbines

Implemented 24 month fuel cycle

Thermal hydrogen recombiners

Converted to best estimate LOCA analysis

High pressure turbine

Moisture separator reheaters

Converted to alternate source term

Second main transformer

Containment sump improvements

Sodium tetraborate baskets



Site

1987 Training building

1997 Water treatment facility

2005 Generation support building

2007 Dry fuel storage


IP1 - 160 fuel assemblies

IP2 - 96 fuel assemblies

2008 E-plan siren system

Planned Emergency operations facility


IPEC Plant Status



Current Plant Status

- Both units on-line at full power
 - IP2 continuous days on line 274
 - IP3 continuous days on line 672
- Next outages
 - Spring 2009 (IP3)
 - Spring 2010 (IP2)


Indian Point Energy Center





IPEC Generation





IPEC License Renewal Project



LRA Development

- Incorporated lessons learned from previous applications
- Peer review conducted NEI and other utilities
- LRA internal reviews (Safety Review Committees and QA)
- LRA prepared by experienced, multidiscipline Entergy team (utilized corporate and on-site resources)
- All comments resolved prior to submittal

Application of NUREG-1801




Aging Management Reviews

 Aging management reviews consistent with guidance in NEI 95-10

Aging management review results achieved good consistency with NUREG-1801

90% of AMR line items used notes A – E (consistent with NUREG-1801, Rev 1)

Application of NUREG-1801



Aging Management Programs

- 41 aging management programs
 - 31 existing programs
 - 10 new programs
- NUREG-1801 / plant-specific breakdown
 - 8 plant-specific programs
 - 33 NUREG-1801 programs
 - 8 with exceptions to NUREG-1801

Commitment Process




- License renewal commitments (38)
 - Refined during audit / inspection process
 - IP commitment management process

 Commitment management process established consistent with industry guidance

Entergy periodically inspects commitment management process

Implementation



Fleet Approach

- Employing fleet approach to implementation for Entergy plants that have submitted an LRA
- License renewal implementation fleet manager and site coordinator in place
- Develop schedule for Entergy plants as renewed licenses approved
- Several common fleet implementing procedures are being developed for Entergy plants

SER Open Items



<u>ltem</u>	<u>Status</u>
IP2 Fire Protection – yard hose houses and chamber housings	Ready
IP2 & IP3 Main Feedwater System – stop valves	Ready
IP2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Fire Event Scoping	Ready
Electrical and Instrumentation & Control Systems – SBO scoping	NRC review
Fire Protection Program – inaccessible fire barrier penetration seals	Ready
Structures Monitoring Program – IP2 reactor cavity	NRC review
Structures Monitoring Program – IP2 spent fuel pool	NRC review

SER Open Items




<u>ltem</u>	<u>Status</u>
Containment Inservice Inspection – containment concrete aging mgmt	NRC review
Heat Exchanger Monitoring – visual inspection criteria	Ready
Inservice Inspection Program – Lubrite sliding supports	Ready
Inservice Inspection Program – ASME Code Section XI	Ready
Nickel Alloy Program – program clarification	Ready
Inservice Inspection Program – CASS components	Ready
Service Water System – material / environment clarification	Ready

SER Open Items



<u>Item</u>	<u>Status</u>
Periodic Surveillance and Preventive Maintenance – program elements	Ready
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Fire Event – aging management	NRC review
Containment Structures – water-cement ratios	NRC review
Concrete Structures – Aging management of concrete subject to elevated temperatures	NRC review
Structures and Component Supports – Groups B1 – B5 supports	Ready
Class 1 Fatigue – IP3 heatup and cooldown transients	Ready




•	Rema	ining	Open	Items
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- OI 2.5.1	SBO scoping
- OI 3.4-1	AMR results for systems used during auxiliary feedwater pump room fire
- OI 3.0.3.2.15-1	IP2 reactor refueling cavity structure
- OI 3.0.3.2.15-2	IP2 spent fuel pool structure
- OI 3.0.3.3.2-1	Exterior containment concrete aging management
- OI 3.5-1	Water-cement ratio for concrete
- OI 3.5-2	Aging management of concrete subject to elevated temperatures

Other Topics of Interest

- Reactor vessel integrity
- Buried piping aging management program
- IP2 containment liner 1973 feedwater event

SBO Scoping



OI 2.5-1 SBO Scoping

- SBO scoping for IP2 and IP3 meets the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(3)
- The LR SBO recovery boundary is in accordance with the NRC guidance (NUREG-1800, Section 2.1.3.1.3 and 2.5.2.1.1)
- The LR SBO recovery boundary is also in accordance with the proposed NRC guidance in LR-ISG-2008-01 (Draft issued 3/5/2008)
- Both primary and alternate sources of offsite power are included for SBO recovery for IP2 and IP3

IP2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Fire Event



OI 3.4-1 Component Aging Management

- Secondary systems credited for alternate flow path to steam generators for a period of one hour in the unlikely event of fire in the room
- Normal plant operation directly demonstrates ongoing ability of the identified systems to perform license renewal intended function
- RAI requested additional detail on component types credited and aging management
- Provided requested information in letter dated January 27, 2009




OI 3.0.3.2.15-1 IP2 Reactor Refueling Cavity Structural Integrity

- Stainless steel liner leakage occurs only during refueling outages since late 1970s. Corrective actions implemented with mixed results
- Evaluation of concrete samples concluded concrete and rebar behind the cavity lining remain capable of performing license renewal intended function
- New processes being researched to repair leaks in the reactor refueling cavity liner
- Aging management includes SMP inspections, core bore sample of concrete and inspection of rebar



INDIAN POINT REACTOR CONTAINMENT





Cross Section Reactor Cavity



- Pool liner leakage first identified and repaired in 1992
- 2005 during excavation for dry fuel storage, an exterior shrinkage crack in concrete wall was found
- 2007 liner leak found and repaired in transfer canal
- Structural evaluations concluded that the concrete and rebar remain capable of performing license renewal intended function
- Aging management includes SMP inspections, SFP level monitoring and monitoring of groundwater near SFP exterior wall

IP2 Spent Fuel Pool








OI 3.0.3.3.2-1

Exterior Containment Concrete Aging Management

- Isolated areas at Cadweld joints of rebar and at attachment points used for scaffolding during construction
 - First documented during the initial IWL inspection in 1995
- Evaluation of structural impact reinforcing steel provides most of the strength, observed surface degradation has no impact on ability of containment to perform its intended function
- Areas are monitored by Structures Monitoring Program
- Commitment for program enhancement to better characterize observed degradation through the use of optical aids for improving trending capabilities



OI 3.5-1 Water-Cement Ratio for concrete

- NUREG-1801 identifies aging effects for concrete in outdoor air environment
- Recommends evaluation considering water-cement ratio
- IPEC water-cement ratios for concrete are outside NUREG-1801 recommended range
- ACI 318-63, original design spec for IPEC, provides two methods to determine the required concrete strength
- IPEC used method 2 for testing of concrete mixtures for containment concrete
- IPEC actual test reports confirm the compressive strength of concrete was above the required 3000 psi of ACI 318-63



OI 3.5-2 Aging management of concrete subject to elevated temperatures

- Concern that IP2 hot piping penetrations are allowed to operate at temperatures greater than 200° F
- NUREG-1801 allows local area concrete temperature greater than 200° F with a plant specific evaluation
- IP2 plant specific evaluation for the effects of temperatures up to 250° F was performed
 - Engineering evaluations determined that a maximum of 15% reduction in the strength of concrete for temperatures up to 250° F
 - Concrete tests showed actual strengths more than 20% above design strength of 3000 psi

IP2 Reactor Vessel Integrity



- Limiting Upper Shelf Energy (USE) location is Plate B2002-3 at 48.3 ft-lbs. Although less than the Appendix G screening criteria of 50 ft-lbs, it exceeds the 43 ft-lbs required by the WOG equivalent margin analysis.
- Limiting RT_{PTS} location is circ weld 34B009 at 269.4° F which is less than the screening criteria of 300° F.




IP3 Reactor Vessel Integrity




- Vessel was manufactured by Combustion Engineering
- Limiting Upper Shelf Energy (USE) location is Plate B2803-3 at 49.8 ft-lbs. Although this is less than the Appendix G screening criteria of 50 ft-lbs, it exceeds the 43 ft-lbs required by the WOG equivalent margin analysis.
- Limiting RT_{PTS} location is plate B2803-3 at 279.5° F which exceeds the screening criteria of 270° F.
- As required by 10CFR50.61, IP3 will submit a plant-specific safety analysis at least three years prior to exceeding the screening criterion


Buried Piping Aging Management



- Program includes consideration of operating experience
- An inspection in Fall of 2008 examined six pipe sections (i.e. three sections at each of two locations)
- Inspections revealed some coating degradation. Pipe wall thickness was measured with UT
- UT indicated that the piping remains at full thickness.
- The coating was repaired and the holes were backfilled.








- The location was excavated, the areas of concern were repaired or replaced and the line was returned to service.
- A failure analysis is on-going on the removed section of piping to establish additional inspection scope as well as future re-inspection frequency.
- This operating experience is being reviewed to establish the scope and frequency of future buried pipe inspections.









- Flashing steam impinged on the containment liner causing a bulge to develop
- Piping was repaired, other modifications made, and liner deformation restored leaving a slight permanent deformation
- During last outage, 2008, visual inspection confirmed liner still in "as-left" configuration
- Continuous weld channel pressurization and ILRTs confirm liner integrity
- Commitment made to perform a one-time visual inspection prior to entering the period of extended operation



Comments and Questions







Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards License Renewal Subcommittee

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items

March 4, 2009
Kimberly Green, Project Manager
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation



Introduction

- Overview
- Section 2: Scoping and Screening Review
- License Renewal Inspections
- Section 3: Aging Management Program and Review Results
- Section 4: Time-Limited Aging Analyses (TLAAs)
- Open Items



Overview

- LRA Submitted by letter dated April 23, 2007
- Westinghouse 4-Loop
- 3216 MWth, 1080 MWe
- Operating license DPR-26 (IP2) expires September 28, 2013
- Operating license DPR-64 (IP3) expires December 12, 2015
- Located approximately 25 miles north of NYC limits



Overview

- Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items was issued January 15, 2009
- 20 Open items
- 121 RAI's Issued
- 272 Audit Questions
- 38 Commitments



Overview

- Scoping and Screening Methodology Audit
 - October 8, 2007 October 12, 2007
- Aging Management Programs (AMP) Audit
 - August 27, 2007 August 31, 2007
- Aging Management Review (AMR) & Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) Audit
 - October 22, 2007 October 26, 2007
 - November 27, 2007 November 29, 2007
 - February 19, 2008 February 21, 2008
- Regional License Renewal Inspections
 - January 28, 2008 February 1, 2008
 - February 11, 2008 February 14, 2008
 - March 31, 2008 April 2, 2008
 - June 2, 2008 June 6, 2008, and June 18, 2008



Open Items

- SER issued with 20 open items
 - 14 with requests for additional information
 - 6 are still under review by staff
- Applicant submitted additional information dated January 27, 2009
- Staff can close out 13 Open Items



Section 2: Structures and Components Subject to Aging Management Review

Section 2.1 – Scoping and Screening Methodology

 Based on audit and review staff concluded that the applicant's methodology is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4 and 54.21(a)(1)

Section 2.2 – Plant-Level Scoping Results

- IP2 chlorination and IP3 H₂ systems initially omitted from scope
- Staff concluded applicant identified mechanical systems and structures within the scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a).



Section 2.3 – Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems

- Mechanical Systems: 59 (IP2) and 87 (IP3)
- Two Tier Review of Balance of Plant systems:
 - Tier 1 Review: Review LRA and UFSAR
 - Tier 2 Review: Detailed review of LRA, UFSAR, and license renewal drawings
- 100% of mechanical systems identified by applicant as within the scope of license renewal were reviewed



Section 2.3 – Scoping and Screening Results: Mechanical Systems

- Staff identified omission of nonsafety-related components from scope for IP2 containment spray system
- Applicant re-evaluated and identified 3 other systems (IP2 CCW, IP3 CCW, and IP3 BVS)
- Amended LRA and added components to scope



Section 2.3 – Scoping and Screening Results Mechanical Systems

- Three Open Items
 - OI 2.3A.3.11-1 yard hose houses and chamber housings
 - OI 2.3.4.2-1 feedwater isolation valves
 - OI 2.3A.4.5-1 auxiliary feedwater pump room fire event systems
- These Ols can be closed



Section 2.4 – Scoping and Screening Results: Structures

• Staff concluded that there were no omissions of structures or structural components from scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a), and no omissions from AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).



Section 2.5 – Scoping and Screening Results: Electrical and Instrumentation and Control Systems

- OI 2.5-1 Station blackout scoping
- Issue is under staff evaluation
- With exception of SBO OI scoping, staff concluded no omissions of electrical and instrumentation and control system components from the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a), and no omissions from AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)



Section 2.6 – Conclusion for Scoping and Screening

- The applicant's scoping and screening methodology is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 54.4 and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1)
- With exception of open items, the applicant adequately identified those SSCs within the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a), and those SCs subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).



License Renewal Inspections

Glenn Meyer

Region I Inspection Team Leader



Inspection Objectives

- Scoping of Non-safety SSCs
- 28 Aging Management Programs (AMPs)
- 2 Systems: Auxiliary Feedwater; IP2 SBO diesel generator (DG)
- Followup: IP2 SBO DG, electrical cable vault, and containment liner



Scoping

- Scoping of non-safety SSCs generally accurate and acceptable
- Structural and spatial interactions reviewed
- AMP reviews found 2 component scoping errors



Aging Management Program Review

Resolved by LRA Amendment 3:

- Structural Monitoring
- Oil Analysis
- Diesel Fuel Monitoring
- Water Chemistry
- Metal-Enclosed Bus Inspection



Aging Management Program Review

Resolved by LRA Amendment:

- Selective Leaching
- Non-EQ Bolted Cable Connections

Resolved by LRA Commitment 37:

Exposed rebar on containment exterior



Aging Management Program Review

Resolved Onsite:

- Metal-Enclosed Bus Operating Experience
- Instrument air heat exchangers
- AMR for transite material
- Condition Reports on isolated degradation



Follow Up Inspections

- IP2 SBO diesel scoping and system review when operational
- Electrical cable vault when accessible
- Unit 2 containment liner when accessible



Inspection Conclusions

 Non-safety SSC scoping and aging management programs are acceptable.

 Inspection results support a conclusion of reasonable assurance that aging effects will be managed and intended functions will be maintained



Current Performance

Both units – Licensee Response Column

- All Findings Green
- All Performance Indicators (PIs) Green



Section 3: Aging Management Review Results

- Section 3.0.3 Aging Management Programs
- Section 3.1 Reactor Vessel & Internals
- Section 3.2 Engineered Safety Features
- Section 3.3 Auxiliary Systems
- Section 3.4 Steam and Power Conversion System
- Section 3.5 Containments, Structures and Component Supports
- Section 3.6 Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls System

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Section 3.0.3 – Aging Management Programs (AMPs)

- 41 AMPs
 - 10 New Programs
 - 31 Existing Programs
- 15 consistent with GALL Report
- 10 consistent with GALL Report with enhancements
- 8 with exceptions to GALL Report
- 8 plant-specific



Section 3.0.3 – AMPs

- 8 Open Items
- The following 5 Ols can be closed
 - OI 3.0.3.2.7-1 fire penetration seals
 - OI 3.0.3.3.3-1 acceptance criteria for visual examinations
 - OI 3.0.3.3.4-1 inspection methods, etc. for lubrite sliding supports
 - OI 3.0.3.3.4-2 corrective actions for ISI
 - OI 3.0.3.3.7-1 Periodic Surveillance and Preventive Maintenance Program



Section 3.0.3 – AMPs

- The following 3 OIs are still under review
 - OI 3.0.3.2.15-1 IP2 reactor refueling cavity leakage
 - OI 3.0.3.2.15-2 IP2 spent fuel pool leak
 - OI 3.0.3.3.2-1 Exterior containment concrete degradation



Section 3.1 – Aging Management of Reactor Vessel, Internals, and RCS

- 2 Open Items
 - OI 3.1.2-1 Nickel alloy components
 - OI 3.1.2.2.7-1 Inspection of CASS

These 2 Ols can be closed



Section 3.3 – Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems

- One Open Item
 - OI 3.3-1 Clarification of material/environment/aging effect for titanium components

This OI can be closed



Section 3.4 – Aging Management of Steam and Power Conversion Systems

- One Open Item
 - OI 3.4-1 AMR results for components needed during a fire in IP2 auxiliary feedwater pump room

This OI is still under staff review



Section 3.5 – Aging Management of Containments, Structures and Component Supports

- 3 Open Items
- The following 2 Ols are still under staff review
 - OI 3.5-1 Water-cement ratio for IP concrete
 - OI 3.5-2 Reduction of strength and modulus of concrete due to elevated temperatures



Section 3.5 – Aging Management of Containments, Structures and Component Supports

- The following OI can be closed
 - OI 3.5-3 Aging management of concrete surrounding B1 supports



Section 3.6 – Aging Management of Electrical and I&C Systems

- LRA identified no aging effects for IP2 138-kV high-voltage cable
- Staff issued RAI
- Applicant amended LRA to add cable to Periodic Surveillance and Preventive Maintenance Program



Section 3.7 – Conclusion

With the exception of the Open Items, the applicant has demonstrated that aging effects will be adequately managed during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(3)



Section 4: Time-Limited Aging Analyses

- 4.1 Identification of Time Limited Aging Analyses (TLAAs)
- 4.2 Reactor Vessel Neutron Embrittlement
- 4.3 Metal Fatigue
- 4.4 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment
- 4.5 Concrete Containment Tendon Prestress
- 4.6 Containment Liner Plate and Penetration Fatigue
- 4.7 Other Plant-Specific TLAAs



Section 4.2: Reactor Vessel Neutron Embrittlement – Upper Shelf Energy

Limiting Beltline Material—Lower Shell Plate (B2002-3)

Unit 2

% CU	48 EFPY Fluence (E>1 MeV) at 1/4T 10 ¹⁹ (n/cm ²)	Initial Charpy V notch USE Value (ft-lb)	Irradiated Charpy V notch USE Value at 48 EFPY (ft-lb)	Acceptance Criterion per 10 CFR 50, App. G (ft-lb)
0.25	1.136	74	48.3	<u>></u> 50

 Equivalent margins analysis submitted which meets Appendix G of ASME Section XI and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G



Section 4.2: Reactor Vessel Neutron Embrittlement – Upper Shelf Energy

Limiting Beltline Material—Lower Shell Plate (B2803-3)

Unit 3

% CU	48 EFPY Fluence (E>1 MeV) at 1/4T 10 ¹⁹ (n/cm ²)	Initial Charpy V notch USE Value (ft-Ib)	Irradiated Charpy V notch USE Value at 48 EFPY (ft-lb)	Acceptance Criterion per 10 CFR 50, App. G (ft-lb)
0.24	0.9298	68	49.8	≥50

 Equivalent margins analysis submitted which meets Appendix G of ASME Section XI and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G



Section 4.2: Reference Temperature for Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Values

Limiting Beltline Material—Lower Shell Plate (B2803-3) Unit 3

%CU %Ni	48 EFPY Fluence (E>1 MeV) (@clad/steel interface) 10 ¹⁹ (n/cm ²)	Initial Charpy RT _{NDT} ⁰ F	RT _{PTS} ⁰ F	Acceptance Criterion per 10 CFR 50.61
0.24 0.52	1.56	74	279.5	<u><</u> 270°F

Commitment 32: As required by 10 CFR 50.61(b)(4), IP3 will submit a plant-specific safety analysis for plate B2803-3 to the NRC three years prior to reaching the RT_{PTS} screening criterion. Alternatively, the site may choose to implement the revised PTS rule when approved.



Section 4.3: Metal Fatigue Analyses

- 60-year fatigue analyses were performed for all NUREG/CR-6260 locations, except 2 locations (IP2) and 3 locations (IP3)
- Entergy will manage aging for NUREG/CR-6260 locations in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(iii) (Commitment 33)



Section 4.3: Metal Fatigue Analyses

Section 4.3 – Class 1 Fatigue

- One Open Item
 - OI 4.3-1 Number of IP3 plant heatups and cooldowns

This OI can be closed



Open Items Still Under Staff Review

- OI 2.5-1 SBO scoping
- OI 3.0.3.2.15-1 IP2 reactor refueling cavity leakage
- OI 3.0.3.2.15-2 IP2 spent fuel pool leak
- OI 3.0.3.3.2-1 Exterior containment concrete degradation
- OI 3.4-1 AMR results for the auxiliary feedwater pump room event
- OI 3.5-1 Water-cement ratio for IP concrete
- OI 3.5-2 Reduction of strength and modulus of concrete due to elevated temperatures



OI 2.5-1 – SBO scoping

- Applicant revised LRA Figures 2.5-2 and 2.5-3, the "Offsite Power Scoping Diagram(s)" for IP2 and IP3 for primary and secondary offsite power paths
- By letters dated March 24, 2008 and August 14,
 2008, the applicant revised and clarified its response
- The staff is completing its review of the applicant's information on the SBO scoping boundary and will document its conclusion in the final SER



- OI 3.0.3.2.15-1 IP2 reactor refueling cavity leakage
 - IP2 refueling cavity leaks at the upper elevations of the stainless steel cavity liner when flooded during refueling outages
 - Attempts have been made to mitigate this condition
 - An action plan is being developed for permanent fix
 - Applicant has committed to perform one-time inspection prior to entering period of extended operation to confirm absence of degradation (Commitment 36)
 - Applicant has not identified augmented inspections for period of extended operation
 - Staff sent draft RAI to request how the AMP will monitor condition during period of extended operation



- OI 3.0.3.2.15-2 IP2 spent fuel pool leak
 - IP2 spent fuel pool (SFP) has experienced leakage
 - IP2 SFP does not have leak chase channels
 - Applicant committed to test the groundwater outside
 IP2 SFP every 3 months (Commitment 25)
 - Applicant does not plan to perform augmented inspections of SFP during the period of extended operation.
 - Staff sent draft RAI to request how the AMP will monitor this condition during period of extended operation



- OI 3.0.3.3.2-1 Exterior containment concrete degradation
 - External surfaces of IP2 and IP3 containments have locations of concrete spalling
 - Applicant explained that areas of spalling occur at cadweld sleeves and scaffolding anchor locations
 - Applicant concluded there is sufficient design margin for exposed rebar
 - Applicant committed to perform enhanced inspections of containment (Commitment 37)
 - Staff sent draft RAI requesting information on how the applicant will use the above within its Containment Inservice Inspection Program



- OI 3.4-1 AMR results for the IP2 auxiliary feedwater pump room fire event
 - Applicant stated that systems are continuously in operation and monitored
 - Applicant stated aging related degradation that occurs during 1 hour is negligible
 - Applicant concluded that there are no aging effects; therefore no AMPs are necessary
 - Applicant provided additional information on January 27, 2009
 - Staff is still evaluating applicant's response



- OI 3.5-1 Water-cement ratio for IP concrete
 - LRA identified the water-cement ratios for IP concrete
 - Staff identified a discrepancy and asked for clarification
 - Applicant stated it used Method 2 in ACI 318-63 standard to determine concrete strength
 - Applicant stated that compressive strength > 3,000 psi
 - Staff sent draft RAI to define water-cement ratios and provide results of original concrete strength tests. Alternatively, the applicant may identify applicable aging effects and how they will be managed



- OI 3.5-2 Reduction of strength and modulus of concrete due to elevated temperatures
 - LRA stated concrete surrounding IP2 penetrations can reach 250 °F
 - GALL Report recommends further evaluation to manage reduction of strength and modulus of concrete structures due to elevated temperature (>200 °F)
 - Applicant concluded that reduction of strength and modulus is not an aging effect requiring management
 - Applicant determined a reduction in strength of 15% from elevated temperatures which is acceptable
 - Staff sent draft RAI about how strength margin was determined and if reduction in modulus of elasticity was considered. Alternatively, the applicant may explain how the aging effect will be managed



Questions?

SBO Recovery

Entergy

IP2 Offsite Power Scoping Diagram




Figure 2.5-2

SBO Scoping

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Buchanan Substation

